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

THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY

OF

ARISTOTLE.

THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY

OF

ARISTOTLE:

CONSISTING OF

A TRANSLATION OF THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, AND OF THE PARAPHRASE ATTRIBUTED TO ANDRONICUS OF RHODES,

WITH AN

INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF EACH BOOK;

BY THE LATE

WALTER M. HATCH, M.A.,

FELLOW OF NEW COLLEGE, OXFORD, AND RECTOR OF BIRCHANGER, ESSEX:
SOMETIME WARDEN OF ST. PAUL'S COLLEGE, STONY STRATFORD.

COMPLETED AFTER HIS DEATH BY OTHERS.

LONDON:
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1879.

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PREFACE.

FOUR years ago one of the most eminent of English Aristotelians expressed the opinion that "the problem how to translate Aristotle into English has not yet been solved . . . . The problem is how to convey, in readable English, a philosophical style, full of technical terms for which we have no exact representatives. Circumlocution, or paraphrase, becomes necessary; the question is, how to use this with the greatest tact, so as, while conveying Aristotle's exact meaning, to retain something of his manner." (Sir Alexander Grant, art. *Aristotle*, in the 'Encyclopædia Britannica,' 9th edition, vol. ii. p. 523.)

The present work, though planned and begun before these remarks appeared, may be regarded as being, to some extent, an answer to the challenge which they imply. Its aim is to make the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle intelligible to a modern reader. It endeavours to do so chiefly by modifying the style in which the original is written. For whether it be that the mind of an average Greek student was capable of greater concentration than the mind of an average English student, or that what remains is rather a rough draft than a completed treatise, there is no doubt that the style of Aristotle's work is to most modern readers intricate and obscure. "A considerable fund of metaphysical imagination is necessary in order to give a logical coherence to his



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THE

MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE.

BOOK I.—THEORY OF HAPPINESS.

INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS.

I.—IS THERE A PERFECTION OF MAN? HOW CAN IT BE ATTAINED?

THE subject of the Treatise is an inquiry into the nature of the Summum Bonum. What constitutes the perfection of man? What is that ideal towards the attainment of which all the powers and tendencies of our nature are directed? What is the perfect life?

Before entering upon the main subject, there is a prior question which we must answer: Is there such a perfection? Is the fulness of satisfaction, the perfection of all human aims and efforts, ever completely realized or capable of being realized?

The analogy of nature forces us to conclude that there is such an ideal and that it may be and ought to be attained. In outward Nature, science discovers to us coordination and arrangement in all things: law and order, the adaptation of means to ends, prevail throughout the world. In the nature of man, again, there are aims which, consciously or unconsciously, influence every movement of the mind, every activity of the body. There is design in all things—a 'good' or purpose which Nature is incessantly striving to attain.

Nor is this true only of isolated forms of activity. There is design equally in the larger groups of existences formed by the simpler modes of good. There is a gradation of 'goods,' lower goods being subordinated to higher ones. The higher we ascend in the scale of being, the grander the design which we see manifested.

But in the purposes of *man* there is a point where the subordination ceases and where the mind attains complete and absolute satisfaction. However noble its range there is a point where human conception can ascend no higher. There is a 'final good,' a supreme purpose satisfying all aspiration, comprehending in its completeness all lower forms of good. The result at which the strivings of our nature aim is no vague, unattainable 'infinite,' but a *human* good—a good which man can

attain by his own effort and in his own life. In one word, there is a perfection of human nature and we can attain to it.

The same conclusion may be expressed more simply thus: When an action has attained its proper 'end' and fulfilled its proper design, that action is a perfect action. When therefore *all* actions have attained their proper 'end' and fulfilled their proper design, life itself—as the sum of all human activities, will be perfect, and man will have attained his proper perfection, his Summum Bonum, and, with it, all that is possible of blessedness and felicity.

But how can this perfection be attained?—By a life in community, under the guidance of the State. There is no sphere in which a man's activities can be exercised or his virtues practised, save in the community of his fellows. There is no security for his freedom, save under the protection of the State. Nature herself teaches us so much: the very constitution of man marks him out as a 'social being.'

The study of life will therefore be a study of *civil* life; and the study of man will be the study also of social organizations and of the influences which they exert upon him. Since human perfection can only be attained, as we have seen, in the State, the science of human perfection will be a form of the Science of Statesmanship. Statesmanship itself will be the supreme Science, sovereign of all other Sciences, the unique dispenser of human well-being, regulating the steps by which the soul must mount up to its perfection, giving to each man his proper sphere, determining the Sciences which each must pursue, opening to all the practical means by which their proper genius can be most amply satisfied and perfected.

The inquiry into 'human perfection' merges itself, therefore, into a 'study of man as a member of an organized community;' and that is a wide and complicated subject. The interests of society are so varied and its issues are so involved, that we must be well-content if we can delineate the main principles which should govern life and characterise its broader features.

Looking at the difficulties and complexities of the subject, the student, if he be an educated man, will be sympathetic and appreciative. He will not insist upon a rigid, unelastic method, but will be satisfied if the conclusions drawn are as exact as the premisses will warrant.

In fine, the Method of Ethics will be Inductive, and its inductions will be general conclusions into which the element of probability will largely enter. Where the contingencies are so great as to baffle all minute calculations—which is the case in reference to the facts upon which Ethics are based—'probability must be the guide of life.'

There is one other caution which must be borne in mind. The facts of life are unlike other facts in this respect: they are 'complex wholes.' The fact and the meaning of the fact are inseparably bound up, one with another. We see only so much of the facts of the moral life as our eyes have been trained to see. Experience is thus essential for one who would read aright the facts of the moral order. Hence, of course, it is impossible for the young to study morals with any profit to themselves. They have no experience to guide them to a sound judgment; and what they see they cannot understand, whilst the clouds of their own passions darken their conscience.

II.- REVIEW OF CURRENT OPINIONS UPON HUMAN PERFECTION.

Assuming, then, that there is such a thing as human perfection, and that it is attainable, let us examine more precisely *what* it is. What are the characteristics of that conception which denotes the satisfaction and fulfilment of the varied efforts and aims of human nature? What is that 'end' which civil communities were formed to realize in their members, and with which the Science of Statesmanship deals?

As far as words go, there is an universal agreement: all men identify perfection with *happiness*, and understand by happiness 'a good life and a prosperous career.'

But that is only a verbal agreement. The ideas which men practically associate with happiness are various and conflicting, answering to the needs and wants of their own lives. Some give their preference to pleasure, others to honour, others to wealth, others to philosophy. There are others again who regard the Chief Good as something transcendental.

We need not pass all possible conceptions under review. Sufficient for us to examine those views which are most generally entertained, or which admit of more intelligent criticism.

[Here again a caution is necessary in reference to the spirit in which we ought to approach discussions of moral questions.

There are two points which cannot be too often insisted upon:

1. That we must take our start from the facts of real experience, as exemplified in actual life (and *not* from *à priori* truths);

2. That in order to *understand* these facts, we need a specially trained intelligence, or an educated conscience. Early education and the discipline of sound habits must have fostered within us those moral dispositions that make it easy for us to recognize moral truth.

Observation of moral facts becomes thus (in one who has been rightly educated) an intuition of a moral law. To detect right and wrong (which are the *facts* of morals) amid the entanglements of circumstance, is to detect a moral *law*. A conscience which has been so educated as to read aright the moral fact, has, whether latently or consciously, recognized the moral principle or 'law.']

Let us now proceed to criticise in detail the popular theories, though they are but the reflection of men's own lives, and the ideals which they picture take their form and colour from the surroundings in which men live.

They may be characterized as follows:

1. There is the theory of animalism, which makes 'pleasure' the goal of life. But this surely is a slavish type of life, unworthy of the true freeman, however much it may be countenanced by men in high station.

2. There is the theory of men of action, who see in 'honour' or 'dignity' the culmination of their hopes. But this, again, is open to many objections: (α) it can be easily wrested from us; (β) it depends upon others rather than upon ourselves; (γ) it is not pursued for its own sake, but only as the sign and seal of virtue. [Indeed, on this

hypothesis, it would appear rather that virtue had the stronger claim to the chief place. Yet neither is virtue adequate to meet the requirements of happiness; for these reasons. (1) It may exist in complete inaction; (2) it depends upon external conditions which are likely enough to entail utter disaster and misery.]

3. There is, again, the theory of the mystic, which regards Meditation as the end of man. (The discussion of this theory will best be reserved for the end of the Treatise.)

4. Lastly, there is the theory of the money-maker; but that is below notice. The life of commerce is obviously an unnatural existence for man. Moreover, money is not an end in itself; its value depending solely upon its uses.

There is one other theory of great importance—the transcendental theory of the Platonists, which seems to represent all things which are 'good' as falling under a common *ἰδέα*. It is a matter of diffidence to criticise the system of one whose memory is so revered as that of Plato; but reverence for truth is more sacred than affection for a friend.

I. First of all let us assume that Plato's 'theory of ideas' may be stated in some such way as this: 'whatever things are good may be grouped under one common notion, or law of the good, *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*.'

The following arguments are advanced in disproof of this position:—

1. Things which admit of priority and posteriority cannot have a common *ἰδέα*:

The various forms of 'good' admit of priority and posteriority:

Therefore, the various forms of 'good' cannot have a common *ἰδέα*.

The major in this Syllogism is admitted by the Platonists. The minor may be proved as follows:—

Substance is a good, Quality is a good, Relation is a good:

But substance is prior to Quality, and Quality is prior to Relation:

Therefore, some good is prior to some other good.

2. Things which are predicated in several categories cannot be a single Universal:

But 'the good' is predicated in several categories:

Therefore, 'the good' cannot be a single Universal.

3. If 'goods' fell under a single *ἰδέα*, they would be treated by a single Science:

But they are *not* treated by a single Science:

Therefore, they do not fall under a common *ἰδέα*.

4. Moreover, the *ἰδέα* is unnecessary and superfluous, at any rate as an abstraction subsisting independently of phenomena. The definition of 'a thing in itself' is identical with that of the actual, existing thing. The definition of 'good in itself' will therefore differ in no way from the definition of 'good' in its actual manifestation.

5. Nor, again, is it to the point to say that the *ἰδέα* is eternal and indestructible. It makes no difference in respect of the existence of a thing whether it be long or short-lived.

(There is more plausibility in the view of the Pythagoreans. Unlike the Platonists, who regarded the unity of the good to be its essence and cause, the Pythagoreans, and with them apparently Speusippus, regarded 'unity' as only a mark or characteristic of good, ranging unity as one

of a number (or 'roll') of things perfect; according to which view 'unity' is immanent in things and not (like the Platonic *ἰδέαι*) separable from things and independent of them).

II. Perhaps, however, the theory of the Platonists may be stated differently. It is possible that the theory does not mean that every aspect or form of good may be brought under a single *ἰδέα*, but rather that only 'absolute goods' can be reduced to a single notion as coming under a single 'law,' and as having the unity of a single *ἰδέα*.

Let us then put out of the consideration such 'goods' as are merely relative or instrumental, and consider the case of 'absolute goods.'

Now if there be any 'absolute goods,' they will be pre-eminently such things as sight and thought; and we may regard them under two alternatives:

(*α*.) If thought and sight are *not* 'absolute goods,' there will be no members to form the class which the *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* assumes; whereas if they *are* 'absolute goods' there can be nothing '*more* absolute;' and, therefore, the *ἰδέα* (as implying nothing beyond the members which come under it) will be superfluous.

(*β*.) If thought and sight are 'absolute goods' and come under a common *ἰδέα*, the definition of each would be identical. But their definitions are quite distinct. Therefore absolute goods do not form a common *ἰδέα*.

III. Some possible solutions may be attempted of the problem which underlies the Platonic theory.

There are three ways in which 'good things' may come to have a common name:—

(1.) As depending upon a single cause.

(2.) As conducing to a single end.

(3.) As having an analogy to one another.

May not the latter be the true explanation?

IV. But a thorough discussion of these subjects belongs rather to a Treatise of Metaphysics. Our present concern is with the *practical* side of Ethics. That perfection which we are discussing in the present Book, is a *human* perfection, one which can be realized in life and carried out in action. The transcendental character of Plato's conception of the good removes it from the sphere of practical Ethics.

It may however be retorted that though itself unattainable, the 'Law of the Perfect' gives us an ideal which may ennoble our work and help us to realize what can be realizable in actual life. But this is not, in fact, the case. The various professions utterly ignore it; nor truly is it easy to see how a man could be a better artist or a better surgeon by having contemplated 'the Absolute.' In art, and in the business of life, the important point is the specific detail, in which special knowledge rather than transcendental conceptions, is of real avail.

III.—HUMAN PERFECTION DEFINED AND EXPLAINED.

Dismissing, therefore, the theories of the world and of the philosophers, let us now endeavour to construct a definition of our own, of human perfection.

i. First we will enumerate the main characteristics of our conception of it:

(1.) It is 'the end of ends.' Every action has an end: architecture has its end, as medicine has its end, and all the arts their end. But one end is subservient to another: there is an ascending scale of ends, until at length we see all the purposes of life consummated in a supreme end. This final purpose, which is the culmination of all the purposes and interests of life, is 'the practical good,' the perfection of our life which we are endeavouring to describe.

(2.) This supreme end is most absolute, highest, and most perfect. Some ends are imperfect ends, being 'good' only in relation to the purposes which they serve. A perfect end is one which is sought for its own sake; and an absolutely perfect end is one which is never sought but for its own sake. Such is 'happiness,' or 'the perfection' of our nature: everything else that we do has reference to it, but there is no purpose beyond itself.

(3.) It is completely 'self-sufficing': an absolutely perfect end is thought to imply complete self-sufficiency—the satisfaction of whatever is wanting for its own realization. Nor is that all: in this conception there is further involved the idea of the well-being of a man's friends and relatives, nay, even of his fellow-citizens. But of course a reasonable limit must be placed upon this proviso: otherwise the circle of his interests would widen into infinity.

(4.) It is 'unique' and *sui generis*—not one among a number of other good things, but sovereign over all.

ii. After this general description of human perfection, we may now proceed to work out an exact and formal definition of it.

(1.) Everything in nature has its *raison d'être*, a certain function to fulfil, a certain work to do. Man has, therefore, a certain function to fulfil, a certain work to do in the economy of all things. But man is a complex whole; and in all complex unities there are special purposes in each part, and a general design for the whole. Man has a defined sphere for the exercise of each one of his faculties, whether of mind or of body: has he not also a defined sphere and a definite work for his nature as a whole or moral unity?

What then is there distinctive of man *as man?*

(α.) Not mere life; for life is common to plants.

(β.) Not mere sensation; for that is common to the horse and the ox, and to all organized creatures.

The alternative is 'a life of action, inspired by the *rational* element of his soul'—not merely a rational life, but a conscious *exercise* of the rational life—not a passive nor an emotional life, but a life of activity and work.

(2.) But we are treating not merely of life but of perfect life, not of the work of man merely, but of the perfected work of man. We must

therefore limit further our definition. In the perfect man 'the powers of reason will be developed in action in the most perfect way,' according to the standard of the truest excellence.

(3.) One other condition must be added to the definition. The outward circumstances of life must be in harmony of the aims of the perfect man.

The full definition of happiness will therefore be: 'A conscious play of the rational powers after the standard of the highest excellence manifested in an unbroken harmony of external circumstances.'

[It will be understood that the above definition is wide and general in its scope; and from the nature of the subject it could not be otherwise. But reasons will be given as we proceed with our argument. So far we have only drawn the outline of a picture, and are trusting to subsequent elaboration to render that outline more striking and expressive.

A definition must in any case be adapted to the purpose for which it is required and to the conditions of the problem which it is framed to explain. Our purpose is not purely scientific, but *practical*; and an attempt at the rigorous accuracy of the mathematician or at the refinements of the metaphysician would be out of place, and tend to encumber needlessly the course of thought.

For the same reasons we need not stop to discuss the ultimate principles upon which Ethics depends. The question for our consideration is rather into the fact 'whether, for instance, this is right or wrong,' rather than 'why it is so.' The recognition of the moral fact is (implicitly) the recognition of a moral law. The 'fact' is thus a starting-point and 'a principle'; and the 'principle' serves to elucidate many a truth of subsequent experience.

We must endeavour, therefore, to trace out those simple *facts* of morals which may serve as 'principles' or criteria for the discrimination of other truths; and we must follow the guidance of nature if we would understand those principles as they really are. Some of these 'principles' can be apprehended by association of ideas, others by immediate perception, and others by the moral instinct which comes from education, and others in other ways.]

IV.—DEFINITION COMPARED WITH OTHER THEORIES AND DIFFICULTIES SOLVED.

But if our definition be a true one, it must be capable of explaining all the recognized facts of the case, and must harmonize with the universal verdict of experience.

I. That happiness is 'an activity of the soul' is in perfect consistency with the common impressions of mankind:

(1.) Men regard the 'goods of the soul' as the highest goods.

(2.) Certain actions are called their own 'end.'

(3.) Happiness is called 'fair living and fair acting.'

II. There are, in truth, five principal ideas which men associate with happiness, and these ideas (some of which are handed down from old times and supported by men of repute, while others are the views of

the world at large) are all comprehended in the definition which I have given.

These ideas are—Virtue, Thought, Philosophy, Pleasure, and Prosperity. Leaving Thought and Philosophy for Bk. VI. and X. we will examine the other three.

1. 'Happiness is Virtue:' our own definition being 'an activity of the soul *in accordance with virtue*.' We cannot suppose that our perfection is a merely passive state; and we must therefore premise that virtue is actively exercised, and that the happy man exhibits his virtue in the arena of the world, struggling amid the trials of life for its noblest meed.

2. 'Happiness is Pleasure:' certainly, the life of the happy man, being *ex vi termini* also the life of a *virtuous* man, will be a life of pleasantness. The virtuous man being devoted to his virtue (as all men are devoted to that in which they are specially interested) will necessarily take *pleasure* in displaying it. Indeed a man is not a virtuous man *unless* he has pleasure in his virtue.

The life of perfection, therefore, is a life of virtue, and a life of virtue is a life of pleasure; and these attributes are all indissolubly bound up, one with another.

3. 'Happiness involves prosperity':— of course the happy man requires certain favourable conditions and external resources for the exercise of his powers. There must be nothing in his circumstances to mar the completeness of his joy. Health, beauty, good birth, domestic consolations are all necessary to happiness, though of course they are not identical with it.

We will now proceed to consider certain difficulties which have been felt in regard to happiness, and offer such solutions as we can.

I. Is happiness within our own power, capable of being compassed through our own agency? Or is it dependent upon the Divine Favour, or even upon Chance?

(1.) Whether it come from God or no, it is certainly one of those things which are most divine.

(2.) It is the 'reward of virtue,' and is therefore as wide in its range as virtue is. Yet virtue can exist in almost all whose consciences are not seared, by the help of discipline and education.

(3.) Things are *best* when proceeding from law and defined causes and virtue: what proceeds from the highest cause will, therefore, be the very best result. Happiness, therefore, as the best of all things will proceed from the best of all causes—virtue. To leave it to chance, would be an utter discord in Nature's harmony.

(4.) The very definition of happiness as 'an activity of soul according to virtue,' other conditions being only secondary and subordinate, shows that the essential conception of it can be realized by a man's own self.

(5.) The Science of Statesmanship rests upon the assumption that our perfection depends upon our virtue. It therefore spends its utmost care in creating virtuous dispositions among the citizens: those creatures (*e.g.* boys and animals) who are incapable of virtue, it assumes to be incapable also of happiness.

(6.) So much, however, of fortune is assumed as may allow for the free play of the faculties and guard us from overwhelming calamities.

II. But what is the limit of these human uncertainties, and what their influence upon happiness? Can a man be really happy in this life, or is Solon's adage the true one, that 'we must wait and see the end?'

Solon's view opens up another difficulty: Is a man happy after his death? The relation of the dead to the living is a question full of mystery. Is death utter unconsciousness? Or is there any communion between the living and the dead? If the dead are conscious of the fortunes which befall their survivors, what is the influence of the sorrows of the living upon the souls of the departed? Either hypothesis seems to lead to conclusions which men find difficulty in accepting.

As for the original question, whether we may call a man happy in this life, that is surely reasonable to do: so long as a man really *is* happy, credit should be given him for his happiness.

Indeed the whole idea underlying Solon's theory is false in principle. It implies that a man's weal or woe depends upon external conditions; and that is untrue. The essential idea of happiness is 'a virtuous development of a man's powers;' and nothing is so permanent, nothing so stable as virtue; so neither can anything be so abiding as the happiness which is the result and concomitant of virtue.

Misfortune cannot, therefore, utterly take away a man's happiness. Indeed, if sorrow be slight, it will have no influence upon his life; though if it be incessant and appalling, it will take away the lustre and charm of his happiness. Yet at the worst, though the brightness of life be overclouded, he will simply be not happy: he will not be wretched: he will make the best of life, however great his reverses.

The conclusion upon the whole question seems therefore to be, that happiness is as much within our own control as virtue is, yet still there are 'conditions of mortality' to be taken into account which must modify all our statements. Whatever happiness is ours, it is a *human* happiness and one that is subject to the mutability of our human destinies.

III. We must revert to the question which we left unanswered in reference to the condition of the departed: are they or are they not rendered unhappy when sorrow overtakes their friends on earth?

Two points must be taken into consideration:

1. The extent and nature of the calamity;

2. The fact that the dead are not actual spectators, much less agents in the drama of earthly sorrow.

The general conclusion seems to be that even if the affairs of earth penetrate to the world of spirits, they make no absolute difference to the departed, neither taking away their felicity from the blessed nor changing the condition of the lost.

IV. One other question remains to be settled in regard to the properties of happiness: Is it a good of relative or of absolute worth? Is it a good which is 'praiseworthy,' or one which is precious for its own sake and adored?

1. It is not a merely relative term. Praise is inappropriate and inapplicable to it. Praise implies reference to a higher standard, and is a tribute paid to merit. But happiness can be referred to no standard higher than itself: it is a thing absolute and complete *per se*.

2. It is a thing exceeding all price: we pay to it not encomium but reverence and awe: we acknowledge it to be its own ideal as a thing divine and blessed in its own right.

V.—CLASSIFICATION OF THE VIRTUES, BASED UPON AN ANALYSIS OF SOUL.

Now since the main element in happiness is virtue, we must examine with greater fulness into the nature of virtue. Virtue has ever been the chief concern of true statesmanship: witness for example the legislation of Crete and Sparta. As our own inquiry is a branch of statesmanship, we must examine the nature of virtue as the means whereby man may realize his perfection.

But virtue is 'the excellence of the *soul*' just as happiness is the activity of the *soul*. We must therefore in the first place study *the nature of the soul* if we would understand its excellence.

For our present purpose it will be sufficient for us to adopt the main conclusions of Psychology which are discussed in my Public Lectures.

There is an admitted distinction of soul into (1) rational, and (2) non-rational: whether that be a profound and real distinction, or only a convenient and notional one, matters not.

1. The non-rational may be subdivided again into (1) nutritive, and (2) emotional; but the nutritive element may be dismissed from our consideration for the following reasons:

(*α.*) It is common to plants and not characteristic of man, as man,

(*β.*) It is most active in sleep.

(2) The emotional soul is not entirely non-rational, but rather *semi-rational*. It is the seat of the desires and impulses which sometimes submit to reason and sometimes are opposed to it. It has not reason in its own right, but yet is capable of 'receiving reason' as a child listens to the counsels of his father.

2. Thus the 'rational soul' may be also subdivided into (1) semi-rational or emotional, and (2) purely rational or intellectual. The semi-rational soul is capable of receiving good impressions and forming virtuous dispositions. The intellectual soul has reason in its own right and independently of external influences.

Corresponding to this division of conscious soul, is the division of Virtue into emotional (or moral) and intellectual.

TRANSLATION.

I.—INTRODUCTION. IS THERE A PERFECTION OF MAN, AND HOW CAN IT BE ATTAINED?

i.—Arguments from 'Design in Nature' in proof of Human Perfectibility.

EVERY art and every step to knowledge, and similarly both every moral act and every decision of the will, seems to have some 'good' or 'purpose' at which it aims. The supreme good, therefore, or 'purpose of all things' is, as philosophers have well described it, 'that at which all things aim.'

There is 'design' in all the works of nature and in all the activities of man.

But in the subordinate purposes or 'ends' of nature there is a certain distinction to be observed. Some ends are simply 'modes of activity,' and others are material results beyond the simple exercise of the faculties; and where there are material results of any kind reaching beyond the actions, in such cases these results are more important than the activities which produced them.

As, moreover, there are many forms of action, and many varieties of art and science, so also are there many 'ends' resulting therefrom: the end of medicine, for instance, being health; of ship-building, a ship; of strategy, victory; of domestic economy, wealth. But where the arts through which these ends are realized, themselves fall under some higher art (as bridle-making and similar functions connected with the manufacture of horse-trappings fall under the general art of Riding, while Riding, again, and the whole business of war falls under the Master Art of Strategy; and as, in an exactly similar way, other subordinate arts fall under higher arts)—in all such cases, I say, the ends of the Master Arts are more important than those of the subordinate arts, the latter being pursued only for the sake of the former.

But not only has each activity its 'end,' but these 'particular ends' are all subordinate to 'higher ends.'

[But, as regards the principle of subordination, it is immaterial

whether the 'ends' be simple activities, or whether beyond the mental process there is a tangible result, as in the case of the sciences mentioned above.]

If, then, this argument be a sound one,—if, that is, there be one end for all human interests and for all human pursuits, and if everything else which we desire be relative and subordinate to this final end, and if we do not go on interminably making our every choice for the sake of something beyond (in which case our aims would reach on to infinity, so that all our impulses would be purposeless and void of effect) —if this be true, it is clear that this end must be the *Summum Bonum*, the perfect consummation of human aims.

This hierarchy of 'ends' implies a 'supreme end,' which is therefore the *perfection* of man and of all his purposes.

In every art and in every way to knowledge there is some 'good' which we seek to attain. The objects which determine human choice and action are those from which we expect to gain some 'good.' Hence some have properly defined the Summum Bonum as 'the good at which *all* things aim.' This is a universal law: not only things which are moved by conscious thought, aim, by that motion, at some good, but also things which are moved by the laws of nature are led towards the realization of some good end, or purpose, though it be unconsciously, like an arrow shot at a mark. There is thus an 'end' in every form of moral action or of physical movement.

But there is evidently a distinction to be noted in 'ends.' In some cases the end of action is a material result, as the end of the shipwright's craft is a ship. In other cases, again, the end of action is further action; as the end of horsemanship is the practice of riding. Where the 'end' is not action but a material result, in such cases the result is more important than the action.

Since, moreover, actions are manifold, the 'ends' of action are correspondingly manifold. The end of the art of medicine is health; of the shipwright's art, a ship; of the soldier's art, victory; of the economic art, wealth. But it frequently happens that many actions and arts fall under some one faculty and art; when, that is, they are pursued in view and for the sake of that art. For example, the art of saddlery, and the art of horsemanship, and all military enterprise seek the same end as the art of generalship:—they are all pursued with a view to victory. These minor arts are, on this account, said to fall under the art of generalship; and this again is called an architectonic or Master Art in reference to the arts subordinated to it, since it has exactly the same authority as a Master Builder among his workmen. Just as the Master Builder has an eye to the 'form' of the complete structure, and bids his workmen execute the various works which tend to realize that form, so too the art of Generalship and all similar Master Arts lay down rules for the subordinate arts from the point of view of the end special to itself. Thus the bridle-maker, having regard to victory as the measure of his purpose, fashions the bridle to be convenient for the horseman when pressing forward for victory. Another workman makes the saddle-cloth, and all such as are craftsmen skilled in cavalry equipments keep before them the ultimate purpose of the soldier's life. Soldiers again, cavalry and infantry alike, so dispose and shape their conduct that they may have strength to gain victory. In fine, the end of the art of generalship determines the character of the arts subordinated to it.

There is, therefore, an end involved in each one of the arts subordinated to the Master Art, just as a bridle is the end in the art of the bridle-maker, and the practice of riding in the art of horsemanship, and so on in other ways. Yet there is also an end in the Master Art, just as victory is the end pursued in the art of Generalship. Nevertheless the end of the Master Art is better and more esteemed

than the minor ends, because, as has been explained, the ends of the minor arts are pursued only in view of and in relation to the ultimate end.

Even though the ends of our actions be not the actions themselves but material results beyond, there is nothing in that to prevent the end of the Master Art (though it be only action) being better and more choiceworthy than even those material results. For example, the end of the bridle-maker's art is a material result, *i.e.* a bridle, while the end of the art of generalship is action, *i.e.* victory; yet there is nothing to prevent victory being better and more choiceworthy than a bridle. A material result is better than mere action, not universally, but only in case where it is a consummation, as being the completed end of an action; —since of course the end is always more esteemed than that which is ranged in reference to it.

Thus it is that while many arts have but a single end—that of the Master Arts, yet all arts, in their totality, have one ultimate end for the sake of which all other arts are pursued. This supreme and ultimate end has no object beyond itself, but is pursued for its own sake.

Otherwise, if there be not some one supreme end, but we are incessantly to pursue objects for the sake of objects beyond;—if at every moment we are to be pressing forward to ulterior ends in an interminable series, then shall we never attain the object at which we aim. The inference therefore follows, that unless there be a point at which the mind may rest as it is impelled to self-realization, all human striving is purposeless and vain.

Universal failure such as that would be a monstrous anomaly, seeing that there is no impulse of nature that is in vain. It is, therefore, a thing of necessity that there should be some one end final and absolute; and this end must be the Summum Bonum, and that which is best for man.

ii.—The Science which takes cognizance of the Summum Bonum is Social Science.

Surely then the knowledge of this Summum Bonum has a mighty influence on the conduct of life: and if we have it before us as a mark at which, like archers, to aim, shall we not the more readily attain to what is meet and right? If then the importance of this knowledge be so great, we must strain our endeavours to comprehend, at least in outline, what this Summum Bonum really is, and under which of the Sciences or Faculties it falls. It would appear to belong specially to that Science which is most absolute and which has the widest and most comprehensive range. Such obviously is the character of the 'Science of Society,' as being the science which ordains what other sciences shall find a home in States, what sciences the various ranks of individuals shall learn, and within what limits. Even the most esteemed of the Arts and Faculties are, as we see, in subordination thereto; for example, strategy, domestic economy, and rhetoric.

The study of 'human perfection' and of its various gradations comes under the 'Science of Civil Life,' or 'Politics' in its most comprehensive sense.

Seeing then that the Science of Society uses the various Sciences concerned with action and production as subservient to its own high purposes, and further lays down laws of its own, prescribing what things men ought to do and from what they ought to abstain,

the 'end' of this Master Science will embrace the ends of all other Sciences, and will consequently be the highest good of man. Though the end of the individual be identical with that of the State, yet the end of the State is recognized as being at any rate grander and more perfect to acquire and to preserve. Even for an individual, for his own sake, the Summum Bonum is an aim to be cherished: but for a nation and communities it is even more noble and divine.

Supremacy of Politics as the Science which investigates how perfection can be realized by whole communities.

Such are the questions which the present Treatise aims at solving, being, as it were, a study of man in his relations to Society.

The knowledge of this Summum Bonum will, therefore, be of great assistance to us in the conduct of life. The consequence of such a knowledge will be that we shall the more easily succeed in compassing that which is our duty, if like archers we have a mark at which to take our aim.

If this be true, we must endeavour to define, so far as may be, in outline what precisely this ultimate 'end' is, and to which of the sciences or departments of action it immediately belongs.

Now there is, of course, an end which is common to every art and to every faculty; and there is also an end specially belonging to each single, separate faculty—just as the end of the Master Art is an end common to all the arts subordinated to it, while yet it is an end specially attaching to the architectonic art itself.

It seems clear, therefore, that there is an 'end' of that art which is sovereign over all other arts, and which is, in the highest sense, architectonic; and such is the character of the art of Society. This art of Society prescribes to the other arts their rank and proper season. It comes under its cognisance alone to consider what Sciences ought to exist in States, and what Sciences the different ranks of men ought to learn, and within what limits. It alone is the guardian of the common good, expelling from the State such arts as are evil, nor permitting all the citizens indiscriminately to learn such arts as are beneficial, nor to practise them on all occasions. If a citizen have the abilities to be a General and to save the State, it suffers not such an one to be a shoemaker, and if he be competent as yet only as a private, it does not at once raise him from the ranks. It assigns to those concerned the proper season for the exercise of their art; for instance, preventing a General from leading out an army when it is fitting for him to remain at peace. The statesman will despatch the General when occasion makes it necessary, and will bid him remain inactive when it is the proper season for inaction. Though the General ofttimes determines for himself the proper time for fighting, yet that is not owing to his art as a General (*but because he is also a statesman*). All the rules of an art regard simply the end of that art: a rule which extends to opposite or alien considerations is not a rule of the art, *as such*. Consequently, when a General takes into consideration the circumstances under which he ought to fight, and in view of those circumstances frequently remains inactive and sends embassies to treat for peace, it is clear that he is not employing the rules of his art as a General, but the rules of another and distinct art, greater and more paramount than that of Generalship, the art of the Statesman.

Since, therefore, this art of Society subordinates to itself even the most esteemed of the other arts (I mean, Generalship, Economy, Rhetoric.) and avowedly treats all other arts concerned with action with a view to its own special end (for it ranges them all with a view to the common interests of the State, and for that reason lays down what the citizens ought to do and from

what they ought to abstain,) the end of the art of Statesmanship will comprise within its province the ends of all other arts.

But since the ends of all the other arts are sought with a view to the well-being of mankind, and the end of the art of Statesmanship is the one for the sake of which the ends of all the other arts are sought, it is evident that the end of this art of Statesmanship will be the Summum Bonum, the supreme good of men. It is evident also that though the end sought by the individual is identical with that sought by the State, yet the good of the State is recognized as being a grander and more perfect good for us to acquire, and to maintain when acquired. Though the winning and keeping of this good be an aim to be coveted by each individual—whether he have the power of guarding it in the case of others or of his own self alone, yet is it an aim more glorious and divine for nations and for States, in proportion as the happiness of the many is better than that of the individual. Hence it will be more just to say that the end of Statesmanship is the ultimate end and the supreme good, inasmuch as it has regard, not to a single end, but to the ends of all other arts as proper to itself, being as it is of wide comprehension and embracing the whole interests of man as a social being.

iii.—The Method to be pursued in Moral Science.

In regard to method, the subject will be adequately treated if it be elucidated with as much clearness as the subject-matter of the science admits. Rigorous exactness must not be looked for, to the same extent, in all subjects of discussion, any more than an equal perfection of finish is looked for in all the different products of handicraft. In fact questions of honour and of justice—the subjects which Social Science investigates—present so much controversy and uncertainty as to seem dependent upon custom and opinion rather than upon essential right. An almost equal uncertainty prevails in regard to the good things of life from the fact that the results accruing from them are in many instances injurious:—ere now some men have been ruined by reason of their wealth, and others by reason of their bodily vigour.

The facts with which Social Science has to deal are exceedingly complex, and do not admit of a rigid method of treatment.

Arguing, then, as we are, upon such varying phænomena and from such uncertain premisses, we must be satisfied if we can illustrate and express the truth in a broad and general sense, and as it were, in outline. Where the premisses no less than the subject-matter upon which we are arguing, are only probable and contingent, we must be content to draw inferences of corresponding generality.

The conclusions drawn must, therefore, be general, and probability must be our guide.

In a similar spirit, each of my readers ought to accept what is here advanced upon the subject. It is the characteristic of an educated man not to require scientific precision upon any subject under inquiry, to a degree beyond what the nature of the case admits; *e.g.* To demand scientific demonstrations from an orator

would be almost as incongruous as to allow a mathematician to make moral appeals.

To us, in desiring to treat the subject of human perfection, any method of exposition will be found adequate which is suitable to the character of the subject-matter. We must not expect the same degree of precision in all investigations: it is impossible to discover an absolute accuracy for all subject-matter, without distinction. In mathematics, doubtless, truth is pure and unalloyed, inasmuch as that is a science dealing with subject-matter which is necessary and invariable under all conditions, and which presents no obstacles to rigorous scientific precision. On the other hand, in investigations where the facts to be dealt with are not necessary nor unchangeable, a method of treatment is adequate and satisfactory which draws inferences from facts which are only general and contingent. This principle applies especially to the constructive arts. The form of art is not applicable to the same extent to all kinds of material. In certain materials which are specially adapted to it, the form of art will be more perfectly finished off; but in materials otherwise formed, this elaborate finish will not be practicable. The beauty of the human form will be differently represented, in their different materials, by the statuary and the painter. The painter represents the very colour of the original, while at the same time he is thought to reproduce the relative proportions and distinctions of form, since his material appliances enable him to do so. The statuary, too, will accommodate to the character of his material a certain external bulk of body; but he is unable to reproduce the proper colours, owing to the nature of his materials. The same truth applies to the arts generally; and for this reason we ought not to require the same degree of precision from every art alike, but only so much as the subject-matter allows.

Correspondingly indeterminate, in reference to abstract truth, is the subject-matter with which Social Science deals. Questions of honour and of justice which Social Science investigates, and which constitute its subject-matter, present divergencies and uncertainties so great, that it veritably appears that what is noble is not noble by right of nature, and that what is just is not inherently just, but only through a kind of conventionality and custom. What is noble and just in very truth is for this reason difficult to distinguish from what is just only in appearance. Nor is this all: even those good things of which happiness is thought to be composed– (I mean courage and wealth, and other moral qualities)––even these admit of great uncertainty, owing to the fact that in many cases injury arises from them. Ere now some men have been ruined by reason of their wealth, and others through their bodily vigour.

We must be satisfied therefore, if, in treating of social facts of such complexity, and of 'the end' which is based upon these contingencies, we can exhibit the truth roughly and in outline. And in general, when we discuss matters which are contingent and usual (*not necessary and invariable*), and the 'end' of such matters, it is sufficient that we draw conclusions of corresponding generality.

But just as the student who treats of Social Science is unable to discover a more rigorous accuracy than the nature of the subject-matter allows of: so, too, the critic who passes judgment upon social theories will only judge fairly if, in the same spirit, he requires no greater precision than the nature of the case admits, but is satisfied with what is possible. It is the characteristic of an educated man only to search for exactness in the various departments of inquiry, in the degree which the nature of the circumstances permits. In the sphere of Mathematics, as has been shown, he will not allow of any contingent statement. But in Logic, or Physics, and subjects which are contingent and variable, he will take into account the element of chance or probability. To tolerate a mathematician making moral appeals would of course be folly; and almost as foolish would it be to demand from an orator scientific demonstrations.

That is the proper spirit in which a judgment should be formed upon moral questions.

iv.—Mental Requisites for the Study of Ethics.

Now a man judges aright only of what he himself knows, and only to that extent is he a proper critic. A man, therefore, who is educated in any special department of knowledge, estimates soundly the facts of such special department: and if he be educated in every department of knowledge, his judgment will be absolutely sound.

For a due appreciation of any science, a knowledge of the facts of that science is essential.

It follows that the young man is no fit student of Social Science. He has no experience of his own in the affairs of real life upon a knowledge of which, as their whole province, moral theories depend. Moreover, as he is prone to follow his passions, it will be idle and profitless for him to listen to moral truths the end of which is not intellectual but practical, not knowledge but action. Whether such a student be young in age or only childish in character, is immaterial: his incompetence is not measured by length of time, but is due to his living and pursuing his several objects under the rule of his passions.

The young, therefore, are incompetent to study Ethics because (1) they have no real, personal knowledge of the facts, and (2) their judgment is coloured by their passions.

To such as are in this undisciplined state a knowledge of Ethics is found to be profitless, just as a sense of duty is powerless to control those who are weak of will. On the other hand, to such as shape their desires and regulate their conduct after the pattern of Reason, it will be of extreme value to have a knowledge of moral science.

These remarks may serve as an Introduction to indicate (1) who are the proper students of Morals, (2) what is the spirit and method with which the subject must be treated, (3) what is the precise scope of the present Treatise.

Now a man will judge rightly only of what he himself *knows*, and only to that extent is he a competent judge. Hence, in regard to the Science of Life, a man will only judge aright if he has been trained in social questions and has gained experience therein as the result of long observation. The man who has been educated in a specific subject will judge aright of those specific circumstances; and if he has been trained in *every* subject of knowledge, he will be a competent judge of whatever comes before him.

For this reason a young man is no proper student of questions bearing upon conduct, being, as he is, without experience of the facts of practical life. Now moral theories have, in part, to decide upon particular facts, and in part to draw inferences from them.

Further, since the young man is not yet of an age to live by the law of Reason, but follows still his passions and *laissez-faire* and mere wont, it will be vain and profitless that he study moral science. He will be powerless to attain to the true

end of Theory and to change his own disposition and to live according to reason, being, as he is, overpowered by the influence of his own habits. Yet the end, surely, of moral speculation is not knowledge but action.

But not merely one young in age, but also one young in character though he has passed the limits of youth, will gain equally little profit from the Lectures he may hear upon Ethical questions, because he continues to live a life that is suitable only to the young. In fact, in the case of the young in age, his shortcomings are not entirely parallel with his age, but are owing to the fact that his life is not regulated by Reason but actuated by impulse, and that all his aims are directed by the impulse of the moment. To those who are in such a condition as this, the knowledge of moral truth is a profitless knowledge, just in the same way as it is to those who are sensual and depraved, or to those who give way to the attractions of pleasure. On the other hand, to those who shape their desires by the law of Reason and act in accordance therewith, it brings great assistance that they should know the bearings of moral questions. In men of that stamp, Reason will not only be able to perform the duties which it will understand, from the perception of moral truths, to be obligatory upon it, being emancipated, as in their case it is, from the slavery of the passions, but also, through having this moral freedom, will be able also to make use, instantaneously on all occasions, of its own proper strength.

In the preceding Introduction, I have now sufficiently explained (1) what should be the character of one who would study Moral Science: (2) in what spirit we ought to judge of and accept Moral statements; and (3) what is the precise scope which we have set before us in the present Treatise.

II.—REVIEW OF CURRENT OPINION UPON HUMAN PERFECTION.

i.—What is to be understood by Human Perfection?

(*a*) VAGUENESS AND INCONSISTENCY OF THE POPULAR CONCEPTION OF IT.

Assuming that there is such a perfection of man, what are we precisely to understand by it?

Let us now take up the subject anew from the commencement; and assuming that every process of thought and every decision of the will has some purpose which it strives to realize, let us now ask what precisely that purpose is which we say that it is the business of the Science of Society to attain? What is it which consummates all the 'good' things attainable by human activity?

Men generally agree to identify our 'perfection' with our 'happiness.'

In regard at any rate to the *name* there is a pretty general consensus among the mass of men. The masses no less than the *élite* say that *Happiness* is the Summum Bonum, and they are under the impression that 'living well and faring well' is identical with 'being happy.'

But if we go beyond this verbal agreement, and ask what the real nature of happiness is, there are many conflicting opinions;

and men generally give a very dissimilar account of it from that which philosophers give. The masses define it as one of those obvious 'goods' which impress the senses, such as pleasure or wealth or honour, and so on through many varieties. Even the same person will often give a conflicting account of it: when suffering from illness a man says that health is happiness; when straitened by poverty he says wealth is happiness. Others, again, self-conscious of their ignorance, admire and envy those who utter grand truths, transcending their own horizon. Others, again, have thought that beyond the various 'forms of good' there is, besides, a 'Supreme Good,' which is good in its own right and is the cause which produces good in all lower varieties.

But the ideas associated with 'happiness' are vague and often inconsistent.

But it is, surely, an unnecessary task to put each one of these theories to an examination: sufficient for us to criticise those views which are most in vogue and which appear to involve some ground of reason.

Let us now take up the subject from the commencement and proceed with its discussion.

Since every process of thought and every movement of the will has some purpose at which it aims, what is that purpose at which we say that the Science of Life aims? All actions being directed, as has been shown, to the realization of some purpose, what is that purpose towards which the Science of Society is directed, and what is that culmination of all good things attainable by action, which is 'the end' of the Science of Society?

So far as this is a question of *words*, there is but one single name applied to this ultimate end by the mass of mankind: and so far the masses are in perfect accord with the *élite*:—all men call this end *happiness*, and suppose that 'being happy' is exactly equivalent to 'living well and faring well.'

But as for what happiness really is,—upon that point men are at issue, and philosophers do not give the same account of it as mankind in general. The masses proclaim happiness to be one of those goods which are palpable and conspicuous, and which are commonly thought to be dear to men, such as pleasure or wealth or honour, different men preferring different objects, but all of the same character. Ofttimes even the same person will give a fluctuating account of it, now calling it one thing, now another (*e.g.* in sickness, health; in poverty, riches); and generally, men apply the name of happiness to some particular thing for which they have a desire at the moment. Again, those who are enamoured of philosophy are eager to learn subjects of which they are conscious of being ignorant; and hence admire and envy those who utter grand truths transcending their own horizon. Others, again, consider that beyond the multitude of particular goods, there is some other good, subsisting by itself, which constitutes happiness, and which is in truth the *cause* to all other things of their goodness.

To examine, however, all the opinions held about happiness is surely a futile task. Sufficient is it for our purpose if we examine the opinions which are most in vogue and approved by men generally or which seem to rest upon some ground of reason.

(*b*) THE TRUE VIEW OF HUMAN PERFECTION MUST BE DRAWN FROM THE FACTS OF EXPERIENCE.

The method of arriving at the truth in Ethics is not *à priori* and demonstrative, but inductive — based, that is, on the facts of experience.

But let us not forget that arguments drawn from first principles differ from arguments which lead up to first principles. There was wisdom in the question which Plato raised when he asked whether the method of Science proceeds from principles to particulars or from particulars to principles, like the course in the Stadium, which is either from the umpire to the goal or from the goal to the umpire.

Our own starting point at any rate in this Inquiry must be from what is known; and things are known in two senses, some relatively to individual experience, and others absolutely and in the nature of things. Our own starting point, then, had probably better be the facts which are known to ourselves by our own experience.

But in order that these facts may be rightly read, the moral consciousness of the student ought to have been trained and disciplined.

It follows, therefore, that (*if a theory of morals depends upon personal experience and careful perception of particular facts,*) the conscience of the student ought to have been properly educated under good discipline—if, that is, he would be a competent student of what is noble and great, and generally of what concerns our social well-being.

The necessity for such an education is obvious. The moral fact being the basis of the moral principle, if the *fact* be perfectly clear to a man, he will have no further need to seek for its principle. When a man's conscience has been so educated that moral facts are clearly and adequately known to him, such an one either has moral principles latent in him or could easily acquire them. If on the other hand a man has no perception of moral facts nor fund of moral principles, let him listen to these lines of Hesiod :—

> "Highest and best is he who all things himself comprehendeth;
> Excellent also is he who, wisely counselled, obeyeth.
> But whoso naught comprehendeth himself, nor to friend ever listeth,
> Pondering counsel in soul, he surely advantage quite lacketh."

But since a theory of morals is a theory of moral *principle* (the 'end' of all our actions, that for the sake of which we do whatever we do, being the cause and 'principle' of those actions) we have here to consider in what way we must formulate the question of principle—a question which admits of widely different aspects.

We must at the outset discriminate, with a certain degree of exactness, the different nature of principles or 'causes.' One kind of cause is the 'final cause;' another the 'formal cause;' another the 'material cause;' another the 'efficient cause.' The efficient cause is the conscious agency of the artist. The material cause is, for example, the wood and the stones of which the house is built,

The formal cause is the conception or 'form' of the house in the mind of the artist. The final cause is the purpose for which the house has been constructed.

Since these are the causes of their existing to all existences, they are also the causes of our *knowledge* of those existences: it is only through these causes that things are able to be apprehended by us. If, for example, a man knows the art of the craftsman, in accordance with which he constructed the house, he will know also whether the house be good or bad, so far as it falls within the province of that art. In the same way, a man who knows the matter or the form of a house will know its whole character. Again, if we know what is the end or purpose of the house, we shall know whether it is a good or a bad house.

An inverse process is, however, sometimes found to be applicable—that we gain a knowledge of the causes from knowing the consummated idea of the work itself. A man who knows the completed house, will recognize the art of the builder; and so in the case of the other arts.

Hence our method of treatment must necessarily be twofold—either to demonstrate causes from effects, or to deduce effects from causes. In the present Treatise we must adopt either of these modes of treatment as occasion may require. We shall demonstrate our theory from principles when principles are obvious, and from effects when effects are the more manifest. On this account Plato was right to raise the question of method, and to argue the point as a material one in certain cases, whether the proper course in scientific discussions was a deduction *from* principles or an induction leading up to principles (as in the Stadium from the umpires to the goal or *vice versâ*.)

Since then a twofold method is open to us, whence must we take our start? Is it not obvious that we must begin from realized effects, *i.e.* from the facts of daily life of which the end of society constitutes the cause or inner principle? These social facts are *known* to us, and we are bound to take our start from what is *known* relatively to our own experience (and not in the nature of things). Things which are known in their *essential nature* are called 'principles' and 'causes,' since nature exhibits or manifests them prior to their effects, and has regard to them primarily and before all else. But relatively to ourselves effects are better known; and therefore we must take our start therefrom.

In this way the course of our argument will be clearly defined as proceeding from facts known to our own selves.

If then the basis of morals be a clear perception of moral facts, it behoves a man who intends to study Ethics, to live in the practice of noble and virtuous actions—if he is to have a chance of understanding moral questions aright and of forming a sound judgment thereon, and of gaining profit for himself. Had we been demonstrating from abstract principles that a certain course of conduct was the right one, we might have won the assent of a student though he had not been trained to the practice of goodness, constraining him by the irresistible force of argument. But since we intend rather to demonstrate our theories from the particular facts of social life, and it is necessary that an assumption be made, as a starting point for our demonstration, that 'such and such actions are right,' it is evident that a man cannot possibly be convinced unless he has learnt from personal experience of his own the truth upon which that assumption rests. If on the other hand a man accept the truth with an adequate conviction of his own, that 'such and such actions are right,' we shall have no further need of an inquiry into the ultimate cause of their being so. Such an one either knows the cause (*i.e.* the 'end') of moral action, or when he hears of it will readily recognize it. If, on the contrary, a man knows neither the moral fact nor the moral law,—if he neither knows himself nor has the power of learning from others, let him listen to these lines of Hesiod:

> "Highest and best is he who all things himself comprehendeth,
> Guarding what for the future is best and what to the end appertaineth.
> Excellent also is he who, when counselled wisely, obeyeth;
> But whoso naught comprehendeth himself, nor to friend ever listeth,
> Pondering counsel in soul, he surely advantage quite lacketh."

ii.—Human Perfection is to be found neither in the life of Pleasure, nor in the life of Honour, nor in the pursuit of Wealth.

Let us now return to the point from which we digressed—what is to be understood by the Summum Bonum or 'happiness?' Men seem to draw their views of it, not unnaturally, from the needs of their own lives. The masses, and those who are specially 'the sons of toil,' suppose that for them pleasure would be happiness; hence the life they covet is a life full of bodily delight.

Popular views of the Summum Bonum are partial and egoistic.

There are, in fact, three types of lives particularly prominent: (1) the life of pleasure just referred to; (2) the public or citizen-life; and (3) the life of meditation.

(1.) The masses, then, are seen to be absolutely 'slave-like' and sensual, since they adopt as their choice the existence of mere animals; but they have a plea to justify themselves in the fact that many men in high position show a self-indulgence like that of a Sardanapalus.

The life of pleasure is simply animalism and unworthy of *man*.

(2.) Men of refined tastes and men who are engaged in active pursuits make *honour* the goal of their lives, honour being pretty generally the 'end' of a public man's career.

The pursuit of honour is one the success of which is dependent upon others.

But it is evident that such an end is too superficial to form happiness, which is our present quest. Honour seems to be dependent rather upon those who confer it than upon those upon whom it is conferred; whereas we have a feeling within us that happiness is something peculiarly *our own*, and difficult to be wrested from us.

Moreover, the reason why men make honour their pursuit would seem to be that they may gain a full assurance of their own virtue. It is from men of high character, men by whom they are personally known, and that too on the score of merit, that they seek to receive honour. It is evident, then, that even according to their own estimate virtue is better than honour.

Honour itself is only relative to the standard of virtue.

Perhaps, then, we might assume that virtue more truly than honour is the end of a public career. Yet even virtue manifestly falls short of the requirements of happiness. Though a man be in possession of

Virtue, again, requires many conditions satisfied for

virtue, it seems conceivable that he may be asleep or inactive all life long, or even worse than that, be ill-treated and suffer the direst misfortunes. But if a man lived under such conditions, no one would count him happy, unless to defend a paradox.

its own realization, and, therefore, cannot be the Summum Bonum.

But I will not here discuss this point further. An ample examination of the question will be found in my Public Lectures.

(3.) The third life is that of the mystic or of the philosopher, of whose claims I shall make a full examination in the progress of my work.

The life of contemplation may be reserved for discussion later on.

[I pass by the life of commerce or of money-making as being in a way an unnatural existence for a man, its 'end,' wealth, being obviously not that 'good' for which we are in search. Wealth is not 'an end in itself,' but only useful as subservient to other things. Hence one might more readily suppose happiness to consist in one of the 'ends' enumerated above rather than in wealth, since both pleasure and honour are coveted for their own sake; but it is evident that not even are these our 'Summum Bonum,' though many an argument has been lavished to prove that they *are*.]

The life of commerce is below the dignity of man, and is obviously inadequate to the demands of happiness.

Let us now return to the point under discussion before this last digression. The point of our argument was that men entertain divergent opinions upon the nature of happiness. In fact, every man defines happiness in such a way as to reflect the tenor and inclinations of his own life. Hence the masses (whose passions are unbridled) maintain that pleasure is happiness, and for that reason the life they love is the life of enjoyment.

Indeed, if we look at the world as a whole, there are three general types of lives: the life devoted to pleasure, the life of social interests, and the life of contemplation.

(1.) The first life, that of pleasure, has in it nothing that is sacred. Those who follow such a life are thoroughly slave-like, and live the life of mere animals. In fact their life seems only worthy of consideration from the fact that there are many men in high positions who make it their choice, and cultivate tastes like those of a Sardanapalus.

(2.) The second life is one which the better kind of men prefer. Those who follow a line of noble conduct think that honour is their true end, honour being pretty generally the 'end' of that social life to which I am referring, and the aim sought for by all. But it is evident that this is not the ultimate end of man: on the contrary, it must itself also be added to the list of those things which *seem* only to be good, and which have no existence beyond appearance. For that which is in very truth the good of man, and in virtue of which he is happy, must needs be something depending upon his own self. Honour, on the contrary, does not depend upon the person upon whom it is conferred, but rather on the person who confers it. Happiness, therefore, does not consist in honour: if a man is to be happy, his 'good' must be a thing peculiarly his own, and difficult to be wrested from him.

Moreover, the reason why men pursue honour, is that they may have an assurance about themselves that they are virtuous; hence they seek to be honoured by men of sound judgment by whom they are personally known, and to be honoured on the ground of their moral worth. It is clear, therefore, that the reason why men pursue honour is that they may have the reputation of being good and worthy men, and that on the score of their virtue; and thus it is evident that honour is not pursued for its own sake, but on account of the virtue implied in it. Hence honour itself will not be our ultimate end, but rather virtue.

Yet even virtue fails of being the *perfect* good, and therefore happiness which is our perfect good cannot consist in virtue. That virtue *is* imperfect, is evident. It is possible for a man to have a habit of virtue, though he be slumbering or in some other way inactive all life through, or though he be evil-entreated, or unfortunate, or fallen into great calamities, and, in consequence thereof, have his virtue marred and incomplete. If a man's life is thus situated, no one would call him happy:—much less would one assume it as a fact that 'happiness is the habit of virtue,' and name it accordingly.

(3.) Let these considerations suffice for discussing the claims of the life of self-indulgence and the life of social interests. I have in fact treated the subject sufficiently in my Public Lectures. As for the life of meditation, I shall have to examine into that by-and-by. For the present I have a different object in view.

[There is, however, still one other life, that of the money-maker; but this has practically been already considered in the lives above described. The man who pursues pleasure, equally with the man who pursues honour, wishes to amass riches. Hence I said that there are *three* types of lives which are specially prominent, the life of the money-maker being included in our previous survey.

Such a life is, in fact, an unnatural existence for a man. So far from pursuing that 'good' which is the 'perfect good' of man, it does not even profess to pursue it. Hence there are not many by whom it is embraced. Few there are who make it their choice to have money as the end of all their endeavours and interests in life. It is also evident that not even does the money-maker himself seek wealth as the 'chief good.' Wealth is sought only for the sake of its uses, and with a view to an ulterior purpose, for the sake, that is, of pleasure or honour. But the 'chief good' must needs be good *for its own sake*. Hence one might rather consider the aims referred to above (I mean honour or pleasure) as the 'ends' of life, riches being sought with a view to the attainment of these. Yet it is evident that neither are pleasure and honour the perfect goods, though many an argument has been framed in their favour by many an old philosopher, some maintaining that pleasure, others that honour is the 'final good' of man.]

Here we must end our criticisms upon the popular theories.

iii.—Human Perfection is not the realisation of the Platonic 'Idea of the Good.'

(*a*) NECESSITY OF EXAMINING THE PLATONIC THEORY.

It is perhaps better that we should here consider the nature of 'the Universal Good,' and discuss thoroughly the sense in which the term is used; although the subject is rendered difficult from the fact that it was friends of ours who introduced 'the theory of ideas' to explain it. Yet assuredly it would seem to be the better part, nay, our bounden duty, that as

There is also the transcendental theory, which our regard for its author makes us reluctant to criticize.

we are the professed 'lovers of wisdom,' we should refute even cherished theories of our own in the interests and for the sake of truth. Though friends and truth be equally beloved, it is a sacred duty to pay to truth the greater reverence.

Since our inquiry has reference to the supreme end of man, which is thought to be some one 'Universal Good,' we must consider, in regard to this Universal, in what sense it is predicable, and whether there is any one 'law' or 'conception of the good.'

This is, however, an aspect of the subject which it is uncongenial for us to consider, because they are friends of our own who have introduced the 'Theory concerning Ideas'—the theory, that is, that there is a certain ἰδέα of each separate existence, and that this ἰδέα is self-subsisting. But in spite of our regard for the Platonists, it would seem to be the better course, nay, our bounden duty, to sacrifice even cherished opinions with a view of saving the truth, particularly as we are 'lovers of wisdom.' Though the author of this theory was our friend, as Truth is our friend, it is a sacred obligation to pay to Truth the greater reverence.

(*b*) DESTRUCTIVE CRITICISMS UPON THE PLATONIC THEORY.

1. *First Argument.*

Now those who brought forward this theory, did not frame 'ideas' in cases where the matters of which they were speaking, were prior or subsequent to one another; and, for that reason, neither did they construct any ἰδέα of numbers.

The various forms of 'good' cannot come under a common ἰδέα because they admit of priority and posteriority.

But 'the good' is predicated simultaneously in various categories (*e.g.* Substance, Quality and Relation), which are prior and subsequent to one another, Substance and Essence being prior to Relation, and Relation corresponding to an offshoot or accident of Substance.

The inference is that, for these different forms of 'good' there cannot be any one common ἰδέα.

Now those who introduced this Theory did not allow that there was any single ἰδέα of existences in which priority and posteriority was implied: and for this reason did not construct of number any single ἰδέα, since number admits of relations of 'first' and 'second.' But there is priority and posteriority also in the good: and hence it is clear that there cannot be any single ἰδέα (embracing all varieties of good).

The proof that we *can* recognize priority and posteriority in 'the good' is obvious. There is 'good' in the category of existence (as mind or God), and in the category of quality (as the virtues), and in the category of relation (as 'the useful') and in the category of quantity (as 'the proportionate') and in the category of place (as home—that being a place in which we pass our time pleasantly), and in the category of time (as opportunity—that being the time suitable for each purpose), and similarly in the other categories.

But in saying that 'the good' is predicated in many categories, we are saying that it admits of priority and posteriority: substance, for instance, is prior to

relation, both because substance exists *per se*, whereas relation has its manifestation in a body alien to itself, and also because existence is devoid of form, whereas relation consists in form being, as it would seem, an offshoot and accident of existence.

2. *Second Argument.*

Again: since 'the good' is predicated in as many senses as is existence (*e.g.* it is predicated in the category of Substance, as God and Intellect, and in the category of Quality, as the virtues; and in the category of Quantity, as the proportionate; and in the category of Relation, as the useful; and in the category of Time, as the seasonable, and in the category of Place as home, and so on through all the categories), it is clear that 'the good' will not be any one common notion that is both universal and one. Had it been so, it would have been predicated not in all the categories, but in one only.

The good cannot be a single Universal, because it is predicated in several categories.

Again: since 'the good' is predicated in as many ways as is existence, and existence is predicated in many ways, 'the good' will also be predicated in many ways; and there will not be any 'good' that is 'common' and 'universal' and 'one:'—otherwise the 'good' would not have been predicated (as it has been shown that it is) in all the categories, but in one only.

3. *Third Argument.*

Again, as there is a single science of whatever falls under a single conception, so would there have been a single science of all 'goods,' had there been a single 'ἰδέα.'

'Goods' do not fall under a common ἰδέα because they are not treated by a single science.

But, as a matter of fact, there are many sciences even of things which fall under a single category: for instance, under the category 'opportuneness,' in war, there is strategy; in sickness, medicine; again, under the category 'the Mean,' there is, in food, Therapeutics, and, in exercise, Gymnastics.

Again: since of a single ἰδέα there is one single science, there would have been a single science of all good, had there been a single ἰδέα of all good. But in fact there is no single science of the good; so neither is there any single ἰδέα of the good.

It is indeed obvious that there are many sciences of the good: not only is there no one single science of things existing in distinct categories, but not even of those which fall under *one* category. For example, in the category of time, the 'good' is the opportunity; and this opportunity exists, of course, in war, and in sickness, but does not fall under the same category. The physician knows the crisis in disease, and the general the crisis in war. Again, 'the proportionate,' which belongs to the category of quantity, is applicable both to food and exercise; and in the one case it comes under the cognizance of the art of training, and in the other under the art of healing.

4. *Fourth Argument.*

One may further raise the question as to what our friends really mean by talking of 'a thing-in-itself,' or 'a thing in the abstract' (αὐτοεκαστὸν), seeing that in the case of the 'absolute' or 'ideal' man, and that of the individual, actual man, there is but one definition, that of *man*. So far as either the individual or the ideal is man, the types will not differ. If that be true of 'man,' it is equally true of 'the good': in so far as they are 'good,' the 'ideal good' will not differ from the 'actual good.'

The 'absolute thing' is identical with the definition of a thing, and therefore also with the thing itself.

Since, again, in the case of man and abstract man, there is one and the same definition, as also in the case of horse and abstract horse, that is, of course, of its ἰδέα (since, were the definition different, how could there be a common ἰδέα of it?) —it is evident that man *quâ man* differs in no way from 'man in the abstract;' and similarly in all cases. Hence it follows that 'good' (quâ good) differs not at all from 'good in the abstract.'

5. *Fifth Argument.*

Furthermore, a 'good' will not assuredly be more 'good' by the fact of its being eternal . . . . . if it be true that what is white for a lengthened time is not more white than what is so only for a single day.

The eternity of the ἰδέα would not alter the character of the ἰδέα.

It is further evident that the ideal good and the actual good will not differ, quâ good, though the ideal good be eternal, and the actual good be not eternal, exactly as what is white for a long time is not more white than what lasts only for a day. Consequently there is not an ἰδέα beyond itself in the case of any other class of existences, nor yet of 'the good.'

[The Pythagoreans seem to argue with greater plausibility when they place 'unity' (τὸ ἓν) in the file of things which are good. Speusippus, moreover, seems to follow in their track. But their speculations upon the subject can be reserved for another treatise.

The view of the Pythagoreans is more plausible than that of Plato.

The Pythagoreans, on their part, seem to speak of 'the good' with greater plausibility, since they ranged 'unity' in what they called 'the rank of the good;' and their view seems to be adopted by Speusippus. Their arrangement of the list of things which are good as opposed to things which are evil, was in this wise :—

finite	opposed to	infinite	straight	opposed to	crooked
unequal	,,	equal	light	,,	dark
one	,,	many	square	,,	oblong
right	,,	left	calm	,,	agitated
male	,,	female	good	,,	evil]

(*c*) RESTATEMENT OF THE PLATONIC THEORY, AND NEW DIFFICULTIES WHICH IT SUGGESTS.

But reverting to what was said above, a new difficulty is suggested by the fact that the arguments of the Platonists do not apply to every kind of 'good,' but that only things which are pursued and desired for their own sake are ranged under a single notion, whereas things which are productive of these absolute goods or preservative of them, or preventive of their opposites, are predicated only as 'instrumental goods,' and that in another sense.

But assume that the term 'goods' is limited to 'absolute goods': will these 'absolute goods' fall under a single ἰδέα?

It is clear, then, that things may be predicated as 'goods' in two senses, some being 'absolute goods,' and others 'relative' or 'subordinate goods.' Separating, therefore, things which are good absolutely from those which are good only as helps, let us examine whether these 'absolute goods' are predicated under one single class or ἰδέα.

But what, pray, exactly are those goods which one would class as 'absolute goods'? Are they not such as are pursued and desired even when isolated: for example, the power of thought and sight and certain pleasures and honours? Surely they must be so: though there are times when we pursue such things for ulterior reasons, yet one would certainly also rank them among absolute goods.

Destructive criticism of this hypothesis.

Here, then, is a dilemma. (1) If such things as thought and sight are *not* 'things good *per se*;' and if, as there is nothing else which can be put into competition with them, there is in fact, as Plato says, '*nothing good except the* ἰδέα,' then the class which that ἰδέα forms will be void of contents. (2) If, on the other hand, sight and thought *are* among the number of absolute goods, it will then be necessary that the definition of the 'good' should be seen to be identical in each and all of these cases (just as in the case of snow and of white lead the definition of whiteness is identical). So far, however, as thought, *e.g.*, and honour are 'goods,' their definitions are various and conflicting; and therefore 'the good' is not some one common attribute falling under one general ἰδέα.

But we shall have another opportunity for discussing the bearings of the subject. We must now proceed to define more explicitly the nature of 'the good,' since the statements made above require further examination and refinement owing to the fact that the arguments of the Platonists were not used of and do not apply to every kind of 'good' in specific detail. We must, therefore, distinguish the various kinds of 'good' in order to make our theory more exact.

Well, then: the 'good' is predicated in two senses. Some goods are good *per se* and are spoken of simply as 'goods' and are coveted for their own sake. There are other goods which are not goods *per se*, but are good only on account of their results, being pursued because they tend to preserve or to produce goods which are so absolutely, or because they tend to counteract their opposite evils. Things good *per se* are health and virtue and the power of thought and sight. Things which are good but not *per se* are such as, for example, the training which conduces to a virtuous life, discipline, medicine and such things as are sought with a view to health. Goods of this class are called also 'instrumental goods.'

Distinguishing, therefore, instrumental goods from such as are good in their own right, let us examine whether there is any one single *ἰδέα* of these absolute goods. Evidently, then, it is a matter of superfluity to speak of an *ἰδέα* of absolute goods. In what respect would the *ἰδέα* differ from the members composing it, seeing that these members are as much 'absolute goods' as the 'ἰδέα of the good' itself is? The power of thought and of sight, and certain temperate pleasures and honours, even though they are sought for other reasons, yet nevertheless, apart from the addition of things external, are in and by themselves choiceworthy and objects of pursuit. Hence, in this respect they are 'goods' *per se* and in their own right: and we shall not have to limit that title simply to the 'ἰδέα of the good.'

Again, if there be a single *ἰδέα* of all things which are good *per se*, the same definition of the good will be applicable to all things which are good, precisely as the same description of whiteness will be applicable in the case of snow and of white lead. But that is not true in the case of things which are 'good:' since the definitions of thought and of pleasure, in the aspect under which they are 'good,' differ from one another. The 'good' of pleasure, for example, is one thing, and the 'good' of thought a different one.

(*d*) POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS OF THE QUESTION SUGGESTED.

In what sense, then, as a matter of fact, is the term 'good' predicated of different objects? [Of course there is herein more than a chance identity of name.]

Different modes of understanding the *ἰδέα* by the Realist, the Conceptualist, and the Nominalist.

1. Is the common idea involved in the common name, owing to the fact that all things which are 'good,' are derived from a single source?

2. Or is it because all things which are good, contribute to a single end?

3. Or is it not rather the result of metaphor and analogy; for example, 'as sight is in the body, so is reason in the soul,' and so on of other relations in other things?

But since, as has been shown, good things are not predicated as synonyms, seeing that they have not the same definition, we must now ask in what sense they *are* predicated.

They may be predicated:—

1. Universally—as having the same sound but a different sense.
2. As things which flow from a common origin.
3. As things which contribute to a common result.
4. By way of analogy.

[By analogy I mean, the figure by which *e.g.* the mind is called 'an eye,' as holding the same relation to the soul which the eye does to the body. It is on the same principle that 'the good' seems to be predicated: just as we speak of a 'good soul' so we speak of a 'good time' and 'a good place.' The relations

in such cases admit of an exact parallel. Corresponding to virtue in the soul is a fair opportunity in point of time or a fair dwelling in space, or symmetry in point of quantity.]

(*e*) THE PLATONIC THEORY IS TRANSCENDENTAL, AND VALUELESS IN PRACTICAL LIFE, EVEN AS AN IDEAL.

The discussion belongs more properly to Metaphysics.

Perhaps, however, it will be better to dismiss this subject for the present. To treat of the Platonic 'theory of ideas' with metaphysical exactness belongs more properly to another branch of Philosophy. For the same reason we will dismiss the further discussion of the '*ἰδέα* of the good.' Even if the 'good' which is predicated as a common name be some one quality, or a thing isolated from phænomena and absolute in itself, it is clear that it will not be within the scope of action, nor a good attainable by *man*. But in morals the subject sought is a *practical* good, or a good that can be realized in action.

The question is one outside the range of practical Ethics.

Even as an 'ideal' for life and action the *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* is valueless.

But perhaps it may be thought by some to be better for us to have a knowledge of this 'absolute good' in view of those goods which *are* attainable and produced by our own effort. It may be urged that if we have this 'absolute good' as our pattern or ideal, we shall the better understand what things are 'good' in relation to our own selves; and that, if we have such a knowledge of these attainable goods, we shall succeed in attaining them.

Such an argument has at any rate a show of plausibility; but it seems to be at variance with the lessons of the sciences. All the Sciences, aiming though they severally do, at some result, and seeking to make good the deficiency of nature, still disregard the knowledge of this 'absolute good.' Yet it is unreasonable to suppose that all our artists could be ignorant of so vast a help, without so much as seeking to gain it. It is indeed difficult to see what advantage a weaver or a carpenter will gain in the practice of their art by knowing 'the good in itself,' or how a man will be a better physician or a better general who has gazed upon the 'absolute *ἰδέα*.' It is clear that the physician does not regard health in the abstract, but the health of man as individual, or rather of some particular individual: he tries to cure his patients separately as they come before him.

But the discussion need not be carried further.

We need not here discuss the metaphysical aspects of the subject. To refine upon it with precision and nicety is a topic more suitable to another branch of

Philosophy: it is not one congenial to Ethics. For the same reasons, too, to treat of the 'ἰδέα of the good' in its universal bearings is a question rather for the Theologian, and serves no purpose for one who is investigating the good of social life.

But even assuming that there is an 'ἰδέα of the good' which is common to all other forms of good and is predicated universally and is separable from all other goods and subsists in its own right, it is clear that it will be impossible for a man to achieve such a good and to gain possession of it for himself. But the whole point of Ethical inquiry is a *human* good—a good which can be realized in action. Only in such a human good is it possible for happiness to subsist: a man is happy only in virtue of what he himself has done or has himself acquired. Hence it will be unsuitable for us to speak of any good that is not human and which cannot be compassed by our own endeavours.

Perhaps, however, there are those who may approve of an opposite conclusion, and think rather that it is better for us, and more expedient with a view to our own conduct and to the acquisition of those goods which are capable of being acquired and realized in action, that we should have knowledge of the 'ἰδέα of the good' in itself. It may be argued that if we use this ἰδέα as a pattern or ideal of life, we may learn what and of what nature are those goods which *are* capable of being acquired and carried out in action; and that, if we know them, we shall not fail to realize them.

Such a view has a kind of plausibility, but it seems to be at variance with the usages of the Sciences. All the Sciences aim at some good, and seek to supply a deficiency. Medicine supplies what is lacking in health; gymnastics what is lacking in strength or courage. But although the Sciences are thus occupied in the search for the good, they omit the knowledge of this Universal Good. But they never would have foregone such a quest, had there been any assistance to them in it. It is unreasonable to suppose that our artists would remain in ignorance of so vast a succour, without so much as seeking to remedy it. From this consideration it follows that the 'ἰδέα of the good' is a vain and profitless speculation.

There is this further difficulty about it: what advantage will the weaver or the carpenter derive, in respect of their own arts, by knowing the Absolute, Universal Good? How will the physician be more competent to heal, or the General more capable of victory, through having gazed upon the pure 'ἰδέα of the good?' An artist,—for instance, a physician does not investigate the Universal: he does not investigate health in the abstract, but the health of man:—nay, more, he does not investigate the health of man universally, but the health of man as an individual: his method of cure has reference to single, separate cases.

Here we may dismiss the speculations which have been advanced upon the nature of the Universal Good.

III.—HUMAN PERFECTION DEFINED AND EXPLAINED.

1.—General conception of Happiness.

Let us now return again to the subject of our quest, and ask what is the nature of human perfection or the Summum Bonum.

Happiness described generally as 'the end' to which all action and all effort ultimately tend.

It is evident that 'the good' is different in different kinds of action and arts. It is something different, for example, in medicine to what it is in strategy; and so we might trace its diverse forms in the various departments of

knowledge. What, then, is the Summum Bonum—'the good' to which every science has reference? Is it not, surely, that for the sake of which all else is done? Now in medicine the good sought is health, in strategy, victory, in architecture, a house and different things in different relations; but in all cases alike, in every action and in every purpose, the 'good' sought is 'the end' —that to which all else that men pursue is conducive.

Consequently, if there be any one 'end' for all that can be compassed by action, that end will be 'the practical good' (or 'human perfection,' or 'the consummation of human interests'); and if these 'ends' be various, it will be their sum which constitutes our perfection.

Let us now return again to the object of our quest, and consider what it really is: I mean, what is that 'end' of which the realization is sought by the Science of Life.

Now 'goods' are different in different arts. The good sought in medicine is different from that sought in Generalship, and so on. But in every art 'the good' is 'the end' with a view to which it executes all its various processes, just as in medicine the good aimed at is health, in generalship victory, in architecture a house.

Since, then, in every action and in every art 'the good' is that for the sake of which all other things are done; *i.e.* since 'the good' is 'the end'; so, in a universal view of things, if we discover the end of all human endeavours, that for the sake of which we pursue everything else, then will this 'end' be 'the good' involved in all human activity. Just as the 'good' of medicine is 'the end' of medicine, and the good of generalship the end of generalship: so also the 'good' of action will be the 'end' for the sake of which all our actions are done, and if there be not any single end but several, then these various ends will together be 'the good attainable by human activity.'

(*a*) HAPPINESS SHOWN TO BE NOT A 'RELATIVE END,' BUT 'AN END ABSOLUTE AND PERFECT.'

Our argument has therefore come round after a circuit to our original point; but we must endeavour to illustrate our view of happiness with still greater clearness.

To describe this 'ultimate end' more exactly:

Since it is evident that 'the ends' of action are numerous; and some of these 'ends' we make choice of only for ulterior purposes (for example, wealth, flutes, and, generally, material appliances), all ends are manifestly not final and absolute. But the Summum Bonum, as what is 'highest and best,' is evidently a thing absolute and perfect. Consequently, if there is any one single thing absolute and perfect, that will be the object for which we are in search; or, if there be several such things 'absolute and perfect,' then it will be that one of them which is *most* absolute and *most* perfect.

its characteristics are that it is supreme, most absolute, and most perfect.

Now when an end is pursued for its own sake, we call it more perfect than an end pursued with a view of something beyond; and we call an end which is *never* chosen for the sake of anything else, more perfect than an end chosen as well for its own sake, as for the sake of something beyond; and we speak of an end, without qualification, as an absolutely perfect end when it is chosen for its own sake alone, and never as a means to something beyond.

All these attributes of perfection and absoluteness are thought to be characteristic of happiness in the very highest degree. We make happiness the object of our choice always for its own sake and never as a means to higher ends. On the other hand we choose honour and pleasure, sound sense and all virtue not only for their own sake—since we should still choose them, though no result accrued therefrom — but also for the sake of happiness, under the impression we have that by their means we may become happy. On the other hand, as regards happiness, no one makes his choice of that for such considerations as these, nor in fact for the sake of anything to follow from it.

But we must endeavour to render it still more evident what the real nature of this 'end' is. Hitherto we have not made any definite statement about it, but have still to examine its real character. The discussion has been traversing a circle and has made no actual progress, but has come round to the very point which was premised in the Introduction that the 'end' of all human action will be the Summum Bonum and the highest interest of man.

Since then the ends of action are various, and some of them are not chosen by us for their own sake, but for the sake of different ends, namely, the ends of the Sciences which are Sovereign Sciences, as we have already shown, being simply 'instrumental ends' in view of those higher ends—just as wealth which is the end of the money-maker's life is useful also to the statesman for the furthering of his special end; or as the flute which is the 'end' of the flute-maker is useful also to the flute player for his playing: and as in the same way all instruments are serviceable with a view to further uses; since, I say, there are certain kinds of ends which are not 'goods' *per se*, all ends cannot be final or perfect ends. Yet the good for the sake of which we perform all our actions, ought to be a thing final and perfect; hence it cannot be any one of the ends of this kind, namely, imperfect ends. Nay, if there be many perfect ends, the summum bonum will be the most perfect of all; and if there be only one perfect end, then that one perfect end will be the good sought for in all human endeavour.

Now we say that an end which is sought for *per se* and for its own sake is more perfect than one sought for for the sake of something beyond. Again, since there are certain goods sought for as well for their own sakes as also for other objects, (*e.g.*, health and the power of thought,) among such ends that is the more perfect which is sought for its own sake alone, and never for the sake of aught else. Such a good is not more perfect simply through combination with other goods, but without qualification in and by itself it is a perfect good.

Such attributes as these of finality and perfection are thought to be characteristic of happiness in the very highest degree. We make our choice of happiness invariably for its own sake. Honour and pleasure and sound sense and all virtue are also things which we make choice of for their own sake (since we should still make our choice of them, though no result accrued therefrom): yet at the same time we also make choice of them for the sake of happiness, actuated

by the impression that through their means we may be happy. On the other hand no one makes choice of happiness for the sake of pleasure and such things, nor in fact for any motive beyond itself. Consequently happiness will be the good sought for in all the transactions and endeavours of men.

(*b*) THE PERFECTION OF HAPPINESS INVOLVES ITS SELF-SUFFICINGNESS.

The same conclusion is seen to follow from the 'self-sufficingness' of happiness; a final, absolute good being thought to be also self-sufficing.

Perfection and absoluteness imply a life 'lacking in nothing'; and this 'self-sufficingness' of the happy man will redound (within reasonable limits) to a wide circle of friends and connections.

By the attribute of self-sufficingness, we do not imply simply what would satisfy a man's own self, living a sequestered life, but a sufficiency which includes his parents and children and wife, and generally his friends and fellow citizens, man being in his frame and make a *social* being.

Still, some limit must be placed to the range of a man's surroundings: if he stretch his happiness to include his parents and ancestors, his friends and his friends' friends, the area of his sympathies will reach on to infinity. What these limits are, we will examine by-and-by. For the present we assume that 'self-sufficingness' is a quality which, independently and by itself, makes life desirable and in lack of nothing; and this we suppose to be a characteristic of happiness.

Moreover, happiness is, we think, most of all things to be coveted—provided, that is, it be not reckoned in the same rank with other 'goods' (otherwise, if happiness were only reckoned as 'one of a number of desirable things,' it would clearly be *more* choiceworthy and *more* greatly to be coveted when associated with the very least of other good things; since the addition causes the sum of good things to be in excess of what it was before, and the larger quantity of what is good is always more desirable than the less).

Consequently, happiness is proved to be 'an end in itself,' and one which is perfectly self-sufficing, as the consummation of all human aims and interests.

This conclusion is further evident from the following considerations. That perfect good which is sought for as being man's perfection, is thought to be a self-sufficing good; and this self-sufficingness is such as satisfies not merely the single individual living a solitary life but also his children and wife, and generally his friends and fellow-citizens, since assuredly a man will need a 'good,' which extends to them no less than to himself, being as he is by nature a member of a social organism and made for intercourse with others.

Now the idea of self-sufficingness is that of a thing which in its isolation and independency makes life satisfying and desirable and in lack of nothing; and such is the character which we suppose happiness to bear. It is evident, therefore, that happiness is 'the good' of which we are in search.

Again: we say that happiness is not a thing to be reckoned as one among a number of other 'goods,' since we regard it as the highest of all things desirable. If we were to place it in the same rank with other goods, it is clear that, by adding any other good to it, we should make it *more* desirable, and thus it would not be itself the summit of all that is desirable:—*i.e.*, the good added would, in conjunction with happiness, achieve a form of good more choiceworthy than happiness singly. But the good of which we are in search is an 'absolute good,' and cannot be included among other goods, being as it is, the culmination of all things choiceworthy. It is a thing perfect; and a thing which is perfect is a thing most choiceworthy and absolute. We invariably prefer a good in the degree of its perfection. Happiness therefore is the end of which we are in search.

But our theory of the 'self-sufficingness' of happiness presents a kind of puzzle. If 'the good' for an individual be not perfect until it is adequate for himself and all his connections, for his fellow citizens and friends, for his relatives and his relatives' kinsmen, this 'self-sufficing good' will never be found to exist, since the circle of his sympathies will be ever widening into infinity. Hence some limitation must necessarily be made to the range of friends to whom a man's 'good' will reach. We shall have to examine the nature of this limitation by-and-by; for the present we will proceed with our immediate subject.

ii.—Exact and formal Definition of Happiness.

(*a*) ARGUMENT FROM FINAL CAUSES.

But perhaps it may appear a kind of truism to describe happiness as what is 'highest and best,' and a desire may be felt that its nature should be explained with greater perspicuity.

This requirement will probably be met, if the 'function' or work of man be taken into account. In the case of the flute-player, and of the statuary, and of all artizans and others who have some defined work and occupation, what is 'good' and excellent for them in all such cases depends upon their *work*. Exactly similar would seem to be the case with man, if, that is, there is any function or work which belongs to him specially *as man*. It cannot surely be true that while there are certain functions and lines of life for man *qua* carpenter or *qua* shoemaker, there is no work for man *qua* man, but that Nature has left him without a work. There is evidently a function for each of the various parts of man—for the eye, for the hand, and for the foot:—shall we not also assume that there is a function beyond and besides the functions of the parts—a function for man *as man?*

As there is design in each of the various parts of man, so there must be design in man as a moral whole.

What then precisely will this characteristic function of man be? Mere life it evidently cannot be, that being common even to plants, whereas, what is sought

This special 'design' of man will

be found in his highest and most perfect life, which is the life of reason.

is a function special to man. We may therefore eliminate from our consideration the life of mere nourishment and growth.

Next in development is a kind of conscious, sensitive life; but evidently this also is a life shared in common with other organizations—the horse and the ox, and every living creature.

The remaining alternative is that the special function of man is a life developed by the action of that part of our nature which contains reason. Of this part of our nature, one element is, as it were, obedient to reason: the other element contains reason and consciously exercises it.

But as this life again is manifested in two ways, potentially and actively, we must assume the true life of man to be one manifested in conscious activity, since thus only does life seem to be predicated in its more absolute and perfect sense.

Now, to describe happiness as 'the good which is sought by the Science of Life,' and as 'that which is best for man,' is evidently a truism. It is required that we should explain the nature of happiness with greater perspicuity. This desire may be satisfied if we can discover the work which is distinctive of man, in so far as he is *man*. Just as the 'good' of every craftsman depends upon his work, the good of a piper depending upon his piping, of a statuary on his statues, the same principle holding good of every work and of every action, precisely so the special good of man depends upon his own peculiar work—if there be any work peculiar and characteristic of man *as man*. But is it possible that, though there are certain works and actions proper to the carpenter and the shoemaker, there is no work proper to *man*, but that he is so constituted as to be a thing without a purpose? Is it not rather the truth that just as there is seen to be a special function for the eye, for the hand, and for the foot, and in fact for each one of our physical members, so also, beyond the functions of the parts, one might find a function for *man* as a moral unity?

What, then, is this special function of man? Mere life, of course, is common also to plants: what we are seeking is the characteristic function of man. We may, therefore, dismiss the consideration of mere life. But following after this life of growth and increase, or the life of plants, there comes the life of sensation, a life more nearly approaching to the life of reason; and we must here examine into its claims. Yet this life of sensation is shared in common by other organizations, by the horse and the ox, and animals generally; hence neither is this the *special* work of man of which we are in quest.

There is one only alternative, that the special work of man should be a 'life manifested in action within the sphere of Reason.' This, again, is found to bear a twofold aspect. Under one aspect it is irrational in itself, though obedient and submissive to reason. Under another aspect it contains reason, and consciously exercises it. The element which contains reason, and consciously exercises it, is the faculty of arranging and co-ordinating; whereas the element which is irrational is ordered and arranged by the other. Hence the rational element is more distinctively than the other, the special activity of man—since this rational life is a real activity, whereas the other element is called 'passive' or 'receptive' only.

(*b*) EXPLICIT DEFINITION OF HAPPINESS DEDUCED FROM THE CONSIDERATION OF MAN'S FINAL CAUSE.

Summary of argument:—if the design of man *qua* man be a rational life, the design of man, *qua* a good man (*i.e.* human perfection), will be 'a rational life *in accord with virtue*.'

Assuming therefore (1), that the true function of man is a conscious activity of soul in perfect harmony with Reason or not without its guidance; and (2), that we are right in saying that the function of man is the same *in kind*, whether it be the case of an ordinary individual or of a perfect individual (the performance of a lute-player, for example, being identical *in kind* with that of a good lute-player) —a truth which applies without restriction to all cases, the superiority which comes from excellence being added as a qualification of a particular work (lute-playing being the function of the lute-player, and excellent lute-playing of the true lute-player); assuming, I say, that we are right in defining the function of man as a kind of life or conscious exercise of the faculties and conduct regulated by Reason, and that the function of a good man is to perform this part excellently and well, a thing being executed well when brought up to the standard of its own ideal; . . . if these assumptions be true, it follows that 'human perfection' or 'the good of man' is 'a conscious exercise of the faculties in conformity with the law of virtue;' and if there be many forms of virtue, then his activity will be in accord with that one which is highest and most perfect.

Moreover, this activity must be displayed in an adequate sphere of external circumstances that perfectly harmonize with it. A single swallow does not make a summer, nor does one (*bright*) day; so neither does one single day, nor a brief spell of sunshine, make a man's whole career blessed and happy.

The special work of man, therefore, is 'an energy of the soul in conformity with perfect Reason' when the soul is exercising thought: or not devoid of Reason when it is moved in respect of its passive conditions acting in association with Reason.

Since, then, the energy of man is an energy in accordance with Reason—though it be exercised well and nobly, its excellence does not prevent its being still a human energy. The functions of the lute-player, and of the skilful lute-player, are not distinct in kind, it being the part of the lute-player to play the lute, and of the good lute-player to play artistically: but the functions of playing and of skilful playing are not distinct in kind, any more than a horse is distinct from a good horse. If this be true, and we regard the work of man as a kind of life, and life as an activity of the soul, and actions in accordance with Reason, it will be the special function of a good man to develop his faculties nobly in accordance with Reason. But a thing is ever done well and exquisitely when it is in accord with the ideal which is special and peculiar to it. The activity of man, therefore, will be well and exquisitely developed when it is in accord with the ideal which is special and peculiar to it: and this ideal is Virtue. Hence the ideal special to

man is 'an activity of the soul *in accordance with Virtue*;' and if there are many Virtues, his ideal activity will be in accordance with the best and most perfect among them.

Here, then, has been discovered what is the 'perfection of man.' As has been shown 'the good' or 'perfection' of a thing is its 'end.' There has thus been discovered also 'the end' of human actions and of human endeavours; and it has been shown that the end of human actions is identical with happiness. Our task, therefore, has been fulfilled, and happiness has been discovered.

But it is also necessary that if the work of man is to have free range for being perfected, there should be an unbroken harmony of external conditions in which it may be exercised. It is not the solitary swallow nor the one bright day which produces summer; so neither does one single day nor a brief spell of sunshine make a man's whole career blessed and happy.

(*c*) THE DEFINITION OF HAPPINESS MUST, FROM THE NATURE OF THE CASE, BE PROVISIONAL AND IN OUTLINE.

This definition may suffice to indicate the main characteristics of the Summum Bonum, or human perfection. One ought surely first of all to draw the outline of a picture, and to fill in the details afterwards. To expand and explain truths once rightly defined in the rough draft would seem to be within any one's power; and Time is fertile in the discovery of such improvements, or, at any rate, is an excellent contributor towards them. It is by such means that the development of the various arts has been brought about: any one can add on the finishing touches which make good the omissions of the first draft.

Our definition is only a descriptive outline and is capable of considerable elaboration.

Here we must bear in mind the cautions already given, not to expect scientific precision in every subject, at every step, but to be guided in each instance by the nature of the subject under discussion and require only such a degree of exactness as may be consistent with the treatment adopted. The carpenter seeks for the right angle in a different spirit from the geometrician. The carpenter seeks for it in the rough way that is serviceable for his particular purpose; the geometrician, as being a student of abstract truth, seeks to define what is its true nature and what are its properties. We should adopt the same course of treatment generally, so that our subject may never be overladen with extraneous matter.

But definitions vary with the variations of subject-matter and of the purposes to which they are applied.

Nor, again, ought we to require an explanation of *causes* in all cases equally. In some cases it is sufficient that the simple *fact* be clearly proved; as, for example, in the case of (ἀρχαί) those ultimate truths which are the 'principles' of thought and of action. The *fact*, whether in Morals or in

Sufficient if our definition indicate the scope of the facts, without analysing the facts into their ultimate cause.

Science, is a starting-point, and thus, a '*principle*' both of moral action and of positive knowledge. Some of these 'principles' are apprehended through mental association, others by the sensation, others by the help of moral education, and others in other ways.

We must endeavour to trace out these principles under the aspect in which they are severally presented by Nature, and use all diligence that their true import be properly marked out, since they possess great influence in determining what follows from them. 'The start is more than half the race;' and by means of a good start, or sound 'principle,' in Morals, it is thought that many problems of the moral life are simultaneously made evident.

The perfection of man may thus be defined as 'a conscious activity of soul in harmony with Virtue in a complete life.' But this definition is only provisional. It is necessary of course, in the first instance, to sketch roughly our theory of the Summum Bonum, and afterwards to elaborate our sketch as an artist does the outlines of a picture. When the outlines of a subject have been skilfully traced, it would seem to be an easy task and one within the scope of any one who wills, to advance the work to perfection and to delineate every shade. Time itself contributes its share to this result, being, as it is, fertile in discoveries and an admirable promoter of improvements. It is owing to the work of Time that the development of the Arts has been brought about, since it is open to everyone to improve what may be defective.

We must at the same time remember the cautions which were given at the outset, and not require the precision of science in all subjects alike, but in every point expect only that degree of accuracy which is consistent with the subject-matter, and never further than is suitable to the mode of treatment adopted. The carpenter does not require that his right angle shall be as faultless as the geometrician does; but they severally require only such precision as may be in keeping with the business which they have in hand. The carpenter seeks an angle of sufficient accuracy to be of service to him in practical work; whereas the geometrician seeks to know what a pure right angle is, what is its nature and what are its properties, without being desirous of effecting any material result by means of it, but seeking simply a true explanation of its real nature. We must act in this same spirit in other relations to prevent the accessories of our work growing to a greater bulk than the work itself. If, for instance, we were to demand from the carpenter a theory of the right angle—a question which is immaterial to him in view of his special work, he would be put to greater trouble in answering it, than in executing the practical work of his art.

Nor, again, must we search for a *cause* to the same extent in all subjects. In certain cases it is sufficient that it be clearly proved that the *fact* is so-and-so, even though we cannot add a *reason* for its being so. This is even found to be the case in regard to the principles of the Sciences. In regard to principles we shall not have to enquire *why* they are but simply as to the fact *whether* they are. This is the starting point of all scientific inquiry. If we had to examine into *the cause of our principles* we should never make a start, but be ever groping further and further after an infinite 'why.'

The particular facts (on the basis of which the 'principles' of knowledge rest) are made evident to us either (1) through mental association, or (2) through the medium of the senses, or (3) through the moral instincts resulting from education.

(1.) 'Induction' or 'mental association' applies to such cases as that 'things which are equal to the same are equal to one another'—a truth which we can prove by bringing forward certain numbers and quantities, Induction being proof from particular instances.

(2.) 'Sensation' applies to such cases as when the student of Nature shows that 'fire is hot' or 'water is cold'—facts which are 'principles' in his science.

(3.) 'Instinct' or 'moral sense' is the faculty by which the principles of Ethics are understood—a faculty which is the result of a moral education. It is, of course, impossible to attain to a knowledge of truths bearing upon virtue, unless a man has spent his life in the practice of virtuous actions (as was shown in the Introduction to this Book).

We must, therefore, endeavour to trace out the various 'principles' of knowledge as they may be severally capable of being proved, and take due care that they are made perfectly clear by means of definition, since they afford great assistance in establishing the truths which are consequent from them. Hence it is evident that 'the principle has a force equal to more than half the demonstration;' and many truths of which we are in quest become evident by means thereof. In the Major Premiss 'the principle' is invariably assumed; and the Major Premiss carries with it almost the entire force of the Syllogism. It is for this reason—though for others also—that 'Major' Premiss is so named.

So much only need here be said, in a general way, upon the question of 'principles.'

IV.—DEFINITION OF HUMAN PERFECTION COMPARED WITH OTHER THEORIES AND DIFFICULTIES SOLVED.

1.—Our Definition satisfies the Conditions of Happiness implied both in the Popular View and in the Theories of previous Thinkers.

Our definition can be verified by the evidence of popular language and opinion.

We must, however, discuss the nature of Happiness not merely from the terms of its definition and of the propositions in which that definition is stated, but also from the view of popular opinion and current testimony about it. The attributes of a thing all harmonize with a true view of it; but the true nature of a thing is soon found to be at variance with attributes wrongly assigned to it.

In regard, however, to the 'principle' which we have laid down as the basis of Ethics—I mean of course happiness, we must examine further into it, and discuss not merely the definition of happiness and the terms which make up that definition, but also whatever true conceptions were formed about it by men of old time, to see if they are consistent with that definition. If a definition be a true one, whatever is involved in the thing defined will be in harmony with it: and hence also, all that is rightly attributed to a thing, will be equally consistent with its definition; whereas if the definition be a false one, the truth is soon at issue with it.

(*a*) COMMON OPINION CONFIRMS OUR DEFINITION AS AN ACTIVITY OF THE *SOUL*.

Popular classification admits that the 'goods of the soul' are the highest goods. Therefore happiness, as the

Now things which are good have been divided into three classes, one class being called 'external goods,' another 'bodily goods,' and a third, 'spiritual goods,' or 'goods of the soul.' Of these various kinds of 'goods,' those which concern the soul, are, as we all admit, sovereign goods—goods, that is, in

the very highest sense; and we define 'goods which concern the soul,' as 'moral actions and the activities of the inner life,' which are therefore sovereign goods.

Summum Bonum, will be 'a good of the soul.'

(*But in saying that 'moral actions and activities are sovereign goods' we imply that they constitute happiness, happiness being* par excellence *'the sovereign good;' and*) therefore happiness may properly be defined as '*an activity of the soul*' . . . according, at any rate, to this view which has long been held and is admitted by all previous thinkers.

The correctness of this view is further borne out by the fact that certain lines of conduct and activities of the moral nature are said to be 'the *end*'; since thus it is proved that 'the end' which comprehends all others, man's 'happiness' or 'perfection,' belongs to those goods which affect the *soul*, and not to those goods which come from without.

In harmony also with this definition is the common proverb that 'the happy man lives a noble life and acts a noble part,' happiness being itself pretty generally described as a kind of 'noble living and noble acting.'

Now things which are 'good' are commonly divided into three classes, one class being called 'external goods,' another class 'goods relating to the soul,' and a third 'goods relating to the body.' Of these various kinds of goods, those which concern the soul are, as we all with one consent admit, 'sovereign goods'—goods, that is, in the very highest sense.

But by 'goods which concern the soul,' we mean moral actions and the exercise of our mental powers. Consequently the exercise of the vital powers in moral action and virtuous activities of our nature are goods in the highest and most paramount sense; and, therefore, the sovereign and supreme good of man consists in a virtuous exercise of all the powers within the soul. And this is Happiness: it is, that is to say, 'an activity of the soul in harmony with virtue'—according to this view of it, which has long been held and is admitted by all thinkers.

A certain mode of conduct and the development of the powers in a certain direction, is thus rightly styled 'happiness;' since, in this sense, happiness will come under the class of 'goods relating to the soul,' and not that of 'external goods.'

It is for this reason also that the happy man is said to 'act a noble part and live a noble life'—terms which indicate a free play of the faculties and a certain line of moral action.

(*b*) STATEMENT OF THE PRINCIPAL OPINIONS HELD IN REGARD TO HAPPINESS.

It is also clear that the requisitions generally made on behalf of happiness are all implied in the definition above given. These requisitions are various. Some men hold that happiness is 'virtue;' others, that it is 'thought;' others that it is

There are five rival theories abroad about happiness:—*i.e.* that it is—

(1) Virtue ;
(2) Thought ;
(3) A form of Philosophy;
(4) Pleasure ;
(5) Prosperity.

All these theories probably contain at least some element of truth, and will harmonize with our own definition.

'a form of philosophy;' others, that it is all of these combined, or else one of them in combination with pleasure, or, at any rate, not without pleasure. There are others, again, who would include 'a sunny condition of external prosperity' as involved in the idea of happiness.

Some of these ideas are advocated by the world generally and by men of old time; others by the few and by men of reputation. It is reasonable to assume that neither one nor the other are wholly and entirely mistaken, but that they are right at any rate in some particulars, or even in the greater part of what they say.

It is also clear that the expectations generally formed by men on the score of happiness are all involved and satisfied in the definition above given. The requirement upon which some men insist is Virtue; that of others is Thought: that of others, some form of Philosophy. There are some again who think that happiness includes *all* these requirements; others, again, that some *one* of these conditions combined with pleasure (though a pleasure engendered by the actions themselves) satisfies the idea of happiness; while others, again, include 'external prosperity' in the notion.

Some of these theories are advocated by men generally and by men of old; others by the few and men of reputation. It is reasonable to assume that neither one nor the other miss the truth in all points; but fail, perhaps, only in some one particular, and are right in their main position.

(1) *The view that 'Happiness is Virtue' discussed.*

'Happiness is virtue' . . . . if it be premised that virtue has full play and a complete activity.

As for those who hold that 'happiness is virtue' or 'some form of virtue,' my own definition fully harmonizes with theirs, for, of course, 'an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue' includes virtue.

But it is a point of no slight consequence assuredly whether we understand 'the Chief Good' to consist in possession or in use, in a passive condition or in a conscious activity. It is conceivable for the passive condition to exist without effecting any good at all: it may be found in a man who is slumbering or who is rendered inactive from some other cause. But it is not possible for the active faculty to be unproductive: the possession of active virtue will of necessity lead to action and to right action. In the Olympic Games it is not the fairest nor the strongest who are crowned, but those who enter the lists, for among them the victors must be. Precisely so is it in practical life: only those who act aright find themselves the winners of its honours and fair guerdons.

As for those who hold that 'happiness is perfect virtue,' or 'that particular virtue which among all other virtues is most perfect,' my own definition fully

harmonizes with theirs, happiness being, as I have defined it, 'in accordance with the activity of virtue.'

But there is a difference between us on this point: the enthusiasts for virtue say that happiness consists in the permanent state or possession of virtue; whereas I maintain that it consists in the use and conscious exercise of virtue. This is, indeed, a point of no slight consequence, whether we suppose that the Chief Good consists in possession or in use—in a passive state or in a conscious activity. It is conceivable for a passive state to exist without effecting any good at all: it may be found in a man who is slumbering, or who is benumbed to a kind of torpor. But it is impossible for an activity to be unproductive. A man who has a mental power working within him, will of necessity act; and if that power be a virtuous one, he will act virtuously, and that is equivalent to being happy. Just as at the Olympic Games it is not the fairest nor the strongest who are crowned, but those who are competitors in the lists, among whom alone must be the conquerors; so also in regard to the honours and advantages to be gained in this life, it is not those who have the powers of acting aright who are successful, but those who put their powers to practical effect.

(2) *Relations of Happiness to Pleasure discussed.*

Now the life of such as are actively virtuous is intrinsically a pleasant life. The capacity for pleasure is indeed a property common to all conscious life; but the actual pleasure which an individual feels is determined by the pursuits to which he is specially addicted. A horse is a source of pleasure to a man who is fond of horses, a spectacle to one who is fond of sights. In the same way the doing of just acts is pleasurable to one who is a lover of justice; and, generally, acts conformable to virtue are pleasurable to one who is a lover of virtue.

'Happiness involves pleasure'. . . . . Certainly: because a man cannot be virtuous(and therefore cannot either be happy) unless he *delights* in his virtue.

But as for the world at large, the objects which yield them delight are mutually antagonistic to one another, since they are not really pleasurable in their own nature. Only to the 'lovers of what is noble' are things pleasurable which are so in their real nature; to which class belong things done in obedience to virtue. To the cultured and noble, therefore, moral actions are pleasurable practically, as well as in the abstract. The life of the virtuous then has no need of pleasure as an amulet to hang about it, but involves a pleasure all its own, in right of itself.

In fact, beyond the considerations already given, a man is not a good man at all unless he experiences pleasure at noble deeds. One could never call a man just, unless he took delight in acts of justice; nor liberal, unless he took delight in acts of liberality; and similarly in regard to other virtues. If this be so, it follows that whatever actions are done in obedience to virtue will be, in and by themselves, attended with pleasure to the agent.

Nay, more than that: actions done in conformity with virtue, will themselves of course be virtuous and noble, and will possess

each of these characteristics in the very highest degree—if the good man be a true judge of such matters (and we have shown how he judges about them).

Pleasure and virtue are thus inseparable elements in happiness.

Happiness is, therefore, a thing most excellent and noble, as well as being most pleasurable; and these attributes are all inseparably bound up one with the other, and not severed as they are in the Delphian couplet:

> "Justice is noblest of goods; and Health bringeth ease, above all things:
> And to obtain what one loves, Nature makes sweetest of boons."

Now all these attributes are found in man's highest activities, in the exercise, that is, of the highest part of his nature; and we maintain that these activities (or some one of them that is the noblest of all) constitute happiness.

Now the life of such as these is a pleasurable life in and by itself, and one that does not derive its pleasure from without. Seeing that the capacity for pleasure is a common property of the soul, there is nothing to prevent 'the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue' from being attended with pleasure, and it is evident that it is so attended. Since in all cases an object is pleasurable to a man when he is said to be specially inclined towards it, (a horse, *e.g.*, being a source of pleasure to a man who is fond of horses, and a spectacle to one who is fond of sights), virtue and actions done in accordance with virtue will be pleasurable to a man who is enamoured of virtue.

As for the world at large, however, the objects thought pleasurable by them are inconsistent one with another. Some think one thing pleasurable, some another, and conversely with its opposite. The reason of this contrariety is that the things which the masses love are not things which are really pleasurable in their own true nature. On the other hand, to those who are lovers of the beautiful, only those objects appear pleasurable which are inherently pleasurable: being, as they are, themselves of noblest frame, it is a natural consequence that they should pursue only such objects as are pleasurable in very truth, and hence the objects which they do in fact pursue, are actions that are in accordance with virtue. It is consequently obvious that actions in accordance with virtue are sources of pleasure to those who are lovers of virtue, and that for their own sake. When a thing is pleasurable by nature, its pleasantness is not owing to an alien cause.

Hence the life of the virtuous requires no pleasure external to itself to be as it were a charm to adorn it from without: it contains a pleasure all its own, intermingled with itself. If there be any one who should aver that 'not all who are virtuous find delight in their virtue, since there are those who practise virtue without any sense of satisfaction in so doing,' we can only deny the fact and say that a man is neither virtuous nor good unless he feels pleasure in noble actions. No one could call a man just unless he took delight in acts of justice, nor liberal unless he took delight in acts of liberality; and similarly in regard to the other virtues. If this be so, acts in accordance with virtue will be pleasurable for their own sake.

Nay more: such actions will not only be pleasurable, they will themselves be virtuous and noble; and every such action will show these characteristics in the highest degree—if the good man be a true judge of such matters (and that his judgment should err therein is hard to believe); and he judges that such actions are virtuous and noble.

Consequently happiness is a thing highest and noblest and sweetest; and these

attributes are all blended together; not as in the Delphian couplet, where one thing is highest, another noblest, and something else sweetest:

"Fairest is what is most just, yet 'twere best that health should be sound:
Yea, sweeter than all by nature is this—to compass the aim that one loves."

All these attributes are found in man's highest activities, in the exercise, that is, of the highest part of man's nature; and we maintain that these activities (or some one of them which is the noblest of all) constitute happiness.

(3) *Relation of Happiness to External or Physical Conditions discussed.*

Nevertheless it is evident that happiness requires, as we have shown, certain external advantages. It is impossible, for example, or it is not easy to perform noble acts unless provided with outward means. There are many acts which have to be performed, if performed at all, by the help of such agencies as friends, wealth, or political influence. Again, there are certain things of which, if men be deprived, they find the brightness of their happiness marred and its lustre gone: for instance, good birth, fair children, or beauty. A man is scarcely capable of happiness if he be distorted in appearance, or base-born, or a widower and childless,—even less so, surely, if he has worthless children or friends, or if he once had kind friends and dear children who are all deceased.

'Happiness involves external advantages' . . . . since the soul, to be happy, must have an harmonious sphere in which to move and adequate materials with which to work.

A man requires, therefore, as I have said, certain favourable outward conditions to complete the sum of his happiness. Hence, some writers rank 'good luck' with happiness as others do virtue.

The essential nature of happiness, therefore, consists, as I have shown, in virtuous actions. Nevertheless it is evident that it requires external advantages It is impossible, of course, or at any rate not easy to perform virtuous actions unless provided with external resources. Many of the best actions have to be done by the help of external means, as 'instruments,' as it were, to effect the result, whether friends, or wealth, or position in the State, or political power, or social influence. Ofttimes when men are deprived of such resources, they find their happiness to be deprived of its lustre: if, for example, he be devoid of good birth, or fair children, or personal beauty. A man cannot be perfectly happy if he be distorted in appearance, or base-born, or a widower or childless, or if he has vicious children, or if he once had dear children and has lost them.

It is for these reasons that we say that happiness has need of favourable conditions external to itself, and of the sunshine of life, to keep it bright; and with this view some have considered that the 'fair fortune' which comes from without is identical with the happiness of which we are in quest, and others press the claims of virtue. The fact is, however, that there is need alike of 'fair fortune' and of a virtuous mind to one who would be happy in the perfect sense of the term.

ii.—Is Happiness within our own power; and, if so, what are the means for its attainment?

WITHOUT EXCLUDING OTHER INFLUENCES, MAN IS HIMSELF THE MAIN AND MOST IMPORTANT SOURCE OF HIS OWN HAPPINESS.

This last discussion opens up a further question: By what means is happiness to be achieved? Is it the result of study, or of moral discipline, or of some form of philosophic culture? Or does it rather come to us by way of special Providence, or may it even be owing to chance?

But does happiness depend at all upon agencies which man himself can create, or is it dependent upon the Divine Will?

Now if there be any boon at all accorded by Gods to men, it is reasonable to believe that happiness is such a 'gift of heaven,' more especially as of all human blessings this is the highest and best. But this is a subject which will perhaps be more appropriately dealt with in another Treatise. Still it is quite evident that even if Happiness be not a gift bestowed on us by Heaven, but be a result attained by means of virtue or through some kind of study and philosophic culture, it is one of those things which are most divine. As the reward of virtue, it is undoubtedly the noblest 'end' of man, and thus a thing divine and blessed.

Whether it be 'a gift of God' is a question for Theology: at any rate it is 'divine and blessed.'

In any event, happiness must be within a wide and comprehensive range: it is a thing capable of being realised by all whose progress in virtue has not been stunted at the outset; the means thereto being a kind of training and discipline.

It is 'the meed of virtue,' and must therefore have a range as wide as virtue itself; yet almost *all* can attain to virtue by means of self-discipline.

Moreover, if it be *better* that men should gain happiness by their own efforts rather than through chance, it is reasonable to believe that such is in fact the case; since whatever is in harmony with nature is so exquisitely designed that 'whatever is, is *best*.' The same law of perfection applies to the creations of art and to all that is owing to a defined cause, especially to that noblest of all causes, virtue. It would surely be discordant to our reason, to attribute to the caprice of chance what is grandest and fairest in life.

The analogy of Nature would lead us to conclude that it is *best* that happiness should come from virtue.

The question in dispute is indeed made self-evident by the definition given of happiness, which was described as 'a conscious exercise of the faculties, of a specific character, in conformity with virtue.' As

If our very definition of happiness be correct, its essen-

for other 'goods' there are some which it is essential for a man to have if he is to be happy, whilst others are in their nature co-operative and helpful in the way of instruments.

tial character is a 'virtuous activity' which needs beyond itself only few and simple conditions.

This truth will be in accord with what was premised at starting. We laid down the principle that the 'end' of social science is the noblest of all ends. Now this Science regards it as its supreme concern to give to citizens a definite moral character and to render them disposed to practise noble acts. It is reasonable, therefore, that we should call neither ox nor horse nor any mere animal 'happy,' seeing that not one of them is capable of taking part in any virtuous activity from which happiness could arise. For the same reason neither is a boy happy: owing to his youth he is as yet incapable of such activities as are requisite to acquire happiness. If ever boys are called happy, it is only because they are complimented by reason of the hopes formed of them.

The 'Science of civil life' assumes that happiness can be produced by defined agencies—*i.e.* virtuous activities; and consistently therewith we count no one happy who is not capable of virtue.

Happiness in a word requires matured virtue and perfect harmony in its external relations, to last all life through. Many the reverses and many the changes which take place in the course of a long life. It is possible for a man in the highest prosperity to incur great misfortunes as he nears old age, as terrible as those which the Myth records of Priam in the heroic poems. But if a man has encountered sorrows such as those, and has ended his days in wretchedness, no one counts him a happy man.

These virtuous activities must be continued all life through. If the moral freedom be taken away by calamity, virtue and happiness become impossible or difficult.

In view of this difficulty a question arises whether happiness be a result of study or is attained through some process of culture, or through constant habituation to virtuous actions, or through some other form of discipline: or whether, on the contrary, it be a gift bestowed on men by the Gods, or even the effect of some chance.

Now if there be any boon at all accorded by God to men, it would seem that happiness is veritably that boon. Far more than all other blessings is happiness 'a gift from Heaven,' in proportion as of all other human interests this is the greatest. But to argue upon these points belongs to a discussion upon Providence and to a different kind of Treatise. We must pursue our investigations upon grounds suitable to the plan which we have set before us. Still it is quite evident that even if happiness be not a 'boon of Heaven' but be owing to virtue, or to some kind of philosophic culture, it is one of those things which are most divine. The reward of virtue and 'the end' of man (which happiness itself exactly is), is manifestly of highest worth, and a thing divine and blessed.

Wide and comprehensive for all will its range be found to be: it is possible for it to be the heritage of all who are not dwarfed in understanding nor incapable

of being incited to the pursuit of virtue, the means thereto being a kind of training and study.

Indeed, happiness as resulting from exercise and discipline, will, it is reasonable to suppose, be greater and more perfect than anything resulting from chance. This principle is a universal one. Whatever is brought about by a defined cause, whether of art or of nature, is better than anything which is produced by chance: and more especially is that the case in the creations of that noblest of all causes, virtue. Besides, to entrust to fortune the keeping of the highest and noblest good, happiness, would prove an utter discord in nature.

This truth is indeed self-evident from the definition of happiness which was laid down. Happiness was described as 'an activity of the soul according to virtue in a complete life.' As for other goods, they are partly bodily, resulting from the body itself, and partly incidental to the body; and of these some are necessary with a view to happiness, and others are, as it were, instrumental to it. Necessary goods are bodily health and the sustaining of life, and those things in lack of which it is impossible for happiness to be completely realized. Instrumental goods are such helps as wealth or friends. If, then, this is the definition of happiness, how could it possibly have its source and cause in *chance?* An activity of the soul cannot result from chance.

Hence what was said of 'the end' of Social Science is consistent with this definition. We said that 'the end' of Social Science was the Chief Good, and therefore happiness (*i.e.*, the realization of the Chief Good) was to be found thereby. It is then with good reason that we assert that neither horse nor ox nor any mere animal is 'happy,' since not one of such creatures is there able to participate in the activities of social life; and for this very reason neither is a child happy, since, that is, by reason of his tender age, he is incapable of performing moral or *social* acts. When children are called happy, it is because they are complimented on account of the hopes formed of them: the essential conditions of virtue are, as we have shown, virtue and a complete life.

I say that an 'harmonious life' is essential, because there are many reverses and all kinds of vicissitudes which befall men in the course of their lives. It is quite conceivable for a man who is in the very highest degree of prosperity to encounter storms of adversity as he nears old age, as in the myth which is told of Priam, in the heroic poems; and when a man has met with misfortunes such as these and has died in wretchedness, no one counts him happy.

III.—Is Happiness still possible for a Man, so long as sorrow may overtake him or his friends?

(*a*) SOLON'S VIEW VARIOUSLY STATED AND CRITICISED: THE AMBIGUITIES OF IT.

In view of possible calamities, is anyone happy in life, or not until death?

Is there then no man in all the world whom we may count happy, so long as he is yet alive, but rather, as Solon's dictum is, must we wait to see his end?

Suppose the case to be so:—still, is it true in fact that a man is happy even when he is dead? Is not that an utterly inconsistent view for us to take—that there should be happiness in *death,* more particularly as we define happiness to be a mode of conscious *activity*?

Yet if happiness be a virtuous activity, and death be annihilation, how can a man be happy in death?

Suppose another case, and that we say—not

that the dead man is happy, and that such is not the idea which Solon intends, but rather that not until his death can we safely *count* a man to have been happy, as being only then out of reach of evil and sorrow; this opens up a new difficulty. It is thought that even to a dead man there is a kind of good and evil: just as good or evil may befall a man in his lifetime without his being conscious of it: for example, honours and disgraces, successes and misfortunes, to his children and generally to his descendants.

But suppose that death is *not* annihilation: the consciousness of the departed will be afflicted by the sorrows of their friends on earth.

This latter view again presents a difficulty. A man who has lived happily until old age, and who has died as he has lived, may still encounter many reverses in his descendants: some of them may be good and find a life in accordance with their deserts, others again may experience the contrary. Clearly, then, it is quite conceivable for men, in their different degrees of relationship to their ancestors, to stand in all kinds of attitudes to them. But that the dead also should be conscious of all these vicissitudes, and change their own lot at every alternation of that of their friends, becoming at one moment happy and at another wretched—that would be a monstrous fate. Yet assuredly it would be none the less monstrous if we took the other alternative—that the fortunes of descendants do not for the very least moment penetrate to ancestors.

This latter supposition seems monstrous:—that the dead should be conscious and that their happiness should be as fluctuating as that of their descendants on earth. Still, equally monstrous would be the supposition that death is *un*consciousness.

But let us revert to the problem as originally stated: the question now raised may perhaps be explained by the light of it.

Assuming then that it is necessary 'to see the end,' and not till then *count a man happy* (not on the score of his actual happiness, but because he has once been happy), surely it is absurd that while a man *is* happy, the existence of his happiness should not be credited to him, merely from a dislike to congratulate the living from apprehension of possible reverses, or from having formed a conception that happiness is something abiding and by no means susceptible of change, whereas fortune is constantly alternating and reversing her position even in the lifetime of the same individuals. If we are to follow in the wake of fortune we shall clearly have to call the same person at one time wretched, at another time happy, revealing the happy man to be as changeful

There is surely no reason why those who *are* happy should not be *called* happy . . . at any rate provisionally.

as a chameleon, and one whose condition rests on an insecure foundation.

Is it right, then, to call any human being happy whilst he is still alive, or ought we rather 'to see the end' as Solon warns us.

Suppose we assume this principle of Solon: will a man be really happy even when he is dead? Is not such a principle quite absurd, that a man should gain his happiness by dying—especially as happiness was defined to be 'a mode of activity?' The inference from such a principle would evidently be that happiness consists in absolute *inaction!*

But suppose we state the case thus—that neither we ourselves nor Solon count the dead man happy on account of his having died, but because his life has been a life of blessedness right to the end, and because after a man's death one could safely count him happy, as being henceforth out of the reach of evils and misfortunes.

Yet not even does this solution appear satisfactory. There is still a difficulty herein . . . if we admit that to the dead man as to the living there is any kind of good or evil, and that he is conscious of it. Such an one will experience various phases of joy and sorrow, disgrace and honour. The successes of descendants and children are put down to the account of the dead, to swell their felicity. Consequently the dead are happy and blessed on the score of the happiness of their descendants, and miserable on the score of their misfortunes.

This latter view again raises a still further difficulty. A man may have lived his own life happily, and have died a death in harmony with his life; and yet it is possible for many reverses to befall him in regard to his descendants, and for some of them to be good and to enjoy a life suitable to their deserts, and for others to be the reverse. It would however be a monstrous thing if the dead man's lot were to vary with every variation in the fortunes of his descendants, and to become at one moment happy, at another moment miserable. On the other hand it seems an equally irrational view that the living should not impart their fortune to those who are departed and are bound to them by nearness of race.

But let us revert to the question as originally raised, and ask whether we ought not to count men happy whilst living, but only after their decease. The question which has since arisen may perhaps be elucidated by means thereof.

If, then, it be necessary 'to see the end' and not till then count a man happy (not as though he were happy through having died, but because he was so formerly), surely it is absurd that whilst he *is* happy, the quality which actually belongs to him should not be credited to him, but that we should shrink from calling him really happy, from an unwillingness to call the living happy and from having regard to the misfortunes of life, or from having formed a conviction that happiness is something abiding and least of all things subject to change, whereas fortune is the entire opposite. But if we follow in the wake of fortune, we shall have to call the same man, time after time, now happy and now miserable, making the happy man to appear as changeful as the hues of a chameleon, or as one whose happiness rests on a rotten foundation.

(*b*) SOLON'S DICTUM DISPROVED BECAUSE THE *MAIN* ELEMENT IN HAPPINESS IS A VIRTUOUS ACTIVITY WHICH IS WITHIN A MAN'S OWN POWER.

Solon's dictum is in fact inconsistent

Yet surely it is in no sense a right conclusion to say that our happiness follows the course of fortune's caprice. Not upon fortune does it depend whether we pass

our life well or ill—though for its completeness our human existence requires, as we have shown, certain external advantages. What determines our happiness is the exercise of our powers in conformity with virtue; what causes our misery is the exercise of our powers in the practice of evil.

with the essential idea of happiness as 'a development of the faculties.'

This view of happiness is corroborated by the above argument concerning the insecurity of fortune. Stability is a property found in association with no performances of man so closely as it is with the activities regulated by virtue. These virtuous activities are thought to be more stable than even the sciences: and those of them which are most revered have this quality of 'permanence' in the highest degree, because the blessed live out their lives in the exercise thereof in the highest intensity and with the least intermission. This fact seems the cause why no forgetfulness is possible in regard thereto.

Whatever be a man's outward lot, the 'exercise of his faculties according to virtue' has a stability and permanence of its own.

Accordingly this quality of 'permanence,' of which we are in quest, will be found in the happy man, and he will continue happy all his life through. Incessantly, or more than anything else, he will continue in the practice and study of the laws of virtue. As for the accidents of fortune, he will bear their shock with perfect heroism and in a manner that is thoroughly consonant with his character, as being assuredly a man who is genuinely good and whose life is 'foursquare and flawless.'

There is, therefore, nothing so permanent as the happiness which virtue entails.

In reply to this last objection we may say that it is in no sense right that our happiness should follow the course of fortune's caprice; nor is it the fact that it does. Happiness does not consist in the gifts of fortune, nor misery in the want of those gifts, though for its completeness human existence requires them, as we have shown. But the essence or real character of happiness does not depend upon such things, but upon the development of the powers in accordance with virtue, as has been premised.

Happiness of course must be a thing which is permanent; and therefore cannot possibly consist in the gifts which come from fortune. The whole scope of the Inquiry which we set before us from the first is in confirmation of this view. Our Inquiry took its start from the assumption which was laid down, that happiness is something *abiding*. But among all the creations of man there is no such stability found as in the exercise of our powers in conformity with virtue wherein happiness consists. Virtuous activities are in fact found to be more abiding even than the pursuits of science; and among these moral excellences, again, those which are most precious are those which are most abiding, for the very reason that the blessed live a life of highest intensity, and of most perfect repose in the exercise thereof, their employment in the practice of virtue never being interrupted even for the slightest moment owing to the charm and delight which such a mode of life entails, as I have shown. For this reason also men never suffer forgetfulness of a virtuous consciousness.

Since, therefore, happiness does not consist in fortune, but in actions which

are in accordance with virtue, the required conditions will all be found in the happy man: his 'good' will be a permanent good, and he will be happy all his life long. Incessantly, or more than aught else, he will meditate in heart and realize in conduct truths in accord with the law of right. As for the threats of fortune, he will take up his stand against them; and he will not feel his moral attitude reversed when circumstances are adverse to him. Whatever misfortune may light upon him, he will bear it in the noblest and most seemly manner, being as he is a man of genuine goodness, 'a perfect square,' with a character faultless at every point.

(*c*) STILL FORTUNE HAS A CERTAIN INFLUENCE, THOUGH IT BE A SUBORDINATE ONE, UPON HAPPINESS.

Circumstances cannot create; so neither can they utterly destroy happiness.

But as there are many things which happen in the way of fortune and which differ in their relative importance or insignificance, such as are trifling, whether as successes or as reverses, clearly do not change the balance of a man's life. On the other hand, things important and constant, when they turn out auspiciously, will make a man's life happier still (since they are of a nature to heighten the lustre of life, and the employment of his advantages becomes a source of honour and credit to the possessor). When, on the contrary, a man's circumstances take an adverse turn, they mar and disfigure his happiness: for they put upon him a burden of sorrow, and interfere with many of his activities. Nevertheless, even in adversity a man's true worth shines through the gloom of his surroundings, when he bears calmly and patiently many and sore afflictions, not because he is insensible to them, but as being a man stout-hearted and noble-minded.

Happiness can never be completely lost so long as a man continues virtuous.

No one, then, who is happy will become miserable, if the causes which govern life be—not fortune, but the exercise of a man's own powers, as we have shown. [*Life being synonymous with activity, and a happy life with a virtuous activity*] the happy man, being also a virtuous man, will never do aught that could make him unhappy—he will never commit deeds disgraceful or hateful.

The virtuous man gives a 'happy turn' even to most adverse circumstances: he is happy in spite of circumstances—unless his sufferings are incessant and appalling, in which case he may be crushed by them.

In fact, the idea that we have of a man who is genuinely good and of sound discretion is, that he bears all the accidents of life with dignity and grace, and acts invariably in the most noble manner to the extent of the means in his power and as circumstances admit; just as a skilful General avails himself of his existing forces with all the strategy of war, or as a good shoemaker makes the finest pair of shoes possible with the materials

at his command, and so on with artists generally. If this be true, the happy man can never become miserable, though certainly he will not be perfectly happy if he comes to be involved in sorrows like those of Priam. Yet of course he is not at any rate changeful, nor is he easily swayed to and fro: he will not lightly be dispossessed of his happiness, certainly not by ordinary misfortunes, but if at all, only by great and manifold sufferings. So too, after great trials, such a man will not regain his happiness in a short time, but, if ever, in the course only of a long career presenting an unbroken harmony to his activities, in which he has gained great honours and dignities.

But as there are many things which result from fortune, some of them being serious and others trifling, such as are trifling for weal or woe will not cause trouble nor anxiety to the good man, nor bring any change into his life. But when the changes of circumstance are numerous and important, if on the one hand they are tokens of prosperity, they will make his life one of greater blessedness: they add to the charm and lustre of happiness, since the good man turns them to the noblest and most beautiful uses. If on the other hand these changes are disastrous, they harass and mar the condition of his blessedness, and are hindrances to the play of many of his faculties. Nevertheless even in affliction the nobility of his character flashes through the gloom, when a man bears calmly and patiently many grave misfortunes, not through insensibility or callousness, but as being one who is stout-hearted and noble-minded.

No one, indeed, of the happy can ever become unhappy—if it be true that happiness has its essence in the activities which are in accord with virtue: in other words, no one who is blessed will ever act in such a way as to bring about unhappiness to himself: will never commit, that is, actions disgraceful and evil which alone can cause unhappiness.

Indeed the idea which we all entertain of a man who is of sound discretion and genuine goodness, is that he will bear all chances and changes with befitting dignity. Just as the best workman displays the genius of his special art in common, ordinary material, and as a General manages the forces at his disposal, though they be inadequate, with the utmost strategy; and as a clever shoemaker works the finest sandal from the materials given him, and all artists, likewise, in their special crafts; precisely so the happy man will not always expect 'the favouring tide and prosperous breeze,' but will ever perform noblest deeds to the extent that his existing opportunities admit. For this reason the happy man will never become miserable, but will simply be 'not happy' so far as fortune is concerned, should he encounter afflictions like those of Priam. Yet of course he will not be shifting nor prone to change: he will not easily be dispossessed of his happiness, and never by ordinary misfortunes, though perhaps he may be if they are serious and repeated. Not even by dire affliction will he be easily dispossessed. Moreover, even when relieved from the strain of affliction, not in a short time will he revert to that state of perfect good from which he has even slightly deviated, since he is a man not easily changed from one thing to another. Still after a long interval he may become happy again, if he has meanwhile achieved great triumphs and dignities.

(*d*) HAPPINESS IS, THEREFORE, WITHIN OUR OWN CONTROL, BUT SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS OF OUR MORTALITY.

What reason, then, is there to prevent our calling a man happy if he is developing a life in conformity with perfect virtue, and is

sufficiently provided with external goods, and that, not for a casual period, but for his whole lifetime? . . . or must we add the limitation, 'who shall continue the even tenor of his life and shall die a death in harmony therewith?' Such a limitation is necessary, because the future is a thing hidden from us, whereas we assert happiness to be 'an end,' and a thing under all aspects 'complete and final in itself.'

The main conclusion, therefore, is that a man may be happy and may be called happy even in this life, but his happiness is subject to the mutability of all things human.

If this view be the true one, we may call all men blessed even in their lifetime, when the conditions here described are realized by them and continue to be realized until the end. But their blessedness will be such only as is possible for *man*.

These limitations may suffice to define the influence of external circumstances upon the attainment of happiness.

What reason, then, is there to prevent our calling a man of this stamp happy when he is developing a life in accord with perfect virtue, a man who, if he has met with misfortune in his outward career, will come back again to prosperity—a man, moreover, who is amply furnished with external resources, and that not for a casual period but until his death, and one who shall pass his whole life in this spirit and die a death in harmony therewith? [I only add the condition of 'external goods' because happiness is the consummation of all human concerns and interests, and for this reason ought to be a *perfect* good, and one deficient in no single particular.]

If these conditions be fulfilled, we need not wait until their death to call the happy by their rightful name; but we may call all men happy in whose life the qualities enumerated above are found and continue until the end, and we may call them happy in their own lifetime. But they will be happy only as it is possible for men to be, with a *human* happiness—a happiness, that is, which does not admit of the realization of 'the good' in an absolutely perfect form.

Thus much only need be said to show that we ought to *call* men happy if they are happy, in their own lifetime.

iv.—Is Happiness possible for man after his decease; or do the sorrows of earth still pursue him?

Now, in regard to the influence which the fortunes of our descendants and of our friends generally have upon us, to say that they do not contribute in any degree whatever to our condition hereafter, is evidently a misanthropic view and repugnant to the beliefs of men.

But what of the condition of men after their decease? Is their happiness heightened or diminished by the fortunes of their friends on earth?

But as the fortunes which befall men are manifold and present all kinds of aspects, some reaching further home than others, to distinguish each kind in detail

would evidently be a tedious and interminable task: it will be sufficient for our purpose if the distinction be drawn broadly and in outline.

If, therefore, the case as it affects one's friends is parallel to the case of the sorrows which befall one's own self, some things entailing heavy affliction and exerting a powerful influence upon life, whilst other trials resemble things of lighter burden; and if, moreover, afflictions differ severally on this point, whether they happen in the case of the living or of the dead, the difference being much greater than that between horrors openly enacted, and horrors assumed to have happened, on the stage—we must of course take these considerations into account in forming our judgment on the question at issue. Perhaps, indeed, we ought rather to argue out the prior question which arises in regard to the departed, whether they continue or not to share in earthly good or evil. Looking at the arguments stated above, it would seem that even if anything does penetrate to the dead, whether good or evil, it does so in a degree trifling and slight (either absolutely or relatively to their condition), or if not that, yet it is only of so much consequence and of such a character as not to make happy those who are unhappy, nor to take away their felicity from the blessed.

Two points must be taken into consideration: — the relative importance of a misfortune, and the difference between being the victim of a calamity and hearing indirectly of it.

To a certain extent, then, the fortunes of those whom they loved in life seem to contribute to the felicity of the departed; and their misfortunes seem to detract from that felicity; yet only in such a manner and only to such a degree as not to render the happy unhappy, nor to produce any such absolute influence upon their lot.

Earthly calamities cannot weigh so heavily upon the departed as to change their lot from happiness to misery, nor *vice versâ*.

We must now reply to that other question which was raised—whether the condition of the blessed will appear to them less blissful from their descendants or friends falling into sorrow on earth. As for the view that nothing, whether good or evil, penetrates to the blessed from their posterity, or from those who are in any way related to them,—that is a misanthropic theory and at variance with the feelings of mankind, since man is a social and sympathetic being; nay more, it is contrary to universal belief, since it is agreed by all men that the interests of their friends are common also to themselves.

But as the accidents which befall the relatives of the blessed dead are various, and present every kind of phase, some contributing more and others less to happiness—to distinguish these various degrees of fortune in detail seems to be a vast and interminable task: it will be sufficient for our purpose if we distinguish them broadly, and, as it were, in outline. We will then discriminate between these various kinds of misfortune upon the same principle as those which befall the blessed in their own lifetime, and assume that certain circumstances are great and important, and have great influence upon life, whilst others are trifling and of

less consequence. There is, moreover, a further difference between the circumstances which befall relatives whilst the fortunate ones are still alive, and those which befall them after their death—a difference quite as great as is presented by crimes designed and carried out on the stage, and crimes assumed as having been already enacted, of which these representations are but shadows. We must, therefore, examine into this distinction. Better still is it that we should consider whether the blessed after their decease share with their relatives the vicissitudes of their fortunes. It is certainly evident that, even if aught reaches to them from their relatives, whether good or bad, it is trifling and slight, either as being so in its own nature, or because it is so relatively to their condition, even though it be found to be great on earth, because the blessed are no longer living a human life. But though earthly wants exercise a kind of influence, yet that influence is not of an extent nor of a character to make those happy who are unhappy, nor to take away their blessedness from such as are happy.

The inference is that there is a sympathy penetrating from the living to the dead, yet that the character and extent of that influence is such as in no wise to bring about a change in the condition of the departed.

v.—Is Happiness a thing of absolute or of relative value?

What rank does happiness take in our esteem? Is it a good that is creditable or a good that is adorable?

Now that these questions have been decided, let us further investigate the question whether happiness belongs to the class of things which are worthy of praise, or to the class of things which are honoured for their own sake.

It is not a merely potential good.

[It is obvious, of course, that happiness is not at any rate one of those things which are indeterminate and potential.]

Nor, again, a merely 'creditable' or 'praiseworthy good,' because praise implies a standard of reference higher than the thing praised.

Now it is quite evident that any object which obtains praise, earns that praise from the fact of its possessing certain qualities, or from bearing a certain relation to a certain standard. For example, we praise the just man, and the brave man, and generally the virtuous man, and virtue herself, on account of the actions and effects which result therefrom; and in the same way we praise the strong man, and the swift runner and athletes generally, from the fact of their possessing severally certain natural gifts, and bearing a certain relation to what is good and excellent.

This truth is palpable also from the case of praises offered to the Gods. They are made to appear ridiculous when referred to a human standard; and this is a result owing to the fact that praises are bestowed, as I have explained, relatively to a perfect ideal.

But if praise has reference to a higher standard, it is clear that it does not belong to what is highest and most excellent, but implies a something greater and better than the thing praised; as in fact is obvious. We do not praise what is beyond all praise—

i.e., the Gods: we count them blessed and happy, and we only count men blessed in the degree of their 'nearness to God.' Similarly also in regard to what is 'good:' no man praises happiness as he would do justice; but he calls happiness a state of blessedness as something grander and more divine.

I think, also, that the arguments by which Eudoxus pleaded the cause of pleasure for the highest place among 'goods,' might apply here. He thought the fact that pleasure is not praised (as being itself 'a good,') proved it to be better than things which *are* praised; and the only things of a similar character to pleasure are, he argued, God and the summum bonum, everything else being referred to these as a standard of value.

In fact, praise implies merit; and is its proper meed. By praise, men are stirred to the performance of noble deeds, and such eulogies extend equally to the achievements of the body and the conquests of the mind.

But, perhaps, the task of laying down precise rules upon these subjects is more suitable for those who have laboured upon the composition of panegyrics.

To my own mind, however, it is clear, for the reasons stated above, that happiness is one of those things which are honourable for their own sake, and are complete and perfect in themselves. Among other reasons it seems to me to hold this supreme rank from the fact of its being an ultimate principle: it is for the sake of happiness that we perform all the actions of our lives, and that which is an ultimate principle and the cause of what is good, we rank as something honourable and divine.

Happiness is its own ideal and a thing above all praise. Therefore it is a thing reverenced for its own sake.

Now that these questions have been decided, we may proceed to examine whether happiness be one of the faculties, or one of those things which are worthy of praise, or one of those things which are honoured for their own sake.

α. 'Faculties' are the mental states or aptitudes for the arts; as the faculty of the pilot's or physician's art is the possession of power to steer a boat or to heal a disease. *β.* Things praiseworthy are such as have actually succeeded, things which, having come to the test of action, are found good. *γ.* Things reverenced are such as are divine, and transcend the common ken.

Such being the mutual relations of these three classes of things, we must inquire to which of them happiness belongs.

1. It is certainly not a faculty. Happiness is a perfect good, whereas a faculty is a thing imperfect. Moreover, happiness is not a thing to be included amongst a multitude of others, as a faculty is, there being many kinds of faculties. Happiness, therefore, is not a faculty.

2. Nor assuredly is it among things which are praiseworthy. A thing is praised simply for having a share in some good. We praise the just and the brave, and in fact, all good men, and virtue itself, on account of their sharing in a certain

quality of good, and from their having a defined relation in regard to something good and excellent. For this reason it is ridiculous to *praise* the Gods: to praise them is to bring them down to our own level—an anomaly consequent on the fact that praises are bestowed in view of the comparison they imply, and the relation they make between the thing praised and a standard of 'good.'

Such, then, is the character of things which are praised; but happiness does not bear this character, being, as it is, itself the Summum Bonum and the highest end of man. Praise is not applicable to the Summum Bonum nor to the 'highest end.' The Summum Bonum cannot be referred to the standard of any other good. For this reason we do not *praise* the Gods, but call them blessed and happy; and in the same rank we account men to be when they are most 'like to the Gods,' and also those 'goods' which are goods in their own right, such as is happiness. No one praises happiness as one does justice; but we account it a thing blessed, as being more God-like and excellent than ourselves.

3. Since, then, things which are praiseworthy are praised on account of some good 'end' which they serve, whereas happiness is not referred to any 'end' because it is in itself the supreme end, happiness cannot be classed among things which are praiseworthy.

The only alternative is, that happiness is one of those things to which reverence is paid. In this view of it Eudoxus also coincides. Being desirous of proving that pleasure is the Chief Good and 'an end-in-itself,' he maintained that his view of it was confirmed by the fact that pleasure does not belong to things which are praised, but is more excellent than they, being, as it is, 'an end in itself.' Of a similar nature, he said, was God and the Summum Bonum; and that it was with reference to them as to a standard that all other things were compared, so as to be called 'good' and to be worthy of praise.

In fact virtue is praised because in consequence thereof men become capable of performing good and noble deeds. In the same way, actions which are virtuous are the subjects of encomium, whether they be owing to bodily strength or to mental power, because they tend to some good 'end.' But happiness cannot be praised, since it does not tend to any good 'end' beyond itself, being, as has been shown, itself the ultimate 'end' of man.

However, to treat of encomia and praises, and to define to whom they are applicable, is not within the scope of our subject, but belongs more naturally to others to explain. Confining ourselves to the subject immediately before us, it is clear that happiness is one of those things to which reverence is paid, and which are perfect in themselves. It is clear also that happiness is the principle or source and cause of all else being good, since we have it in view in all the actions of our lives. But the thing which is the principle and cause of all other goods we call precious and divine.

V.—CLASSIFICATION OF VIRTUES BASED UPON AN ANALYSIS OF THE SOUL.

i.—Importance of a knowledge of Virtue.

To understand fully the nature of happiness, we must examine the nature of virtue—a subject of special importance in practical statesmanship.

Now since happiness is 'a mode of the soul's activity in harmony with perfect *virtue*,' we must further consider the nature of virtue: we shall perchance gain thereby a better insight into the nature of happiness.

This subject is one upon which all genuine statesmen seem to have spent greater pains than

upon any other, from the desire which they have felt to render the citizens virtuous and obedient to the laws. As examples of men of this high purpose, we may take the lawgivers of the Cretans, and those of the Lacedemonians and others like-minded, who have written in other States.

If this subject, then, is one which concerns the Science of civil life, it is clear that the examination of it will come within the purpose which we assumed at starting.

Now since happiness is 'a conscious exercise of the human faculties in harmony with perfect virtue' we must further consider the nature of virtue: the examination of it will render more distinct our theory of happiness. This is clearly a subject which all genuine statesmen must consider, from the desire which they must feel to render the citizens virtuous and obedient to the laws, as the legislators of the Cretans and Lacedemonians and others like-minded in the ancient States have done.

Hence it is evident that an 'Inquiry concerning virtue' will be consequent upon the scope originally laid down for our Treatise; *i.e.* 'the end of the Science of civil life.'

HUMAN VIRTUES HAVE THEIR SEAT IN THE DIVISIONS OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

But the virtue into which we have to examine, is a virtue proper and peculiar to *man;* precisely as 'the good' of which we went in quest was a human good, and its consequent happiness was such as is possible for man.

Psychology is the proper basis of the study of the virtues.

By 'virtue proper to man' I mean not the excellence of the body but the excellence of the *soul*, just as by 'happiness' I mean an activity of the soul. If this be so, it clearly behoves the statesman to know to some extent the workings of the *soul*, just as the oculist who undertakes the cure of the eye should know also the economy of the whole body, and with greater reason, as the aim of statesmanship is far more precious and more excellent than that of medicine. Yet all physicians of repute study long and deep to gain a knowledge of the body.

The statesman must therefore study the nature of the soul, limiting his investigations however to practical utility and to the extent which is sufficient for his particular purpose.

We must, therefore, examine the nature of virtue—the virtue of course which is proper to man, since the happiness or perfection of which we went in search at starting was a perfection of *man*.

Now since the special excellence of man is not an excellence of the body but of the mind or soul (indeed we define happiness as an activity of the *soul*), and since the excellence into which the statesman inquires is a *human* excellence, it is evident that he ought to know how the economy of the soul is constituted. In the same way it is essential that one who is to treat successfully an eye-disease should have a knowledge of the whole body. But even more than the physician, it is

right that the statesman should understand the phænomena of the soul in proportion as statesmanship is more excellent and of higher worth than is the art of healing. Yet all physicians of repute labour earnestly to gain a knowledge of the body, so that it is only reasonable that statesmen also should understand the condition of the soul; yet we need not carry our speculations further than may suffice to elucidate the theory of virtue.

ii.—Division of the Soul into (1) Rational and (2) Irrational.

Popular classification of the soul into 'rational' and 'non-rational' may be adopted here.

To examine the psychology of the subject with any minuteness would be a superfluous task and beyond the scope of the present Treatise. The bearings of the subject are sufficiently explained in my Public Lectures; and the conclusions there drawn may be adopted here.

It is, for example, admitted that 'part of the soul is irrational, and part contains reason.' It is immaterial for our present purpose whether these two parts are distinct and separable from one another, like the different members of the body, and as everything is which can be broken up into separate parts; or whether they are only distinguishable logically and in thought, being physically and in their own nature inseparable, just as much as the concave and convex in the circumference of a circle.

To elaborate a scientific theory of soul, and to exhibit its wider issues, would be beyond the scope of our purpose. I have already treated of psychology, not only in various compilations but also *viva voce* with those whom I have met in discussion; and I will here adopt some of the conclusions at which we have arrived.

I premise then that there are two divisions of the soul, one rational, the other irrational. But as for the question whether these parts are separable and distinct from one another, as the parts of the body are, and as other things are which can be broken up into their component elements, or whether they are in fact one and only logically distinct (like the concave and convex in the circumference of a circle, which are in reality one and in their nature inseparable though differing in definition, that of the concave being one thing, that of the convex another)—this is a question which tends in no way to the elucidation of the problem before us.

iii.—Subdivision of the Irrational Element into (*α*) Nutritive and (*β*) Emotional.

The 'nutritive' element in the 'non-rational' part of the soul may be dismissed as outside our scope.

But in the irrational part of the soul there is one element resembling a property common to all organized life and which is merely vegetative—I refer to that which is the cause of receiving nourishment and growth—such a power of soul as one would attribute to all creatures capable of increase, and even to animals in the fœtus, a power identical

also in creatures which are full-grown (since it is more natural to believe that this latter power is identical with the power of increase, rather than diverse).

The excellence of this part of the soul is, however, evidently an excellence common to all organized life, and not one special to man. Indeed the nutritive part of the soul and the nutritive power itself seems to be most active in time of sleep; but during sleep the good man is not in the very least distinguishable from the bad man; and hence the proverb that 'for half their days the happy differ nowise from the wretched.' This is but a natural consequence, sleep being the repose of the soul in so far as it is said to be good or bad:—except that to some slight extent certain emotions penetrate into it, and in that way the dreams of the good are purer than those of ordinary persons.

But enough of these speculations. We may omit the nutritive part of the soul from our consideration, since it is of a nature foreign to the special excellence of man.

We will now proceed to speak of the irrational part of the soul. In this division there is one element which is vegetative—I am alluding to the power of nutrition and of growth which is common to all plants and animals. This power indeed is found in all things capable of growth and even in embryos, and it is this self-same power which is found in creatures who are full grown (for it would be absurd to suppose it to be any other).

In this faculty, however, it is impossible to detect the excellence of *man* in the proper sense of the term: its excellence is shared by all organized life. Indeed this power of increase and of growth is of a nature to operate even when men are asleep, and more so then than at any other time; but the special excellence of man is of a very different character from that. The good man is never so little distinguishable from the bad man as when asleep; and for this reason men say that 'for half their days the happy are in no wise different from the wretched,' that is, during the period of sleep. There is good reason in the proverb, sleep being inaction both to the good and to the vicious soul. Only one may say so much—that the slumbers of the good are purer and better than those of the bad; since the physical inclinations of the daytime penetrate in a sense even to sleep; and hence 'the visions of the night' assume a healthier form to the good than to common mortals.

But enough of these speculations: sufficient to have shown that the nutritive part of the soul is devoid of that *human* excellence with which our business lies.

iv.—Subdivision of the Rational Soul into (1) Emotional and (2) Intellectual.

But there seems to be another part of the soul which is irrational and yet has in some sense a share of reason.

We praise the reason as well of the man whose character is weak and immature, as of the man whose will is strong and whose character is formed. We praise also that part of the soul which is the special seat of reason; since reason is man's true

The other element of the 'non-rational' soul is 'emotional,' which is nevertheless receptive of reason, and capable of

'good impressions.' It is thus '*semi-rational*'—sometimes resisting, sometimes assimilating reason.

guardian and incites him to whatever is noble. Yet there is evidently both in the strong and in the weak character, a tendency to transgress reason—a force that is at variance and conflict with reason. In fact it is with the soul as with paralysed parts of the body: when men assay to move to the right they swing to the left, contrary to the force exerted. But in the case of bodies, we *see* the thing that is borne in the wrong direction: in the case of the soul there is nothing that we can see. None the less however we may be quite assured that there is in the soul an element contrary to reason, thwarting its influence and moving in an opposite direction to it. It is immaterial to discuss *how* this conflict arises.

Yet even this irrational part of the soul seems to have a share in reason, as I have said. At any rate in the case of the strong and matured character this element is obedient to reason; and in the case of the brave and temperate man the character is submissive to reason to an even greater degree, in their case every element of their nature being perfectly attuned to reason.

Consequently the irrational part of the soul is also seen to be two-fold. The nutritive element has no part nor lot in reason, but the emotional and appetitive element and generally that part which is the seat of impulse, does share in reason in a certain sense;—in so far, that is, as it is submissive and obedient to reason. With this view we say in common language that we 'admit the reasons' of our friends, or of our father (*i.e.* submit to their guidance), but that in a very different sense from that in which we 'admit the reasons' of mathematical demonstrations. [*In the former case the will and the character are parties to the assent: in the latter case the reason only.*]

The statement that 'the irrational element is somehow under the control of the reason' is further proved by the moral appeals which men make, and by the various sorts of reprimand and exhortation.

If then we must admit that the emotional element of the soul also involves reason, the rational part of the soul will also be two-fold—one part absolutely and in its own right, the other part being attentive and deferential to reason as to the advice of a father.

But there is another power or tendency in the soul not in every respect irrational (as the one first mentioned was) but in a way participating in reason, and even entering into conflict with it. On this account we sometimes praise the reason of the strong-minded man, and sometimes that of the weak-minded man, since both hold out against a force opposed to them—in the one case as long as is right, and

in the other case at any rate up to a certain point. Hence there is evidently another power within them which contends and struggles against reason. In simple truth, just as paralytic parts of the body, when men strive to move them to the right, swing contrariwise back to the left, so is it also in regard to the soul. The impulses in men of weak character bear them back in a direction contrary to the suggestions of reason. But in the case of bodies we see the part that is strained back; whereas in the soul there is nothing that we can see. Still though this moral struggle is not seen with the eyes, it is a real fact, and we must take it into our consideration that there is a power within the soul besides reason, opposed to it, and in conflict with it. To describe the mode in which this conflict takes place is immaterial to the purpose which we have in hand.

Yet this element also has unmistakeably a share of reason, as we have shown, in so far as it is obedient to reason. This irrational element (I mean the impulsive or appetitive part of the soul) is guided and governed by the reason of the strong-minded man: even more easily controlled and influenced is it by the reason of the temperate and brave man in whose character every element is in perfect accord with reason.

Accordingly it is evident that the irrational part of the soul is twofold. In one respect it is absolutely irrational, as the principle of vegetation, of growth and of nutrition. In the other aspect it participates in reason up to a certain point, as the principle of impulse and desire—a principle which participates in reason in so far as it is submissive and obedient thereto. That this irrational part is to a certain extent governed by reason is a fact rendered evident by the counsels and exhortations and reproaches which are addressed to it; and by means of which many of our irrational inclinations are brought to order.

But a man is said to 'share in reason' in a double sense, just as he is said to 'have reason.' We speak of a man 'admitting the reasons' of his father or friends—*i.e.* betaking himself to them and following the advice which they give. We speak also of a man 'admitting the reasons' of mathematical demonstrations, *i.e.* comprehending their meaning and having knowledge or scientific perception of them. In an exactly similar way a man is said to '*share* in reason' in a double sense. In one respect he is said to 'share in reason' absolutely and in his own right just like the purely intellectual part of the soul. In another sense a man is said to share in reason on account of his being submissive to reason, in the way in which one is submissive to his father.

v.—Corresponding division of Virtue into Moral and Intellectual.

Corresponding with this division of the soul is the division of virtue into distinct forms. We say that certain virtues are moral, and that certain others are intellectual—wisdom, insight, and prudence for instance being intellectual, liberality and temperance moral. In speaking of a man's moral nature we do not say that he is philosophic or that he has insight, but that he is gentle and temperate; though we praise the student of philosophy too in respect of his mental powers. But whatever states of mind are praiseworthy we call virtues.

Accordingly the virtues are either (1) purely rational (*i.e.*, *intellectual*), or (2) semi-rational (*i.e.*, emotional or *moral*).

Corresponding with this division of the soul is the classification of virtue into distinct forms. We say that certain virtues which belong to the rational part of the soul are intellectual virtues, and that certain others which belong to the

impulsive or appetitive part of the soul are moral virtues. The intellectual virtues are such as philosophy, insight, and prudence; and the moral virtues such as liberality and temperance. When we speak of a man's moral nature, we do not say that he is philosophic or that he has comprehension, but that he is, for instance, gentle and temperate; though we praise the student of philosophy in respect of the excellence of his mental habit, which is in fact a virtue. For whatever states of mind are praiseworthy we call virtues.

BOOK II.—THEORY OF VIRTUE.

INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS.

I.—GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MORAL VIRTUE.

In the preceding book we sketched a definition of human perfection which implied that virtue was its main element. We stated at the conclusion of the book that virtue was two-fold, moral and intellectual.

But moral and intellectual virtue cannot be treated of together: they have a different origin and a different sphere. The important element in intellectual virtue is knowledge; in moral virtue, training or discipline.

Reserving intellectual virtue to a later book, let us proceed with our analysis of moral virtue.

It is necessary, first of all, to show the origin of moral virtue. How is it produced? Is it dependent upon Divine Providence, or is it the gift of Nature, or is it the result of our own efforts?

i. Proofs are, therefore, first given in support of the view (α) that moral virtue does not depend upon Nature; (β) that it is capable of being engendered by human effort; and (γ) that it is consolidated into habit by the help of daily discipline.

In brief, the arguments are as follows:—

1. What exists through a fixed constitution of Nature cannot be reversed or made spontaneously to change its character. But, in fact, moral qualities lose their character or acquire a fresh one through education and other influences. Therefore they are not the expression of unalterable law.

2. Nature, indeed, gives us certain capabilities, but these capabilities are unformed and indeterminate: education is necessary to mould them into shape. Nature does not effect her purpose *per se*, but requires our own co-operation to supplement her work.

3. Natural qualities exist prior to and independent of exercise. But *moral* qualities are only brought into existence by exercise. We have to learn how to be virtuous by practising the virtues.

4. All legislation assumes human responsibility, and is an appeal to our moral freedom. Assuming that man *can* be educated, and ought to be educated, legislation aims at producing a system of universal training. Yet training and education would be idle and useless if fatalism were true, and men were *born* good or evil.

5. Further, if acts repeated form a tendency or 'habit,' and if every such act necessarily bears a character that is moral or immoral, our habits will reflect the character of the acts which formed them, and will be either moral or immoral. But the acts are under our own control: therefore also the moral tendencies which we make habitual to us, will be under our own control also. By accustoming ourselves, therefore, to the practice of brave acts, we *grow* to be brave; and by accustoming ourselves to acts of self-denial, we grow to be self-controlled. Virtue is therefore not innate but acquired.

The conclusion seems to be that a man's character for good or evil is not what nature created, but what education has fashioned it to be. Hence the extreme importance of early discipline. Our actions have an influence spreading all life through: every act tends to repeat itself, and to create an incipient habit; and when repeated often, the act grows to be a confirmed habit or 'state' of the moral nature.

ii. But how are we to determine what actions are right, and what actions are wrong? This is a question of extreme importance, more especially as Ethics is a practical Science. If we can detect what are the qualities in actions which constitute their goodness or their badness, we shall be able to take the first step towards virtue: the actions we perform being virtuous actions, the habits which result therefrom will be virtuous habits, and thus we shall be enabled to develop a virtuous *character.*

Of course there is the general principle which may be at once assumed, that a right action must be conformable to Right Reason. But that is a standard unattainable except to those whose intellects have been thoroughly trained, and who have developed an intuitive faculty of discriminating right and wrong. In a subsequent book we will examine morality under this aspect, and explain fully the nature of Right Reason.

For the present we will look at the more obvious characteristics of right and wrong:—not that we can frame infallible rules. Circumstances are too complex to admit of exact or scientific generalization. We can only indicate the more general features of good and evil, leaving the determination of particular cases to the moral sense of the agent, to be settled at the moment of action. Still it may conduce to the guidance of the student, and be a contribution to the philosophy of Ethics, if we describe the more prominent features of right and wrong.

There is, then, this most characteristic impression which 'right' causes:—that it is a 'fitness' of things, an exact adjustment between means and ends, a moderation, in absence of all extravagance whether of excess or defect. It is analogous to what health is in the body—freedom alike from superfluity or from want. It may be described as a harmony or 'consistency' of life.

iii. But how are we to distinguish an act which is isolated and accidental, from one which flows from a confirmed habit of virtue? The act may be outwardly the same; but the following points must be noted:

1. There is a greater *facility* seen in the performance of an act which flows from a settled state of the *will:* the inward struggle has disappeared.

The man who has grown to be strong finds it easier to undergo toil than before; and in precisely the same way, the man who has grown to be virtuous and who has, for instance, formed a 'habit of temperance,' finds an ease and readiness which makes the burden of his self-denial light.

2. The virtuous action which flows from a virtuous habit, is accompanied by *pleasure* to the agent. If a man performs a virtuous act, but finds the performance of it irksome and grievous to him, therein is proof that the virtue has not become natural nor habitual to him. But if a man feels *pleasure* in acts of virtue, therein is proof that he has attained to a state of mind that is congenial to him, and that the virtuous act flows from the virtuous habit.

iv. But not only is it true that pleasure is the index of habit: it forms the whole sphere of morality. Virtue, as the perfection of the moral or *emotional* nature, is necessarily concerned with the *emotions;* as may be shown by the following arguments:

1. From the nature of the case:

(1.) Pleasure, or the avoidance of pain, being the motive of our doing evil, we must, in order to be virtuous, learn to associate pleasure with what is right, and pain with what is evil: such a discipline and cultivation of the feelings is the only right education.

(2.) Virtue is the regulation of the emotions and of conduct, both of which are inseparably attended by pleasure or pain. Therefore, virtue is attended by pleasure and pain.

(3.) The virtues are kept healthy by means of pain, as moral medicine or punishment for excess of pleasure (or vice).

(4.) The moral states are formed under the influence of pleasure and pain, and continue what they are from their attitude thereto. Virtue is not the exemption from the feeling of pleasure, but the proper regulation of that feeling.

2. From our own susceptibilities:

(1.) We are influenced to the choice of a thing by the consideration of the 'beautiful,' the 'expedient,' or the 'pleasurable'; and to the avoidance of a thing by their opposites. In all such cases the virtuous man is sure to be right in his choice, and most assuredly so in reference to pleasure, which enters as an element into *every* consideration.

(2.) Pleasure is engrained in the very tissue of our being: more or less, in different degrees we all make it the standard of our duties: it is the strongest motive from our childhood upwards.

(3.) Pleasure remains the most difficult struggle for our maturer years, and excellence is ever concerned with what is difficult of achievement.

The following truths may now be regarded as being established:

α. Pleasure and pain constitute the domain in which moral virtue must be displayed.

β. The emotions cannot become permanently virtuous, (*i.e.* virtuous 'habits' cannot be formed) unless a definite line of conduct be persisted in.

γ. A virtuous 'habit' being formed will reproduce the acts which led to its formation.

v. Here we must explain a seeming inconsistency in our theory. How is it that men perform virtuous acts before they are themselves virtuous? Can an act be virtuous while the author of the act is vicious? Does not the analogy of the arts suggest that if a man does just acts he is himself just—precisely as he would be a musician if he performed musical compositions?

In answer to this difficulty we may reply:

1. The case of the arts is not quite a parallel one: a man may execute an artistic piece by chance or from the suggestion of others; but he will not be an artist unless he has knowledge of his own.

2. If the analogy held good it would prove nothing. In conduct involving issues of right and wrong, it is not sufficient for the act to bear the impress of certain qualities:—the agent must have certain qualities. Besides the knowledge of his act (which the artist also must have) a man, in order to be moral, must have a formed attitude of heart and will, and also a firm, unwavering disposition.

Our reply, therefore, is that the mere performance of a virtuous act does not make a man virtuous, nor an act virtuous in the true sense: virtue is meaningless, except as involving an assent of the will and expressing a formed disposition of heart.

To create such a permanent disposition of virtue it is essential to perform virtuous acts. Such performance often repeated, will lead to the formation of a virtuous 'habit.' But mere knowledge of right, unless accompanied by the practice of it, is utterly futile: only practice can make us perfect.

II.—FORMAL DEFINITION OF VIRTUE.

The previous discussions have sufficiently cleared the ground for a more exact definition of virtue. It has been shown that virtue is not inherited from Nature, but acquired by our own efforts; that it is, in fact, the result of constant practice of such acts as law prescribes, or reason suggests.

We will, therefore, construct our definition, 'per genus et differentias.'

i. The 'genus' or material nature of virtue may be arrived at by an enumeration of the powers working in the soul, and by a gradual process of elimination.

We may classify those powers as (1) 'feelings'—*i.e.* all states of consciousness which are attended by pleasure or pain; (2) 'capacities,' or the dormant susceptibilities of our nature; and (3) 'habits,'—*i.e.* permanent dispositions of soul.

We may eliminate 'feelings,' because they do not involve any moral character, nor an assent of the will; and we may eliminate 'capacities,' because they do not imply any moral character, but are dependent on physical causes.

There is, therefore, no alternative but that virtues are 'habits.'

ii. The definition of virtue as 'a habit' is as inadequate to express its nature as it would be to describe a statue as 'stone-work.' We must consider what are the more distinguishing features of virtue: what is the 'form' which 'habit' assumes when it is identical with virtue?

Now what is the simplest conception we have of 'excellence'?—Is it not that of a quality which enables an object to fulfil its proper function perfectly? The excellence of *man*, therefore, (*i.e.* his virtue) will be that quality which enables him to make the function of his life perfect.

We may perhaps analyse this idea of perfection more definitely still, if we will take the illustrations which we may derive from mathematical proportion. Proportion implies excess and defect and 'a mean,' and that either absolutely in relation to the thing itself, or viewed in relation to the circumstances of individuals. Relative proportion takes cognisance of the whole conditions; and is such as the trainer has in view when he adjusts the dietary of his pupils according to their special needs, so as to attain a perfect 'fitness' in every case.

These ideas of art and of proportion may be applied to the moral life of man. Virtue, like art, is the perfect finish in the work of man: even more delicate than the touch of art, is that ideal beauty which virtue spreads over the life of man. Wherever feeling is displayed, virtue ensures its perfect harmony with all its surroundings, guards it from all extravagance and all defect. Wherever action is necessary, virtue gives to it a genuine gracefulness.

But it is no easy thing to realize this perfect beauty of the moral life, —to finish off our display of conduct and of emotion with the graceful proportions of an ideal virtue. The forms in which evil is possible are so manifold, so diverse and so infinite, that it is hard indeed to escape from every conceivable temptation.

The definition of virtue is now fairly established. As to its material nature, it is 'a permanent disposition of the moral nature.' As to its form, it is moulded after an ideal of what is best relatively to the conditions of human nature; but this 'form' changes with the vicissitudes of circumstance, and must be left to the judgment of Right Reason to determine under special connections; and that Right Reason can only be developed after a manifold experience of real life.

iii. But, after all, the conception of 'the mean' is only a metaphor which may illustrate the idea of virtue under certain aspects, but is not of universal application. It can apply only to 'things indifferent'—to those aspects of the moral life which are not good or evil *per se*, but only in their uses.

There are, however, certain classes of actions which are good or evil independently of all conditions and of all limitations. Certain emotions —*e.g.*, rejoicing at evil; certain actions, *e.g.*, adultery, are inherently and absolutely wicked; and the idea of a mean is meaningless when applied to them: there is no 'Fine Art' of murder.

Such acts as murder do not depend upon any kind of condition; but are evil under every conceivable circumstance.

So neither can 'the mean' be applied to things which are themselves deviations from a mean: there can be no 'mean' in things which are excesses or defects of another mean.

III.—CLASSIFICATION OF VIRTUES TO ILLUSTRATE THE LAW OF THE MEAN.

We may now proceed to show how the principle of proportion applies under different circumstances and conditions of the moral life—how virtue is the avoidance of all extravagance and inconsistency of life, and how the vices are the perversions of what is 'fitting' both in feeling and in conduct.

We may use the Diagram of the Virtues and Vices for the purpose of our illustration.

(A) SELF-REGARDING VIRTUES.

		Excess.	Mean.	Defect.
i. In questions of pleasure and pain	1. *Avoidance of pain.*			
	(*a*) *In confidence*	Rashness	Courage	Cowardice.
	(*b*) *In fear*	Cowardice	Courage	Rashness.
	2. *Pursuit of pleasure*	Sensualism	Temperance	Asceticism.
ii. In giving and receiving of money	1. *Ordinarily.*			
	(*a*) In giving	Prodigality	Liberality	Meanness.
	(*b*) In receiving	Meanness	Liberality	Prodigality.
	2. In great wealth	Ostentation and want of taste	Magnificence	Stinginess.
iii. In seeking honour	1. In great honour	Vain-glory	Magnanimity	Littleness of soul.
	2. In small honour	Ambition	[ ]	Unambition.

(B) VIRTUES RELATING TO SOCIETY.

i. In regulation of temper		Passionateness	Good temper	Listlessness. Indifference.
ii. In intercourse of society	1. Regarding *truth*	Boastfulness	Truthfulness	Dissimulation.
	2. Regarding agreeableness.			
	(*a*) In recreation	Buffoonery	Politeness	Boorishness.
	(*b*) In business	Adulation. Sycophancy	Friendship	Churlishness.

(C) SEMI-VIRTUES.

i. In the emotions of shame		Dumbfounded	Modest	Shameless.
ii. In contemplating the fortunes of others		Envious	Righteously indignant	Spiteful.

IV.—PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR DETERMINING THE MEAN.

i. In comparing the various states of 'excess' and 'defect' with their proper ideal, we note that they are all mutually opposed the one to the other.

But the following points may be noted in reference to the degrees of opposition which are found among them :

1. The 'mean' man in steering his course clear of all extremes, pleases neither of the extremes : each of them call him by the name of the other. The temperate man, for instance, seems an ascetic in the eyes of the sensualist, and a sensualist in the eyes of the ascetic.

2. The extremes are wider apart from one another than either from the mean. Between the mean and either of the extremes there is a kind of affinity and some elements in common, but the extremes are utterly dissimilar and at variance with one another.

3. The mean is more opposed to one extreme than to the other. There is a twofold reason why this should be so : (α) In the nature of the case there is a greater correspondence between one extreme and the mean, than between the other—the natural affinities being greater. (β) From our own susceptibilities : we are more *prone* to one thing than to another ; and that extreme is the worst towards which we are the more easily led.

ii. We have now said enough to show what is implied in the dictum that Virtue is a 'mean state' : it is an ideal standard by which all conduct and all feeling might be made to assume the noblest conceivable form.

But in delineating this perfect conception of our actual life we have implied that it is a difficult task to realize it. The beauty of life is so easily marred : the estimate of times and means which give the exact turn to action, is so easily mistaken, that it is difficult indeed to be virtuous after this ideal pattern.

We may, however, suggest a few simple rules which may serve for our guidance in the effort to attain to the perfect 'fitness' of virtue.

1. Avoid the worst extreme :—though you should rebound to the other extreme, choose the least of evils.

2. Avoid your besetting sin : set yourself resolutely against that form of evil to which your own tendencies incline you most easily.

3. Avoid pleasure above all things : admire and praise the charms which pleasure can afford, but dismiss it from your aims as the Greek counsellors voted to dismiss Helen.

Still rules are for the most part futile : no system of casuistry can anticipate the infinite complications of circumstance. The varied shapes and combinations of circumstance must be judged separately, as each new phase arises. The only sure index is the Moral Sense of the agent. [To train and educate that Moral Sense until it becomes an unerring instinct, or Conscience, is the work of life, and requires very favourable conditions of discipline and experience.] The Moral Sense must take an instantaneous survey of what has to be done under the conditions of the moment, and its judgment, when fully educated, will be infallibly right.

TRANSLATION.

I.—GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF VIRTUE.

i.—That Virtue is a permanent state of mind produced by our own Actions.

(*a*) DIFFERENT ORIGIN OF MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE.

There is, then, a two-fold excellence of the soul: there is 'moral' and 'intellectual' virtue. The excellence of our intellectual nature takes its earliest rise and its aftergrowth for the most part from instruction, and hence requires experience and length of time to mature it. On the other hand the excellence of our moral nature is a result brought about by constant practice of moral acts, the term 'morality,' ἠθική, being in fact derived from ἔθος, 'habit,' with only a slight change.

The essential cause of intellectual excellence is knowledge; that of moral excellence, practice.

Now since virtue is a perfection of the soul, and one element in the soul is rational and another element impulsive, it necessarily follows that virtue also is of a two-fold character: as the excellence of our intellectual nature it takes the form of Philosophy and Thought; and as the excellence of our emotional nature, it is called *Moral* Virtue.

To a certain extent *intellectual* excellence has its origin in Nature. It receives its earliest impulse from nature—man being by nature a receptive being, and capable of assimilating knowledge; and it gains a certain degree of increase from the natural disposition in certain cases. Yet, for the most part, and among men generally, it owes its earliest rise and its after development to instruction, and hence requires experience and length of years to mature it.

The causes which produce *moral* excellence are different from this. Moral excellence is a result brought about by the constant practice of moral acts. All that Nature contributes to moral excellence is the capacity she gives us for growing to be virtuous; and all that instruction contributes is the knowledge that it is our duty to be virtuous. But as for being virtuous in fact, and in our own personal behaviour, nothing but constant practice of virtuous actions can secure *that* to us; and hence it is that virtue has derived its name from habit, being called 'moral,' ἠθική, from ἔθος, 'habituation,' with only a slight change in one letter.

(*b*) PROOFS THAT MORAL VIRTUE IS *NOT* A GIFT OF NATURE, BUT A CREATION OF HABIT.

1. From this consideration it is further clear that no form of moral excellence is developed in us spontaneously, by a fixed

constitution of nature. What belongs to the order of Nature can never be brought to act contrary to its law. A stone, naturally gravitating to the earth, could never be brought of its own accord to soar heavenwards: though one were to try to form such a habit in it by hurling it into the air ten thousand times, it could never be forced to change its own law. Conversely, fire could never be habituated to move downwards. In fact, when things have a fixed tendency in obedience to a law of nature, they can never be made by practice to act contrary to that tendency.

1. Moral virtue is not innate; since whatever is innate, cannot be changed: a law of nature is fixed and unalterable.

2. It is not, therefore, through an irresistible law, nor yet in violation of any such law, that the various forms of moral excellence are developed in man: nay, rather we are born with a nature capable of virtue, but the realization of those capabilities can only be attained by means of habit.

2. Yet nature supplies us with materials which reiterated effort can mould into perfect shapes of moral beauty.

3. Again, where qualities attach to us by nature, we are first put in possession of latent powers, and then proceed to put our powers into outward effect. This truth is obvious in the case of the senses. We did not obtain the senses of seeing and hearing from the fact of our having constantly seen and heard. On the contrary, we used our faculties because we were possessed of them: we did not come into possession of those faculties through having used them.

3. Qualities inherent and natural are prior to use and exercise: *moral* qualities are subsequent only to use and exercise.

It is the exact reverse with our moral faculties: we acquire them by having put ourselves to the test of action, as we do in acquiring artistic skill. What we have to learn in order to perform, we learn by the very process of performing. Men become builders by building houses, and harpists by practising on the harp. After the same analogy, men grow to be righteous by performing right actions, and self-controlled by performing acts of self-control, and brave by performing acts of bravery.

4. This truth is further illustrated by the tradition which prevails in the Greek States regarding the discipline of the citizens. Our law-givers try to make the citizens virtuous by making virtuous actions habitual to them, regarding it as the chief aim and intention of legislation—to create and foster

4. The efficacy and necessity of habit as a means to virtue, is assumed in all legislation.

morality. When they do not successfully achieve this result, they fail in their whole purpose, as upon their success herein it depends whether a constitution be a good or a bad one.

5. But not only are virtuous states dependent on virtuous practice, every single action has an influence in forming a moral state which shall reflect its character.

5. Moreover, every kind of moral, like every artistic excellence, is either acquired or lost according to the *character* of the acts performed: the faculties by which the acts are originated and the processes by which they are developed are the same. It is by practising upon the lute that men become lute-players; but their excellence varies according as they have practised well or ill. Builders and artists generally show the same differences: if they execute their various works well, they will become good workmen; and if they execute them badly, they will become bad workmen. Otherwise, had this not been the case, there would have been no need of men to teach, but all would have been *born* good or bad artists.

The case is precisely similar in the sphere of the virtues. According to the actions which we perform in our business-relations with our fellows, we grow to be either just or unjust. By our conduct, again, in circumstances of danger, and by the habit we form of showing terror or courage, we grow some of us to be heroes and others cowards. This truth is applicable also to the regulation of the feelings and desires: men become temperate and gentle, or intemperate and passionate, according to the demeanour which they are in the habit of assuming under provocation or excitement.

1. Consequently it is clear that there is not one of the moral virtues which is formed in us by nature. Had we been good spontaneously by force of nature, we could never have been impelled in an opposite direction by force of habit. But as an actual fact, we *are* so impelled; and hence it is clear that no single moral excellence is formed within us by nature. Nothing that is impelled in a certain way by a law of nature changes and assumes an opposite tendency under the influence of habit. No one, for example, will ever accustom a stone to gravitate upwards, though he throw it into the air ten thousand times; nor could we habituate fire to tend downwards. In fact, whenever a thing has a certain tendency from nature, it can never be made to change that tendency by force of habit.

2. It is not, therefore, through a law of nature nor yet in violation of any such law, that the virtues grow up within us. What we receive from nature is the *capacity* for virtue: we are so constituted by nature as to admit of the virtues being impressed upon us, though we only acquire those virtues in fact and are made perfect therein, by habit.

3. Again, in the case of our *natural* faculties, we first have them perfectly matured, and afterwards simply put them to their uses. We found ourselves, for instance, with the faculties of sight and hearing fully developed, and so employed

them for their uses. It was not from having repeatedly seen and heard that we gained our senses of sight and hearing: on the contrary, it was from being in possession of these senses that we exercised them.

On the other hand, we only gain our *moral* faculties by having first put ourselves to the test of action (as we must do also to acquire artistic skill). What we have to learn in order to perform, we learn by the very process of performing. Men become builders by building houses, and harpists by practising upon the harp. In a precisely similar manner, men grow to be righteous by performing right actions, and self controlled by performing acts of self control, and brave by performing acts of bravery.

4. This truth is further attested by the practice which prevails in States, in the application of law to the lives of the citizens. Legislators try to render the citizens virtuous, and they employ custom for the purpose. By wholesome rewards and punishments they impel the citizens to practise morality, and in this way render them in the issue virtuously disposed. If in certain cases they do not effect this result, they fail in their whole purpose, the professed aim and mission of all legislation being to habituate the citizens to the practice of morality.

Consequently the moral virtues do not depend upon natural laws, but are the creations of habit.

5. Moreover, all moral excellence is of a nature to be acquired or lost from the self-same habits and through the self-same acts. The difference in the result is owing to the difference in the *character* of the habits formed and of the actions done. When those habits are virtuous, moral excellence is developed from them, and the ruin of that excellence is caused, if those habits are immoral. The case is identical with that of artistic excellence. It is from their performances on the harp that harpists are formed, whether skilled or unskilled: by performing their exercises well, they become skilled harpists, and the reverse if their practice be indifferent. So also is it with builders and craftsmen generally: it is owing to the *quality* of the activity which they display in the practice of their art, being good or bad, that they turn out skilled or unskilled workmen. By building skilfully they become skilful builders, by building clumsily, unskilful builders. Of course if this were otherwise, if,—that is, artistic skill of any kind were not owing to activities being exercised in a particular way, and nature were the cause which produced artists, there would be no need, to any one, of a teacher to shape the practice of an art, but all men would have been *born* from the outset good or bad workmen.

This truth presents a precisely similar aspect in the sphere of the virtues. According as we discharge our obligations to our fellows we grow to be, some of us just, some unjust—in the one case from acting invariably in a spirit of justice and in conformity with law, and in the other case from our behaviour to our fellows being the reverse of just. When, again, we are thrown among circumstances of peril, we grow into the habit of showing confidence or fear, and thus become, some of us brave and others cowards. Even in regard to our desires and impulses the same law holds good: from the habits which we form and the mode in which we comport ourselves when our feelings are called into play, we grow to be, some of us temperate and gentle, others dissolute and passionate.

(*c*) SUMMARY: THE IMPORTANCE OF MORAL EDUCATION.

To sum up the argument: the moral nature assumes certain permanent tendencies, or 'habits,' as the result of the various lines of conduct in which it has been exercised; and the character of these various tendencies corresponds to the character of the various acts out of which they have sprung. Wherefore

Since then our moral states are not inherited nor innate, but *acquired*, it is in our own power, by the

help of education, to give to our lives whatever moral character we will.

it is our duty to give to our every act a definite character of moral worth, seeing that it is from the qualities of these separate acts, through all the incidents of daily life, that our 'habits' (*i.e.*, the permanent tendencies of our moral being,) take their tone and colour. It is a matter of no slight consequence, then, upon what principles and amid what influences we are trained from childhood; nay, rather, it is a matter of vast and even sovereign importance.

To sum up the argument and to describe our theory of the origin of virtue in one sentence: every 'habit' or formed state of mind is engendered from an exercise of the faculties, and the one corresponds to the other as cause and effect—when the activity is virtuous, the habit will be virtuous, when the activity is evil, the habit will be evil. Looking to this relation between the activity and the habit, we must not say without qualification that 'the exercise of our powers is a cause of a virtuous habit,' but premise that such exercise must be a virtuous exercise; nor must we say that a bad habit is owing simply to the exercise of our powers, but premise that such an exercise in that case must be a bad one. To take the case of house building: we must not say that the exercise of our powers upon house building is the cause of a correct state of mind thereon, but rather that if the faculties have been exercised rightly upon house building, then a correct state of mind is brought about in reference thereto, and *vice versâ*.

In fine, we must assign to each one of our mental states certain definite activities as their cause. Our habits or permanent states of mind follow closely upon our activities through the varied changes of daily life.

For these reasons it is a matter of great consequence, as determining the character of our habits or moral tendencies, whether the practices to which we become habituated from youth upwards be good or evil; nay, rather, the entire difference in the character of our moral tendencies is owing to this early habituation.

ii.—Qualities exhibited by virtuous action.

(*a*) NEED FOR A RULE OF LIFE.

Some principle must be laid down for discriminating the *quality* of actions.

Our present Inquiry, therefore, is not, as scientific Inquiries generally are, with a view simply to speculative knowledge. The aim which as moralists we have in view is not simply to gain a scientific theory of virtue, but rather that we may ourselves grow to be virtuous:—otherwise there is no practical utility in the study. It is essential, then, for us to consider upon what principles we ought to shape our conduct in the various circumstances of life, since, as we have shown, our separate actions determine the character which our 'habits' or moral tendencies permanently assume.

The principle of 'conformity to Right Reason' is too vague and general.

That we should act under all circumstances '*in accordance with Right Reason*' is a common axiom, and may be assumed as true. But what exactly 'Right Reason' is, and in what relation it

stands to other forms of human excellence, is a subject which we must leave for discussion later on.

Since, therefore, our present Inquiry does not belong to the purely speculative branch of Philosophy (which has for its end the simple contemplation of truth, being occupied with that class of existences which are objects of knowledge, and not with matters of action), but falls rather under the practical division of Philosophy, which has for its end the production of positive good (*i.e.* the purpose of our investigation is not merely to know what the nature of virtue is but to enable us ourselves to become virtuous :—otherwise, had our aim not been practical, there would have been no need for earnestness on our part, if we were not thereby achieving the aim of life,) . . . . since, I say, the end of our Inquiry is action and conduct, let us examine what are the conditions of moral action, seeing that moral action determines, as has been shown, the character of the 'habits' formed thereby, whether they be good or whether they be evil, and it is upon the character of these habits that our theory of life depends.

Now to take as our definition of virtuous actions 'such as are found to conform to Right Reason,' and of evil actions 'such as are not conformable to Right Reason'—that is true enough, but gives us no sufficient indication whereby to distinguish good from evil. To say that 'Right action is in accordance with Right Reason' is too vague and general: a definition of such a kind is not sufficient to indicate the character of a thing of which we are ignorant. If when we ask for a definition of 'man,' the definition 'animal' is given, that is not sufficient to explain to us the whole meaning involved therein.

This wider view may therefore be dismissed for the present. We shall have to deal with it by and by, and to define what 'Right Reason' is, and what is its relation to the other virtues.

(*b*) 'RIGHT' CANNOT ALWAYS BE DISTINGUISHED FROM 'WRONG' BY A HARD AND FAST LINE.

Any rule of conduct must allow for the complication of circumstances, and must be sufficiently elastic to allow freedom to the moral sense of the agent.

Thus much, however, may at the outset be premised—that a rule to be applicable to real life must be delineated in outline, rather than drawn out with the precision of a scientific formula. As was explained at the opening of this work, the explanations to be demanded from a Science must be relative to the nature of the subject-matter. Questions of practical conduct and considerations of utility present neither fixity nor uniformity, any more than do the conditions of health. Such being the complexity of the main problem, there is even less exactness admissible in the treatment of specific details. Particular circumstances do not completely fall under any art or under any set of rules. At the moment of action, in view of special complications, men must determine *for themselves* what tends to their true goal, in the same way as the physician judges for himself of the special symptoms of his patients, or as the helmsman acts in a storm. Still, though the difficulties of our subject are so embarrassing, we must endeavour to render help towards their solution.

Thus much, however, may at the outset be premised—that our whole theory of duties, I mean the definition of what actions are right and what are wrong, must be framed not with the exactness of a scientific formula, but as it were in general outline. As we stated at the commencement of this Treatise, it is proper to require only such definitions of a subject as may be consistent with the conditions of that subject. Now actions, and the interests involved in action, are not uniform nor invariable, any more than are the momentary conditions of health. In regard to health, at one time one thing is beneficial, at another time the entire reverse, the conditions changing with the alternations of bodily health and with the vicissitudes of circumstance. The case is precisely similar in regard to moral action. A line of conduct which at one time has been pernicious, at another time has brought great benefit often to the same individual.

But if a theory of the general truths of morality be thus incapable of being drawn out with the precision of a scientific definition, even more treacherous must a theory of details be: with even less certainty than the universal are we able to understand particulars. The determination of particulars falls under no kind of art, nor under any defined mode of treatment, nor under any fixed set of rules. For this reason it is the duty of those who have to meet any difficulty to decide for themselves on each occasion upon the circumstances before them, and from the consideration thereof to seek for a principle to regulate their conduct at such a crisis. Men will know whether their conduct be right or wrong if they survey the whole circumstances in this spirit. Such is the course which the physician and the helmsman take, judging of the course which is most consistent with their art from the nature of each crisis as it arises.

Still, though the subject before us is thus complicated, we must endeavour to contribute assistance to the elucidation of the truth which underlies it.

(*c*) DISTINGUISHING FEATURES WHEREBY RIGHT AND WRONG MAY BE RECOGNIZED, IN THE ACTUAL CONDUCT OF MEN.

The prominent characteristics of moral failure are defect or extravagance of virtue.

The point, then, to be chiefly noted is that the attributes of morality are of a nature liable to be marred by extravagance or defect, by want or superfluity;—to employ, as we must do, material analogies to illustrate immaterial truths. We see this principle to be literally true in the case of health and strength. Strength is undermined if exercise be taken either too lavishly or too sparingly; and in the same way, health is ruined if food or drink be either immoderate or insufficient. On the other hand, if the amount of food or exercise taken be suitable to the individual, his health is promoted and strengthened and preserved.

The same analogy holds good in regard to self-restraint and courage and the virtues generally. The man who flees before every danger, and shows fear at every alarm, and bears up against not even the slightest evil, that man becomes a coward. On the other hand, the man whom no danger will daunt, but who goes to face all odds, becomes reckless. Similarly, when a man drains the full measure of every indulgence, and exercises no kind of self-restraint, he is a sensual man; and, conversely, the man who shuns every form of enjoyment, as country boors do, he is a man devoid, as it

were, of the feelings of humanity. In other words, the virtues of temperance and of courage are lost by those qualities existing in superfluity or in defect, whereas they are fostered and secured by a true fitness and equable moderation.

The point, then, to be chiefly noted is, that 'actions conformable to virtue' are of a nature to be marred by superfluity or want, just as we see is the case in regard to strength and health—to employ, as we must, illustrations from what is palpable to explain immaterial truths. Exercise which is excessive utterly ruins the strength of the body, as also does exercise which falls short of what is moderate and right. In precisely the same way the matter stands in regard to meat and drink: what is beyond or below what is fitting banishes health away, whereas moderation therein produces, strengthens, and preserves health. So also is it, in fact, in regard to temperance and courage, and other virtues. The man who flees before everything and is afraid at every alarm, and never holds his ground in face of panic, that man grows to be a coward. On the other hand, a man who is absolutely afraid of nothing, but goes to meet all dangers, he is a reckless man. Midway between these extremes is the man who has the virtue of bravery. In the same way temperance is marred by excess or defect: the man, for instance, who drains the full measure of every enjoyment and abstains from not a single one, he is a sensual man; while, conversely, the man who shuns every pleasure, as country boors do, is devoid, as it were, of the feelings of humanity. Between these two extremes is the temperate man, temperance, like courage, being preserved by an equable moderation and a due fitness between desires and their object.

iii.—Qualities exhibited by actions proceeding from a virtuous habit.

(*a*) THE *EASE* WITH WHICH THE ACTION IS PERFORMED.

But not only does each separate state of growth, of development and of decay in our moral life depend upon a repetition of acts akin to itself; not only is every phase under the influence of its original cause; but even after our habits have been formed, the soul will display its activity by the performance of the self-same acts as those out of which its various habits have grown.

There is a continuity in the moral life: the act produces the habit and the habit reproduces the act.

Even in more obvious and material things the same law holds good. Strength, for example, is produced by taking ample food and undergoing toilsome exercise; and it is the strong man who is best able to bear such a discipline. This analogy applies exactly to the case of the virtues. By abstaining from pleasures we become self-controlled; and, such a habit being once formed, we are better able than ever to continue our abstinence. So, too, in the case of bravery: by accustoming ourselves to despise panics, and to bear up against their terrors, we become brave men; and, a character for bravery once formed,

But an act resulting from a habit is distinguished by the *facility* with which it is done.

all the more readily do we find strength to withstand what otherwise might appal us.

But not only do the activities by means of which the birth and increase or decay of the virtues are brought about, correspond mutually to the results which are thereby effected, being virtuous if they create and strengthen virtue, and evil if they destroy it; but, further, the activities which follow *after* the formation of a state of virtue, and which are the consequences of such a state, exhibit likewise the characteristics of their early origin. This truth is clear from similar relations that are even more palpable. Strength, for instance, is first produced by taking ample food and undergoing constant toil; and the strength thus gained becomes the cause of our capacity for such a discipline, the strong man being better than ever able to take ample food and to undergo constant toil. The history of the virtues is precisely similar. By abstaining from pleasures we become temperate, and, a habit of temperance being once gained, we are better able to abstain in future. Similarly in regard to courage: by habituating ourselves to despise dangers and to endure hardship, we grow to be brave men; and a habit of bravery being once formed, we are the better able to show our strength and to be resolute before alarms.

(*b*) THE PLEASURE CONSEQUENT UPON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ACTION.

An act resulting from a habit is also accompanied with pleasure to the agent.

Again, the pleasure or pain which is consequent upon the performance of actions, must be regarded as an indication of corresponding habits. The man who abstains from bodily indulgences and delights in his self-restraint, is a temperate man; while the man who is inwardly vexed at the curbing of his passions, is a sensual man. A man who confronts dangers and is glad to do so, or at any rate does not chafe under it, is a brave man, whereas the man who confronts them with reluctance is a coward.

But since the activities which we display *before* we arrive at a formed state of moral virtue are the same as those which we display *after* the virtuous habit has been formed, what mark can be found to distinguish those who possess a habit of virtue from those who have not yet acquired such a habit? There is no other criterion except the pleasure or pain which are felt in the actions which are done in conformity with virtue. The man who abstains from bodily indulgences, and delights in the abstinence which he practises, he is a temperate man; while the man who is vexed in heart at self-restraint, he is a sensual man. Again, the man who bears the brunt of danger and does so heartily, or at any rate without annoyance, he is a brave man; but if he feels regret at his own self-sacrifice, he is still a coward.

iv.—The field of Morality is co-extensive with that of pleasure and pain.

(*a*) PROOFS FROM THE NATURE OF THE CASE.

(1.) In fact, the special sphere in which moral virtue is displayed is that of pleasure and pain. When we practise evil, it is on

account of the gratification which evil gives. When we shrink from noble deeds, it is from apprehension of the pain which self-sacrifice involves. Hence the need of moral discipline. The true course is, as Plato says, that men should in some way or other, be so trained from childhood as to have feelings of pleasure in what is right, and feelings of pain in what is wrong. That is the only sound system of education.

1. Pleasure and pain are universal motives of conduct, and hence the aim of education is to associate them with the right ideas.

(2.) Again, since the virtues are exhibited in the various modes of feeling and action, and every feeling and every action is attended with pleasure and pain, the inference is that the sphere of the virtues is the sphere also of pleasure and pain.

2. Pleasure and pain being inseparable from consciousness, must be virtuous or vicious.

(3.) A further indication of this truth is given in the fact that it is by means of pain that punishments are inflicted. Punishments are after their kind, 'modes of moral cure;' and cures are naturally brought about by means of things contrary to those which produced the disease.

3. Pain is employed as 'moral medicine.'

(4.) Moreover, as we have already shown, every attitude or condition of the sensitive soul bears a character which reflects and reproduces the influences by which it is naturally rendered better or worse. But the influences by which men's characters are rendered evil, are pleasure and pain:—in consequence, that is, of pursuing or avoiding the one or the other improperly or at unreasonable times or in an illegal manner, or violating other conditions defined by Right Reason.

4. Influence of pleasure and pain in the formation of character.

In view of the tyranny of pleasure and pain, there are some who positively define the virtues as 'modes of impassivity and of freedom from emotion;' inadequately, however, as such a definition needs qualification to limit the impassivity to particular times and circumstances, with other necessary reservations.

It is assumed, therefore, that virtue is that disposition towards pleasure and pain which we have described above, and which is qualified to produce the best results from them: and that vice is the exact reverse.

1. In fact the special sphere in which moral virtue is displayed is that of pleasure and pain. The evil that we do, has pleasure for its motive; and when we shrink from noble deeds, that is owing to the pain they cost.

Hence the importance of a training of the feelings. We ought, as Plato says,

to regard it as a matter of grave concern that the habits we form should be virtuous habits, and that the actions we do should be virtuous actions, from our childhood upwards, and that we should, even while children, be brought up to habits of such a character as would give us strength to find pleasure in what is right, and to feel pain where it is fitting for us to grieve. That is the only sound and rational system of education.

2. Again, since the virtues are either actions or feelings; and whatsoever a man does or feels, he has pleasure when those actions and feelings are agreeable to his own wish, or else has pain when his actions and feelings are under constraint from another—it is evident that all moral virtue is concerned with pleasure or pain.

3. This truth is further evident from the punishments which are inflicted in States. Lawgivers cause trouble to fall upon such as take pleasure in vicious courses, and thus try to induce them to hate what is evil, and to find their pleasure rather in a virtuous life. Thus it is, by the moral discipline which they inculcate, that lawgivers instil into men's minds the pleasure which is consequent upon virtue. Legal punishments thus fill a position analogous to medical remedies towards those who are diseased in their social relations. Just as the diseases are opposed to the remedies which cure them (if, for instance, we see a physician employing a cold method of cure, we know at once that the disease has been brought on by heat), so also we know from the painful nature of punishments that the vices which those punishments are designed to cure, arise from pleasure.

4. Moreover, as has been explained, every formed state of soul bears a character in sympathy with the objects or circumstances through which it is engendered, and by which it is made better or worse;—in fact it is only under the influence of such circumstances that a mental state consists at all. But it is under the influence of pleasure and pain that vicious states of mind are formed—through men pursuing pleasure in an improper manner or at an improper time, or through their avoiding pain at an improper time or in an improper manner, or in an improper place, or through violating other conditions which make the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain immoral. The case which virtue presents is very similar. A virtuous state is constituted by our pursuing pleasure and pain in a fitting manner and at fitting times. From these considerations it is clear that our mental states exhibit a character of virtue or of vice according to their attitude to pleasure and pain, and that it is under these influences that such states are formed.

It is from this point of view that certain philosophers define the virtues as 'modes of impassivity' or 'states of repose,' taking pleasure as the standpoint for their definition:—incorrectly, however, in that they form their definition without necessary qualification, *i.e.* without adding to their idea of moral calm or repose the limitations 'as is right' and 'when it is right,' and similar conditions.

It may therefore be assumed that virtue is 'a state of mind which is virtuously disposed in relation to pleasure and pain' (according to the qualification which we have just drawn), and in those relations is 'capable of effecting the very best results.' Vice, on the other hand, is the exact opposite.

(*b*) PROOFS FROM THE NATURE OF MAN.

There are still other considerations from which this view may be made clear to us.

There are three ideas which lead to our choice of an object, and three which tend to our aversion of an object. On the one hand are 'the beautiful,' 'the expedient,' and 'the pleasurable;' on the other hand,

Pleasure is not only a direct motive, but, indirectly, also

and opposed to these, are 'the ugly,' 'the hurtful,' and 'the painful.' In all these relations, the good man is sure to be right, and the bad man is sure to be wrong, most of all where pleasure is involved. But pleasure is shared by all organized beings, and follows in the train of whatever objects fall under our choice, since even the beautiful and the expedient are thought to be also pleasurable. It is, moreover, an element ingrained in all of us from childhood, and is proportionately difficult to rub out, being, as it were, part of the very complexion of our life. Indeed, we all, though not all in an equal degree, estimate our duties in the balances of pleasure and pain, and regulate our conduct accordingly.

influences our every choice.

For these reasons, then, our chief concern must necessarily be with the regulation of these emotions. It has no slight bearing upon our conduct, whether the pleasures and pains we feel are right or wrong.

Moreover, it is even more difficult to fight against pleasure than against *passion*, as Heraclitus says; and the special sphere both of art and of virtue is ever that which is most difficult to accomplish, excellence being, in such a case, more excellent still. Herein is a new reason why the problem concerning both virtue and statesmanship should resolve itself into one concerning pleasure and pain. The man who puts pleasure and pain to their true use, will be good, and the man who abuses the one or the other, will be a bad man.

But we may gain a better understanding of the arguments here adduced from the following considerations.

Since there are three feelings which may become motives in determining our choice, and three corresponding opposites which may be motives for our avoidance of a thing—those of the beautiful, the expedient, and the pleasurable opposed to those of the ugly, the injurious and the painful, the good man applies himself to every one of these considerations in a spirit of fairness, pursuing as he does what is really best, and avoiding what it were injurious to pursue; whereas the bad man falls into error in his choice of considerations, especially in reference to what is pleasurable.

Now pleasure is not only shared in by all organised beings, but is also a concomitant element in all the 'objects of choice' enumerated above. Whatever objects we make our choice, in all of them we experience pleasure. What is beautiful or expedient is also in its nature pleasurable; and it is on this account that the wicked are deluded, by considering that whatever is pleasurable must be beautiful and expedient, and fancying that because pleasure is consequent upon whatever is beautiful and expedient, that therefore the terms are mutually convertible. Such, however, is not the fact, since many of those things which are pleasurable are disgraceful and ruinous.

Hence it is evident that all human action is found displayed in the field of pleasure and pain.

Moreover, this feeling is part of our nature from childhood, and grows with our growth, being, as it were, ingrained in the very tissue of our lives. Pleasure

is in truth the standard by which we distinguish right and wrong in conduct—according as they entail, the one pleasure and the other pain; and thus it is that we regulate the activities of our own lives, if not in the same degree yet all of us more or less.

Therefore it is that our whole business is concerned with pleasure and pain. It is of no slight assistance to a man when he is inquiring what he ought to do, if he know what it is to have the feelings of pleasure and pain under virtuous control; since it is a most important element in conduct that we should feel pleasure or pain in a right way. It is from the emotions which men exhibit of joy or sorrow that we have knowledge of their character, whether it be virtuous or immoral.

Again, both virtue and art are displayed in achievements where it is not easy to succeed. In order to compass objects which are easy there is no need of a long-sustained habit, nor of a special course of training. In proportion therefore as things are more difficult, will they require the greater skill and the greater virtue, since it is more meritorious to achieve successfully what is specially difficult than it is to surmount what is easy. Virtue will therefore assume its highest form in what is most difficult, and circumstances of difficulty form its most characteristic sphere. But, as Heraclitus says, it is more difficult to fight against pleasure than even against passion. Herein, then, is a new reason why the whole business of our inquiry will lie with pleasure and pain, as well in view of private as of public morality. The man who turns pleasure and pain to a noble use is a good man; while the man who abuses these emotions is a bad man.

(*c*) SUMMARY OF THE CONDITIONS OF A VIRTUOUS HABIT.

These arguments will be sufficient to prove:

1. The field in which virtue is displayed is pleasure and pain.

2. Virtue is strengthened when the acts from which it originates are continued, and, contrariwise, is destroyed when those acts cease, or are changed.

3. Virtue continues to manifest itself under conditions like those by which it was formed.

It has now been shown that:

1. The sphere of moral virtue is formed by pleasure and pain.

2. Moral virtue is strengthened or destroyed under the conditions out of which it is formed, according as our activities are displayed therein in one mode or another.

3. Moral virtue continues to manifest itself under conditions like those by which it was formed.

v.—Morality of the Act distinguished from the Morality of the Agent.

(*a*) STATEMENT OF OBJECTIONS TO THE THEORY OF HABIT.

But perhaps a critic may raise a difficulty as to the precise sense in which we hold the view that, 'by performing right actions men grow to be righteous, and by performing acts of self-restraint men grow to be temperate.' He might object that, 'if men perform acts of justice or of temperance,

'But if the virtuous *state* depends upon the virtuous *act*, the agent is virtuous independently of habit, as

they must by that very fact be already just and temperate, in the same way as they would be scholars and musicians, if they showed the knowledge of the scholar, or the skill of the musician.'

in the analogy of the arts.'

But here a critic may raise a difficulty. 'What is the meaning,' he may ask, 'of saying that it is necessary for a man, who desires to become just, to do just actions, or temperate actions, if his desire is to be temperate. Those who perform just acts are in every sense just men, and those who perform temperate acts are temperate men, precisely as those who execute musical or scholarly compositions are musicians and scholars.'

(*b*) REPLY TO THE ABOVE OBJECTIONS.

1. But does this objection hold good even in the case of the arts? It is surely possible for a man to show grammatical knowledge by accident or the suggestion of others. A man will not be a scholar unless he not only shows grammatical knowledge, but does so for scholarly reasons—in virtue, that is, of the scholarship which he possesses *in himself* and in his own right.

1. But it is not true, even in the arts, that the perfect act precedes the perfect habit.

2. Moreover, the case is not parallel between the arts and the virtues. The results effected by the arts have an excellence of their own independently of the artist: it is sufficient for them to bear the impress of certain qualities. On the other hand, the results attained in the way of the virtues, are not effected, for example, with justice and temperance, by bearing certain characteristics of their own, unless at the same time the agent who produces them himself possesses certain qualities.

2. If it were true, the analogy would not hold good: in art the dispositions of the artist are immaterial, but they are of the very essence of right and wrong.

There are, in fact, three conditions for a perfect moral act. The agent must perform the act (1) consciously, (2) from deliberate preference (his choice being for a particular object *for its own sake*), and (3) with firm and settled purpose.

Three tests of the morality of the agent.

Now for the attainment of the various arts, these conditions (save the simple possession of knowledge) are not accounted necessary requisites in the artist. For the attainment of the virtues, on the contrary, knowledge is of slight or of no avail; whereas it is of great, nay, of supreme importance, that the agent should himself be possessed of those moral qualities which ensue from the constant practice of justice and of temperance. In fact, moral acts can only be ranked as just or temperate when they are of such a nature as the just and temperate man would perform.

But the just and temperate man is what he is, not by the mere performance of such and such actions, but by showing the spirit and acting after the manner of one whose *character* is just and temperate.

1. In reply, I maintain that there is manifestly a difference between performing just actions and being oneself just, and this difference applies equally to the arts. It is conceivable for a man to execute a grammatical composition from chance, or at the suggestion of another, and yet not be himself a scholar. A man will not be a scholar unless he not only executes scholarly work, but does so for scholarly reasons—following, that is, consistently the standard of scholarship which he possesses within himself. By the same analogy it is quite conceivable for a man to perform acts of justice without being himself a just man.

2. Nay, rather, the difference upon these points is greater in the case of virtue than in that of the arts. In the arts 'the good' consists in the exercise of the artistic faculty. Consequently, if a man execute musical compositions with a knowledge of the musical art, there is nothing to prevent our calling him a musician. He is none the less a musician, though the compositions he performs are not done with deliberate preference of his own, but under the constraint of another. But in the case of virtue the reverse is true; a man will not be just though he perform just actions, unless, in addition to other conditions, he perform the actions with a positive wish of his own, and impelled to act by his own choice, without any constraint placed upon him.

In fact, to be moral a man must satisfy the following conditions. In doing just actions he must, in the first place, *know* what he is doing; secondly, he must act from his own free choice; and thirdly, his moral attitude in regard to such actions must be firm and unwavering. [The reasons for this last condition are that, according to our meaning of the word, a man will not be just, though he knows what justice is, and willingly acts up to his knowledge if he fancies that there are times exempt from the obligations of justice.]

But these conditions are not required in order to acquire the various arts, and to become artists in virtue thereof—excepting the one condition of knowledge. Devoid of knowledge, how could a man possibly be an artist at all? But as for the other conditions, though a man practise his art without any deliberate preference, or without having a firm, unfaltering attitude in regard to the handling of his art, he is not on that account hindered from being an artist. On the other hand, in regard to moral virtue, the mere knowledge of what it is fitting for a man to know of his duty, serves little or no good purpose; whereas the other qualifications are of great and even supreme importance—in view, that is, of growing to be oneself good and virtuous. It is quite conceivable for a man to be a good and virtuous man, though he know not how to speak of virtue with any degree of precision; but it is impossible for him to be good unless he have a deliberate preference for such and such a course, and an unwavering attitude in regard to virtue—and these are moral conditions which result from the repeated exercise of the faculties in a particular direction, as has been explained.

Actions are, therefore, only just and temperate when they bear a character like that which the just and temperate man would show therein; and a man is just and temperate not necessarily from doing such and such actions, but from doing them in the spirit which the just and temperate show.

(*c*) CONCLUSION: FOR AN ACT TO BE MORAL THE AGENT MUST BE MORAL; AND THE AGENT IS MORAL BY CONSTANT PRACTICE.

It is, therefore, rightly affirmed that 'a man becomes just by performing just acts, and temperate by performing acts of self-

restraint; whereas, by refraining from such acts a man would not even have a chance of becoming good.'

The conclusion is that 'practice makes perfect,' and that knowledge is useless unless carried into effect.

The generality of men, however, instead of practising the virtues, take shelter in arguing about them, and fancy that they are philosophers and that their speculations will make them good. Such conduct is just as foolish as that of invalids who hearken zealously to their physicians, but carry out none of their directions. As these foolish patients will never attain to sound health by such a method of treatment, so neither will these doctrinaires attain to a virtuous state of soul by such a method of philosophising.

The view, therefore, which I have maintained is the right one—that 'a man grows to be just by performing just acts, and temperate by performing acts of self-restraint; whereas a man who does not practise virtuous acts will never even have a chance of becoming good.'

The generality of men, however, instead of practising the virtues, take refuge in philosophy and fine theories, and fancy that they are philosophers and virtuous men, simply on the ground that they know how to talk with subtle discrimination upon the theory of virtue. Such conduct is much like that of invalids who hearken zealously to their physicians, yet carry out none of their directions. As these foolish patients will never attain to sound health by such a method of treatment, so neither will these moral dreamers make their souls more noble and virtuous by studying the philosophy of life in such a spirit of trifling.

II.—FORMAL DEFINITION OF VIRTUE.

i.—What is the generic character of Virtue?

Our next enquiry will be to settle what is the generic character of virtue.

1. ENUMERATION OF THE POWERS OF THE SOUL.

Now, as there are three forces operating in the soul—emotions, capacities and habits—virtue must be one or other of them.

Analysis of the moral powers.

1. I mean by 'emotions' such feelings as desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, affection, hatred, longing, emulation, pity,—in fact, all those states of consciousness which are attended by pleasure and pain.

2. I mean by 'capacities' those dispositions or tendencies from which such and such feelings may be evoked, and in virtue of which we are said to be 'capable' of those feelings, capable, that is, of feeling anger, pity, or pain.

3. I mean by 'habits' those dispositions in accordance with

which we hold a certain attitude, whether right or wrong, towards particular emotions; for example, in regard to the feeling of anger, if the attitude of our minds be towards either violence or apathy, then our 'habit' is an improper one, whereas, if our attitude be one of due moderation, then our 'habit' is a virtuous habit. The case is analogous with the other virtues.

We will now go on to consider what is the generic character of virtue.

Now there are three forces operating in the soul—emotions, capacities, and habits.

1. 'Emotions' are such feelings as desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, affection, hatred, longing, emulation, pity—in fact all such states of consciousness as are attended with pleasure or pain.

2. 'Capacities' are aptitudes and tendencies of soul for such and such and such emotions, and in virtue of which we are said to be capable of experiencing those emotions, *e.g.*, of being roused to anger or of feeling pain and pity.

3. 'Habits' are the *modes* in which we are affected by the emotions, and in accordance with which our 'frame of mind' is right or wrong. For example, in feeling anger or passion, if, on the one hand, our attitude be violent and uncontrollable, or, on the other hand, apathetic and easy, our 'habit' or state of mind is a wrong one, whereas, if our attitude be one of due moderation, then our habit is a virtuous habit. The same analogy applies to other mental states.

2. VIRTUE SHOWN TO BE 'A HABIT.'

(*a*) There are the following reasons to prove that neither virtues nor vices are mere 'emotions':—

1. Considerations to show that virtue is something more than feeling.

(1.) We are not said to be either good or evil simply on the ground of our emotions, as we are on the ground of our virtues and vices.

(2.) We are neither praised nor blamed on the score of our emotions as we are on the score of our virtues and vices: *i.e.*, a man is not praised simply because he has emotions of fear or of anger, nor is a man blamed simply on the ground of his anger, but only when anger is felt under unjustifiable circumstances.

(3.) We are moved to anger or to fear without a deliberate act of the will. But the virtues are 'forms of volition'—or, at any rate, they are not devoid of some action of the will.

(4.) Besides, in common language, we are said to be 'stirred' or 'roused' in regard to our feelings, whereas in regard to the virtues and vices we are said to be '*disposed*' in such and such a way.

(*b*) The above reasons show also that neither are the virtues simple 'capacities;' *i.e.*,

2. Considerations to show that virtue is something more than capacity.

(1.) We are not said to be either good or bad simply from a capacity to receive impressions.

(2.) We are neither praised nor blamed for our capacities.

(3.) We are capable of receiving impressions by the very constitution of our nature, but we do not become, merely by nature, either good or bad.

(*c*) Seeing then that the virtues are neither 'emotions' nor 'capacities,' it follows that they must be 'habits'—*i.e.* permanent tendencies of our moral nature.

To which of these three forces then, does virtue belong? Is it an 'emotion,' a 'capacity,' or a 'habit'?

1. Certainly neither virtue nor vice is a mere emotion; because—

(1.) In respect of our virtue we are called virtuous, and in respect of our vice, vicious, but neither one nor the other in respect of our emotions. No man is either good or bad simply from having, for instance, the feeling of anger. Neither virtue nor vice, therefore, will be an emotion.

(2.) In respect of our emotions we are neither praised nor blamed as we are in respect of our virtues or vices.

(3.) We feel anger or fear without any distinct determination of the will (and so it is with all the other feelings we experience), but in the case of virtue and of vice there is the conscious assent of the will. Virtue and vice are therefore not mere emotions.

(4.) Again, in regard to the emotions, we are not said to have such and such a disposition, but to be 'moved' or 'stirred' in respect thereto. But in respect of virtue, and similarly in respect to vice, we are said to be 'disposed' in a certain way. Hence virtues and vices are not emotions.

2. The same reasons prove also that they are not 'capacities:'

(1.) We are not called good or bad simply from having the capacity for being angered.

(2.) Nor are we praised or blamed for such a capacity.

(3.) We are not capable of being angered simply by having formed a resolution to be so, as is the case with moral virtue (the moral decision producing the moral state), but our capacity for emotion depends upon the natural constitution which is born with us. As has been shown in the previous arguments we do not become by nature either good or bad.

3. If then the virtues are neither emotions nor capacities, the only alternative is that they must belong to the class of 'habits,' or tendencies fixed by practice of their acts.

It has thus been proved that in its generic nature virtue is a 'habit.'

ii.—What are the distinguishing characteristics of Virtue?

It has now been explained what virtue is in its 'material' nature. But we must not be content with this general explanation of it as 'a habit' or 'permanent tendency:' we must further explain what is its 'formal' nature or specific character.

What 'form' or special character does the habit of virtue assume?

1. WHAT IS IMPLIED BY THE 'EXCELLENCE' OF A THING?

Now it may be assumed that the 'excellence' of a thing is that quality which finishes off, as with a touch of art, the object to which it attaches, and renders the result as a whole perfect. The

excellence of the eye, for instance, makes the eye good and its operation effectual: it is through the excellence of the eye that we see well. In the same way the excellence of the horse makes the horse strong, and able to run and to bear its rider and to stand the shock of the enemy.

General conception of virtue as 'the *excellence* of man.'

If this definition be, as it is, of universal application, the 'excellence' of *man* will be a habit or fixed state of mind in virtue whereof he proves himself to be a good man, and is enabled to finish off, with a perfect touch, his work as man.

But we must not merely describe virtue as 'a habit;' we must add the further qualification what *kind* of habit it is, *i.e.* that it is a *virtuous* habit, while vice is a vicious habit.

Now thus much may be at once assumed respecting virtue—that like all excellence, it adorns the object which possesses it, and causes it to be in a right state, and brings the work which is effected by means thereof to an excellent effect. The excellence of the eye, for instance, perfects the eye and makes it a good eye and renders its function, *i.e.* seeing, effectual: it is through the excellence of the eye that we see well. Similarly also the excellence of the horse distinguishes the horse itself and makes it a good horse and renders its operation effectual: it is through such excellence that it is able to bear its rider easily, and to gallop, and to stand the shock of the foe.

Since this principle is of universal application, the excellence proper to man will show the same characteristics, and will be 'a habit of mind in virtue whereof a man proves himself a good man, and is enabled to accomplish the proper work of his life successfully and nobly.'

2. THE IDEA OF 'EXCELLENCE' ILLUSTRATED BY COMPARISON WITH THE IDEA OF A 'MEAN' OR 'IDEAL.'

I have already explained how this excellence may be attained; but our view of it will be rendered yet clearer in the following light—by examining, that is, what the distinguishing nature of excellence precisely is.

The mathematical metaphors of a proportion, and of 'the mean' introduced to elucidate further the idea of excellence.

Take the analogy of mathematical proportion: in all quantity whether continuous or discrete, we may take a part that is 'greater' or 'less' or 'equal'—either absolutely in regard to the thing itself or relatively in regard to ourselves (the equal being that which is midway between excess and defect). By the 'absolute mean' I understand a point equally distant from two extremes, a point which is one and the same for all persons. By the 'relative mean' I understand one which is neither in excess nor defect in regard to a particular purpose, or point of view of our own. The 'relative mean' is then not a quantity which is one and the same for all. Suppose, for example, that ten be too much and two be insufficient, we take six as 'the absolute mean:' it exceeds and is exceeded by the same number, and that is the mean according to

arithmetical proportion. But the 'relative mean' must be regarded in a different light to this. Looking to the 'relative mean,' if ten pounds be too much for a man to eat and two pounds be too little, the trainer will not necessarily prescribe six pounds. Six pounds might be either too much or too little for the man who would have to take it: it would be too little for a Milo, and too much for a man who was just beginning gymnastic training. Similarly also in the case of running and wrestling. In this spirit every wise teacher avoids excess and defect, and adopts by preference 'a mean'—not the mean that is absolute, but one that is proper and relative to ourselves and adapted to our own needs.

How such a state can be brought about, was explained a few pages back. We showed that the man who was resolutely determined to live in the practice of virtue ever aimed at 'a mean state' in regard to those impulses which lead to the forming of emotions, and further habituated himself to such a line of moderation.

This principle of moderation will be made yet more clear by the considerations which I will now proceed to give. from the careful examination, that is, of the distinctive and special characteristics of virtue or excellence as such.

Let us, then, regard the matter in the following aspect. In everything which is continuous, for instance a line, a superficies, a body, a speech, a period of time —in fact, in everything which is capable of being divided into parts, one may take a part which is greater or less or equal. In the case, for example, of extended space: if ten feet be too much and two feet too little, the 'equal' will be that which contains six feet, and that is called also 'the mean,' because it exceeds two feet in the same proportion as it is exceeded by ten feet. The case is similar also in regard to 'discrete' quantity. If 20 be too much and 10 too little, 15 will be a fair equality, because 15 exceeds 10 the less in the same proportion as it falls short of 20 the greater. An 'equal' of this kind is called 'a mean,' and an arrangement of ratios of this kind is arithmetical proportion. In the case of discrete quantity it is not invariably necessary to find the arithmetical proportion (since we cannot carry on our division to infinity); but in the case of continuous quantity we may do so (since that is capable of being divided into infinite parts).

We do not, therefore, always determine this mean in the same manner. At one time we judge of it by the standard of the thing itself, at another time by a standard that is relative to ourselves. In respect of the thing itself the mean between 10 and 2 is 6, 6 exceeding and being exceeded to the same extent. But a mean is relative to ourselves when the middle and the excess and the defect is taken from our own point of view. For instance, if it be too much for anyone to eat 10 pounds, and 2 pounds be too little for him, it does not follow that 6 pounds is the quantity which keeps the mean and is suitable to our constitution: it is possible that either more or less may be needed to satisfy. In respect therefore of the thing itself, 6 pounds are the 'mean,' between 10 and 2, and what is equal; but in reference to our own needs perhaps 7, perhaps 5, pounds, that is to say, whatever number of pounds is suitable to the constitution. A dinner of 6 pounds will be too little for a Milo, as being in a thorough state of training, and his trainer will provide him with a more ample allowance; whereas such a quantity would be excessive for a man who is just commencing systematic training.

The same principle applies to running and wrestling: we judge of the 'mean' from the stand-point of those who are being trained for competition. Indeed, anyone who presides over the regulation of any profession seeks the mean, avoiding the excess or defect; but the mean which he pursues is one relative to ourselves and to our own circumstances, and not the mean which is absolute.

3. APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPTION OF 'THE MEAN' TO THE MORAL LIFE.

Comparison of virtue to an art where the symmetry of all the parts produces a perfect beauty.

Seeing, then, that it is the genius of science to give an exact finish to its special functions, having regard to its own ideal and referring to the standard of that ideal all its products; and seeing that artists are wont to say of their works when finished off that it is impossible to take away a line or to add a single touch, under the belief that a line wanting or a stroke too much spoil the beauty of a work, whereas a chastened moderation preserves it; seeing further, that skilled workmen make this 'finish of art' as we call it, the ideal at which they aim in working; and seeing, lastly, that virtue like nature is a thing far more exact and important than any art:—for all these reasons, clearly, virtue will likewise aim at producing a perfect finish and realizing the noblest ideal.

Truth and science are absolute and limitless: the artistic conception of virtue will, therefore, apply only to the *moral* life and to its expression in conduct.

The virtue of which I am now speaking is moral, not intellectual virtue, the moral nature being alone concerned with feeling and action in which 'excess' and 'defect' and 'the mean' are manifested. It is possible, I mean, to be afraid and to be confident, to have strong passions or to be roused to anger or to be moved to pity, and generally, to feel pleasure and pain, in excess and defect, and in either event wrongly. In such cases what constitutes the moral mean and the true ideal of action, is the observance of the due season, of the proper circumstances, of the true end and of the right manner, and such an observance is the special characteristic of virtue.

The same law applies to outward conduct. In actions as in feelings are found excess and defect and a true fitness. But actions and feelings are the sphere in which virtue is displayed, and in both cases excess or extravagance implies moral failure, and defect is visited with censure; whereas the attainment of a perfect mean receives the approbation of mankind and is crowned with success. But success and public approbation are indications of moral merit.

Thus it is that every science finishes off with true grace its proper function; and accordingly we are wont to say in reference to works of art when beautifully executed that it is impossible to add a single line or to take away a single touch, indicating thereby that a perfect work avoids equally excess and defect, under the idea that extravagance or defect spoils the beauty of a work, whilst a chastened simplicity preserves it.

But since virtue is more delicately exact and more important than any art

(just as also nature is), it will itself also have regard to this principle of the 'mean' or relative fitness.

The virtue of which I am now speaking, is not intellectual but moral virtue (the circumstances being different in regard to intellectual virtue), moral virtue being concerned with emotions and actions which are capable of being more numerous and stronger, or on the other hand, less, than what is fitting; and hence what is 'due,' *i.e.* what is 'equal,' is also found therein. It is possible to be afraid or to be confident, to indulge in passion, to be roused to anger or to pity, and generally to have the sensations of pleasure or pain in excess or in defect, and in either issue, improperly. To experience these feelings invariably at the proper time and in the proper manner, under proper circumstances and against proper persons and with proper motives . . . this is the moral ideal, and the true Best, and that in which virtue consists.

The case is similar in regard to the actions which are brought about under the influence of the passions: therein, also, in excess and defect and 'the mean.'

Since, therefore, virtue is manifested in the sphere of feeling or of action, and in regard both to feelings and actions the 'mean' is always called 'rectitude,' or 'success,' and is praised (public recognition and popular applause being both characteristic of moral merit), it is evident that virtue is neither excess nor defect, but a 'mean state' having regard in every case to an ideal fitness or moderation between extremes.

4. DIFFICULTIES IN THE ATTAINMENT OF 'THE MEAN.'

Virtue is, therefore, a 'moral fitness'—a state calculated at any rate to achieve an ideal fitness in the conduct of life. To fail, however, in this high standard is possible in innumerable ways (since 'wrong' belongs—as the Pythagoreans expressed it in their mystical way—to the 'infinite,' which is not brought under the sphere of law; whereas 'right' or 'the good' belongs to what is determinate and within the sphere of law). To succeed is, on the other hand, possible in one way only. Consequently wrong is easy, and right is difficult: it is easy to miss the mark and difficult to attain it.

This conception of virtue as a 'faultless symmetry and fitness of life,' suggests the extreme rarity and difficulty of its attainment.

Here, then, is a new reason why excess and defect are characteristic of vice, while a true fitness is the characteristic of virtue; as the poet says,

"Single the path of the good: many the ways of the bad."

Further, error or failure in our true purpose is multiform, so to speak. Many are the ways in which it is possible for a man to go wrong. 'The evil is infinite,' as the Pythagoreans phrase it; whereas the good is a thing defined and limited. Accordingly to act rightly is a simple, plain course, which has but one single aspect. Hence also to err is easy—as easy as for an archer to miss the mark, while to succeed is difficult, as difficult as for one to throw at a precise point. It is evident, then, for this reason among others that excess and defect are characteristics of vice (each of them being indeterminate), whereas 'the mean' being defined and simple, is the characteristic of virtue; as the poet says,

"Single the path of the good: many the ways of the bad."

5. RÉSUMÉ: COMPLETE DEFINITION OF VIRTUE.

Virtue is, therefore, 'a formal state of mind united with the assent of the will and based upon an ideal of what is best in actual life—an ideal set up by Right Reason, according as the moral sense of the good man would determine its application.' This ideal or standard of right is 'a mean state' between two vices, one in the direction of excess, the other in the direction of defect: it is a mean state also from the fact that vices fall short or else go beyond what is fitting both in feeling and conduct, whereas virtue has an instinct to find out and the resolution to prefer 'the mean,' the true fitness of things.

The elements which enter into the conception of virtue are: (1) a formed state, (2) an assent of the will, (3) a moral ideal, (4) Right Reason, (5) long experience.

Hence it is that, regarded in its cause,—defined, that is, according to its essential nature, Virtue is 'a mean state;' but in its effect and from the point of view of what is best and most excellent it is an 'extreme.'

Virtue is, therefore, 'a permanent state of mind, formed with the concurrence of the will and based upon an ideal of what is best in actual life—an ideal fixed by Reason according as the moral sense of the good man would determine its application.' This ideal is 'a mean state' between two vices, one tending to excess and the other to defect: it goes beyond the one and falls short of the other—since one of these faults goes beyond what is right and the other falls short of it, whereas virtue seeks only what is fitting, *i.e.* 'the mean,' and makes that mean its choice.

Consequently, if we were to seek the simple essence of virtue, it is 'a mean state;' but if we regard its result and take the standpoint of what is excellent, virtue is 'an extreme.'

iii.—Certain exceptions to which the criterion of 'the mean' does not apply.

1. CERTAIN ACTIONS ARE ABSOLUTELY RIGHT OR ABSOLUTELY WRONG, IRRESPECTIVELY OF CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONDITIONS.

(*a*) Still it is not every action nor every feeling that admits of these delicate distinctions of proportion, fitness or harmony. There are feelings and actions the bare mention of which involves at once the idea of their wickedness. Rejoicing at evil, shamelessness, envy, or, in outward action, adultery, theft, murder—these things and such as these are reprobated from the fact of their being wicked, not in their states of excess or defect, but in themselves and inherently. In relation to such sins as these, it is

The conception of 'the mean' as virtue, and of its deviation as the vices, applies only to things indifferent: there are certain things inherently wrong.

never possible to be right, but one would certainly commit a crime on every occasion of their indulgence.

(*b*) Nor does the rightness or wrongness of such an act as adultery depend upon the commission of the act with a particular person or in a particular manner, but without limitation or exception, to commit any such act as that is to commit a sin.

No consideration of circumstances affects the sinfulness of murder.

(*c*) It is equally futile to claim 'a mean' or 'an excess' or 'a defect' as qualifying injustice, or cowardice, or intemperance. On such a supposition there would be 'a mean of excess and defect' and 'an excess of excess' and 'a defect of defect.' But just as there is neither excess nor defect possible in self-restraint or courage, seeing that 'the mean state' is in some sense an ideal limit or extreme; so neither in these other cases is there 'a mean' nor an excess nor a defect, but in whatsoever way they may be committed, such acts are absolutely sinful. In a word, there is no mean of excess and defect, nor excess and defect of a mean.

The law of the mean cannot either be applied to things which are themselves deviations from a mean.

1. Still it is right for us to understand further that it is not every action nor every feeling that admits of this principle of 'the mean' into which we have been making inquiry; the standard of 'fitness' is not universally applicable. There are certain acts and certain emotions which, whether they are found in excess or in defect or in some kind of mean, are invariably sinful and evil—for example, in the emotions, shamelessness and envy, or in actions, adultery, theft, murder. All such things are not called evil from the fact of their going beyond a certain 'mean' point therein, nor from falling below such a point; but they are inherently evil in themselves. Under no circumstances whatever can the idea of 'fitness' be applied to any form of such sins; but under any and every form of their indulgence it is inevitable to commit a crime. In such cases one cannot determine beforehand any limits within which such acts may be done, as may be done with the virtues generally. One cannot lay down rules for housebreakers, determining in what manner they may steal, upon what occasions, what things or from what persons; but irrespective of all conditions, to do anything whatever of the kind is to commit a crime.

In such cases as these, therefore, there is no 'mean' nor 'excess' nor 'defect' any more than there are limits for the practice of justice or cowardice or sensuality. Some of these states are excesses, and others defects of virtue; and it would be utterly absurd to seek for an 'excess of excess,' or for 'a defect of defect,' or 'a mean in excess and defect.' Just as there is neither excess nor defect, nor a mean of a mean (I am speaking of moral virtue,) but virtue is, so to speak, 'the extreme of the mean;' so neither can there be a mean or an excess or a defect in states of excess and defect, but invariably, under whatever circumstances such acts are committed, they are sinful and wrong. In a word, there is no mean of excess and defect, nor excess and defect in a mean.

III.—CLASSIFICATION OF VIRTUES TO ILLUSTRATE THE LAW OF 'THE MEAN.'

We may now proceed to illustrate the law of the mean in its various applications to specific virtues.

But the principles of virtue must not simply be stated in this general way: we must show their adaptation to the special circumstances of life. In ethical speculation general propositions are somewhat impalpable: there is greater reality in specific truths which illustrate specific duties. As the whole range of action lies within particular circumstances, our principles ought to be consistent when applied to them.

We will therefore take from our Catalogue of the virtues certain specimens of the special conditions of life, to show the application of our theory thereto.

But we must not merely say in a general way that 'virtue is a mean state,' and that 'vice consists in extremes,' but we must further explain in detail what particular virtue is a mean between what particular extremes. In discussions bearing upon conduct, while general propositions are more comprehensive, and are applicable to the larger number of instances, specific truths are the more real and trustworthy, inasmuch as they fit on closely to actions for the very reason that actions always take place under specific circumstances, and with the exigencies of specific circumstances true principles of course harmonize.

We will therefore take such cases as we require from the Diagram which I have unfolded before you. As has been explained, virtue lies midway between an excess and defect in every single phase of the moral life (excepting only such as are inherently vicious *per se*).

i.—Self-regarding Virtues.

1. VIRTUES DISPLAYED IN CIRCUMSTANCES OF PLEASURE AND PAIN.

(*a*) Virtues and vices shown in the avoidance of pain.

(*a*) In regard to the feelings of fear and of confidence, the proper attitude of mind is courage. Of the characters which deviate from the true limits (*a*) the man who errs from incapacity to feel fear, has no distinctive name (as is the case with many other of our moral states), whereas (β) if he go beyond the line through excess of confidence he is called reckless. If, on the other hand, a man outstrip the due limits of fear, and fall short of a proper confidence, then he is called a coward.

(*b*) Virtues and vices shown in the pursuit of pleasure.

(*b*) In regard to pleasures and pains (not *all*, however, and perhaps pains less than pleasures), the perfect attitude is temperance, and the excess sensuality. As for falling short in self-gratification, such cases hardly occur: hence the class have not met with a distinctive name. However, they may be called 'insensate.'

(1.) In reference to fear or confidence—these being emotions of the soul, the perfect frame of mind is Courage, while the extremes are cowardice as a defect, and recklessness as an excess. From the point of view of fear there is no special name for the excess, though there is from the point of view of confidence. (There are indeed many such phases of mind which have no special name.) Moreover, there is no special name for the excess of confidence, though there is a special idea —that of cowardice—drawn from the excess of fear. Hence, of the extremes the one derives its name from fear, the other from confidence.

(2.) In reference to pleasures and pains, both the extremes and the mean states are for the most part without any distinctive name, especially in regard to *pains*. But in reference to such pleasures as are purely bodily there is a mean state, 'temperance,' and an excess, 'dissoluteness.' The defect has no special name, inasmuch as there are few who entirely refrain themselves from every form of gratification: it may, however, be classed as 'insensateness.'

2. VIRTUES DISPLAYED IN MONEY-MATTERS.

a. In regard to the giving and receiving of money, the true disposition of mind is liberality, the excess prodigality, the defect stinginess. These extremes go beyond the mark or fall short of it in inverse ratio to one another: the prodigal exceeds in giving, and falls short in receiving, while the stingy man exceeds in receiving, and fails in giving. [For the present we may be content with this simple enumeration, as we are only describing the virtues in outline with a view to summarize them. By and by their definitions shall be settled with more scientific accuracy.]

a. In the ordinary transactions of life.

b. But there are other dispositions of mind which must be noted in reference to money. Magnificence is a virtuous attitude (and this character of magnificence differs, it must be observed, from liberality, in that the one is concerned with vast wealth, the latter with only moderate wealth). On the other hand, failure in one direction is seen in want of taste and ostentation, and in another direction in meanness or pettiness (and these extremes again differ from the extremes of liberality: the point where they diverge shall be explained later on).

b. In the disposition of great wealth.

(*a*) In reference to the feeling which we experience in giving or receiving money, the true disposition is liberality, while the perversions of the mean are prodigality as an excess, and niggardliness as a defect. Yet in certain conditions the reverse is true, that prodigality is a defect, and niggardliness an excess. In *giving* money, prodigality is an excess, and illiberality a defect, whereas in *receiving* money illiberality is an excess, and prodigality a defect. [For the present we may be satisfied with this simple enumeration, as we are here only treating the subject in a cursory manner, and as it were in outline. By and by we shall have to describe these states with greater precision.]

(*b*) There is yet another form of the perfect state with corresponding extremes in reference to the giving and receiving of money; and that is magnificence, differing from liberality in that it lavishes vast sums, whereas liberality has only small sums to lavish. The excess of this virtue is want of taste and vulgarity, and its defect meanness. These extremes again differ from the extremes of liberality: the points of difference shall be explained later on.

3. VIRTUES DISPLAYED IN THE DESIRE FOR ESTEEM.

a. In regard to honour and disgrace, the virtuous state is high-mindedness, the excess being what is called 'vain-glory,' and the defect, littleness of soul.

1. In great matters.

b. I just now explained the relation of liberality to magnificence to be that the former has a more circumscribed sphere than the latter. There is a corresponding relation between high-mindedness which is concerned with *great* honour, and another state which is concerned with ordinary honour. It is of course possible to strive after honour rightly and becomingly, as well as in a way that is either extravagant or insufficient.

2. In smaller matters.

Now the man who is of excessive ambition is called ambitious, and the man who is wanting in ambition, unambitious; while the man who holds the true balance between these extremes has no special name. Neither does language give name to the corresponding states of mind—save to that of the ambitious man, which is ambition. Hence it is that the two extreme characters dispute for the possession of the ground intervening between them. There are indeed times when we call the moderate man ambitious, and times when we call him unambitious. There are times when we praise the ambitious man, and times when we praise the unambitious man. The cause and ground of these variations of opinion shall be explained later on.

We must now proceed to enumerate the remaining virtues, following the plan which has hitherto guided us.

(*a*) In regard to the emotions involved in honour and dishonour, the perfect state is magnanimity, the excess 'vain-glory,' as it is called, and the defect, littleness of soul.

(*b*) Corresponding to the differences which we said existed in the dispositions that relate to money, liberality and magnificence, the former being concerned with small sums, the latter with great sums, there is similarly in regard to honour a certain disposition which differs from high-mindedness in being concerned with small interests, while high-mindedness is concerned with great interests.

Now it is possible for a man to strive after honour as is fitting, or to a degree beyond what is right, or even less than is fitting. The man who is extravagant in his desires is an ambitious man, and his mental state ambitiousness. The man who lacks a proper ambition is an unambitious man (but his mental state has no distinctive name). The perfect attitude in such matters is also nameless, but it differs from magnanimity upon the point which has been mentioned.

Inasmuch as the virtuous character (*i.e.* the man who holds the true mean) has no special name of his own, he is called after the extremes, since he partakes of the character of both: at one time we call him ambitious, at another time unambitious, and at one time we praise the ambitious man, at another the unambitious man. The grounds upon which we do so will be explained in the sequel.

Let us now proceed to enumerate the states of mind which still remain, seeking in each case for 'the mean' and for the extremes.

ii.—Virtues shown in relation to others.

1. VIRTUES DISPLAYED UNDER PROVOCATION.

In reference, again, to anger there is excess and defect and a true 'mean.' These three states have scarcely any recognized names; but if we call the ideal character 'the good-tempered man,' we must name the corresponding disposition 'good temper.' Of the extremes, the man who is excessive in his anger may be classed as a 'passionate man,' and his vice as 'passionateness,' while the man who is deficient in a proper feeling of anger is a kind of impassive person, and his mental state impassivity.

The regulation of the temper.

In the matter of anger, the mean state is good temper, the ideal character being called the good-tempered man. The two extremes have no special name, though the excess may be named passionateness, and the man who shows the excess, the passionate man; and deficiency of anger may be called impassivity, and the man who shows it, the impassive man.

2. VIRTUES DISPLAYED IN SOCIAL INTERCOURSE.

There are three other virtuous dispositions which have a kind of resemblance to one another, though with characteristic differences of their own. Their sphere is social intercourse in word and deed between man and man.

The virtues of social life depend upon the motives shown and the circumstances which form their sphere.

The point upon which they differ is that while the one is concerned with the *truth* involved in social relations, the others are concerned with what is *pleasant* in the same connection either (*a*) in relaxation, or (*β*) in the various circumstances of daily life.

We must therefore consider the case of these dispositions, that we may the better understand that in all cases a true moderation is praiseworthy, while the extremes are neither right nor praiseworthy, but reprehensible.

Of these relations the greater number have no special name of their own. Still we must endeavour (as we have already done in the case of others) to give them a name for ourselves, as well for the sake of perspicuity as to ensure our being intelligently followed.

a. In respect, then, of truth, the perfect man is the truthful man; and the perfect state of mind is truthfulness, as it may be called. On the other hand, assertion that errs on the side of exaggeration is boastfulness, and the corresponding character is the boastful man; while assertion that errs on the side of sup-

pression is reserve, and the corresponding character is the reserved man.

b. In respect of what is agreeable:

(*a*) In relaxation, the perfect man is the polite man, and the corresponding frame of mind is politeness, while excessive pleasantry is buffoonery, and the man who indulges in it the buffoon. Defect of politeness, again, is boorishness, and the corresponding character the boor.

(*β*) In the circumstances of daily life, the man who is agreeable as is right and proper is a friend, and his attitude is that of friendship. On the contrary, when a man goes into excess of pleasantness, if for no selfish motive, he is a courtier; but if for purposes of his own, then he is a sycophant. Again, the man who is defective in courtesy, and in every way disagreeable, is a kind of churl and cross-grained fellow.

There are further three other 'mean states,' which to a certain extent enter into one another, though they present also characteristic differences. In the actions we perform, and in the words we utter in our intercourse with our fellow men, part of what we say and do is said and done for the sake of amusement, part for the sake of that general gratification which we find in life.

Hence there are of necessity three 'mean states' in respect thereto. In what is said or done with a view to truth, the mean state is truthfulness; and in reference to pleasure, the state which has reference to relaxation or amusement is politeness, and that which is concerned with pleasantness generally is friendliness.

These three states all enter into one another, because they are all concerned with intercourse in word and deed, but they are different the one from the other because the relations with which they are concerned are different. Their extremes have no special name, but we must find terms for them for the sake of perspicuity, and in order that our readers may readily follow the course of the argument.

1. Let the extremes of truth, then, be named as follows:—assertion tending towards exaggeration, boastfulness, and the corresponding character, the boastful man; while if the assertion tends towards suppression, it is reservation, and the corresponding character, the reserved man.

2. In regard to politeness, the excess is buffoonery, and the man who shows the excess the buffoon; while the state which falls short of politeness is boorishness, and the man who has such a deficiency, a boor.

3. In regard to friendship, the man who is excessive therein, and that with no selfish aim, may be called the courtier; but if his motive be his own profit or advantage, then he is a flatterer. If, again, he falls short of friendliness, and is in every respect ungracious, then he is a man who is quarrelsome and cross-grained.

iii.—Certain praiseworthy states of the Moral nature.

1. MENTAL PHASES CONCERNED WITH SHAME.

There are also states of moral perfection in regard to the feelings, and the circumstances connected therewith: self-respect, for instance, is not a virtue, yet the man who shows it is praised.

Indeed, on all occasions where shame may be evoked, one man is said to be free from all fault, while another man is said to carry the emotion too far (like the dumfounded man who feels shame at everything). On the other hand, the man who is defective in sense of shame, or even absolutely void of it, is called a shameless person. The perfect character is that of the modest man who has a true self-respect.

There are certain conditions of the moral nature which are semi-virtues, *e.g.* shame (as regards self).

2. EMOTIONS EXPERIENCED AT THE FORTUNES OF OTHERS.

Again, an honest feeling of indignation is a proper mean between envy and spitefulness. The pleasure or pain arising from the fortunes of our neighbours form the province in which their feelings are exercised. The honest feeling of indignation is the grief felt when men succeed in their schemes undeservedly. The envious man, going beyond these proper limits, is pained at every success of every one; and, lastly, the spiteful man is so far from feeling pain at the success of the wicked that he positively rejoices therein.

Or, again, the feelings which arise at the fortunes of others.

But there will be a proper opportunity for discussing these virtues elsewhere. Similarly in regard to Justice, as the term is not applied absolutely, I shall subsequently discuss its various senses, and in explaining its various forms show in what sense they are 'perfect states,' and I shall treat of the intellectual virtues in the same way.

But not only in the emotions themselves, but also in the circumstances which attend the emotions, there are 'mean states,' or perfect conditions, as is evident in the case of shame. Shame is not itself a virtue, since it is not a mean state of an emotion, but a mean state in regard to the conditions which attend an emotion. Still it is one of those things which are praised. The modest man is of course praised: in both directions he has both excess and defect. Shame itself is thus a mean state. The man who is excessive in his sense of shame, is called the dumfounded man; and the man who is defective in shame, or absolutely feels no shame at all, is called 'shameless;' while he who preserves the mean, is called 'modest.'

There is also a mean state in regard to pain—when one is pained on occasion of others faring prosperously contrary to their deserts, and this pain is called 'righteous indignation.' In regard thereto, there is excess and defect in both directions. The excess is when a man is pained at every form of good fortune befalling others. The man who shows such a feeling is envious, and his state of mind is envy. The defect is when a man is so far from feeling pain that he positively rejoices when men fare badly contrary to their deserts. Such a character is called malevolent, and his state of mind malevolence. The ideal state of mind is honest indignation, and the man who shows it, is called a man of honest indignation.

But of this perfect state and its extremes we shall have to speak with greater precision by-and-by.

In reference also to Justice, since it is twofold and requires a somewhat lengthened treatment, it would be inconvenient to treat of it here. In a later book we shall discriminate its several varieties, and determine in what sense they are mean states, and what are their extremes. We shall have to treat of the intellectual virtues also in the same way.

IV.—PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR DETERMINING THE MEAN.

i.—Comparison of the extremes and their opposition to the mean.

THE EXTREMES AND THE MEAN ARE ALL OPPOSED TO ONE ANOTHER.

The various degrees of contrast which the law of the mean gives to conduct.

Now as there are three states of mind in reference to each virtue, two of them being faulty in the way either of excess or defect, and one a perfect state or 'virtue,' they are severally opposed to one another. The extremes are opposed both to the mean and to one another, and the mean is opposed to both the extremes.

We will now go on to speak of the opposition of the extremes towards one another, and towards the mean.

Since of these three dispositions of mind which have a moral character, one is a 'virtue' (which is the perfect state), and two are vices (of which one goes beyond due bounds, and the other falls short thereof), in all of these states there is a kind of mutual opposition: the extremes are in a state of opposition to one another, and the 'mean' to each of the extremes.

1. THE SENSE IN WHICH THE 'MEAN' IS OPPOSED TO THE EXTREMES.

Virtue is opposed to both of the extremes, and from the standpoint of one extreme is called by the name of the other.

This opposition is on this wise: just as 'a half' is in excess compared with a smaller portion, and in defect compared with a greater portion, so too the 'mean states' are in excess compared with their defects, but themselves defective compared with their excesses, in the sphere alike of emotion and of conduct. For instance, the brave man compared with the coward seems to be reckless, and in contrast with the reckless man he seems to be a coward. In the same way the temperate man is thought a sensualist in comparison with the ascetic, and an ascetic when contrasted with the sensualist. Again, the liberal man is a prodigal regarded by the standard of the illiberal man, and illiberal from the standard of the prodigal.

Hence it is that the 'extreme men' try to foist, each of them, the character of the moderate man away from their own extreme,

(*and from its true place*), upon the other extreme: the brave man is called by the reckless man a coward and by the coward a reckless man; and there is a similar recrimination through the whole field of the virtues.

Just as the 'equal' is opposed as well to the greater as to the less (being less than the greater and more than the less), exactly so the mean states are excesses compared with the defects, and defects compared with the excesses. This truth applies equally to the emotions as to the conduct of men. For instance, in the emotions the mean state is courage, and in conduct a behaviour corresponding thereto. Alike from his disposition as from his conduct the brave man is thought to be reckless in comparison with the coward, and a coward compared with the reckless man. Similarly the temperate man is dissolute compared with the ascetic, and ascetic compared with the dissolute man; and the liberal man is a prodigal compared with the illiberal man, and illiberal compared with the prodigal.

The fact is that each of the extremes calls 'the mean' man by the name of the other extreme. The reckless man calls the brave man a coward, and the coward calls him reckless. This truth might be illustrated by the whole list of the virtues.

2. THE EXTREMES ARE MORE OPPOSED TO ONE ANOTHER THAN TO THE MEAN.

But although these states are all opposed to one another, as we have shown, there is a greater contrariety between the extremes and one another than between either of the extremes and the mean:—they are wider apart from one another than from the mean, just as the greater is farther apart from the less, and the less from the greater, than either of them from the equal.

The two extremes are the opposites of one another, but there is a certain affinity between either of them and the mean.

Moreover, there is a kind of correspondence observable between certain extremes and the mean; for example, between boldness and courage, or between prodigality and liberality. On the other hand, there is the widest possible dissimilarity between the extremes and one another.

Those states which are the most distant from one another men define as 'contraries,' so that the more distant states are from one another, they are proportionately the more 'contrary' to one another.

But although the extremes are all of them opposed to one another and to the mean, the contrariety is greatest between themselves, being, as they are, more remote from one another than from the mean (just as 'the great' and 'the small" are more opposed to one another than to the mean, *i.e.* the 'equal'). In each of the extremes, again, there is a kind of correspondence towards the mean, as for instance between daring and courage, between prodigality and liberality. But there is no kind of correspondence in the extremes towards one another, but they differ from one another to the very utmost.

Those states which are most distant from one another men define as 'contraries;' and hence the more distant states are from one another, the more contrary are they to one another.

3. VIRTUE IS MORE OPPOSED TO ONE EXTREME THAN TO ANOTHER.

Moreover, there are cases where the defect is the more opposed to the mean, and other cases where the excess is so opposed. For example the vice most opposed to courage is not recklessness as the excess of courage, but cowardice its defect; and, contrariwise, in the case of temperance, it is not the defect, *i.e.* impassivity, but its excess, sensualism, which is most opposed thereto.

One of the extremes is less distant from the mean than the other,

This variety arises from two causes, one being the very nature of the case. Seeing that one extreme is nearer and more akin to the mean, we do not rank this extreme, but its contrary, as being most opposed to the mean. For example, since daring is thought to resemble courage more nearly and to be more akin to it, whilst cowardice is widely different, we oppose cowardice rather than daring, to courage:—things more remote from the mean being more opposed to it.

(α) from the greater affinity between the mean and that particular extreme.

That, then, is one reason, arising from the very necessity of the case. There is yet another arising from our own tendencies. As we have in our own nature, in some form or other, a certain predisposition or tendency towards certain objects, these objects are evidently more opposed to the mean than others are. We are, for example, naturally prone to self-indulgence rather than to self-denial; and for that reason are more easily led on to sensualism than to a seemly moderation. We call objects, therefore, more opposed to the mean, when our own bias more readily inclines us to them; and hence sensualism, as an excess, is more opposed to temperance than asceticism is.

(β) from our own susceptibilities which make us incline to one extreme rather than the other.

The extremes are more at variance with one another than with the mean, but there is no uniformity in the way in which the extremes are severally opposed to the mean. In some cases the defect is more opposed to the mean than is the excess; in other cases the excess is more opposed thereto than is the defect. The mean states incline rather to some one of the extremes than to the other, and have a greater resemblance at one time to the defect, at another time to the excess. For example, courage has a nearer resemblance to daring than to cowardice; and for this reason is more opposed to cowardice than to daring. On the other hand temperance more nearly resembles asceticism than sensualism; and for that reason is more opposed to sensualism than to asceticism.

But not only is the affinity of the mean towards one of the extremes the cause of its unlikeness to the other extreme; but the same result arises from our own nature. Since the conflict arises in the mind of the virtuous man against the two extremes in his pursuit of the true mean, that extreme against which the

conflict is fiercest, is the extreme most opposed to the mean. But the struggle is sharpest against the extreme to which we are more naturally inclined, and towards which we are the more easily impelled. Hence the extreme towards which we are more easily impelled is that which is most opposed to the mean. In the extremes of temperance, *e.g.*, we are more readily moved to sensualism than to asceticism; since we are more naturally disposed to self-indulgence than to the reverse. Hence the struggle is greatest against sensualism, and sensualism is more opposed to temperance than asceticism is. The analogy applies equally to the other virtues.

4. RECAPITULATION.

[Sufficient has now been said to prove (1) that moral virtue is 'a mean state,' (2) in what sense the metaphor of 'a mean' must be understood, (3) that the mean is an ideal point between two vices, the one tending to excess, the other to defect, and (4) that this 'mean state' is of such a nature as to be capable of attaining what is ideally 'fitting' and perfect, both in the regulation of the feelings and in outward conduct.]

[Sufficient has now been said to prove that moral virtue is a 'mean state' between two vices, one tending to excess and the other to defect, inasmuch as virtue always seeks to attain 'the mean' (or a due proportion) both in the emotions and the conduct.]

ii.—Practical suggestions for the attainment of the mean.

1. HOW SOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF PRACTICAL ETHICS MAY BE SOLVED.

Hence it is a serious matter indeed for a man to be virtuous: for it is a serious matter to attain a perfect fitness in every instance—just as to find the centre of a circle is not in everyone's power, but only in the professor's. To apply this truth: it is easy enough to be roused to anger, and any one may be so, or, again, to give money and to incur expenses, but it is not everyone who has the tact and skill (nor is it easy of attainment) to mark the proper persons and the proper time, the proper objects and the proper manner. Therefore it is that excellence is as rare as it is laudable and noble.

The vast difficulty of realizing the ideal of a perfect fitness.

But the following suggestions may be useful:—

a. The man whose aim it is to realise a perfect life ought above all things to withdraw himself from the *worst* extreme, according to the warning which Calypso gives:

a. Avoid the worst extreme.

"Out of this range of spray and swell keep back thy bark."

One of the extremes is of course more sinful than the other. Since, therefore, it is a difficult thing to hit the mark of life with

unerring skill, we ought, as the second best course, as men say, to avoid the worst of evils, and that will best be attained by the course which I am now suggesting.

b. It behoves us also to have regard to the faults to which we are ourselves most prone. Some of us are born with tendencies in one direction, some with tendencies in another. What our besetting sin is, will be known from the pleasure and pain which arises throughout our lives. Our duty is to force ourselves away from temptation. By drawing ourselves far from the reach and chance of sinning, we shall arrive at last at a perfect state:—just as by straining back bent pieces of wood, men make them straight.

b. Avoid your besetting sin.

c. But in every case the temptation against which we have most of all to be on our guard, is the pleasurable and pleasure: we are not impartial judges that we should form decisions upon it. The feelings which the old Greek counsellors had in regard to Helen, ought to be the feelings which should animate us in regard to pleasure; and on all occasions we should quote their verdict. If we dismiss the fascinations of pleasure as they dismissed Helen, we shall be less likely to sin.

c. Avoid the charms of pleasure.

If only we act in the spirit of these rules, we shall best of all be able, looking at life as a whole, to attain to a true perfection, the ideal 'fitness' of things.

But to know how to attain this 'mean' or 'perfect fitness' and to become good, is an arduous task. Indeed on all occasions it is a difficult matter to discover 'the mean;' precisely as it is not everyone, but only the man who is skilled in geometry, who is able to find the centre of a circle. The same difficulty is found both in the emotional and in the active life of men. To be roused to anger, for instance, is an easy matter, or to give money or to spend it; but to do so in a proper manner, at a proper time, upon deserving persons, in a fitting amount, and with a right motive (conditions which constitute the 'mean,' and involve something as excellent as it is rare, and praiseworthy and noble)—that, I say, is not easy nor within the compass of anyone who simply wills.

The following rules will, however, serve as a guidance:—

a. The man who is anxious to become good, and who is in search of a perfect 'fitness' of action, ought in the first place to avoid by all possible means that extreme which is most opposed to the mean, *i.e.* that one of the evils which lie on either side of the mean, to which he is himself more specially prone to yield, following the advice which Calypso gave:

"Out of this range of spray and swell keep back thy bark."

Of course we sin, into whichever of the extremes we fall; but our sinfulness is not to the same extent. There is a greater sin in that extreme which is the more opposed to the mean than in that which is less opposed.

Since, therefore, it is difficult to attain the mark with perfect exactness, it behoves us, as the next best course as men say, to make choice of the least of evils. This result may be attained if we hold such an attitude of mind towards the extremes, as I have defined.

b. But we must not only consider that extreme to which we are all prone as men, but we must also inquire individually what that extreme is to which we are ourselves personally prone. Some of us are naturally inclined to one thing, others to another. We may understand the points of our own special weakness if we examine what it is in which we take pleasure, and what it is in which we feel pain. If we have found out what is the nature of that extreme to which we are ourselves inclined, we can then draw ourselves away from it, with all seriousness, in an opposite direction. By striving earnestly to avoid the extreme, we may arrive at the true mean; just as men do who are intent upon straightening crooked pieces of wood, *i.e.* they strain them in an opposite direction.

c. But more than all other emotions, that of pleasure and of the pleasurable is difficult to master; and there is consequently need of the utmost scrupulousness, and it is our duty by every means to guard ourselves against self-deceit when we wish to distinguish an evil pleasure from an honest one. It is difficult indeed to be an impartial judge of such matters. The feeling which we ought to have in regard to pleasure is precisely that which the Trojan counsellors experienced in regard to Helen, calling her beautiful and marvelling at her loveliness, but for all that passing a decree to send her back, fair as she was, to her countrymen. If we detach ourselves from the charms of pleasure in the spirit in which the old counsellors dismissed Helen, we shall be less likely to fall into temptation.

Such is the plan or principle of life through which (to speak in a general way and in outline) we shall be best able to attain to a true 'fitness' and moral perfection.

2. THE SPHERE AND IMPORTANCE OF A 'MORAL SENSE.'

But it is surely difficult to attain to perfection, particularly in practical details. It is no easy task, for instance, to distinguish the exact limitations under which it is right to be angry—the true manner, the proper persons, the precise terms, and the exact length of time. Sometimes we praise those who are deficient in anger, and call them 'mild;' while at other times we call those who display fierce anger, 'manly.'

But rules cannot anticipate the infinite combinations of circumstances.

Still, the man who deviates only slightly from what is excellent, is not blamed either more or less: it is when he diverges widely from such an ideal that he is censured, since in that case his sin is notorious and open. But it is not easy to draw the lines of censure: it is not easy to frame a definition to embrace every consideration of extent and degree. The same difficulty applies to all matters that fall within the cognisance of the senses and of practical experience. In morals certainly such questions depend upon the circumstances of the moment, and their solution rests with the *Moral Sense* of the agent.

The 'Moral Sense' must determine right and wrong in practical life.

Thus much, at any rate, is clear—that an equable, proportionate and righteous frame of mind is in all circumstances that which will gain men's praise; and that such a disposition is bound to incline sometimes towards one extreme, and sometimes towards another. It is by cultivating such a dis-

position that we are most likely to attain to a true proportion, and a perfect harmony of life.

Yet, notwithstanding, it is difficult to attain to this ideal, especially in actual detail. The decision upon specific points of conduct is not a defined one, but varies with the variation of circumstances, since neither can circumstances be defined. Take for example the being roused to anger: it is not easy to define with whom one ought to be angry, or in what manner one should show it, or for what time continue it. We have to judge for ourselves from the nature of the provocation and the attendant circumstances; and we pronounce now in one way now in another. At one time we praise those who fall short in anger and call them gentle: at another time we praise those who are excessive in their anger and call them manly.

Still the man who deviates but a little from the perfect state is not blamed, since he is thought to fall neither into excess nor defect. He is only blamed when he falls away from the perfect standard to such an extent as to attract notice. But as for settling the point how far and to what extent we must deviate from the mean in order to be blameworthy—that is a matter which it is not possible to define in one comprehensive theory, nor indeed is generalization possible in any case which is found only in special connections and is as shifting as circumstance. Judgment upon such cases must have regard to their special limitations, and must depend upon the moral sense and the view which the moral sense takes of the whole surroundings generally.

It is clear, therefore, that under all circumstances that habit of mind which preserves a middle course between vicious extremes is the praiseworthy one; and that, having regard to the tendencies of our own characters, it is right at some times to incline to excess and at other times to defect—*i.e.* to that particular 'extreme' which is nearest akin to the mean. In this way we shall most easily attain to the moral mean and our own true perfection.

BOOK III.—PART I. ANALYSIS OF MORAL ACTION. PART II. EXAMINATION OF THE VIRTUES.

INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS.

Part I.—Analysis of Moral Action.

IN the last Book it was shown that Virtue implied *an assent of the Will.* In the present Book, before proceeding with his classification of virtues, Aristotle expands and illustrates his conception of 'the Will,' and shows its relation to the larger conception of 'the *agreeable*' or 'the voluntary.'

This subject is treated under two main theses: (1) that action cannot be considered as virtuous or vicious unless it is 'voluntary' or agreeable to the agent; and (2) that action is *perfectly* virtuous or *perfectly* vicious, when this voluntariness or liking for an action proceeds from a deliberate choice. In other words he examines first *Voluntariness* under the aspect of moral responsibility, and then *Volition* as the rational expression of the moral consciousness.

I.—ANALYSIS OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY.

A man is not held to be 'responsible'—he is not praised or blamed, for actions done without his free consent.

Cases of 'non-responsibility' may be classified according as their causes are (i.) external or (ii.) internal. The agent has not free play when he is either under external constraint, physical or moral, or when he is ignorant of the circumstances under which he has to act.

i. *Absence of constraint* is, therefore, the first condition of voluntary action.

Constraint may be—

1. *Physical* constraint, where the agent is under the positive control of a force operating upon him, without any wish or liking of his own, as when he is taken prisoner.

2. *Moral* constraint, where the agent is surrounded by influences which force upon him a line of conduct which is distressing to him and in which he only acquiesces as being the least of evils.

Actions of this latter kind, where the agent 'acts for the best' in difficult complications and under circumstances which are not within his own control, are '*mixed actions*'—partaking, that is, of the nature both

of voluntariness and involuntariness. But, practically considered, they are more voluntary than involuntary, for the following reasons—(1) the end which is selected, though not good under all circumstances, is not only justifiable but commendable at a particular crisis. (2) The agent has the free use of his limbs, so as to act one way or another. (3) According as he acts in one way or another he is praised or blamed; and praise or blame implies freedom of choice.

On the other hand there are cases where constraint means necessity; and where no mortal could hold out. Evil deeds committed in face of overwhelming pressure are practically involuntary, and deserve forgiveness. Still no conceivable pressure ought to make a man violate the eternal principles of right and wrong, as for instance, to be a matricide.

No definite rule can be laid down to anticipate every possible contingency of this kind. The degree of praise or blame which should be meted out to 'mixed actions' depends upon the delicate adjustments of Casuistry. The complications of actual life seem to baffle all general principles. In ordinary cases, however, the history of 'moral constraint' is this: the actual pain of the moment or the future pain which their imagination conjures up as impending, weighs so unduly with men that they will do any shameful thing to avoid it. There is a conflict between feeling and conviction, imagination and conscience.

Still the definition given above of 'compulsory' and 'mixed' actions holds good. Actions are 'compulsory' when the agent is powerless to prevent them and does nothing to bring them about: actions are 'mixed' when the will does not assent to them except as an escape from worse evils.

[Here we must draw a line of demarcation between 'constraint' and 'motive.' The Cyrenaics maintained that actions done under the influence of pleasure and pain were done 'under constraint.' But such a theory proves too much: in that view every action would be compulsory. Again, constraint implies pain—which is a direct negative of their theory. Lastly, their theory ignores the susceptibilities of the agent.]

ii. *Full knowledge of the nature of his act* is the other condition of a man's acting voluntarily. If a man acts in ignorance of what he is doing and is full of regret and remorse when he finds out what he has done, he is an involuntary agent. If on the other hand he is not sorry for what he has done, though at the time he was ignorant what he was doing, he is a non-voluntary agent.

But here it must be noted that there is a twofold aspect of ignorance. A distinction must be drawn between accidental and essential ignorance, between ignorance of details and ignorance of principles, between ignorance as a casual mistake and ignorance as a confirmed habit of mind.

(1.) When ignorance amounts to a darkening of the moral sense and issues out of a bad heart, it is voluntary ignorance.

(2.) When ignorance is only an accidental want of perception of some detail, of the surroundings or circumstances of action, it is then involuntary ignorance. Such an ignorance may be of any of the following particulars—the agent, the act, the scope, the time, the place, the means, the instrument, the motive, the manner. Some of these details being more important than others, the degree of involuntariness must be measured accordingly.

The conditions, therefore, which are requisite for voluntary action will be—(1) free origination by the agent, and absence of all constraint; (2) a full knowledge of the circumstances under which he is acting.

[Here a question may be raised: Is a man responsible for his own feelings? Are actions done under the influence of desire or impulse voluntary actions? Most certainly. (1) Children act voluntarily, yet they act from impulse. (2) Even noble actions are sometimes done under impulse. (3) There are certain feelings which we are under a moral obligation to entertain. (4) Acts done under impulse are pleasurable: involuntary acts are painful. (5) Errors of impulse are as much to be avoided as errors of judgment. (6) Desire and impulse are essential parts of human nature. (7) Desire as much as reason governs the moral life of man.]

II.—ANALYSIS OF RATIONAL VOLITION.

But voluntariness implies little more than that an action is agreeable to the agent; and that is not an adequate explanation of moral action. Moral action implies not merely a movement of the heart, but also an assent of the Reason. Voluntariness is not 'volition' until it be associated with a purpose marked out by the Reason. We may therefore proceed to examine moral action under the special aspect of Rational Purpose.

First of all we must distinguish it from kindred processes.

i. 'Voluntariness' is distinct from Volition:

(1.) All sentient beings act voluntarily, *i.e.* agreeably to their nature, but not all are capable of a rational choice or moral purpose.

(2.) Acts done 'on the spur of the moment' are not rational, nor the result of a rational adjustment of means to end; and yet they are voluntary (*i.e.* not disagreeable to us).

ii. 'Desire' and 'Impulse' are distinct from Volition:

(1.) Volition is not found in irrational animals.

(2.) Volition and impulse are mutually exclusive of one another in the case of the man of strong or weak character. The ἐγκρατής has no impulse but strong volition: the ἀκρατής has impulse and not volition. There is thus an antagonism between impulse and volition.

(3.) Impulse is concerned with pleasure, Volition with honour.

iii. 'Wish' is distinct from Volition.

(1.) A man may wish for the impossible, but he cannot '*will*' it.

(2.) Wish is often concerned with things beyond a man's own compass; but volition is concerned only with what comes within our own power.

(3.) Wish is concerned with the 'end'; volition with the means whereby the end wished for may be realized.

iv. 'Opinion' is distinct from Volition.

(1.) The sphere of opinion is the whole universe; the sphere of volition things within our own power.

(2.) Opinion is true or false; volition is morally right or wrong.

v. Volition is distinct from any special form of Opinion.

(1.) Opinion does not imply in any case a moral nature; volition does.

(2.) Opinion does not imply pursuit or avoidance; volition does.

(3.) Opinion is praised for its *form*; volition for its *matter*.

(4.) Good opinions and good volitions are not coextensive nor convertible.

(5.) Opinion implies only *probability*; volition moral *certainty*.

Still Volition if not identical with any of these processes, seems to comprise elements derived from them all. It is a form of the voluntary, and consequently implies desire, what is voluntary being also what is agreeable or desirable. But it is something more: it is an intellectual as well as a moral or emotional process. It is not merely a free desire, but a conscious survey of all the circumstances, and a deliberate adaptation of means to ends, with the striving necessary thereto.

We may now proceed to consider Volition under its double aspect of (1) Calculation or Deliberation, and (2) Wish, or Desire.

A. Deliberation is identical with 'practical reason:' it is 'the mind in council,' calculating what is or is not within its power to effect, and how best its object may be attained.

The sphere of deliberation is, therefore, not coextensive with thought, but is limited to human interests. The following list will be excluded from it:—(1) the eternal and unalterable, (2) fixed laws of Nature, (3) the changes of outward phenomena, (4) the contingencies of chance, (5) even human interests which are beyond our own horizon. By inference also certain even of the arts must be excluded—such as have exact rules: only those arts which are στοχαστικαὶ and admit of contingency come within the range of deliberation.

Deliberation, therefore, as 'the practical reason,' is concerned only with what is practicable. Its method is like that of geometrical analysis. It starts from a certain conception of a whole which it breaks up into constituent parts: when the analysis is complete, the mind finds itself resting upon an ultimate fact which is the basis of the whole superstructure. This ultimate fact is the *cause* of the whole set of phenomena which result from it. The process of deliberation is thus the 'mind in council' upon the question of ways and means: the problem to be solved is how to take the first step, what course of action will bring about the desired end. It may be that the mind finds that this first step is impracticable, that the money for example, necessary to initiate a war is not forthcoming; the result is then a negative one; whereas if the money be forthcoming, then the result is action.

Deliberation thus implies also choice or decision: when the whole field of circumstances and possibilities has been surveyed, the mind takes its part on one side or another; it either acts or forbears. Deliberation and Choice are thus identical; except that choice is the end, deliberation the beginning of the process. The mind deliberating may be compared with the Princes deliberating in the pictures of the War-Councils which Homer draws. The mind purposing or choosing may be compared with the Princes announcing to the crowd the result of their Council.

Regarded intellectually Volition is, therefore, an exercise of the practical reason in the attempt to realize a given end. It involves (*a*) deliberation upon ways and means, and (*β*) a choice of some particular means. It is a complex conception, in which deliberation, calculation, choice and purpose are all inextricably intertwined.

B. Wish is the emotional element in Volition. A movement of the heart must precede the movement of the mind. Before the mind can begin to calculate its course, there must be not only an intuition of an end, but also a desire to attain to that end.

But how is it that the intuitions of men are so different? How is it that men think so many different things to be their true end and aim? There are two aspects of the case, both of which present difficulties:—

(1.) Suppose a man wishes for an object which is confessedly a wrong or injurious object: how can we say that he has an intuition of the real good?

(2.) Suppose a man wishes for whatever 'takes his fancy,' and that all men have not an intuition of the real good: is there not then an end of moral distinction?

The solution of this dilemma seems to be this: In the abstract, and as an ideal, men universally seek and wish for the real good; but the actual realization of this perfect good is confined to the few. The impressions made on the minds of men at large are coloured by their own follies and fancies. Pleasure is the medium through which the world regards the vision of the good. Thus it is, that actually, and as a matter of fact, men wish for the satisfaction of their own imaginations rather than of a perfect ideal. The conscience of the world is corrupt; and as with men whose physical tastes are vitiated by disease, so it is with those whose moral ideal is vitiated. Only the pure and blameless life can understand and see the true good: he only whose conscience is purified and without guile, can detect unerringly in the complications of circumstance what is the true 'end' to be desired, what is the summum bonum in realizing which he realizes his true felicity.

Here we may pause to consider Volition under the aspect of '*Free Will.*'

The analysis above given of Volition will have shown that moral action in the true sense of the term, is synonymous with voluntary action. It is immaterial to the psychologist whether action be of one quality or another; an action may be virtuous or vicious, but it is in all cases the result of the self-same machinery, the outcome of the self-same processes. The same arguments which prove that it is in a man's power to be virtuous, prove also that it is in his power to be vicious. The will is free, whether a man be virtuous or whether he be vicious.

But here we are met with a seeming inconsistency: Can a man wish for his own misery? Can vice be voluntary? Can a man be wilfully miserable?

This difficulty is suggested by the lines of Epicharmus:

> "No man is sinful and sorrowful with the free consent of his will:
> No man is happy and blessèd in despite of the wish of his heart."

The second line is true enough: it is indeed a contradiction of terms

to say, that a man is 'reluctantly happy.' But the first line hides a fallacy: sin and sorrow are not convertible terms, and are not always found together. A man may sin and take pleasure in his sin: 'wickedness is a state that is agreeable to the wicked man.' A man is the cause of his own actions, just as he is the father of his own children; and he takes pleasure in his own creations.

The following considerations will give fresh proof in support of the theory that wickedness is as much 'voluntary' as virtue is:—

1. The causes of action being within our own power, the effects of our actions must also be within our own power, whether they be good or whether they be evil.

2. Legislation assumes that a man's actions are within his own control: otherwise it would be as idle and as foolish as to order what sensations of heat or cold we ought to experience.

3. So rooted is the belief in human responsibility, that penalties are doubled where, *e.g.*, ignorance is pleaded for acts done in drunkenness.

The argument against responsibility of vice sometimes takes another form: the objection is shifted a stage further back. It is argued that 'a man's actions are the outcome of his character, and *his character is beyond his control.*'

But, surely, it is a fallacy to say that a man is not accountable for his character. If a man is vicious, his vicious tendencies are the consequence of a dissolute mode of life. Character is only a generalized idea to represent the sum of a man's habits, and the direction of his tastes. But every habit and every taste is the result of conscious activities; and these separate activities are all within his own control. A man does not become a drunkard, except as a result of continued acts of drunkenness. It is idle for him to say that he does not *wish* to be a drunkard: we cannot escape the effects of our actions: the past can never be undone: as a man soweth, so also must he reap.

This law of human responsibility may be seen even in the case of our physical states: we do not wish to have bodily distempers, but we are none the less censured for them if they are the consequence of our own disordered lives.

The objections of the necessitarians that vice is involuntary because it is the result of his character, may be answered, therefore, as follows:

1. If a man produces his own moral states, if at any rate he is a 'joint' author of his own habits, and there is an element which he contributes to their formation—then of course he is responsible for the ideas which reflect back those habits, and are the expression of his inner life.

2. If, on the other hand, a man is not in any sense responsible for his moral ideas, but those ideas, whether good or evil, are inherited, and Nature is the author of his character,—even on this hypothesis, a man's actions are voluntary, because he freely performs whatever is subsidiary to his 'end' (whether that 'end' be virtuous or vicious): the *φαντασία* does not *force* him to act.

The general results of this analysis of the Will may be tabulated as follows:

EMOTIONAL ELEMENTS.

INTELLECTUAL ELEMENTS.

1. The initiatory process in moral action is the impression (*φαντασία*) made upon the mind of a certain object as desirable, whether as pleasurable, or profitable, or noble. This 'conception of the end' reflects the character or moral nature of the individual: a good man has beautiful and true ideas, a bad man vicious and false ideas of what is desirable. [The power by which we represent such and such an idea to the mind is 'the moral sense,' *αἴσθησις*, which in the case of the perfectly good man is developed into *νοῦς*—an unerring intuition of right and wrong in each particular instance.]

2. Wish for the good is naturally consequent upon an intuition of it. The impression of an object as desirable generally creates in the mind a wish for its attainment. Feeling is excited and associated with its object.

[If the object of the impression be the real good, *τὸ ὂν ἀγαθὸν*, then the feeling excited for it is a genuine wish, *βούλησις*; if it be only the apparent good, *τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν*, then the feeling excited may more properly be called 'desire,' *ἐπιθυμία*.]

3. But, assuming that the mind has an impression of a particular object as desirable and a wish to attain it, what steps are necessary to give the wish effect? Obviously a consideration of ways and means must follow: the mind must sit in council and deliberate how best it may compass the object of its desires. This is the process of *βούλευσις*—a review of what it is in the power of the individual (or of his friends) to do in order to realize the given object. It is the exercise not of reason, *per se*, but of the 'practical reason:' it does not concern itself with what is ideally

EMOTIONAL ELEMENTS. INTELLECTUAL ELEMENTS.

possible, but with what is practicable for *man*.

4. After deliberation, choice ensues: after a review of all practicable ways and means the mind makes its 'preference' for some one: it 'prefers' (προαιρεῖται) one course of action rather than another.

5. After the mind has made its conclusion, there is nothing else to be done but to set in motion the necessary part of the organism, τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη, to give outward effect to the inward volition. A certain tension of the muscles ensues: 'the will is determined' whether action actually ensues or not. ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι κρίναντες ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν.

The conception of Volition as προαίρεσις thus involves a variety of complex processes. Sometimes the term is applied specially to the conclusion at which the mind arrives, the 'preference' which it shows for a particular course of conduct. But more frequently it is used to express the whole machinery of the Will, the action of the various forces which operate within the mind and lead to the formation of 'purpose' or 'determination.'

It has been shown that it involves: (1) a freedom of action, a 'liberty of choice' to act in one way rather than in another, (2) the representation to the reason or imagination of an 'end' as desirable, (3) desire to realize that end, (4) survey of the surroundings, and consideration of the practicability of that end, (5) determination of a particular agency whereby to effect that end, (6) final impulse or tension of the muscles with a view to carrying out that determination.

Part II.—Examination of the Virtues.

A.—COURAGE.

The essential attributes of moral action *per se* having been explained, we may proceed to illustrate the character which moral action actually assumes in real life. The method laid down in Book II. will be followed: an ideal of perfect virtue will be assumed and made a standard by which to estimate the actual conduct of mankind.

The aspect of virtue to be treated first is Courage. Not only is this virtue the earliest in historical development: it is psychologically also the basis of the whole superstructure of manliness, without which the other virtues would not be possible. It is necessary not only for the

safety (and indeed the very existence) of civilized communities, but also for the development of the character and the strengthening of the will.

i. The subject matter of Courage is fear and confidence.

Courage was defined as a perfect attitude of mind in circumstances of fear or confidence. Things which are fearful are *evils:* fear is 'an anticipation of evil.' But there are certain things which all men *ought* to fear; God's anger, the destruction of country—these are evils which it is honourable to fear, and base not to fear. There are certain other things which can either be feared or not without blame; such evils as do not befall us through our own fault—poverty, sickness, captivity:—courage has no reference to such things.

The evil with which courage is most emphatically and characteristically concerned is Death. Of all terrible things death is the worst; not only does it deprive men of all goods, but it takes from them all hope.

But death may come upon a man in many forms, yet there is no form so honourable or so glorious as death in war where the most sacred interests are at stake. The special sphere therefore in which the courage of the brave man will be displayed is death in war. Still, even on ordinary occasions, the brave man will show the firmness and constancy of his mind: in sickness or in a shipwreck he will be courageous, though he may grieve that he cannot exert his prowess nor gain glory by his bravery.

ii. The attitude of the brave man is determined by circumstances.

There are some dangers too fearful to be despised or endured by human nature—earthquakes, hurricanes, where only a madman can be unmoved. Other dangers are within the compass of human endurance; and in these the brave man will show his courage. Still even in these lesser dangers the brave man has none of the insensibility of a stone or trunk, but retains the feelings of a man. He is guided by Reason in whatever he undertakes. He does not encounter dangers rashly, but has due regard for time and place and manner. He always keeps before him the ideal of virtue; and his motive is always glory or the good of his kind.

There are four ways in which the ideal of the brave man may be vitiated: four states of mind opposed to perfect virtue in these relations:—

1. Insensibility, or incapacity to feel fear—the state of mind which only a madman could have.

2. Recklessness, akin to boastfulness or affectation of courage—the mental attitude of men who are impetuous to meet danger, yet shrink away when it comes.

3. Cowardice—the feeling of fear where no fear is, the mental attitude of those who are despairing and desponding, and afraid of everything.

4. Self-destructiveness—the feeling of the suicide who is afraid of the common burdens of mortality, and thinks death better than poverty or love.

Very different from all this is the temper of the brave man. He is not insensate; for he cherishes noble feelings. He is not reckless; for his conduct conforms to the ideal of Reason. He is not a coward;

for he knows that there is nothing which a man need fear except dishonour.

He is not a suicide; for he will not surrender his life except at the price of glory or the good of mankind.

iii. Approximations to the ideal of Courage.

There are five types of character in which some elements of true courage are found, but which all fall short of the perfect ideal.

1. The courage of self-interest—the courage which citizens are bound to show for the protection of their country, and which rewards and penalties are constituted to promote. This is not perfect courage, inasmuch as it is not spontaneous nor voluntary, but enforced by legal sanctions. Still it approximates very closely thereto: in a sense the motive which inspires citizens to be brave, is a noble one—the attainment of honour and the avoidance of disgrace.

2. The courage of experience—the courage which is based upon a knowledge of superiority rather than upon an attitude of mind which would inspire a man to act only with a view to right (τὸ καλὸν) whatever the cost. Soldiers conscious of their strength are courageous with 'the courage of experience,' but when sudden crises arise they are apt to turn cowards.

3. The courage of passion—the courage which comes from strong excitement, courage under its animal aspects. It may or may not be real courage. In itself it wants the essential conditions of real courage—deliberate calculation and a high moral purpose. Still it may be associated with the intellectual elements of real courage; and then it becomes courage as a perfect virtue. This form of courage is generally found in animals and bad men as undisciplined feeling: it is the result of momentary impulse rather than of rational reflection, and its motive is present gratification rather than the realization of a virtuous ideal.

4. The courage of self-confidence—the courage which high-spirits give to a man when external succours abound and the chances of victory have been foreseen. It is inferior to true courage in that it is dependent on circumstances rather than upon a living force within, and has regard to victory more than the attainment of a noble ideal. Its unreality is seen in sudden crises where calculation can have brought no adventitious elation.

5. The courage of ignorance—the courage which is shown by tyros in war, who have no conception of the danger they incur, and who are bold in exact proportion to their ignorance. Men who are bold in their presumption are apt to experience sudden revulsions from confidence to cowardice.

iv. Limitations of the pleasure which the brave has in his virtue.

Now courage has been shown to be a fitting behaviour as well on occasions of confidence as amid circumstances of fear; but its special province is the latter. Peril and suffering test courage much more than anything else does. Courage is therefore in a sense painful to practise. Yet, if it be a virtue, it must be pleasurable, all virtues entailing from the nature of the case a sweetness of their own; and so in fact it is. The pleasure of courage, however, is not in the activity itself, but rather in the consciousness which the activity brings with it, that τὸ καλὸν, a

beautiful ideal, is being realized thereby. Hence, though the struggle itself is bitter and painful, the thought of the glory that shall follow is sweet and comforting. It is no disparagement to the brave man that he fears death, if all the same he faces it. His courage is only shown in brighter colours when he prefers glory to all the blessings which he is in danger of losing by his self-sacrifice—blessings which he knows that he deserves still to enjoy. The greatness of those blessings measures the extent of his sacrifice, and the completeness of his virtue. It is no sign of virtue, but rather the contrary, to barter away life for trifling odds as mere mercenaries do. The consciousness of sacrifice is an essential element of courage.

B.—TEMPERANCE.

Following the psychological analysis of the virtues, we come next to Temperance, which is the principal virtue of the irrational part of the soul after Courage. It is also next in the order of historical development. As Courage is the instinct of self-preservation developed into manliness, so Temperance is the instinct of manliness developed into an ideal form: the one virtue is man's safeguard against outward foes, the other is his victory over the assaults of animal passions which might destroy his inward peace.

Temperance is chiefly concerned with pleasures: it was defined as a virtuous state of mind, which ever aims at an ideal in the pursuit and in the enjoyment of pleasure. But it is also to a certain extent concerned also with pains; it is the noble suffering of privation—a state of mind which, for the sake of an ideal of personal goodness, will endure the loss of pleasure under the circumstances which Reason lays down.

But what are the pleasures in regard to which this abstinence ought to be practised?

There are pleasures of the body and pleasures of the mind, pleasures of intellect and pleasures of sense. Men who are addicted to intellectual pleasures, are neither temperate nor intemperate on that account, but simply students or dilettanti. Nor again do ideal pleasures or pains—the loss or gain of money or of friends, form the province of temperance. It is *bodily* pleasure as a purely physical sensation, with which temperance is concerned.

Yet there are certain forms even of bodily pleasure which are outside the range of Temperance: *e.g.*

(1.) Pleasures of Sight: however much men may indulge their love for beautiful sights or for beautiful forms of art, they are neither temperate nor intemperate in consequence.

(2.) Pleasures of Sound: men who feel excessive pleasure in music or acting are not therefore intemperate, nor yet are they temperate, though their desire be moderate and right.

(3.) Pleasures of Smell: though certain pleasures are suggestive of desires which lead to intemperance, as the scent of a hare suggests to the hound a banquet in store, that is only *per accidens:* men are not on the simple score of scent either temperate or intemperate.

It is rather the pleasure which arises from *touch* and *taste* which forms the special province of Temperance: indeed this province may be still further narrowed to the sense of touch alone. Tasting has little con-

tentment for the intemperate man, and little scope for the exercise of temperance: it is only *partial* enjoyment—what the sensuous man loves is complete satisfaction. It is, therefore, *touch* which is the occasion of most frequent temptation, and the pleasure of touch which is most frequently associated with sensualism. Notwithstanding, there are certain modes in which the pleasure of touch is liberal, as in the healthy glow of the gymnasia.

But there are various kinds of pleasures, just as there are various kinds of desires. Some are common to all men; others are special to individuals. In regard to pleasures for which the desire is universal, intemperance is shown only in one way—by excessive indulgence therein. But as for the *special* desires of individuals for particular pleasures, intemperance therein is manifold, and its sinfulness varies with the changes of time and circumstance.

The love of pleasure in the case of the intemperate man is so unrestrained that he positively feels pain when debarred from his pleasures. The temperate man, on the other hand, feels no pain at the loss or privation of pleasure. Nevertheless the temperate man is not an ascetic: he does not belie human nature so far as to ignore the essential distinctions between sweet and bitter, wholesome and injurious.

A picture may now be drawn of the temperate character. He takes his full measure of enjoyment, but his desires are always controlled by Right Reason, and a sense of the fitness of things. He is moderate in all his tastes, and only indulges them at a proper time and in a proper manner. He does not grieve if pleasure be denied him, and will not be over-anxious to supply his loss. Health and well-being and a consideration for the higher aims of life determine his every wish.

Lastly, we may compare intemperance with cowardice under one aspect, and with the faults of childhood under another.

1. Intemperance is more censurable than cowardice, for this reason. Pleasure is more voluntary than pain:—pain is indeed *in*voluntary. Intemperance as the pursuit of pleasure is therefore more voluntary than cowardice as the avoidance of pain, since the refraining from pleasure is easier than the endurance of pain. If then temperance be easier than courage, intemperance is more blamcable than cowardice.

[However we must distinguish cowardice as a habit from cowardice as a single act, and intemperance as a habit from intemperance as a single act. (α) Intemperance *per se* is involuntary, but particular indulgences of it are voluntary. (β) Cowardice *per se* is painless and voluntary, but cowardice as a particular act is painful and involuntary.]

2. Intemperance is closely analogous to the faults of childhood. It is a want of discipline and control: intemperate men are like undisciplined children, whose desires run wild with disorderly violence. As the authority of his tutor is despised by a disorderly and undisciplined child, so is the voice of reason disregarded by an intemperate man. Intemperance is therefore the reign of the appetitive soul, not chastened nor ordered by Reason; temperance the reign of Reason, inspiring the desires to aim at noble conduct, and curbing whatever is base and unworthy in human nature.

TRANSLATION.

PART I.—ANALYSIS OF MORAL ACTION.

I.—CONCERNING MORAL RESPONSIBILITY.

SEEING, then, that the province in which virtue is displayed is emotion and action, and that when emotion is freely entertained and action willingly done, praise or blame is accorded, whereas on the other hand when feelings arise and actions are done in despite of ourselves, they are matters of forgiveness, and at times even of compassion, it is surely incumbent upon us that in investigating the nature of virtue we should discriminate between what is 'voluntary' and what is 'involuntary.' Such a distinction will further be useful to those who frame laws and fix the scale of rewards and punishments.

Reasons for treating of moral responsibility in Ethics:—
1. Praise and blame, pardon and pity depend upon it.
2. Law-givers necessarily take account of it.

Now actions are admitted to be involuntary when done either under constraint or through ignorance.

Division of the 'involuntary.'

Now since the province in which virtue is displayed is emotion and action, and since virtue consists in 'good actions willingly done,' and vice consists in *evil* actions willingly done, and the element of 'willingness' or 'unwillingness' is involved in the very definition of virtue and vice, it is consequently necessary that in speaking upon virtue and vice, we should understand the nature of the voluntary and of the involuntary:—it is in fact by their willingness or unwillingness that we test the worth of actions. Some actions we call praiseworthy, others pardonable, others worthy of censure. When good actions are willingly performed, we praise them: when evil actions are willingly performed we blame them: when evil actions are unwillingly committed, we do not blame them but think them worthy of forgiveness, and when such evil deeds are done not only unwillingly but to the injury of those who do them, we consider that they are worthy of our compassion.

Wherefore, as our inquiry relates to what is either praiseworthy or deserving of censure, it is necessary for us to know the nature of the voluntary and of the involuntary. Such a knowledge will be of service also to those who have to frame laws: from a consideration of these distinctions they will know whom it is right to punish, whom to honour, and who are entitled to claim our forgiveness or

compassion :—and that assuredly is the main point in the art of practical statesmanship. We will accordingly draw out the difference between what is voluntary and what is involuntary.

Well then, it may be taken as granted that 'the involuntary' is what is done either under constraint or through ignorance.

i.—Actions done under constraint.

(*a*) DEFINITION OF 'POSITIVE CONSTRAINT.'

Positive constraint implies :—
1. A force operating from without.
2. A force sufficient to move the subject.
3. A force acting independently and without any cooperation of the subject.

An act is 'under constraint' or 'compulsory' when the cause of it is external to the agent and is of such a nature that the agent contributes in no sense to bring it about, either as an active instrument or as a passive subject; for example, if a gale should drive him to a certain place, or if he were to be carried away by others who had physical control over him.

An act is 'under constraint' or 'compulsory' when the cause of it does not reside in the agent but is external to him, and when the agent contributes no single element to bring it about, either as an active instrument or as a passive subject. An example of such constraint would be a case where a person is driven by a gale and brought from place to place, or where a man is moved about by others who have control over him and are strong enough to move him against his own will.

An act is 'voluntary' or 'free' when it is the exact opposite of this—when, that is, the cause of it rests entirely with the agent.

(*b*) 'POSITIVE CONSTRAINT' DISTINGUISHED FROM 'MORAL CONSTRAINT.'

Moral constraint implies stress of adverse circumstances which necessitate a 'choice of evils.'

Actions, however, which are done under apprehension of evils greater than themselves, or in order to gain some honourable end (as, for instance, if a tyrant enjoined the commission of some foul deed when he had our parents and children under his power, and in the event of our compliance they would be saved, and in the other alternative they would be put to death)—such cases, I say, raise an issue of dispute whether they are voluntary or involuntary.

Somewhat similar in character is the question which arises in reference to throwing cargo overboard in storms at sea. Apart from special conditions, no one throws his cargo overboard of his own free will; yet for the safety of himself and of his crew any one would do so who was in his senses.

There are, however, certain actions which are neither involuntary in the perfect sense of the term nor yet voluntary, but in a kind of intermediate position. Of

this character are actions done under apprehension of evils worse than themselves, or in order to gain some honourable end. An instance of this kind would be a case where a tyrant enjoined some foul deed when he had power both over the agent himself and his parents and children, and was able to save them all—the victim and his friends, in the event of compliance, or to put them all to death in the event of refusal. Such an instance raises a question whether an act done under such pressure would be voluntary or involuntary.

Another instance of the kind would be the measures taken by sailors in storms at sea, when they throw overboard their cargoes. One could not call such a course 'voluntary' in the perfect sense of the term; nor yet, again, involuntary; but both one and the other under different aspects. In such a case, the cause (*i.e.* the storm) is external and yet the action depends also on the agents: they judge for themselves and form their own resolutions, and take the course they do with a view to the safety of themselves and of their fellow-voyagers . . . . at least if they are in their right senses.

(*c*) CASES OF MORAL CONSTRAINT (OR 'MIXED ACTIONS') MUST BE REGARDED AS VOLUNTARY.

Actions of this character are at any rate complex or 'mixed,' though they resemble 'voluntary' more nearly than 'involuntary' actions. At the moment when they are done, they are consciously adopted; and in such cases where there is moral complication and a variety of possible 'ends,' the end adopted must have due regard to the exigences of the particular crisis. Consequently the terms 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' must be predicated (not of the act *per se* but) with due regard to the conditions under which a man is called upon to act at a particular moment.

Mixed actions are practically voluntary for 3 reasons: 1. There are several alternative 'ends' possible, and a man has free choice of any one at a given crisis.

In such cases, I say, a man acts willingly, because in fact the spring which sets in motion his physical organism is under his own control; and where this primary power rests with a man's own self, with him it rests also to act or to forbear. Actions of this kind, therefore, are voluntary—though regarded independently of their surroundings they are surely involuntary: no one, that is, would make choice of an act of great sacrifice for its own sake.

2. He has the free use of his limbs to act in one way or another.

Furthermore, there are occasions when men are actually praised on the score of yielding to circumstances; when, for instance, they undergo some shameful or painful fate as the price of great and glorious ends. On the other hand, they are blamed for submitting to evil treatment if the 'end' to be gained be inadequate: to brook foul disgrace for an end that is not noble or that is trifling, indicates a worthless character.

3. He is praised or blamed for his conduct:—which implies his freedom to have acted otherwise.

Consequently actions of this character are 'mixed' (or complex) and have in them an element both of voluntariness and of involuntariness, though they appear to have a larger element of voluntariness than of the opposite. At the crisis of a storm, for instance, such sacrifices as of the cargo, are willingly made; and if one regard the 'end' in the light of that crisis, it is a good and desirable one. In fact the end of every single action must have relation to the circumstances of that action, and from the nature of those circumstances the end selected becomes either good or bad. Consequently, what is voluntary or involuntary must in the same way be considered in the light of the circumstances under which the action is done. In view of the circumstances of the storm the sailor acts freely in what he does; though if the circumstances were different, and there were a calm, he would never, of his own consent, sacrifice his cargo.

He acts voluntarily, I say, in such a case, because his physical organism—his hands and his feet, are not moved from without by an alien cause, but by a cause which resides in the agent himself. But whatever a man does impelled thereto by his own self, he has it in his own power to do or to leave undone; and acts of this kind are called voluntary.

Such an act, therefore, is in itself voluntary—taken in connection that is, with the circumstances which attend it; but viewed absolutely and apart from these any additional considerations it is involuntary, since no one would elect to act in such a manner, except under exceptional circumstances.

Furthermore, certain actions of this kind are in fact thought worthy of praise, as certain others are thought deserving of censure:—praise when a man undergoes something ignominious or painful as the price of great and noble purposes, and censure when he submits to such a fate for unrighteous objects. Indeed a man is an evil character when he submits to dire ignominy for no grand end, or for a trifling one.

(*d*) LIMITATIONS OF MORAL CONSTRAINT.

But moral constraint sometimes passes into moral necessity; and such cases meet with commiseration and pardon.

There are other cases of moral constraint where, if praise is withheld, pardon is bestowed; when, for instance, a man commits unlawful acts under the influence of pressure which exceeds human endurance and which no man *would* withstand.

Moral necessity, however, must not be stretched to cover the violation of moral laws which are eternal and immutable.

On the other hand there are deeds, consent to which, even under compulsion, is inconceivable: death itself, under the direst tortures, is to be preferred thereto. In contrast to such a principle there is the case of Alcmæon in Euripides: the reasons which induced him to slay his mother are on the face of them contemptible.

There are again certain actions which we think worthy neither of praise nor of blame (as has been shown) but rather of forgiveness and pity: when, for instance, a man does things which he ought not to do through fear of great sufferings or of evils too great for human nature to have the power of withstanding.

There are certain actions also, so foul that there is no kind of excuse for a man who commits them, but all men are bound to flee from the commission of them with all his might, though it should be necessary to die a death of unspeakable horror in consequence of resistance. [The reasons on the other hand which constrained Alcmæon to slay his mother are of course contemptible.]

(*e*) DIFFICULTY OF FRAMING EXACT RULES TO MEET THE COMPLICATIONS OF LIFE.

But it is difficult sometimes to determine which of two alternatives is preferable or to balance what amount of suffering is equivalent to what amount of good. Still more difficult is it to keep firmly to our resolutions when they are formed. The evils foreboded are for the most part painful, while the actions forced upon us are shameful; and so men yield to the shame to avoid the pain. Hence it is that praise and blame are bestowed according as men yield to or stand against the pressure put upon them.

Difficulties of a system of Casuistry.

What kinds of actions, then, must we say are 'compulsory'? In a general sense may they not be defined as 'actions whose cause lies in external circumstances where the agent in no way cooperates thereto?' On the other hand actions which, though by themselves involuntary, are yet for the moment and in preference to other evils choiceworthy, and of which the primary cause depends upon the agent,—such actions, I say, though *per se* involuntary, yet in a particular case and in preference to particular alternatives, are voluntary. But still they resemble more nearly the type of voluntary action, because action depends upon particular circumstances, and these are matters of free choice.

General principles to distinguish 'positive' from 'moral' constraint.

Yet it is not easy to lay down a rule for regulating our choice under all circumstances and contingencies: so many and so various are the shades of difference in the complications of life.

But at times it is difficult to determine what those dangers are through fear of which we are justified in submitting to a particular disgrace, and which of two alternatives we ought to choose. Still more difficult is it for a man, even after he has discovered what his duty is, to remain firm to the resolution he may have formed. For the most part the things which we are constrained to do, are less painful than disgraceful; but the evils which we forebode are entirely painful. Hence the character of a noble-minded man is shown in the disdain which he feels for pain, in carrying out his resolution not to commit any disgraceful act.

In actions of this kind, therefore, we praise some men and blame others; and sometimes we neither praise nor blame but think the agents worthy of forgiveness.

Actions are, therefore, in a general sense involuntary when the cause of them depends on things without and the ostensible agent contributes in no sense to their commission. On the other hand actions are voluntary when the cause of them depends entirely on the agent.

But actions which, though not in themselves desirable, we still desire in view

of a particular crisis and for ulterior ends, such actions, I say, are absolutely involuntary, yet at a particular moment, and in view of particular alternatives, voluntary. But they seem to be voluntary in a greater degree than they are involuntary, since actions are always displayed in particular connections in which the 'time' and 'place' and 'motive' are all important; and these considerations make actions of this kind voluntary.

For this self-same reason (because, that is, actions are concerned with specific circumstances) it is no easy task to define what precise amount of suffering ought to be preferred to what amount of disgrace. Many and various are the shades of difference in the complexities of real life.

(*f*) 'CONSTRAINT' DISTINGUISHED FROM 'MOTIVE.'

In reply to the theory of the Cyrenaics that 'pleasure and beauty' are *constraining* forces, we say :—

1. The theory proves too much.

2. Constraint implies pain.

But if a critic were to maintain that objects of pleasure or of beauty are constraining forces (on the ground that they constrain us to a particular course as forces acting from without)—according to that theory, every motive would be 'compulsory:' every action that men perform has for its motive either the pleasurable or the beautiful.

Moreover, those who act under constraint and against their will, act with pain, whereas those who act to secure their own gratification act with pleasure to themselves.

3. The susceptibilities of the agent must be taken into account.

Again, it is quite absurd to make 'things without' the excuse for our actions, instead of finding the cause in our own characters as being easily captivated by such inducements; or, again, to regard oneself as responsible for what is noble and pleasure for what is disgraceful.

'The compulsory,' therefore, seems to be an action whose cause is independent of the agent, the person compelled contributing *in no way* to it.

Now it is thought by some that objects of pleasure or of beauty are also 'means of constraint,' because, being external, they incite and constrain men in acting to be influenced by loveliness or pleasure, and such inducements are external to ourselves.

But such an opinion is erroneous: if we were to admit so much, then every motive would be compulsory, since whatever we do is done under the belief that it is either pleasurable or beautiful.

Moreover, where we act under constraint from without, we act with pain and regret; but when we act of our own accord for our own satisfaction, we act with pleasure to ourselves. The motive indeed of all that we do, is either beauty or pleasure: even when we do things that are painful, under constraint, we act with a view to pleasure—in order, that is, to escape things that are even more painful, and that amounts to pursuing pleasure. For this reason we ought not to call things beautiful or pleasurable 'constraining motives'—especially as it is ridiculous to regard as causes of one's actions, external objects of beauty or of pleasure,

instead of oneself for being so easily entrapped by such considerations. But in fact, a man often regards himself as the cause of noble actions, but as for disgraceful ones he makes the cause to be not himself but pleasure. Such a view of life is inconsistent: an act is only compulsory when the cause is external to the agent, and *where the agent himself contributes in no sense to its commission.*

ii.—Actions done through ignorance.

(*a*) REPENTANCE THE TEST OF INVOLUNTARY IGNORANCE.

Actions caused by ignorance are entirely 'non-voluntary,' and when painful to the agent and accompanied by repentance, they are involuntary. A man, for example, who has done something through ignorance of its nature, yet is in no way pained at the result, has not acted voluntarily (inasmuch as he did not know what he was doing); nor yet involuntarily—if at least he is not pained at his conduct.

An action done through ignorance is either non-voluntary or involuntary:—

Consequently, in the class of those who err through ignorance, the man who is full of regret seems to be an unwilling agent; whereas the man who does not regret his act (since he must be characterised) is a 'non-voluntary' agent. As there is a difference between the two cases, it is better to have a distinctive name.

(1.) Non-voluntary, when a man looks back upon his action with complacency;
(2.) Involuntary, when a man is grieved and sorry for what he has done.

As for what takes place through ignorance, we must consider whether it be voluntary or involuntary. All cases of the kind do not bear the same character, some being voluntary, others involuntary, while others are neither one nor the other, but '*non-voluntary*' as they may be styled.

Involuntary actions of this class are such as we are sorry for, when we have done them, though we only know *what* we have done after the event and then repent our act.

Non-voluntary actions are such as we are not sorry for doing, and for which we feel no regret after their commission. The man who acts through ignorance, yet after having learnt the character of his act, is not grieved at its commission, has not acted willingly (since he did not know what he was doing), nor yet unwillingly (since after knowing what he has done, he is not angry with himself for doing it). Hence such actions as these may be called '*non-voluntary*.'

(*b*) IGNORANCE AS A MORAL DISPOSITION DISTINGUISHED FROM IGNORANCE AS AN ACCIDENTAL ERROR.

The case, again, of a man acting *through ignorance* seems to be different from the case of a man acting *in a state of ignorance*. The man who is drunk or in a passion seems not to act through ignorance, but from one of the causes indicated—not conscious at all of right and duty, but in a state of moral darkness. In fact, every wicked man is ignorant

Twofold ignorance: (1) of principles and (2) of details;
1. Ignorance of principle is a vicious state of mind and is the outcome of a

bad heart: ideas of 'involuntariness' are therefore inapplicable to it.

what he ought to do and from what he ought to abstain; and it is in consequence of this loss of the moral sense that men grow to be unrighteous and absolutely wicked.

The term 'involuntary' is not intended to be applied to such cases—where, that is, a man is ignorant of what is expedient or morally right. The ignorance which has its root in a bad heart and a depraved taste, is not the cause of involuntariness, but of wickedness. Nor, again, is involuntariness predicable of ignorance of the moral law, men being censured for ignorance of that kind. The only ignorance which can be called involuntary ignorance is ignorance of specific details upon which the action turns and within which is its sphere. Herein also there is room for pity and for pardon, inasmuch as a man acts contrary to his intention when he is ignorant of the particular facts.

2. Ignorance of details or of special circumstances is accidental and excusable.

But there is a difference between acting through ignorance and acting in a state of ignorance. Acting through ignorance is either involuntary or 'non-voluntary,' but acting in a state of ignorance is voluntary. Acting in a state of ignorance is such a case as when a man is in a passion or is drunk, or is committing some other act of sinfulness; such an one does not do what he does by reason of ignorance, but by reason of pleasure or some other cause; at the same time his moral state is a state of ignorance. In fact, every wicked man is ignorant of what it is his duty to do and from what to abstain; and it is owing to this error of principle that men grow to be unjust, or even utterly wicked. Actions of this kind, therefore, are not involuntary. Ignorance which has its seat in a depraved will, and which is the cause of the vices, is not the cause of involuntariness but of wickedness. It is not the fact of a man's being ignorant of the general principle that drunkenness is an evil practice that is found to be the cause of its involuntariness; but rather the fact of his having been ignorant upon specific points—the not knowing, for example, up to what point a man may drink before becoming intoxicated. This kind of ignorance of details has a claim both to pardon and to pity: a man who is in ignorance after this fashion, does what he does *through ignorance* and acts involuntarily.

(*e*) ENUMERATION OF CONDITIONS WHICH MAY OCCASION INVOLUNTARY IGNORANCE.

Classification of the possible 'surroundings' of action.

Perhaps it were not amiss to define the details of circumstance, their nature and variety. There are, of course, (1) the agent and (2) the act; then (3) the scope of the action, and (4) the time and (5) the place in which it is done; there are also (6) the means by which it is done (*e.g.* the instrument), (7) the motive (*e.g.* safety), and (8) the manner (*e.g.* gently or violently).

No one, however, could be ignorant of *all* these details, unless he were mad. Obviously, a man could not be ignorant of the

agent: how could he possibly forget his own identity? But as for the act which a man is doing, he might forget *that;* as, for instance, in talking men say that a thing 'escaped' them, or that they did not know that a thing was forbidden, (as Æschylus said of the Mysteries). Again, a man wishing to show the action of a missile might let it fly (as in the recent accident of the catapult). Again, a man might imagine his son to be a foe, as Merope did; or that his spear was rounded when in fact it was pointed; or a man striking with a view to save might kill; or wishing to show a trick, like those who practise fencing, a man might hit a heavy blow.

Illustrations of involuntary ignorance of these surroundings.

Consequently, as ignorance is possible in reference to all these circumstances upon which the action turns, a man who acts in ignorance of any one of them, appears *pro tanto* to have acted unwillingly, and most of all where the circumstances of which he is ignorant are of critical importance, as emphatically 'the sphere' and 'the motive' of an act seem to be.

But in cases of 'involuntariness' following upon ignorance of details such as I have described, it is further necessary that the action should be painful and attended with regret.

But it is necessary to distinguish what those actions are, and what their varieties, of which we must be in ignorance when we act involuntarily. (1) There is the character of the agent himself in consistency with which he does all that he does; (2) the thing which he does; (3) sometimes also the instrument with which he acts; (4) the motive with which he acts (*e.g.* safety) and (5) the way in which he acts (*i.e.* the mode, whether gently or violently).

Now there is no one who could be ignorant of all these conditions unless he were a madman, though it is conceivable that a man might be ignorant of some of them while in his sober senses. For example a man is often ignorant of the actual thing which he is doing, as those were who divulged the Mysteries: while they were talking of other things, the story is, they became confused and incidentally spoke concerning the Mysteries, failing to perceive what they were saying, or being positively ignorant that these were subjects unlawful to be disclosed. Such persons are in ignorance of the effect which actually takes place, since they do not know that they are disclosing mysteries. Again, there is the case of a man who discharged a catapult in presence of another, wishing to show the action of it, and by accident killed him. Or, again, there is the case of a man who slew his son, fancying that he was a foe, as Merope did; or of one who supposed that his spear was pointless when in fact it was barbed, or that a stone was a pumice and throwing it to save him, killed his friend.

A man who is ignorant of any of such particulars upon which the action turns, has acted unwillingly. He is an unwilling agent in the full sense of the term, when he is ignorant of those particulars which are most important and essential —*i.e.* the identity of the persons, the nature of the act, the circumstances upon which the action turns, and the tendency of his act. When a man is ignorant of these specific points, and furthermore regrets the part that he has taken, he has acted unwillingly in every sense of the term.

iii.—Actions done willingly.

Since then 'the involuntary' is action done either through constraint or through ignorance, it would appear that 'the voluntary' is 'action whose origination depends upon a man's own self, while fully conscious of the particular circumstances upon which the action turns.'

The conditions, therefore, which are requisite for voluntary action are: 1. Absence of all constraint, and 2, a full knowledge of the circumstances.

(*a*) WILLINGNESS IS PREDICABLE OF IMPULSE AND DESIRE.

It is surely improper to describe acts done through impulse or desire as involuntary acts: that, on the contrary, such acts are willing acts, is proved by the following considerations:—

Special reasons given why the sphere of voluntariness must include impulse and desire.

1. Upon this assumption, neither the members of the animal world nor yet children would act willingly.

2. Is it implied that no single act that we perform through impulse or desire is willingly performed? or, rather, that honourable acts are voluntary and bad acts involuntary?—Yet is not such a theory absurd, seeing that there is one and the self-same cause in either case?

3. It is, moreover, monstrous surely to call acts unwilling when we are morally bound to feel a desire for them. There are certain cases where it is a duty to feel angry; and there are certain things, such as health and knowledge, for which it is our duty to strive.

4. Again, it is admitted that involuntary acts are painful: but acts done to gratify desire are pleasurable.

5. Further, what difference is there between errors committed through passion and errors committed through calculation, in respect of their being voluntary or involuntary? In both cases error must be avoided.

6. Indeed, the irrational feelings seem to be as much a part of human nature as the reason itself.

7. The whole moral life of man flows from Reason and Desire: it is consequently absurd to rank the one-half of life as involuntary.

Such then being the nature of 'the involuntary,' it follows that the voluntary will be action whose origination depends upon the agent himself, and where the agent has knowledge of the particular circumstances upon which the action turns.

There is a view which we must here examine, that 'actions which we do under the influence of passion or desire, are involuntary.' The following arguments will

show that on the contrary they are voluntary—provided, that is, that the agents know the whole circumstances of the issue in detail (*i.e.* the means whereby and the conditions under which they acted) :—

1. If we were to grant this assumption (of the Cyrenaics) we should have to admit also that no single creature that is irrational ever does a voluntary act (and animals invariably act either from impulse or passion); and for similar reasons neither do children.

2. The case which befalls our own selves is a paradoxical one. Either no single act of all we do through impulse or desire is voluntarily done, or else our noble actions of the kind are done voluntarily and our evil actions involuntarily (since of course things done through passion or desire are either good or evil). If this latter alternative be true, and we only do noble actions voluntarily and evil actions involuntarily, that is a most inconsistent view, the cause in either case being one and the same—*i.e.* passion or desire. But the cause which makes a thing voluntary is different from the cause which makes a thing involuntary—the one is internal, the other external.

3. Again, if all such acts are voluntary, surely it is monstrous to say (as on such an hypothesis we must) that we strive against our will for things after which we are morally bound to strive. It is of course possible to use our passions or desires for a fitting end. There are occasions when it is a duty to give vent to anger; and there are things for which it is a duty to be eager—for instance, health or knowledge : to say that such strivings are involuntary is absurd.

4. Again, involuntary acts are painful, whereas acts done to gratify desire are pleasurable.

5. Again, if wrongs committed in passion were involuntary, they would differ from such as are committed after rational conviction, in accordance with the difference between the involuntary and the voluntary. But there is in fact no such difference : the one are as much to be avoided as the other (which is a sign of their voluntariness) and the one are as much deserving of censure as the other.

6. Again, the irrational impulses are as much a part of human nature as is thought itself.

7. Lastly, it is by the impulses, from the play of passion and desire, that the whole moral life of man is formed ; and it were monstrous to call the moral life involuntary.

II.—ANALYSIS OF THE 'WILL' (OR 'RATIONAL PURPOSE').

i.—The Will distinguished from kindred processes.

Now that we have defined 'the voluntary' and 'the involuntary,' our next point must be to explain the nature of the 'Will' (or 'Rational Purpose')—a subject which is very intimately connected with moral virtue, and which seems to give a better index to character than even outward action does.

Higher than 'voluntariness' and more characteristic of virtue, is 'volition' or 'rational choice.'

Now that we have treated of the distinctions between the voluntary and the involuntary, the subject which comes next for us to understand is the nature of the Will (or 'Rational Purpose).' The will stands in intimate relation to moral virtue; and by the standard which it implies, we shall be able to distinguish moral actions and to estimate moral character.

(*a*) THE WILL NOT IDENTICAL WITH 'THE VOLUNTARY.'

It is, of course, perfectly evident that, although the Will is a

thing that is voluntary, the two terms are not convertible, but 'the voluntary' is a term of wider range; and that for two reasons—

Volition is included under the general conception of 'the voluntary,' but is not coextensive with it.

1. Children and all living creatures have a common share of voluntariness, but are incapable of Will (or rational preference).

2. We call acts done on the spur of the moment, voluntary, but not conformable to a rational purpose.

Nor, again, do those who describe the Will as Desire or Impulse or Wish, or a form of Opinion, seem to describe it rightly.

The will is of course a thing that is voluntary, yet it is not identical with the voluntary, but only a particular species of it, the will being a term of narrower range than the Voluntary.

This is clear for two reasons:

1. Voluntariness is an element which is found alike in irrational animals and in children no less than in those who are full-grown in reason: children and all living creatures act voluntarily. But 'Will' is found only in those who are able to form judgments and who know how to deliberate: it is indeed rightly described as 'an impulse attended with deliberation.'

2. There is also this especial consideration: acts performed by us on the spur of the moment upon which we have not deliberated beforehand are called 'voluntary' acts, but not acts of volition or of rational choice.

Nor again is the Will identical with Impulse, nor with Wish, nor with Desire, nor with Opinion, as philosophers have variously regarded it.

(*b*) THE WILL IS NOT IDENTICAL EITHER WITH DESIRE OR WITH IMPULSE.

1. The Will is not common to irrational animals, as both Desire and Impulse are.

Volition, involving a rational element, is in frequent collision with Impulse and Desire, and cannot, therefore, be identical with them.

2. The man of weak character acts under the influence of Desire, but does not exercise rational volition. Conversely, the man of strong character acts from his own volition and not under the influence of Desire.

3. Desire is at times in antagonism with Will, but can never be in antagonism with itself.

4. Desire is concerned with the pleasurable and the painful, but the Will is not essentially concerned with either the one or the other.

[These arguments are even stronger in the case of Impulse. Acts done through Impulse seem to be not in the very slightest degree consistent with a rational volition.]

1. Desire and Impulse are shared by us in common with irrational beings; but that is by no means the case with the Will.

2. The man of weak character is not said to do what he does from the exercise

of his own volition, but under the influence of Desire. Conversely the man of strong character is said to act according to his own volition and not under the influence of Desire.

3. Desire is at times opposed to Volition: often we exercise our volition in favour of things which are contrary to what we desire. But Desire cannot be the contrary of Desire. Consequently Volition is not Desire.

4. Desire is painful, and it ever has the pleasurable at its opposite pole and is ever striving to reach it. But Volition is not painful nor has it the pleasurable set over against it as its opposite.

[Neither is Impulse identical with Volition, and indeed is even farther from being so than is Desire: what takes place through Impulse is not in the very least degree consistent with a rational Volition.]

(*c*) THE 'WILL' IS NOT IDENTICAL WITH 'WISH.'

Nor assuredly is Will the same thing as Wish, though evidently akin to it.

Volition is distinct from Wish in being limited to things which are possible and within our own control, and in being concerned with 'means' and not with 'ends.'

1. There is no 'volition' in the case of things impossible; and if a man were to say that he 'willed' (or had 'deliberately resolved upon') a thing impossible, he would be thought to be crazy. On the other hand Wish may have for its object such an impossibility, for instance, as exemption from death.

2. Again, Wish is conversant with objects which never could have been compassed by a man's own self; for instance, that a particular athlete or actor should win a prize. But no one 'wills' (or 'deliberately chooses') anything of the kind: the only things which are objects of choice are such as a man thinks might be attained by his own self.

3. Moreover, Wish is concerned rather with 'the end' of action, whereas the Will (or rational preference) is concerned with the means subsidiary to that end. For example, we 'wish' to be in health, but we exercise our volition upon the means whereby we may attain health. Again, we *wish* to be happy, and we often say so; but it would be an incongruous expression to say that we 'have a volition to be happy.'

In a word, the will (or 'rational purpose') seems to be concerned only with things that are within our own power.

Nor again assuredly is Will the same thing as Wish, though the two seem very closely akin to one another.

1. There is no volition in the case of things impossible: we do not form a resolution to take to ourselves wings and fly, nor to be exempt from death, though we may *wish* that we could be. If a man formed any such 'resolution' he would be thought to be crazy. The Will, therefore, is not Wish.

2. We wish ofttimes for things which not we ourselves but others do; for instance, that a particular actor may surpass all his rivals on the stage, or that a particular athlete may win a prize. But no one exercises his volition upon such things, nor in fact about anything except what he thinks may be compassed by his own efforts.

3. Again, Wish always refers to the 'end,' whereas the Volition has reference to the means which conduce to that end. We wish for health, but we '*will*' (or deliberately adopt) what tends to health—the means whereby it is possible to attain health. Again, we wish for happiness, and we say that we wish for it; but we do not say that we 'will' to be happy—such an expression being inconsistent.

In fact the Will seems to be concerned only with things that are within our own power.

(*d*) THE WILL NOT IDENTICAL WITH OPINION.

Nor assuredly is the Will identical with Opinion:

Volition is a term of narrower range than Opinion; and its sphere is not truth and falsehood but good and evil.

1. Opinion seems to have all things for its sphere, and is exercised no less upon things eternal and unalterable than upon such as are within our own power.

2. Opinion is differentiated by the 'true' and the 'false,' not by the 'good' and the 'evil,' whereas the Will is characterised by the latter rather than by the former.

There is however no one who maintains, without reservation or limitation, that the Will is identical with Opinion.

Nor assuredly is the Will identical with Opinion. 1. Opinion is concerned with every kind of matter, things eternal, things depending upon ourselves, and things that are impossible.

2. Opinion is differentiated by the 'false' and the 'true:' of two opinions we say that the one is true and the other false. On the other hand the Will is characterised by moral good and evil: of one will we say that it has 'the good' for its object, and of another will we say that it has 'the evil' for its object.

There is, however, no one who thinks that the Will is identical with Opinion in the wide sense of the term.

(*e*) THE WILL NOT IDENTICAL WITH ANY SPECIAL FORM OF OPINION.

Nay, more: the Will is not identical with any special form of Opinion:

Moreover, Volition implies moral elements which are immaterial to mere Opinion: it is therefore not identical with any form of opinion, but is entirely distinct in kind.

1. According to the way in which we exercise our wills for good or evil, we gain a certain moral character; but the opinions we form have no such influence upon our lives.

2. We 'will' (or 'resolve') to take or to avoid a thing, or to perform some act implying pursuit or avoidance; but we form opinions only of abstract questions: 'What is expedient?' 'For whom?' or 'How?' We surely do not form an opinion to take or to avoid.

3. The will is praised rather for having a proper object than for

being formed in a certain mould of correctness; whereas Opinion is praised by reason of its truth or falsehood.

4. Those who form the best opinions seem not to be of the same class with those who form the best resolutions. There are those who think rightly what is the better course, and yet through an evil disposition form unrighteous resolutions.

5. We make our choice deliberately of things which we know most surely to be goods; but we form opinions upon things with which we are imperfectly acquainted.

[It is immaterial to our purpose whether Opinion is antecedent to Volition or concomitant therewith:—that is not the point we are now discussing, but rather whether Volition is identical with any form of Opinion.]

Nay more: not only is Volition not identical with Opinion in its wide sense:—it is not identical with any special form of Opinion.

1. In consequence of the volitions we make, we grow to be of a certain moral character: by consciously willing what is evil, we grow to be evil in ourselves: by consciously willing and adopting what is right, we grow ourselves to be right-minded. But no such results flow from the Opinions we form.

2. We make a volition to do something or to forbear:—to take something or to avoid something of the same kind. But we form opinions upon the nature of the thing towards which we make a volition, or of some alternative course, or upon the question 'whose interest a thing serves,' or 'how.' But 'to take' a thing, or to 'avoid' it or to 'choose' it—these are not things within the province of opinion. Volition therefore is not identical with Opinion.

3. Volition is praised when we exercise it upon things that are *right*. Opinion is praised when what we hold as opinion is *true*.

4. We exercise volition upon things of which we are quite satisfied that they are good; but we form opinions which we are not quite sure are true.

5. The same man is not consistent in what he resolves upon and what he thinks: he ofttimes forms admirable opinions, thinking what is true, but at the same time resolves upon what is evil. Volition is, therefore, not identical with Opinion.

[Though Opinion often precedes Volition or accompanies it, it does not follow that Volition and Opinion are identical: there is nothing in that to prevent their being in conflict.]

(*f*) THE WILL PROVISIONALLY DEFINED.

Seeing then that Volition is not identical with any of the mental processes enumerated above, what is its real nature, and its distinctive character?

Obviously it is a thing that is voluntary; but the converse is not true that 'all that is voluntary is volitional.'

Volition is, therefore, a species of the genus 'voluntary,' its *differentia* being 'rational' or 'deliberative.'

May it not be, therefore, 'a thing that is voluntary and that has been previously determined upon?' Of course it must involve reason and an exercise of judgment: indeed the very name 'volition' (or 'rational choice') seems to suggest a thing willed or chosen *in preference* to certain other things.

Seeing then that Volition is neither Desire nor Impulse nor Wish nor Opinion, we must proceed to inquire what is its real nature and what is its distinctive character.

Obviously it is a thing that is voluntary though not identical with the voluntary, as has been explained: not everything that is voluntary is a matter of volition.

But among things that are voluntary that only is called 'volitional' which we do after previous deliberation: volition, of course, implies reason and an exercise of judgment. So much indeed is evident from the very name: the term volition seems to suggest that it is a thing chosen or 'willed' in preference to other things.

ii.—The Will implies a process of deliberation.

(*a*) THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF DELIBERATION EXPLAINED.

Since Volition involves Deliberation, with what subjects is Deliberation concerned?

Do men deliberate upon all questions alike, and is every subject proper matter for deliberation, or are there points upon which deliberation is impossible? [Surely we must not include within the scope of deliberation such subjects as none but a fool or a madman would deliberate upon: its widest limits only include such subjects as a man in his senses might discuss.]

The following limitations must then be made:—

The following are excluded:—
1. Necessity;

1. No one deliberates upon the eternal and unalterable; for instance, upon the Universe, or upon the fact that the diameter and side of a square are incommensurable.

2. Nature, whether (*a*) invariable;

2. No one even deliberates upon things in motion but which obey a constant law in their change, whether from Necessity or by their own nature or through some other cause (as is the case with the Solstices and Sunrisings).

3. Or (*β*) variable.

3. No one deliberates upon things which are perpetually changing, as the heat of the weather and the rains.

4. Chance.

4. Nor is deliberation possible upon the accidents of chance; for instance, the finding of a treasure.

5. Human affairs which have no relation to our own selves.

5. Nay, one does not deliberate even upon all things that belong to the sphere of man. The Spartan does not deliberate how best the Scythians may regulate their community: that is one of those results which could not be brought about by our own instrumentality.

The conclusion, therefore, is that

But the matters upon which we do deliberate are matters of action that come within our own control. The causes above mentioned being excluded, no other

form of causality is left, since the only possible causes seem to be Nature, Necessity, Chance, Mind, and whatever is produced by man.

Deliberation is concerned with things which we can ourselves control.

It is about things which can be produced by their own selves that men severally deliberate. Consequently even certain of the arts are excluded: there is no deliberation in regard to such as are exact and independent (for instance, in regard to Philology there is no deliberation possible upon the subject how we ought to form our letters). The things, I say, upon which we deliberate are such as are produced by our own selves, though differently under different circumstances; in regard, for instance, to Medicine or Finance, or Seamanship more than about Gymnastic, since Seamanship is a less perfectly elaborated Science; and similarly in regard to the other arts, though more so in regard to the Arts than the Sciences, inasmuch as we have more uncertainty about the former.

Such only of the arts as are στοχαστικαί come within this rule; and that in varying degrees.

The sphere of deliberation, then, is that of things contingent and general where there is uncertainty in what way they will result, and where there is an element of indefiniteness. [In regard to serious issues we take others into our counsels, distrusting our own judgment, as being incompetent to decide thereon.]

The conditions, therefore, implied in the subject-matter of deliberation are (1) contingency, (2) absence of a fixed rule, and (3) moral importance.

These general principles assumed, we may now proceed to inquire whether it be possible to deliberate upon every subject alike, or whether there be points upon which deliberation is impossible, so that we may ascertain thereby with what subjects Volition is concerned and what subjects are without its sphere. The sphere of volition is of course the sphere of such matters as come under deliberation. [I mean by a 'matter for deliberation' one about which (not the fool or the madman but) the man of sense would deliberate.]

The sphere of deliberation must be narrowed by the exclusion of the following subjects:

(1.) Deliberation is not concerned with things eternal, for instance, with the Universe: no one deliberates as to how the heavenly bodies ought to move; nor is it concerned with things impossible to be altered, for instance, in reference to the side and diameter of a parallelogram, to effect such a proportion between them as that they should be commensurate.

(2.) Nor is there deliberation upon things which are eternally moved in the same direction either by Necessity or by Nature or through some other cause; for instance, the solstices and sun-risings.

(3.) Nor are we likely to deliberate upon things which are variable, alternating now one way now another, for instance, drought and rains.

(4.) Nor do we deliberate upon the accidents of chance; for instance, the finding of a treasure; inasmuch as not one of these things is dependent upon ourselves nor within the province of human effort.

(5.) Nay, we are not likely to deliberate upon everything that does fall within the province of man, but only upon things that are within our own power and which we could effect of our own selves, either by our own direct agency or

through others. The Spartans are not likely to deliberate upon the constitution of the Scythians as to how they might be most satisfactorily governed. No such scheme as those indicated above, could be effected by our own agency.

The things upon which we deliberate are such only as can be effected by our own selves, and these we will now investigate.

There are three causes operating among existences—Nature, Necessity, and Chance. There is also Mind and whatever is produced by the agency of man—*e.g.*, Art and certain other forms of activity. Now men do not deliberate upon things of which either Nature or Necessity or Chance are the causes; but only upon things of which the cause is human design and human effort. Nay, they do not deliberate upon *all* the designs which are possible to man: there is no deliberation in reference to such sciences as are exact and independent, *e.g.*, Philology—we never doubt how letters should be formed, that being a subject which is exactly known and of which the characteristics are accurately defined.

The subjects, I say, about which we deliberate are such as are produced by our own selves and which are capable of being produced in a variety of ways; in regard, for instance, to the course to be pursued in medicine—wherein the courses are not perfectly defined; or in regard to financial speculations, where it is possible to make money in a variety of ways; or in regard to questions of navigation or training—though we have to deliberate more about matters of navigation than about matters of training, navigation being a less accurately defined science; and similarly in other sciences. But we deliberate more about the Arts than the Sciences, since we are in greater hesitation in the Arts, their province being less accurately defined than that of the Sciences.

The subjects then of deliberation are such as may conceivably take place as a matter of probability, but when the issue is uncertain in reference to such matters —*i.e.*, in what way it will turn out and under what conditions, it is impossible that any definite deliberation should take place. [For this reason we associate with ourselves counsellors when the subject involves grave issues, wherein we are distrustful of ourselves as being incompetent to form a judgment.]

(*b*) THE METHOD AND EFFECT OF DELIBERATION.

But the conditions of contingency apply only to the means not to the ends of action: Deliberation assumes a particular end at starting.

But we do not deliberate about 'ends,' but about the means whereby to compass our ends. The physician does not deliberate whether he should cure his patient, nor the orator whether he should persuade his audience, nor the statesman whether he should promote social order; nor in the various contingencies of life does any one deliberate about the 'end' in view. We *assume* a certain end, and then consider how and by what means it can be realized. In case the end appears possible to be realized by various means, we reflect further what means will be most easy and most honourable; if on the other hand the result is to be achieved by one way only, we consider how we may find that way and what will conduce to it, until we arrive at the original cause, which comes last in point of discovery.

The method by which Deliberation

In fact a man when he is deliberating seems to be making a search and to be resolving a truth into its elements (in the way that I have described),

like a mathematical figure. [But obviously not all forms of search are forms of deliberation:— for instance, certain mathematical investigations are not; though every case of deliberation is a form of search.] Hence the truth which is last in the analysis is first in the production.

proceeds is similar to that of geometrical analysis.

But if, on arriving at this ultimate fact, the thing to be done be found impracticable, we then desist from our deliberations—if, for example, there be need of money to carry the conclusion into effect, and money cannot be found. If on the other hand the conclusion seems to be practicable, we then set our hands to work to carry it out. Things are, of course, only practicable when they can be compassed by our own agency, though in this category we must include things done by our friends, as being in a sense done by ourselves, since the origination thereof rests with ourselves.

When analysed into its simplest elements an action is seen to be either practicable or impracticable.

The object of this inquiry is thus alternately the instruments, and the mode of using them. Indeed in matters of action generally the subject of deliberation is at one time the proper agency, at another time the proper manner, at another time the proper persons, to carry out our purpose.

It seems clear then, that man is, as has been explained, the author of his own actions; and his deliberations have reference only to things which can be compassed by his own self, though his actions when performed, have reference to 'ends' beyond themselves. Consequently the object of our deliberation is not 'the end' of our actions, but the means whereby we may attain those ends.

Things are practicable when they can be compassed by our own agency.

[One other limitation must be made: particular matters of fact are not subjects for deliberation, as for instance whether this be bread or whether it has been properly baked. Such matters are questions for the senses to decide. If one had to deliberate upon simple matters of fact, we should have nothing from which to start, and our deliberations would reach on to infinity.]

Matters of fact are of course not matters of deliberation.

But we do not deliberate about 'ends,' but about the means that are conducive to ends. The physician will not deliberate about giving health to his patient:— it is inconceivable that a physician should have regard for anything else, and therefore he will have no need of deliberation upon *that* point. The question which he will deliberate will be, what are the means which tend to produce health, and which may conceivably be compassed in a variety of ways. Similarly the orator will not deliberate upon the question of persuasion, but only upon the line

of argument that will conduce to persuasion. The statesman does not summon the Senate in order that he may ascertain the expediency of good government, since of course he is bound to secure a proper administration of affairs: the object of his deliberations will be the means which constitute and secure such a good government.

In fact all men in their several vocations assume or presuppose a certain 'end,' and inquire into the manner and the measures whereby they may attain to that end. If there be many ways by which it is possible for them to attain to the mark, they inquire into the means whereby they may most easily and most honourably realize their aim. If, on the other hand, there be only one way by which it is conceivable that they should succeed, they do not inquire further therein, except only as to the mode in which they ought to treat or handle this particular agency, and what course of conduct they ought to adopt in order to achieve their purpose. They have further to consider what measures will facilitate that course of conduct, and again what means will facilitate these other means, until they arrive at something which can be done without the intervention of anything else—and this ultimate fact is the original cause of the 'end,' though it be the last thing to be discovered.

In this way the man who deliberates, starting from the 'end,' travels through the various means which lead to that end, breaking up the whole action into its elements, until he reaches to the original cause,—just in the same way as mathematicians analyse their figures.

Deliberation, therefore, is a mode of search, though the two terms are not convertible. Yet, as has been shown, the man who is deliberating is making an analysis, no less than the man who is making a mathematical inquiry. The fact which is last to be discovered in making the analysis, becomes the first thing to be done by the man who is deliberating. In precisely the same way the mathematician, assuming and positing the point which will be the last at which he will arrive in the course of his analysis, and, with this as a starting point, proceeding through the other points, demonstrates thereby the problem set before him. But both the one and the other desist from their inquiry if, in the course of their analysis, they light upon things that are impracticable:—if, for example, there be need of money to compass the end that is sought for, and this end cannot be compassed except by money, and it be evident that money cannot possibly be found, men do not inquire further therein but desist altogether, whereas if money *can* be found, they then set their hands to work to effect their purpose.

We call things 'practicable' then, which can be effected by our own selves—including thereby the agency of friends, since the cause of their help depends upon ourselves. Among things that are practicable we have to deliberate at one time in regard to the proper instruments, at another time in regard to the proper use of those instruments,—and generally in regard to the means which tend to a given end, how they may be obtained, or else in regard to the mode in which we should employ those means, or as to the agency necessary.

It is evident then, from what has been said, that the 'end' is not a matter for deliberation. The subjects of deliberation are matters where a man has power either to act or to forbear: wherever a man has such a power there is the sphere of human action. But human actions are invariably performed with a view to purposes beyond themselves, and whatever is done with a view to ulterior purposes, is not itself an 'end.' Hence the subject matter of deliberation is not 'the end,' but the *means* to the end. Yet even among the means to ends there are certain things exempted—*i.e.*, specific matters of fact—whether, for example, a loaf has been baked or manufactured as it ought to be. We know these specific facts by our own senses, not by deliberation or exercise of judgment. If one had to deliberate upon all occasions upon specific facts, we could never mark a start, but our deliberations would reach on to infinity.

(*c*) COMPARISON BETWEEN DELIBERATION AND CHOICE.

The province within which Deliberation is exercised is thus identical with that of Choice—except that a matter which has been adopted by the Choice is one which is *ipso facto* defined and settled. A matter which has been selected in preference to anything else, after deliberation, is a matter which is 'purposed,' or rationally adopted by an act of the Will. Everyone ceases to inquire how he shall act, when he has brought the final decision to himself, that is, to the sovereign power within him, which is the power of willing or purposing.

Rational volition, therefore, or the exercise of a rational choice, is identical in its range with Deliberation.

An illustration of this power of Will may be drawn from the old polities or constitutions which Homer has described. There we see the Princes in consultation; and after they have formed their purpose, they announce their Will to the crowd. Just so the Reason deliberates and announces its purpose to the crowd of passions, for them to carry out.

Picture of the war-councils in Homer:—
(1.) Princes deliberating what measures to take.
(2.) Choice of measures and proclamation to the crowd to carry them out.

Since then a thing which has been purposed is a thing which has been deliberated upon, and which is consciously striven after, and a thing which is within our own power, purpose itself will be 'a striving after things within our own power, which have been deliberately determined upon.' After having deliberated we decide, and then strive after our object in accordance with our choice. Let this, then, suffice for an outlined definition of Choice, and for an account of its objects, and of its special concern with *means*.

Such then is the province of Deliberation; and a matter of Choice is such part of the province of Deliberation as has been determined upon. A matter is said to be 'purposed' or 'chosen,' when it has been selected in preference to something else *after deliberation*. After having decided what we ought to do, we no longer deliberate upon the matter, but know definitely how we ought to act: we bring down the power of originating (ἀρχή) the desired object to our own wish, and we bring down our own decision and wish to our own Will, which is, *ipso facto*, the spring or 'cause' of the action.

This view of the Will may be illustrated from the old constitutions which Homer has described in his Ballads. He there introduces the Princes after a Council announcing the course which they have determined upon, to the Demus, just as the Reason or Prerogative Power within us announces its decision to the Will, so that it may be carried into effect.

Since then that which is 'purposed' is what has been deliberated upon, aiming at objects dependent upon ourselves—a thing in fact for which we strive at deliberating thereon and which we are ourselves able to effect, it is evident

the Will may be defined as a 'deliberate striving after objects which are within our own power.' After having deliberated, we decide, and then strive after the object chosen in accordance with our wish.

Such is our definition of Will, or 'Rational Choice,' as far as is possible in a general outline; and in this definition is implied the scope of the Will, which is not the 'end,' but the means which conduce to the end.

iii.—The Will implies a 'Wish for the good.'

(*a*) IS THE OBJECT OF WISH THE REAL OR THE APPARENT GOOD?

How far is a man responsible for his moral impressions?

It has been already shown that 'Wish' has relation to the 'end' of action; but there is a difference of opinion whether this 'end' is identical with the *real* good, or whether it is identical only with the *apparent* good.

1. If every man had a φαντασία of the real good, no one would make an evil choice.

1. Now there is this difficulty facing those who say that it is the real good which is the object of wish:—when a man adopts a particular course in error, that for which he is wishing is not the true object of his wish. Otherwise, had their theory been true, and that for which a man wished were really desirable, it would be a good; but in the case that I am supposing, it might be actually an evil.

2. If our φαντασία be only of the apparent good, there is an end of moral distinctions.

2. On the other hand, those who maintain that it is the *apparent* good which is the object of wish, are met with this difficulty—that, according to their theory, there would be nothing good *per se* and in the nature of things, but whatever each man thought to be good, to him that thing would be good. But there are different things thought good by different individuals, and perchance, in possible cases, things which are antagonistic.

We must now proceed to treat of the subject of Wish.

It was shown in the previous discussion that Wish is concerned with 'the end' of action, but a controversy has been raised whether 'the end' which the Wish has before it may be of any nature whatever, anything in fact which a man might desire to gain, or whether it must be the real good only. In fact some thinkers maintain that Wish is concerned simply with the true 'good,' others that it is concerned with what *seems* to be the good, whether it be so in reality or no.

1. Now there is this difficulty facing those who say that it is the real good alone which is the object of Wish:—they imply that evil is not an object of Wish to the vicious man, though in fact it most assuredly is.

2. On the other hand, those who maintain that it is the apparent good which is the object of Wish, not by reason of any intrinsic quality, but just as each man temporarily thinks it good, are confronted by this difficulty: inasmuch as different things appear good to different individuals, what one man thinks good, appearing evil to another, and the same person ofttimes regarding things antagonistic to each other to be good—according to this view, nothing can be an object of wish in its own nature and for its own sake.

(*b*) RECONCILEMENT OF THESE TWO THEORIES.

If, therefore, neither of these theories be satisfactory, may we not say that 'absolutely, and in strict truth, the object of Wish is that which is really good, though relatively to the individual it is the apparent good?' To the good man, the object of wish is that which is conformable to absolute truth; on the other hand, to the bad man the object of wish is anything that may chance.

The *wish* for the real good is universal, but the *impressions* which men form of it vary with the variations of their own moral temperament.

It is precisely the same in the case of physical tasks: when men are in a healthy state of body, things are wholesome that are really so, whereas if men are themselves diseased, things abnormal are wholesome in their eyes. In such cases, also, the sensations of bitter and sweet, hot and heavy, and so on, are similarly reversed.

The fact is that it is only the good man who judges aright of moral differences; on none but on him are the impressions made in every particular true and just. Corresponding to the varying conditions of temperament, there are special impressions of what is noble and of what is agreeable; and herein is the good man pre-eminent above others, that he sees the truth in every instance; being, as it were, himself the standard and measure of truth in all its forms. On the other hand, in the minds of men generally, error seems to grow up naturally, under the influence of pleasure. Though pleasure is not itself a good, it has the appearance of being so in the eyes of the world: hence they make their choice of the pleasurable as of a good, and shun pain as an evil.

It is only in the good man that the impressions of good accord with the reality. The moral sense of men generally is dimmed by pleasure: that of the good man alone is pure and incorruptible.

But if neither of these views seems probable, we may state a solution of our own:—that it is the good which is the object of wish by nature, and in real truth, and in its own right, but that under certain aspects, and according to the standard of particular individuals, it is what *seems* to be the good that is the object of wish. Though a thing be not a good in real truth, yet in reference to given circumstances it may be good; for instance, to steal clothes is by nature an evil thing, yet from the point of view of the footpad, under certain circumstances it may be a good, and in so far as a thing is a good it is an object of wish. It consequently happens that what *seems* to be good, is under a particular aspect an object of wish. To the good man, therefore, that which is veritably good is the object of wish, and to the bad man the object of wish is anything that may chance.

Precisely similar is the case of our physical conditions. To those who are in sound health and in a good state of body, things appear to be healthy that are so in truth, but to those who are diseased, the contrary. Similarly in the case of things bitter or sweet: to those who are in sound health, things that are in their

own nature bitter or sweet, appear to be what they are. Such men judge rightly that such and such things are hot, or heavy, and so forth: on the other hand, those who are diseased in their senses, judge that things quite different from these are hot, or heavy, and so forth. The analogy applies exactly to things that are morally good or pleasant or evil. The good man thinks things good when they are so in reality: the bad man often thinks quite the reverse. Corresponding to the various temperaments of men's souls, there are things which are specially good and pleasurable; and herein the good man differs from the bad, in that he discriminates the good from the pleasant, and sees what is really true in every situation, having, as he has, become the standard and measure of truth, But the evil, from being unable to recognize the truth, are led astray by pleasure, fancying that things pleasant are good, though they are not so by nature; and similarly they shrink from things that are painful, though they are not in their own nature either evil or undesirable.

iv.—The Will implies Moral Freedom.

(*a*) BOTH VIRTUE AND VICE ARE WITHIN OUR OWN POWER.

The efficient causes of Virtue and Vice being within our own power, Virtue and Vice will both be voluntary.

Since, then, the end of action is the object of wish, and the means of realizing the end are matters of deliberation and choice, the actions consequent thereon will be in accordance with our own Will, and voluntary.

In this sphere also the various forms of moral excellence will be exhibited. Consequently moral excellence is a state within our own power, as also, for similar reasons, is moral corruption. Where the power of action depends upon our own selves, in such cases there is also the power of forbearing; and where there is a power of forbearing, there is also a power of acting.

Hence, if action, when honourable, is within our power, the refraining from action when such refraining is disgraceful, will also be within our power; and if the power of not acting when such non-action is honourable depend upon ourselves, the power of acting when action is disgraceful will also depend upon ourselves. But if it be within our power to perform actions honourable and dishonourable, and similarly to abstain therefrom (and that is equivalent to being good or bad), it will consequently rest with ourselves whether we be virtuous or vicious.

Since then the ends of action are the objects of wish, and the means which conduce to those ends, objects of deliberation and rational choice, it is evident that the actions which result from these processes of deliberation and of choice will themselves be in accordance with our own Will, and voluntary.

Of such a character are the actions which are conformable to virtue, since they are manifested in the same sphere as deliberation and choice. Virtue and vice are therefore dependent upon ourselves, since the actions by means of which we habituate ourselves to virtue are deliberately adopted or 'willed,' and are dependent upon ourselves. But if the doing of good be within our own power, the refraining from good will be within our own power, since where there is 'nay' there is also 'yea.'

Hence if action, when honourable, be within our own power, the refraining

from action, where such refraining is disgraceful, will also be within our own power. If, that is, the refraining from evil. when such refraining is right, be within our own power, the performing of evil, when such performance is evil, is also within our own power. But our line of conduct in such circumstances makes us good or evil; and consequently it is within our own power to be virtuous or vicious.

(*b*) REFUTATION OF THE THEORY THAT VICE IS INVOLUNTARY.

But as for saying that

"None are wicked of their free will, nor 'gainst their will are they happy,"

such a theory is partly true and partly untrue. Though no one is happy against his own inclination, wickedness is still a voluntary state to the wicked man.

Disproof of the theory of Epicharmus that 'Vice is involuntary':—

Otherwise we must raise, in opposition to the theory of voluntariness advanced above, a new issue, and argue that man is *not* the 'primal cause' and father of his own acts, as he is the father of his children.

But if our own theory be, as it manifestly is, the true one, and we are not able to refer our actions to any causes beyond those which are within our own power, then, where the *causes* of actions depend upon ourselves, the *effects* will likewise depend upon ourselves, and our actions will be voluntary.

(1.) By the fact that the first causes of vice are within our own power.

Evidence of this moral freedom seems to be given not only by the individual consciousness of each, but also by the example of legislators, whose codes inflict punishment and penalty upon evil-doers (except where men act under constraint, and owing to ignorance for which they are not themselves to blame) and, on the other hand, confer honours upon such as perform noble exploits, the design and intention being to encourage the one in their heroism, and to deter the others from their wickedness. Yet of course, no lawgiver would urge men to perform actions which were neither within their own control nor voluntary, knowing that it would be as futile as for a man to have been persuaded not to feel heat or pain or hunger or other similar sensations: none the less for all the persuasion we shall continue liable to feel them.

(2.) By the consideration that all legislation assumes human freedom.

Furthermore, when a man seems to be himself responsible for his own ignorance, the laws punish him on the simple ground of his being ignorant; for instance, penalties are doubled in the case of drunkards. In such cases, the first step depends

(3.) By the fact that ignorance is sometimes punished doubly as an aggra-

vation of the offence.

upon the man's own self: it was possible for him to have avoided the drunken excess which produced the ignorance.

Again, men are punished for being ignorant of points of law with which they ought to have been familiar, and which are not too abstruse for them to understand. Men are, in fact, punished in all cases alike, when they are thought to be ignorant of their duties through their own neglect, upon the ground that it was within their own power not to have been ignorant: they were competent to have kept their duties in remembrance.

But as for saying that

"None are wicked of their free will, nor 'gainst their will are they happy,"

such a view seems to be partly true and partly false. It is true that no one can become happy against his will; but the first half of the line is untrue. Wickedness is in no way a thing involuntary. It has been shown from the previous arguments, that man is the cause of his own actions. But where the causes are within our own power, the effects are also within our own power, and voluntary. Hence, for this reason, every action of man, whether it be good or whether it be evil, is voluntary.

This view is borne out by the course which both individuals and lawgivers take against evildoers. They cause vengeance or punishment to light upon those who do evil deeds, except where the wrong-doing is caused by some kind of external constraint, or in consequence of ignorance for which the agents are not themselves responsible (a man, for instance, would be responsible for his ignorance, as well as for his act, if he did anything evil when intoxicated, and so ignorant of the nature of his act: he has only himself to blame for the consequences). On the other hand, lawgivers honour those who act nobly, in order that they may thereby encourage others to noble deeds, and restrain them from doing evil. Hence it is evident that they consider it to be within our own power to be vicious, or to grow to be virtuous; and it is with this view that they use their endeavours to inspire men with this conviction. Of course, where things are neither within our own power nor voluntary, no one in his right senses urges us to perform them: no one tries to persuade another not to experience heat or cold or hunger or other similar sensations over which we have no control, since no good could possibly accrue from such an exhortation, though we who were exhorted were ourselves to desire exceedingly to profit by it; we should continue, all the same, subject to such sensations.

Similarly when a man is involuntarily ignorant from being unable to know, no one would urge him to have the power of knowing: it does not rest with the man himself, whether he knows or is ignorant. But if a man be personally responsible for the ignorance under the influence of which he committed the evil, then he is punished for it: he seems to be in a state of ignorance of his own free will, because in that case it rests with himself whether he know or be ignorant, as with the drunkard, or one who through his own neglect is ignorant of the law, which he might easily have found out. An evildoer of this type is personally responsible, both for his ignorance and for his wickedness, and is wicked of his own free will. The case is similar in regard to other points which it is possible for us to know, and from misunderstanding which we fall into error. It is owing to such faults that we are exposed to the penalties of the lawgivers. We are competent, that is, to avoid being ignorant, because it is within our own power not to be careless of such things, but to make it our own business to understand them.

(*c*) FREEDOM IN THE FORMATION OF CHARACTER.

'But,' it may be objected, 'a man's disposition is such that he *could* not take heed to such things.'

The plea that a man only follows the bent of his disposition does not prove that he is not responsible:—(1.) Character is only concentrated habit, and habit depends upon ourselves.

. . . Nay, men are themselves responsible for having acquired such a character by living dissolutely; and so too are they responsible for being unjust and intemperate whether, as is the case with some, by wrong-doing, or, as is the case with others, by passing their lives in drinking and similar debauchery. It is indeed a law of life that the activities which are displayed in any particular direction, produce a corresponding character in the agent. From the analogy of those who practise for any contest or profession, an illustration of this law may be taken: to ensure success, they practise their art continuously and perseveringly. To be ignorant, therefore, that 'habits' are formed by men developing their powers in particular directions is the mark of an utterly unreflective character.

(2.) Habit depends upon separate actions which are unmistakeably in our own power.

Moreover, it is absurd that the man who performs unjust acts should not *wish* to be unjust, or that a man who acts intemperately should not *wish* to be intemperate. If a man not unwittingly performs acts from the effects of which he will be unjust, he is unjust of his own choice; nay, verily, though he should afterwards desire it, he will not afterwards cease to be unjust and become just, any more than the invalid will gain sound health by desiring to do so. By living intemperately and disobeying his physicians, a man is voluntarily an invalid in the case which I have supposed: in the first instance it was possible for him to have avoided illness, but after a man has once thrown away his health, his chance is gone. Precisely in the same way when a man has discharged a stone, it is no longer possible for him to recover it; yet the projecting or casting of the stone was an act depending upon himself—the primary impulse, that is, was within his own control. This analogy applies exactly to the soul and to such states as justice and intemperance: it was possible in the first instance not to have formed such evil tendencies. Hence men of this type, as of others, are what they are of their own free will; but when once a character of this kind has been formed in them it is no longer possible for them to be different.

But if any one be of such a nature as not to have the capacity for taking heed, he will not on that account escape punishment. Nay, rather, he will be

punished for that very reason—for having culpably grown into such a state as to have lost the capacity for taking heed, by living dissolutely and licentiously. From such a mode of life it is that men become for the most part wicked, unjust, and dissolute. In consequence, that is, of the unjust and dissolute practices to which men become habituated they grow to be unjust and dissolute; and they grow like that, even though they have not wrong-doing as a settled plan before them, but yet live a dissolute life and delight in self-indulgence and luxury. From a course of life like this, men advance to the commission of actual wrong.

It is indeed ever the case, that according to the nature of the activities which we habitually practise, we grow, as has been explained, to be virtuous or vicious or acquire some other complexion in our moral life. Just so we see men who wish to become athletes or to cultivate some other profession or business, practising and exercising themselves in the performance of acts by means whereof they may attain to the accomplishment they desire. No one, in fact, is ignorant that it is from the performance of specific acts that we attain to a fixed and permanent state of vice or of virtue—unless he be utterly without perception. If then this truth be manifest to all, it is clear also that all men understand the character of their own acts, whether, that is, they tend to virtue or to vice; and if they know what they are doing, they are of their own free will either good or evil.

It is, of course, quite absurd for a man who performs unjust acts to say that he does not *wish* to be unjust, or for a man who is dissolute to say that he does not *wish* to act dissolutely. If, though he wish to become just and temperate, he is yet unable to be so through being overpowered by the strength of long habits, even thus he is voluntarily vicious. Take the case of a man who adopts a depraved mode of life and is disobedient to his physicians and is consequently in sickness: such an one is voluntarily an invalid, since the mode of his life depended upon himself, and though he afterwards wish to be relieved of its consequences, he cannot be. Before he fell ill, it depended upon himself to guard his health, but when once he has thrown away his health, it is no longer in his power to recall it. Or, to take another case, a man has it in his own power to cast a stone into the sea, but when once he has cast it he has it not in his power to recall it again; yet still he cast it of his own free will, the act of casting being dependent upon himself. Precisely so is it in the case of the unjust and of the dissolute man. Before they grew to be vicious and attained to the permanent habit thereof, it was in their power not to have become so; but when once they have grown into a certain state, they have no power to alter it.

(*d*) FREEDOM IN THE FORMATION OF BODILY STATES.

We are responsible even for our bodily faults, when, as is often the case, they are self-produced.

But not only are the faults or corruptions of the soul voluntary, but in certain cases the diseases of the body are voluntary also, and these cases, when they occur, we regard with disapproval. No one of course blames those who are naturally disfigured, unless their deformity arise from want of exercise or from their own neglect. Similarly in regard to cases of weakness or of mutilation: no one would taunt a man who was blind from nature, or through disease or through an accident, but we should rather pity such an one. If on the other hand a man were blind through drunkenness or intemperance, all men would censure him. Consequently in the case even of bodily distempers those which are under our own control are blamed, whereas such as are out of our own power are not blamed; and if this principle be of general

application, those distempers which are blamed in other relations will also be within our own power.

But not only are the faults or corruptions of the soul voluntary, but in the case of certain individuals, bodily diseases are also voluntarily formed—those at least on account of which men are censured. Of course no one in his senses blames those who are naturally disfigured; but we do censure those who have ruined their physique through omitting to take exercise or other neglect or through depravity. We do not taunt a man who is blind by nature or through disease or from a blow, but we rather pity him. But when a man has injured his eyes through dissipation or some other depravity, we blame him and censure him. It is clear then that such bodily ailments as are voluntarily incurred are blamed by us, while such as are involuntary are in no way blamed. This law will apply similarly to other cases: such as are cases for punishment and for which penalties are provided are entirely voluntary and dependent upon ourselves: such as are not of this character, are involuntary. Vice therefore is voluntary.

(*e*) FREEDOM APPLIES EQUALLY TO VIRTUE AND TO VICE.

But in reply to the objection of those who urge that 'all men aim at that which appears to them the good, but have no control over the impressions made upon them, but the end which appears good to a man reflects exactly the tendency of his own moral character'—there are two alternative answers:

Statement of the argument of necessitarians that 'a man is the slave of his own nature which he did not produce and cannot alter.'

1. If every man is, in some sense, responsible to himself for his moral state, he will also be, in some sense, responsible for the impressions which different ends make upon him.

1. But moral ideas flow from the moral state which *is* to a certain degree under our own control.

2. If, on the contrary, no one is responsible to himself for his moral states, but the evil which a man does is done through ignorance of his real end, and from a mistaken fancy that by the course he takes the best result will be attained; if, moreover, the inclination for a particular 'end' be not self-produced, but a man must be born with the faculty of moral sight by which to discriminate things rightly and to select the good which is so in truth (and the 'nobly-born' is one in whom this moral perception is perfectly ingrained, and that is the highest and noblest gift, and one which cannot possibly be acquired or learnt by ourselves, but such as nature gave it will be its character, and to have this characteristic truly and nobly engrafted in us is the perfect and genuine nobility) . . . if veritably such a view be true, wherein is virtue more voluntary than vice? In either case, in that of the good man as in that of the bad man, the 'end' which they follow *appears* to them

2. Assuming the fact to be true, without qualification as stated by the necessitarians, their argument proves too much—that neither virtue nor vice are voluntary.

(whether by nature or however it may be) the real end, and is assumed to be so accordingly; and whatever actions they perform under any circumstances that may arise they view in connection with the end which is thus assumed.

Under either hypothesis virtue must be regarded as subject to the same conditions as vice.

Under either of these alternatives—whether, that is to say, the end of moral action does not present itself in the light it does by an unalterable law, but there is an element in each impression which depends upon a man's own self; or whether, though the 'end' be a creation of nature, yet virtue is voluntary, inasmuch as the good man performs all that is subsidiary to that end of his own free will,—for reasons equally strong vice will also be voluntary. The element of freedom exists in the bad man no less than in the good man, in the performance of separate actions, even if not in the choice of the 'end.'

If therefore the virtues are, as has been shown, voluntary, (inasmuch as we are ourselves 'joint-authors' of our actions, and jointly responsible for them, and the 'end' which at any time we propose to ourselves, depends upon the fact that we are ourselves of a certain character or disposition), our vices will also be voluntary, formed as they are under analogous conditions.

But this view is thought by some to be inconsistent with Reason, and that upon the following grounds. 'Vice,' they argue, 'arises from our setting before our actions an evil end; and this mistake is caused by our fancying that, instead of being evil, the end is a good one: but the impressions which our fancy makes upon us as to good and bad, are not under our own control: we all strive after what *seems* to us a good, and are not ourselves responsible for our impressions. Consequently vice is not voluntary.'

In vindication of our own theory we show that this objection applies with equal force to the case of virtue, and yet virtue is voluntary, since no one is blessed against his will.

1. If, on the one hand, the ignorance of what is the real good arises from the mental state of the agent being vicious, and knowledge of the real good is consequent upon the mental state of the agent being virtuous, it is evident that we grow to be vicious or virtuous of our own free will, inasmuch as we are ourselves the causes of our mental states and responsible to ourselves for them.

2. If, on the contrary, the knowledge of the end is not dependent upon our mental state, nor requires the concurrence of the will, but is like good eye-sight or some other physical quality, which if a man have not, it is impossible for him to acquire it elsewhere, or to provide it for himself out of his own resources, but it is essential that a man should be *born* with a power of moral discrimination if he is to have a chance of judging aright, (a moral insight which constitutes the only perfect and genuine nobility,)—even if this be true, still vice is voluntary no less than virtue, even in this view of it: there is a knowledge of the end both in the bad man and in the good, whether it be owing to a man's mental state or to nature, that the knowledge of the *true* end is realized or misapprehended. (1) If, on the one hand, we say that virtue is voluntary because, though the 'end' is owing to nature and rightly perceived by the good man, yet the means subservient to the end depend upon a man's own self to choose or not, what is there to prevent vice being voluntary for the same reasons? (2) If, on the other hand, virtue is voluntary because the knowledge of the good is derived

from virtuous states of which we are ourselves, in a certain sense, 'joint authors.' by the same reasoning vice will be voluntary also, because our ignorance of the true end is owing to our vicious habits.

(*f*) RECAPITULATION OF THE THEORY OF VIRTUE.

To sum up then our theory of the virtues: it has been shown that:

1. Virtues are, in their generic character, 'mean-states' (to use a metaphor) and 'permanent states of mind.'
2. They tend to reproduce the actions from which they were themselves formed, such reproduction being spontaneous and essential.
3. They are within our own power, and voluntary.
4. They conform exactly to the standard which Right Reason lays down.

[Here it must be noticed, that 'habits' are not voluntary in the same sense that actions are. We are responsible for our actions from beginning to end, since we know every condition which surrounds them. But we have control only over the beginnings of our habits, the gradual growth of particular tendencies being imperceptible in the moral, as in the physical organism; yet, inasmuch as we had it in our power at the outset to shape the circumstances of our lives according to one use or another, the habits which result from our conduct therein will consequently be voluntary also.]

Note the different degrees of freedom in regard to acts and to habits.

Let us now take up again the subject of special virtues, and show what their nature is, what their subject-matter, and what the mode of their action. It will incidentally be shown also what is their number and variety.

What, then, is virtue? Generally, and in brief, it has been described, (1) as a 'mean state,' lying midway, that is between two faulty states, and (2) as a formed or permanent attitude of mind. It has been further shown (3) under what influences it is produced, and that, after having acquired a virtue we continue to perform the same acts and to manifest the same activities as those were by which the virtue was first made habitual to us. It has been shown, lastly, that virtue is dependent upon ourselves and voluntary.

[But it must be noticed that the action and the habit are not voluntary in the same sense nor in the same degree, though both are, as has been proved, voluntary. When we perform our actions we know their bearings in every particular, and consequently we have control over them in the purest sense of the term—to do them or not, as we will, from beginning to end. Actions are therefore voluntary in an absolute sense. On the other hand, the 'habit' is not known to the full extent: it is known not through itself, but through the

actions by which it is formed. We thoroughly understand the actions by which the habit is formed, but we cease to understand our actions when consolidated into habit. A precisely similar case occurs with physical debilities. Knowing the character of a particular diet, we consciously adopt it; and weak health imperceptibly follows in its train. A habit, therefore, is called voluntary on account of the activities by which it is formed being voluntary—since, that is, it was possible for us not to have caused those activities.]

We must now proceed at once to enumerate our mental states in specific detail, and show the character of each one, with what emotions of the soul it is concerned, and in what way it is formed. It will be further evident in the course of the discussion what is the number and variety of these moral states.

PART II.—EXAMINATION OF THE VIRTUES.

A.—COURAGE.

i.—The subject-matter of Courage defined.

(*a*) COURAGE IMPLIES FEAR, AND THINGS FEARFUL ARE SYNONYMOUS WITH EVILS.

Courage is concerned with things fearful which are synonymous with evils.

Now it has been already explained that 'Courage' is a mean state in regard to subjects of confidence or fear. What we fear are of course the things which are fearful, and things fearful are, to speak in general terms, evils. Hence philosophers define fear as 'an anticipation of evil.' We fear, in fact, all things that are evils, such as infamy, poverty, disease, loss of friends, and death.

Yet the brave man does not seem to be one who is courageous in face of *every* object of fear. There are certain evils which a man is positively *bound* to fear, and where fearfulness is honourable and bravery would be unseemly bravado, as in the case of infamy. The man who fears infamy is a man of honour and of self-respect: the man who does not shrink from infamy is destitute of all sense of shame; though, by a rhetorical figure, the shameless man is regarded by some people as a daring man, from the correspondence there is between them in that the brave man is, like him, in a sense, devoid of fear.

Poverty, on the other hand, is surely not a thing which a man ought to fear; nor yet illness, nor in fact any of those evils which fall upon a man through no fault of his own nor through his own agency. Nevertheless, the man who is fearless of such evils as these, is not on that account brave; and if we so describe him, it is by a rhetorical figure. There are cases where men are cowards in the crisis of battle, though liberal minded in money matters, and of cheerful countenance in view of financial ruin.

Again, if a man is fearful of outrage upon his wife or children, or of the power of envy, or of other sinister influences, he is not assuredly a coward; nor, on the other hand, is he brave, if he is cheerful when on the point of being flogged.

It was made evident in the course of our previous enumeration of the virtues that the subject-matter of Courage is fear and confidence, and that it is a mean state in reference thereto, going beyond timidity and falling short of rashness. We will now show with what states it stands in contrast.

Now fear is spoken of in relation to things which are fearful; and, in a general sense, all things are fearful that are thought to be evils. Hence, in defining fear, men say that it is 'an expectation of evil.' We fear, in fact, whatever things are evil—disgrace, poverty, disease, friendlessness, death.

But courage does not stand in opposition to *every* object of fear, the brave man not being concerned with every thing that is fearful. The brave man fears only what is it right for him to fear, and it is not right for him to fear all these things, but only some of them. To fear disgrace is honourable, not to fear it disgraceful: the one attitude is that of a man of self-respect, the other that of a shameless man. Still, even the shameless man is called brave by a metaphor, in that he has some of the features of a brave man in not fearing everything, the brave man being one who, in a certain sense, is devoid of fear.

Poverty, on the contrary, it is not right to fear, nor in fact any of those evils which do not befall us through our own fault nor through our own agency. But just as the man who does not fear what he ought to fear is not therefore brave (except by a rhetorical figure), so neither is the man who does not fear what he ought *not* to fear, on that account a brave man, and is only so styled in virtue of a kind of resemblance between the two characters. Many there are who though fearless of such evils as poverty, and of stout hearts in view of the loss of their possessions, are cowards amid the dangers of war.

But just as the man who fears what he ought not to fear is not brave, so neither is the man who does not fear what he ought to fear brave. For instance, the man who does fear outrage upon his wife or children is not a coward, and the man who does not fear such a thing is not brave. Nor again is a man brave if he does not fear but rather is cheerful when upon the point of being flogged. Men are not brave for not fearing what they ought to fear.

(*b*) DESCRIPTION OF THE EVILS WHICH CONCERN THE BRAVE MAN.

What kinds of evils, then, are they, in which a brave man shows his courage? Are they not the evils that are direst and worst? No one is there so capable of sustaining things which are terrible as is the brave man. But of all things terrible death is the worst: it is indeed, the extreme of evils, since to the dead man, as it seems, nothing further can befall, whether good or evil.

Courage is most perfectly manifested in presence of death when death is glorious.

Yet it is not death in any and every form in face of which the brave man would seem to show his courage; not, for example, in face of death at sea, or in sickness. In what kinds of death, then, will his bravery be shown? Must it not be in such as are most glorious? and the most glorious are those which befall in in war, since war involves the greatest and most glorious haza

Corresponding with this idea of perfect bravery are the honours paid to warriors both in free cities and in the Courts of Princes.

A man will be called 'brave,' therefore, in the true and proper sense of the term, when he is fearless in regard to a noble death, or under instant pressure of evils which have death in their train; and such are emphatically the accidents and terrors of war.

Still, even in a storm at sea or in sickness, the brave man is void of fear; yet his courage in a storm is not like that of sailors. The brave man at such times has despaired of safety and is troubled at such a mode of death. Sailors, on the other hand, are confident from the experience which they have had of previous storms. Moreover, the circumstances in which brave men exhibit their courage, are such as give room for prowess and make it glorious to die; but in such disasters as shipwreck or pestilence neither of these conditions is found.

The brave man, therefore, is one who does not fear the worst of evils: no one has such powers of endurance as he. Yet he is not on every occasion courageous to the same degree. There are certain terrors which make even the brave man quail through the mode in which they are brought upon him.

For instance, death is thought to be the last extremity of evil, because it is an end of life, and it is impossible for anything further to betide a man when he is dead, whether good or evil, and therefore it is thought to be the worst and most terrible evil both to the good and also to the evil. But though the death which ensues from disgraceful causes is a thing which the brave man would fear, on the other hand, the death which is brought on by the highest causes, such as that which befalls a man in war, is no longer terrible, but a thing very greatly to be coveted. The death again, which befalls a man in sickness or at sea will be terrible to the brave man, in so far as it has not come upon him on account of some grand cause, but on no account fearful in the proportion in which it is painful.

A man may be called 'brave,' therefore, when he is fearless in regard to a noble death, (or at any rate a death that is not ignoble,) and in regard to the terrors which bring death in their train, coming with sudden visitation upon him, such as are the circumstances of war. The man who is resolute under perils which unexpectedly encompass him, affords manifest proof that he has advanced to a point where courage is habitual and natural to him. When a man endures a death that is noblest for man, then he is brave in the fullest sense of the term. This principle applies also to the case of honours. When honours involve nothing sacred nor permanent, as in the case of honours conferred at the Courts of Tyrants, the brave man will despise them; but when honours are constitutional and just, as they are in well-ordered States, the brave man will covet them.

Sailors are also fearless in regard to death, but not in the same manner as the brave are. Brave men seem to be resolute under such circumstances because they have absolutely despaired of safety; whereas sailors are so because they expect, on the ground of past experience, that they will survive the dangers of the sea. In fact, however, it is impossible to show bravery in the perfect sense of the term under such circumstances as a storm at sea. A man shows true bravery where there is need of vigour or of spirit, and where death is grand and ennobling. But in a storm or in a plague such considerations have no place: death is not then the occasion of any advantage to others, nor can we display any spirit or vigour in face of it.

ii.—Various manifestations of Courage.

(*a*) THE TRUE 'MEAN' OF COURAGE DEFINED.

But what is fearful is not the same under all circumstances, nor to all persons, though of course there is a form of fear which we speak of as 'past human endurance,' and such as would be terrible to any one who was in his right senses. Still, looking to things which are fearful and yet within the limits of endurance, these differ in magnitude and in their relative degrees of intensity, as also do things which inspire confidence. In face even of these the brave man, though dauntless and undaunted, has still the feelings of a man: he will not be unmoved at the sight of things terrible, though his fear will be tempered by regard for the fitness of things and kept within the limits which Reason will allow, his aim being the attainment of honour as the ideal of virtue.

The standard of what is fearful is not an absolute but a relative one, and is determined by Reason.

Yet it is possible to entertain fears of this kind excessively or insufficiently, and again to regard things which are not fearful as though they were. Of the errors committed in these respects, one form arises from the fear being an unworthy one, another from the fear being immoderate, another from its being inopportune, and so on through manifold conditions. The same principle applies to the circumstances upon which we ground confidence.

Causes of moral failure.

That man therefore is a brave man who endures hardship or yields to fear when it is right to do so, though always with a noble motive and to a proper degree and on fitting occasions. Under opposite conditions again he is equally confident. In a word, the brave man is one whose inward feelings and outward actions are in harmony with a true dignity, and with the standard which Right Reason prescribes.

The conduct of the brave man is always conformed to the ideal of Reason.

Now the 'end' of every activity, (in order to be either virtuous or vicious,) must be one which corresponds with the fixed attitude of mind in the agent. To the mind of the brave man the display of his bravery is a source of pride and honour. The 'end' of his every activity, therefore, is a feeling of honour, since the character of every action is determined by its 'end.' It follows that the motive for which the brave man incurs perils, and performs the acts of bravery, is a sense of honour or a feeling of noble pride.

The brave man, therefore, does not always hold the same attitude in rega things which are fearful. Some things are more terrible to some men th

others. Men who are fond of money fear the loss of their possessions above all things; others who care most of all for their reputations, fear disgrace more than anything; and so through many varieties. There are things, again, which are feared in different degrees by different persons or not at all; and there are things which there is no mortal who does *not* fear, as for instance evils which transcend human endurance, like visitations of heaven, earthquakes or inundations of the sea—such things being terrible to all who are in their right mind.

But though the brave man fears, his fear is always fitting and seemly, and in accord with what Reason enjoins, and honour is invariably the motive which actuates him. Honour is regarded by the good man as the principle which should regulate all his personal feelings, and as the 'end' at which all his actions should aim; and accordingly that is the motive which all excellence sets before it.

Yet these calamities of nature do not affect all men with the same degree of fear, some men being more afraid of them than others. Similarly also, the distresses which do not transcend our powers of endurance are not equally terrible to all men, as disgrace, poverty and the like; and the good man will only be afraid of them when it is right to be so, and then only in a proper manner, as has been explained. Herein is the reason why the bad man errs:—he does not fear in a proper manner, nor at a proper season, nor from a proper motive; and similarly in showing confidence he does not do so in a fitting manner nor at a fitting season.

The man, therefore, is a brave man who shows fear or confidence at proper objects and with a proper motive and at a proper time; his fear or confidence being regulated by what is fitting and by the standard which the 'law' or 'idea' of courage lays down. That is in fact the 'end' of every activity in accordance with virtue—that it should be displayed in accordance with the conception of virtue as a formed or permanent state of mind. For example, acts conformable to justice have as their 'end' their being performed in accordance with the conception or standard of Justice as a permanent state of mind. In a general sense, the end of every action whatever that is virtuous, is the realization of a noble ideal (τὸ καλόν). The particular ideal which is before the mind of the brave man is the conception of bravery; that before the mind of the just man, is the conception of justice; and similarly with the other virtues. That indeed is the rationale of all our actions—that they should be brought into conformity with a fixed state of the character. The limitations to which an action conforms (and which constitute its definition or essential notion) are identical with its 'end.' The brave man, therefore, takes his stand within the sphere of what is fitting and seemly.

(*b*) MODES IN WHICH THE IDEAL OF COURAGE IS VITIATED.

Of the characters which pass the limits of this ideal, the man who fails through inability to fear has no distinctive name. [As has been previously explained, there are many aspects of moral character which have no special name.] Such an one must be classed as a kind of madman or as a man devoid of human feelings—if, that is, he fears *nothing*, neither earthquake nor the stormy sea, as they say is the case with the Celts.

Types of moral failure in respect of courage are—
1. Insensibility;

The man again who transgresses in being over-confident in regard to things which are fearful, is reckless; and the reckless man seems to be also a braggart and one who arrogates a claim to bravery which he does not possess. Such an one is anxious to *appear* to the world as resolute

2. Recklessness;

in regard to things fearful as the brave man is in reality: in fact he *poses* in the attitude of a brave man in such points as he can. Hence reckless men are as a rule, for all their courageousness, cowards at heart: though they keep up a reckless mien in times of peril, they never stand the actual shock of danger.

The man again, who errs through excess of fear is a coward. Every mark of cowardice,—unworthy yielding to fear, an extravagant sense of fear, and similar excesses, are all found in such a character. He is at the same time deficient in the feeling of confidence, though he more readily betrays himself in pain and grief. He is therefore destitute, also, of hope, being as he is afraid of *everything*. The brave man is the exact opposite, a feeling of confidence being the mark of a hopeful man. A Coward's.

So then the brave man has the same sphere of action as one who is reckless or a coward; but these opposite characters comport themselves very differently therein. Those who are reckless or cowards go beyond the proper limits or fall short of them, whereas the brave man holds a calm and even tenor. Practical contrasts between Courage and its extremes.

Reckless men, again, are impetuous and precipitate, and before the danger comes they are eager to meet it, yet in the actual crisis they shrink away. On the other hand brave men are swift and keen enough in action, but calm and undemonstrative until it is time to act.

Courage, therefore, is (consistently with the description of it given above) 'a true and virtuous frame of mind in reference to things which are grounds for either confidence or fear' under the limitations which have been already laid down. The courageous man freely makes choice of peril or woe and submits to its consequences, because he has a noble pride in suffering and thinks scorn of a selfish shrinking from the sacrifices of duty.

[But as for courting voluntary death with no motive beyond that of escaping from poverty or love or some other affliction—that is not the part of a brave man but rather of a coward. It is sheer effeminacy to shrink from a thing because it is difficult to bear; and the suicide meets his fate not because he thinks it noble to die, but because he hopes to escape from a present pang.]

Such then are the more characteristic features of courage.

Of those who pass the limits of this ideal, the man who errs by an extravagance of fearlessness, has no distinctive name. [As has been previously explained, there are many aspects of moral character which have no special name.] Such an one may, however, be styled a madman, or one devoid of human feelings if, that is, there is nothing that he fears, not even earthquake or stormy sea, as they say the case is with the Celts.

The man, again, who, though in a less degree, transgresses in being over-confident in regard to things which are fearful, is reckless; and the reckless man seems to be also a braggart and one who arrogates a claim to bravery which he does not possess. In fact he only *shams* to be brave: he is anxious only to appear in the eyes of the world as resolute as the brave man really is, and he *poses* in the attitude of a brave man in such points as he is able. Hence reckless men are, as a rule, cowards at heart: though they keep up a reckless mien in critical times, they never stand the actual shock of danger.

The man, again, who errs through excess of fear is a coward, because he fears objects unworthy of fear, and that to an excessive degree. He is at the same time deficient in the feeling of confidence and extravagant in his griefs, and despondings withal, as fearful of everything. The brave man is the exact opposite: he is a man of hopeful temperament, his confidence being derived from his hoping ever for what is good.

So then the brave man has the same sphere of action as the man who is reckless, and the coward,—the sphere of what causes confidence or fear. But their relations therein are not identical, and they comport themselves very differently therein. Those who are reckless or cowards go beyond the line or fall short of it, whereas the brave man holds a calm and even tenor of life, and remains firm to the standard of what is fitting.

Reckless men, again, are impetuous and precipitate, and before dangers come rush out to meet them, and are exceedingly solicitous of troubles to overcome; but when they find themselves in the midst thereof, they rush away with a bound. Brave men show just the opposite temperament: in the actual crisis they are swift and keen of purpose, but till the moment of action comes they keep quiet.

Courage, therefore, is (consistently with the definition of it given above) 'a true and equable frame of mind in reference to things which inspire fear or confidence' in accord with an ideal standard. The courageous man makes his choice of peril and woe, and submits to the consequences involved, because he feels a noble pride in suffering for righteousness' sake, and thinks scorn of any shrinking from the sacrifices which duty demands.

[But as for being desirous of meeting death on account of poverty or love—that is not a mark of courage but rather of cowardice. To try to avoid a thing because it is hard to bear—that is a mark of effeminacy and moral emptiness. Those who adopt such a death as that of the suicide, do not do so because it is noble, but because it is a relief from an evil which they are not able to bear; and such a frame of mind is an indication of cowardice.]

Such then are the more general features of Courage.

iii.—Five less-perfect forms of Courage.

A.—THE COURAGE OF SELF-INTEREST.

There are yet other forms of courage as they are reputed to be, which fall under five groups, the first being the Courage inspired by society. This form has the nearest resemblance to true courage.

The courage of selfishness approximates to true courage, though its motive is mere regard for consequences rather than the ideal of a true dignity.

Now it would seem that the motives for which the citizens undergo dangers are the penalties inflicted by the laws upon cowards and the taunts of their fellows and, withal, the honours to be won by bravery. Hence men appear to be the bravest in states where cowards are visited with infamy and brave men are in high esteem. Such is the feeling which inspires the

heroes whom Homer paints—Diomede for example, or Hector, who says

> 'First will Polydamas hurl scornful reproaches upon me;'

and Diomede says,

> 'Hector in time to come will say of me haranguing among the Trojans:
> Tydides by my hand....'

This kind of bravery has a very close resemblance to the true courage described above, inasmuch as its actuating motive is a virtuous one:—it is inspired, that is, by a sense of shame and by a yearning for what is noble in the form of honour, and by a shrinking from reproach as from a thing disgraceful.

We may also range under the same category soldiers forced by their commanders to be brave; but such men are inferior to the former, inasmuch as they do not act bravely from a sense of shame, but through physical fear, and it is not the disgrace, but the penalty of cowardice which they shun. Such men are literally *forced* by their officers to be brave, as by the menace which Hector employs—

The vulgar courage of physical constraint must be classed under this head.

> 'Whomsoever I espy shirking in the rear of the fight,
> Nought shall avail him to escape the dogs.'

Such also is the practice of those who lead the lines, since they strike their men if they begin to waver; and such too is the intention of officers who range their men in front of trenches and similar outposts: they all strive to make their soldiers brave of necessity. Yet to be truly brave a man should be so not from compulsion, but actuated by a sense of noble pride.

There are yet other forms of Courage, so reputed, which fall under five heads. The first of these is the courage inspired by society, in virtue whereof the citizens encounter dangers on behalf of the state, in view of the penalties inflicted by the laws on cowardice, and of the taunts of their fellows and of the honours conferred on the brave. Men seem indeed to be bravest in states where cowards are visited with infamy, and brave men are in high esteem. Such is the character of those of whom Homer sings in his poems, for example Diomede, or Hector, who says—

> 'First will Polydamas hurl scornful reproaches upon me;'

and Diomede says,

> 'Hector in time to come will say of me haranguing among the Trojans:
> Tydides by my hand....'

This kind of courage resembles the true courage described above, inasmuch as its motive is in a way a virtuous one (just as the motive of true courage is a noble pride). The citizens act bravely from a sense of shame and a yearning for what is noble, and to avoid reproach as a thing disgraceful: the consideration which moves them to encounter dangers is a feeling of respect for the laws and of yearning for distinction.

Inferior to this form of bravery is that which those exhibit who are compelled

by their generals to encounter hardships, and to behave themselves resolutely in face of dangers. It is inferior to that form of courage which comes from the action of society, inasmuch as it arises from the influences of fear and not from love of good: those who show courage of this pattern do so to avoid the pain rather than the disgrace of cowardice. They are brave because they are literally compelled to be so by their officers, as may be seen in the menaces which Hector uses:

> 'Whomsoever I espy shirking in the rear of the fight,
> Nought shall avail him to escape the dogs . . . .'

Even though the generals be not themselves present to enforce their warnings and personally compel their soldiers to endure perils, yet they effect the same result by inspiring them with terror of conduct through which their comrades have often been scourged for abandoning their ranks. Thus, they seem to be brave from necessity; but to be truly brave a man ought to choose bravery of his own free will—not from necessity, but because it is a noble thing to be brave.

B.—THE COURAGE OF EXPERIENCE.

The experience which a man has in respect of special dangers seems also to be a form of courage; and it was under this idea that Socrates thought courage to be a science.

Practical knowledge, like that of trained soldiers, gives a conscious superiority which may easily be mistaken for real courage.

There are many instances of this type of courage, the most prominent being that of soldiers versed in the perils of war. These perils are often only idle panics, and soldiers are perfectly aware of their real import. Hence soldiers appear to be pre-eminently brave, simply because others are not aware what is the nature of the perils which they really run. Moreover, in consequence of their experience, soldiers are better able than others to cause injury to their enemies and to escape from retaliation themselves, as well from the facility with which they can use their weapons as from the fact that they are furnished with resources such as are best calculated to inflict damage upon their foes and ensure immunity for themselves.

Men such as these contend with their rivals as men who have armed themselves do with men unarmed, and as athletes do with undisciplined competitors. In such contests of course it is not the bravest who are most successful in fighting, but those who have the strongest physique and whose bodies have been most perfectly trained.

Yet even soldiers turn cowards when the peril is overwhelming, and they are outstripped in numbers and equipment. Under such circumstances tried soldiers are the first to turn their backs, while citizen-soldiers hold their ground and die on the spot—a case which literally occurred at the Hermæon. To the mind of citizens flight is disgraceful under any circum-

The test of genuine courage is when sacrifice or death is involved.

stances, and death is preferable to a safety which flight has purchased. As for the professional soldiers, on the other hand, though at the outset they braved the danger in the belief of their superiority, no sooner were they conscious of their weakness than they took to flight, being more afraid of death than of disgrace. The brave man is incapable of acting like that.

The experience also which a man has of the circumstances of special dangers seems also to be a form of courage; and hence with this idea in his mind Socrates considered Courage to be a Science.

Different men who are skilled in different ways may be said to be brave in respect of the matters of their special experience, and most especially soldiers in the affairs of war. Some of the perils of war seem to be only idle panics of which trained soldiers thoroughly understand the significance; and since other men do not know what the dangers are in which they are involved, soldiers are thought to be pre-eminently brave. In consequence of their special experience they are able to handle their adversaries roughly without suffering aught themselves at their hands—to ward off darts and spears from themselves, and to strike their foes with ease, in consequence of being able to use their weapons skilfully and of having weapons such as would prove adapted as well for smiting their foes as for avoiding the infliction of any damage to themselves. They fight, in fact, as men who have armed themselves do against those who are defenceless. In such contests it is not those of greatest courage who are most warlike, but those who are physically strongest and who have their limbs best trained and who are superior in point of experience.

Yet even trained soldiers turn out cowards at times when the peril is overwhelming and they are overmatched in numbers and equipment: those who know the extent of such a danger are the first to flee. On the other hand, those who are brave according to the citizens' standard of bravery hold their ground in such crises and perish on the spot:—a case which literally occurred at the Hermæum. The trained bands who were ranged on the side of the citizens took flight when they perceived that the danger which menaced them was overpowering, while the citizens themselves stayed and were slain, since death appeared to them more desirable than a safety purchased by flight. The soldiers continued resolute so long as they believed themselves superior to, and more numerous than their adversaries; but so soon as they saw that they were inferior and less numerous, they fled, since they were more afraid of death than of dishonour. The truly brave man is of a very different temper to *that*.

C.—THE COURAGE OF IMPULSE.

Men also bring impulse under the category of courage. It is thought that men are brave when they are roused by passion and rush upon their foes, as wild beasts do upon those who have wounded them; and certainly brave men are passionate, passion being the strongest spur to the encounter of danger. Hence the expressions which Homer uses:

Animal courage or high spirit is often a substratum of true courage.

> "He gathered strength through passion."
> "He roused up strength and passion."
> "Fierce strength ran through his nostrils."
> "His blood boiled over."

All such expressions seem to indicate the rousing of passion and the swift rush of desire.

Now all that brave men do is inspired by a motive of honour, and passion tends to strengthen this motive in their case. Animals on the other hand are influenced only by pain:—they are only roused because they have been wounded, or because they are in fear, since otherwise, if, that is, they remain in their native woods or marshes, they attack no one. Consequently, though animals rush to meet danger when spurred on by pain or passion, without foresight of the perils which are before them, they are not therefore brave; otherwise even asses when hungry would be 'brave,' since they do not desist from grazing for all the blows they get. In the same sense adulterers would be brave, since they do many reckless things for the gratification of their passions.

But passion *per se* lacks the true motive of perfect courage.

The conclusion is, that actions are not truly brave when done under the excitement of grief or passion which spur men on to the point of danger. Still courage of this kind, excited by anger or passion, seems to be most natural and characteristic of man; and if it be associated with a definite purpose and a true final cause, then it is real courage.

It is only moral when associated with a right purpose — *i.e.*, with what is 'noble.'

Again, when men are under the influence of passion they are in pain, and when they vent their vengeance they are glad; yet if they fight only for such motives as these, they may be warlike and bold, but they are not brave: they do not act with a view to honour nor to attain to the standard which Reason prescribes, but to gratify a momentary feeling. Still the attitude of mind which they show is one of close resemblance to true courage.

Passion is also called courage among certain people: men receive the title of brave men when they rush like wild beasts upon those who have injured them. Brave men are in fact passionate, passion being an impulsive tendency to face dangers, and hence the expressions which Homer uses:

"He gathered strength through passion."
"He roused up strength and passion."
"Fierce strength glowed through his nostrils."
"His blood boiled over."

All expressions of this character seem to indicate the rousing of passion and the swift rush of anger. The brave man, however, has a noble motive in all that he does, and is in no sense drawn about by passion, though he uses passion as a fellow-worker, or as it were an instrument.

On the other hand, those who are called brave on the score of the impetuosity of their passion, act not from a motive of honour, but under the influence of pain. Such is the way in which beasts act, from being wounded or frightened, not employing passion to effect their purpose, but rather being dragged along by it: before they have been struck or affrighted they display no kind of impetuosity—so long as they remain in their native woods or marshes, they attack no one nor make any spring against any one.

A man, therefore, is not brave who rushes to meet danger under the influence

of pain, or because passion or some other strong emotion is bestirring him, and is thus in no way prescient of the dangers which are before him. Otherwise, on that other supposition, even asses might fairly be called brave when they are hungry, since for all the blows they get, they do not desist from grazing. Adulterers, again, do many deeds of hardihood to gratify their lusts. Yet neither asses nor men are brave who are impelled to face danger by pain or passion, or other strong emotion.

Courage, therefore, only takes its most characteristic and absolute form in cases where, though we are in the first instance roused by a feeling of passion, yet that passion is combined with rational volition and has a noble end in view. Those who are incensed by such considerations as those which I have described are not brave men though they may be warlike, since they are not impetuous nor roused to anger for the sake of honour, but to gratify their feelings: they do not act according to a proper fitness nor in the way that Right Reason requires, but just as their feelings may move them.

D.—THE COURAGE OF SELF-CONFIDENCE.

The courage of the over-sanguine is simply a disbelief in danger, or underrating of it.

Neither surely are those who are sanguine therefore brave. The reason of their feeling confident in the midst of peril is not bravery, but the fact that they have conquered many a foe in times past. There is a correspondence, however, between men who are brave and men who are sanguine: they are both of them confident—only that the confidence of brave men is due to the motives enumerated above, whereas that of sanguine men is due to the belief they have that they are superior to their foes and will receive no hurt from them in turn. Of a similar kind is the confidence shown by men who are drunk and who rise to extravagant assurance, yet take to flight so soon as ever things take an adverse turn.

An unexpected crisis will show how unreal the courage of the sanguine man is.

But it was shown to be the characteristic of a brave man to be steadfast under evils which are evils indeed and which are felt to be such—because it is noble to bear affliction and ignoble to shrink from it. It seems therefore to be proof of a more perfect courage for a man to be calm and undaunted in unexpected crises rather than in those which are foreseen—either because firmness of mind under such circumstances comes more necessarily from a confirmed state of mind, or, in other words, because it implies less of preparation. As for things which can be anticipated, any one might form a plan to meet them by calculation of chances or rational forethought. Unexpected trials, on the other hand, are decided by the general bias of a man's character.

Sanguine men are also thought to be brave, but that is not always the fact. It is possible for men to be sanguine, not because they do not fear what is painful in view of what is noble, but because they have ofttimes conquered many a foe and are consequently confident that they will not eventually succumb to mis-

fortunes. They are, however, thought to be brave because they resemble brave men in respect of the confidence they feel; but brave men are confident for those noble motives which have been enumerated, whereas merely sanguine men are confident simply from the belief they have that they will not suffer any disaster. For similar reasons men who are drunken are confident because they fancy that everything will turn out agreeably to their wishes; and hence it is that when they encounter issues contrary to what they had expected, they rush away in revulsion. The man who is truly brave, on the contrary, bears calamity steadfastly as well when it is coming upon him as when it is palpable to his senses, because he knows it to be a noble thing to bear affliction and ignoble to shrink from it. Consequently among brave men he is more brave than others who is calm and undaunted in the midst of sudden crises rather than in such as are perfectly foreseen and before his very eyes. In the one case a man will have to bear painful things which he has counted upon beforehand, and for which he has prepared himself by previous calculation and judgment. In the other case—when, that is, a man bears evils which he has not foreseen when they come upon him, it is evident that he has attained to a formed and permanent state of courage.

E.—THE COURAGE OF IGNORANCE.

The courage of ignorance is simply illusion and foolhardiness.

Men who act in ignorance of their danger also appear to be brave; and their case is not far different from that of the over-sanguine. Those, however, who are 'ignorantly brave' are inferior to sanguine men because they have no real conception of their danger as the sanguine have. Hence it is that sanguine men hold their ground for some time, whereas those who are 'brave in ignorance' flee away the moment they discover that matters are different to what they expected. Such a revulsion from confidence to fear may be illustrated by the case of the Argives when they charged the Lacedemonians under the impression that they were Sicyonians.

So much may suffice as a description of men who are brave only in appearance in contrast to those who are brave in reality.

Men are also called 'brave' when they rush into dangers through ignorance of the evils which are likely to beset them therein. Such men differ only slightly from the over-sanguine except in so far as that the sanguine stand the shock of danger for a considerable time, whereas those who are 'ignorantly brave' flee away as soon as ever they learn their danger. Such was the predicament of the Argives when, a little while ago, they made a charge upon the Lacedemonians under the impression that they were Sicyonians.

It has now been shown who are brave in reality and who only in appearance.

iv.—Some Characteristics of real Courage.

(*a*) THE SPECIAL SPHERE OF COURAGE IS THAT OF FEAR AND PAIN.

Now though Courage is concerned as well with matters of confidence as of fear, it is not concerned with both to the same

extent nor in the same manner: its peculiar sphere is that of things which are fearful. A man who is calm in danger and whose resolution is fixed to face it, is more truly brave than one who preserves a fitting attitude only in matters of confidence.

Courage has a special relation to fear and pain.

The grounds, therefore, upon which men are specially entitled to be called brave are their capabilities for enduring things that are painful, as has been shown. Courage itself is consequently a painful thing, and praise is rightly bestowed upon it on that account, since it is more difficult to endure positive pain than it is to dispense with a possible pleasure.

Now though Courage is concerned as well with matters of confidence as of alarm, it is not concerned with both to the same extent nor in the same manner: its peculiar sphere is that of things which are painful. A man who is calm in danger is more truly brave than one who is steady in circumstances of confidence. The inward struggle in matters of fear is greater than that in matters of confidence:—to endure pain is a more difficult task than to dispense with pleasure. Hence courage is painful because men who endure painful things are brave; and on this account courage is praised of all.

(*b*) THE EXTENT OF A MAN'S BRAVERY MEASURED BY THE EXTENT OF HIS SACRIFICE.

Nevertheless it would appear that the 'end' attained by Courage is a pleasurable one, though the pleasure be overclouded by the circumstances of pain which envelope it. This is a result which may be seen to occur even in athletic games. The 'end'—the meed for which the wrestlers strive (the crown and the honours) is sweet enough, yet, as even wrestlers are flesh and blood, it is painful for them to be buffeted, and distressing too, as indeed is the whole struggle. Inasmuch, therefore, as the accessories of pain are numerous, and the purpose or 'end' of the contest is but a slight one, it seems to have no sweetness in it.

Still the self-sacrifice of the brave man has a sweetness all its own.

If therefore the case in regard to courage is of a similar nature, death and wounds will be painful to the brave man even in spite of himself; still he endures them because endurance is glory and cowardice is disgrace. The pain in fact which the brave man will experience at death will be all the greater in proportion to the fulness of his virtue and the completeness of his happiness. To a man of his stamp more than to anyone else life is worth the living, and by his self-sacrifice he is deprived of the greatest blessings, and he knows it—and hence the bitterness of his fate.

Though the bitterness of death is keener to the brave man than to any one else, yet the overmastering sense of moral fitness nerves him to endure the worst.

Yet he is none the less a brave man for this inward pang; nay, he is even more so, since he voluntarily chooses the glory that is purchased in war in preference to all other advantages.

Courage, therefore, is one of those virtues which it is not possible to practise with a sense of pleasure except in so far as the brave man 'realizes his end,' and finds his satisfaction therein.

[But as for mere fighting, there is no reason why the best soldiers should not be men who are *not* brave with this ideal bravery, but are less nobly brave in heart and have besides no good things to lose; common soldiers being willing to barter away their lives for very scant rewards.]

Here we must end our examination of Courage. After the explanations above given it will not be difficult to comprehend, at least in outline, what its real nature is.

Now although the brave man has a kind of pleasure in his bravery in consequence of the 'end' which he attains thereby being a pleasant end; yet still it so happens that this pleasure is overclouded and obscured by the painful accessories by which it is environed.

A similar case is found in gymnastic conflicts. The 'end' which is set before the wrestlers—the crown and the honours, is a pleasant one; but as wrestlers are only flesh and blood, it is painful for them to be buffeted: indeed to men of that class the whole struggle is a painful one. Since then the incidents of pain are grievous, and the element of pleasure only slight, they seem to have nothing that is pleasurable from the contest. Precisely the same is the fate which befalls brave men. Death and wounds are painful to them, and consequently also in despite of their own wills; still they submit to their fate because endurance is glorious, and a shrinking from hardship ignoble. Even more grievous do such things appear in proportion as those who incur them are good and brave and happy and have pursued every form of virtue. To men of that stamp death is peculiarly painful because life is to them of an exceeding worth, from the fact of their own life being most excellent and attaining to the true fitness of their manhood, and because these are manifold blessings of which death will deprive them.

In consequence, therefore, of the vastness of these painful surroundings, it seems as though the brave man had no kind of pleasure; and though a man grieve and be distressed at these circumstances, there is nothing in that inconsistent with his being still a brave man. To be overpowered by such influences and to yield to the pressure of pain—that is conduct of which the brave man is incapable; whereas to be grieved and feel inward pain, that is but natural for him. The more grief he feels while still steadfastly, for all his grief, bearing up his courage for the sake of a noble end, the more perfectly is he a man brave in the true sense of the term. In fact, in all the other virtues, there is no single form in which they can be exercised that is pleasurable in its own right: it only seems to be pleasurable to the imagination of the man who is actuated by such a motive because it tends to an end which is a noble one.

But as for simple fighting, there is surely no extreme necessity why we should seek for an exact definition of courage to be realized in common soldiers. More serviceable than the genuinely brave, for purposes of war, are men who do not possess any strong element of courage, and who are entirely destitute of worldly advantages: such men are more ready to face dangers, and freely sacrifice their lives in return for trifling gains. Men on the other hand who are brave in the perfect sense of the term, being as they must be, of sound sense and of a general

excellence and worth, take delight in their own existence as being a noble one, and are extremely reluctant to cast it away.

Here we may conclude our examination of Courage. From the description which we have given it will be easy to construct a formal definition of it, at any rate in outline.

B.—TEMPERANCE.

1.—The subject-matter of Temperance defined.

(*a*) THE SPHERE OF TEMPERANCE THAT OF PLEASURE OF BODY.

The subject of which we must treat next to Courage is Temperance, these two being, as it would seem, the virtues of those parts of our nature which are devoid of Reason.

Temperance, like Courage, is a control of the feelings, but is more concerned with pleasures than with pains,

As has been already shown, Temperance is a middle state of mind in regard to pleasures, though to a less degree and in a different sense it is also concerned with pains. Obviously also, its opposite, intemperance, is displayed in the same sphere.

But what precisely those pleasures are with which Temperance is concerned, we have now to discriminate.

A distinction must be at once drawn between pleasures of the body and pleasures of the mind. Among pleasures of the mind there are, for example, love of honour and love of knowledge, whose votaries *delight* in the pursuits of which they are enamoured, but their delight is not at all a bodily sensation, but on the contrary a purely mental one.

and with pleasures of the *body* rather than with pleasures of the mind.

Now those who are devoted to purely rational pleasures of this kind are not called either 'temperate' or 'intemperate;' nor, for similar reasons, are they who follow other pleasures which are not sensual. When, for example, men are fond of romances or of history, or spend their time upon the passing incidents of the hour, we call them triflers and idlers, but not intemperate; nor, again, do we call men intemperate when they are whelmed in grief for the loss of money or of friends.

The subject of which we must now treat is that of Temperance. In a kind of way this is coordinate with that of Courage, inasmuch as they are both concerned with the irrational part of our nature.

As has been already shown, Temperance is a virtuous attitude of mind in regard to pleasures. (I say 'in regard to pleasures' because, though it is also concerned with pains, yet it is so to a less extent and not in the same sense as it is with pleasures.) Obviously intemperance is also manifested in the same sphere.

It may then be assumed that the province in which Temperance is displayed is that of the pleasures. We must now determine what precisely those pleasures are, some pleasures being bodily, others spiritual. Spiritual pleasures are found in love of honour or love of knowledge: the ambitious man and the student both feel pleasure in the objects which they love, though the body does not experience any sensation therein, but simply the mind. Men who find pleasure in such pursuits are not called either temperate or dissolute; and for similar reasons neither are those who find their pleasure in other interests which are not sensual. We call those who are fond of romance and of stories, and who spend their days upon the topics of the hour, loiterers and idlers, but by no means dissolute; nor again, do we call men dissolute when whelmed in grief for the loss of their property or of their friends when they are deprived of the one, or bereaved of the other.

(*b*) BUT THERE ARE CERTAIN BODILY PLEASURES EXCLUDED FROM THE SPHERE OF TEMPERANCE.

It is then the pleasures of the body which form the sphere within which Temperance is displayed; but this province must be further narrowed by the exclusion of certain bodily sensations.

Yet even bodily pleasures are, in certain cases, out of the range of temperance, *e.g.*, 1. The pleasures of sight.

1. When men feel pleasure in the impressions which come through the sight, beautiful colours and forms and paintings, they are not called either temperate or intemperate for so doing; although it would seem possible even in these pleasures to maintain a proper moderation, or to give them an insufficient or else an undue prominence.

2. The pleasures of sound.

2. Again, in pleasures which come through hearing the same truth holds good. We do not call men 'intemperate' who take extravagant delight in music or in acting, nor yet 'temperate' though their pleasure therein be moderate and right.

3. The pleasures of scent (except where associated with other pleasures which need control).

3. Nor, again, do we call those who take pleasure in indulging the sense of smell, either temperate or intemperate—except through its accidental associations; for example, we do not call men intemperate for delighting in the sweet fragrance of fruit or of roses or of incense, but rather those whose delight is in unguents and condiments, these latter being the things in which intemperate men delight, since by such means a recollection is aroused within them of the things for which their passions crave.

In support of this view of smelling, one may see men of different temperaments all delighting in the odour of food when they are hungry; yet to delight in such odours is, pro tanto, a sign of a sensuous nature, savoury smells being desired by the sensual

man for their own sake. But among animals generally there is no pleasure arising from these sensations, except through accidental associations. Dogs do not delight in the scent of hares but in the eating of them, though the scent has created an appetite. Nor does the lion rejoice at the lowing of the ox, but at the banquet of his flesh: by its lowing he has become aware that the ox is near, and hence seems to rejoice at the mere sound. Similarly the lion does not rejoice at having seen or found stag or wild goat, except in the belief that he will gain a feast thereby.

Temperance, therefore, is not concerned with pleasures of the mind, but with the pleasures of the body. But even certain bodily pleasures are excluded from its range. Those, for instance, who delight in things which are pleasant to behold, beautiful colours or drawings or paintings, are not called either temperate or intemperate; nor are they who are enamoured of certain sounds or musical airs, nor are they who love sweet smells. Yet in regard to all these matters there are states of mind which are ideally best and fitting, and there are states which go beyond or fall short of a perfect standard; but, notwithstanding, we do not call those who preserve the ideal mean 'temperate,' nor those who violate that mean 'intemperate.'

In regard, however, to the pleasures connected with smelling, if we delight in the fragrance of apples or of roses or of incense, we are not called intemperate. If on the other hand we delight in the odours of ointments and condiments, we are called intemperate; but even then only from accidental associations—since, that is, these are things in which intemperate men delight because, by means thereof, a recollection is aroused within them of things for which their passions crave.

One may see, indeed, that all men, not only the intemperate, delight in the smell of food when they are hungry. Hence it is clear that those who take pleasure in smells of that kind, only find their pleasure therein from accidental associations—because, that is, a recollection is awakened within them of the food and trifles generally in which sensual men delight.

Neither in man, therefore, nor in any living creature is there any pleasure consequent upon the exercise of the senses enumerated above, except from casual associations. (I am now referring to pleasures in which the temperate and the dissolute man display themselves.) Dogs, for example, though they delight in the smell of hares, yet that is not for the sake of the scent simply, but in view of food foreseen: they pursue because they have gained from the scent an instinct of preying. Similarly the lion does not delight in the scent or the lowing of the ox, but in the eating of his flesh: only he perceives from the lowing, that his prey is near. He does not delight simply that he has seen or found a stag or wild goat, but because he will gain food thereby.

(*c*) TEMPERANCE IS *SPECIALLY* CONCERNED WITH THE PLEASURES OF TOUCH AND TASTE.

The conclusion is that the pleasures with which temperance and intemperance are specially concerned, are those bodily pleasures which all living creatures share with men, and which are consequently admitted to be slavish and bestial—the pleasures, that is, of touch and of taste.

The sensations in regard to which temperance is specially necessary, are those of touch and taste;

Practically, however, men are found to indulge

the sense of taste only to a slight extent or not at all. Taste is the determination of questions of flavour, and is used chiefly by those who have to taste wines or season dishes. But men do not generally take delight in mere tasting, certainly not those who are sensual, but rather in that full enjoyment which comes entirely through touch, and is experienced in eating and drinking, and in the so-called 'pleasures of love.' Hence the wish which the noted epicure Philoxenus the son of Eryxis uttered, that 'his throat might become longer than that of a crane'—such was the delight he took in the pleasures of touch.

though taste is far less the occasion of temptation than touch.

Now this sense of touch, from the indulgence of which intemperance arises, is the most widely diffused of all the senses; and rightly does it seem to be stigmatised, because it does not belong to us so far as we are men, but so far as we are animals. To take delight in pleasures of this kind and to cherish them exceedingly, is simply the sign of a brutal nature. [But of course such of the pleasures of touch as are really liberal, are exempted from this condemnation; as, for instance, the pleasure felt in the gymnasia from rubbing and heating. The touch from which the intemperate man derives pleasure does not extend to the whole body, but only to certain parts of it.]

Touch is the most widely diffused of all the senses; but the pleasure it gives is of all pleasures least worthy of man.

The pleasures, therefore, with which temperance and intemperance are concerned are the pleasures which we share with all living creatures—the pleasures, that is, of touch and taste. Intemperate men are, therefore, seen to be of a bestial and slavish nature—in that they weakly yield to allurements in which wild beasts find their pleasure.

Generally, however, they find their pleasure in touch rather than in taste: perhaps, indeed, it were more correct to say that they do not delight in taste at all, but simply in touch. Men are not intemperate simply for taking delight in pleasures generally, but for their delight in eating and drinking. They do not delight in such things as things to be *tasted* (the proper business of tasting being to discriminate flavours, a thing chiefly done by those who test the quality of wines and prepare seasoned dishes), but rather as things to be *touched*. Hence, the wish which that noted epicure Philoxenus, the son of Eryxis, uttered, that 'his throat might become longer than a crane's,'—such was the pleasure he experienced in the touch of his favourite relishes.

Among all the senses, that of touch is the one most widely diffused: it is, in fact, by a kind of touch that all the senses arouse our consciousness. It is therefore this sense of touch that forms the special province wherein sensuality is displayed: and rightly does it seem to be stigmatised because it belongs to us, not in so far as we are men, but in so far as we are brutes. To delight in pleasures of such a type, and to covet them above all things, is the sign of a bestial nature. [Still, there are certain liberal pleasures, even in respect of touch, of which the sensual man deprives himself: such are the pleasures which are experienced in the gymnasia through rubbing and heating. The pleasure of the dissolute man is not diffused throughout his body, but is confined to certain parts.]

ii.—Various Manifestations of Temperance.

(*a*) TEMPERANCE VIEWED IN RELATION TO PLEASURES AND DESIRES.

Among our desires there are some which seem to be common to all men, and others which seem to be special to individuals and acquired.

The sensations which temperance has to control are either (1) natural, or (2) acquired.

As an instance of our common desires there is the natural craving for food. Every one when exhausted desires food either to eat or to drink, and at times both; and, as Homer says, those who are young and vigorous need rest and repose. But as for the particular food which different men require under different circumstances—that is another matter, men's tastes being as different as their needs: hence, each man thinks that a particular kind is specially 'his own.' Nevertheless, certain things are natural and universal: though particular things are pleasant to particular persons, there are certain things which *all* men feel to be more pleasurable than ordinary things are.

In regard, however, to the common desires of nature few men err, and then, only in one respect—that of excessive indulgence. To swallow anything which comes to hand, or to drink until one is overcharged, is to violate the law of nature by satiety, natural desires being the satisfying of *real* wants. Hence, gluttons are called 'slaves of their belly,' since they try to fill it beyond what is due—such the degradation to which men of thoroughly slavish tastes are brought.

(1.) Natural desires are innocent except when indulged to extravagant excess.

On the other hand, in regard to the pleasures special to individuals, many are they who err, and manifold the occasions thereof. The reasons why men are called 'lovers of pleasure' being, either that they delight in what they ought not, or that they indulge themselves extravagantly or in improper modes, or that they follow the multitude to evil ——— in all and each of these particulars, the intemperate fall into error: they take pleasure in things which they ought not, as being things which are hateful, and, where there are objects in which they may lawfully take pleasure, they indulge themselves to an extravagant extent, and as foolishly as do the multitude.

(2.) Desires which as individuals we acquire for ourselves, are as manifold as are the forms of sin.

It is clear, therefore, that intemperance is an excess in reference to pleasures, and a thing which is morally censurable.

But since we have in natural sequence to treat of the desires, we must explain in what senses the term 'desire' is used.

One form of desire is common to all men, and natural; another form is special to individuals, and acquired. An instance of a common desire is the striving for sustenance, either solid or liquid, when we find ourselves in need thereof. An instance of a special or acquired desire is the striving after some particular kind of sustenance in preference to any other. This latter case—that of individual striving after a particular thing—is neither natural nor universal. All men do not strive after the same things, nor to the same extent: some men yearn for one thing, some for another; and those who strive after the same objects do not do so to the same extent, but some are more intently eager than others. Hence a desire of this kind is not universal nor natural, in the absolute sense of the term, but acquired and formed from ideas which we have ourselves adopted. Still, in a certain sense, even an acquired desire is natural to a man, inasmuch as every man forms desires in a way that is consequent on the bias of his own nature.

In regard, however, to natural desires, there are few who err therein, and then only in a single way—when they indulge desires of this kind to an extent in excess of what is fitting; when, for example, they eat more than is sufficient, as gluttons do who gorge their natural appetites beyond what is fitting. Such is the state to which men of brutal tastes are reduced.

On the other hand, in the case of desires which are personal and acquired, many are they who err, and many the forms their error takes. There are indeed many varieties of food and of drink and of clothing, and of other things which are naturally objects of desire; and hence there are many ways in which men err in regard to desires of this kind, whether by taking pleasure in improper objects, or doing so to a greater degree than the majority. Now sensual men err in each and all of these particulars. Since they take pleasure in improper objects, though on occasions they may make choice of such pleasures as are seemly, they indulge in them to an extent beyond what is fitting, or what public opinion approves.

It is clear, then, that Intemperance is an excess in regard to pleasures, and a thing that is morally censurable.

(*b*) TEMPERANCE VIEWED IN RELATION TO PAIN.

Pain is the concomitant of intemperance, as being an insatiable yearning for pleasure.

In regard to pains, on the other hand, the attitude of the temperate man is different from that of the brave man: a man is not called temperate on the ground of his enduring pain, nor intemperate from want of endurance; but he is intemperate from the grief he feels in failing to attain to what is pleasant (pleasure being the cause which produces the pain in him), and he is temperate if he does not grieve at the privation of pleasure and at the self-restraint involved.

So then the intemperate man is one who yearns for all pleasures or for such as are most vivid, and is driven along by his passion so as to choose his own gratification above all things. Hence he is positively pained as well when he is debarred from pleasure as when he is yearning for it—appetite being attended with pain. Yet it seems a marvellous thing that a man should feel pain for the sake of pleasure.

In regard to pains, on the other hand, the case of Temperance is not parallel to that of cowardice and bravery (cowardice consisting, as was shown, in not

submitting to hardships nor brooking it): Temperance is not the bearing of pain nor is intemperance a shrinking from pain. But intemperance is shown in regard to pains when a man grieves, at failing to attain what is pleasant, to an extravagant degree and in an improper manner; and, conversely, temperance is shown when a man grieves thereat only so far as is right and shows his grief only at proper objects and in a proper manner, and when the absence of pleasant things causes him no kind of pain. The sensual man yearns after everything that is pleasant or what is most vividly so, and is led about by his desires, so that he chooses things which are pleasant in preference to everything else. Consequently he feels pain in being deprived of things upon which he has set his heart, desire being attended with pain. It seems thus a marvellous thing that a man should feel pain in a matter of pleasure, and that pleasure should be the cause of its opposite!

Temperance, therefore, is an excess in regard to pleasure, as has been shown.

(*c*) ASCETICISM AN UNDUE AVOIDANCE OF PLEASURE.

As for men falling short in regard to pleasures, and taking less delight therein than is natural—such a class is absolutely unknown. Asceticism of this extreme kind is, indeed, contrary to human nature: even irrational creatures distinguish their food, taking pleasure in one kind and rejecting another. If there be a man to whom nothing is sweet, and to whom one taste is not different from another, such an one would be far from being a man. But such a class has not met with a special name, since, practically, it does not exist.

Voluntary abstinence from such pleasures as are lawful is contrary to the instincts of our human nature, and is practically impossible.

The corresponding defect has no name to distinguish it, since it is absolutely unknown in fact. As for men being deficient in matters of pleasure and desiring pleasure less than is fitting, such a class simply does not exist. Asceticism of this extreme type is, in fact, outside the pale of human nature: even irrational animals distinguish between different kinds of food, delighting in what is pleasant and loathing what is unpleasant. If there be anyone who thinks nothing sweet, nor recognises any distinction between what is pleasant and what is unpleasant, such an one will be far from being a man.

Defect and excess in regard to pleasures, then, are both alike morally faulty.

(*d*) CHARACTERISTICS OF A PERFECT TEMPERANCE.

But the temperate man holds a mid-course in reference to self-indulgence and self-restraint. He takes no pleasure in the things which most delight the intemperate man, but is rather grieved and wearied thereat. He will have no pleasure that is unlawful; nor will he indulge himself even in lawful pleasures to an excessive extent. He is not pained when pleasures are denied him, nor does he keep craving to supply their loss, except to some slight degree. He never pursues pleasure

The good man who keeps his desires in thorough control is never guilty of unlawful excess nor of undue craving for pleasure: though he is glad to have pleasures, he does not grieve at their loss.

more than is becoming, nor at unseasonable times; nor does he ever violate therein the conditions of a sober moderation.

The rule of the temperate man, in fact, is this. In moderation and in a becoming manner, he will strive to gain whatever is pleasant and conducive to his health and well-being; aye, and he will strive for other pleasures too, when they do not interfere with his higher interests, and are not in excess of his means to afford. The man who indulges himself at the expense of future loss, loves pleasures more than they are worth; and that is not like the character of the temperate man, since he loves pleasures only so far as Right Reason allows.

The virtuous attitude of mind in reference to these matters is Temperance. The temperate man is one who has no pleasure in the things in which the intemperate man finds his keenest delight, but, on the contrary, is rather grieved and wearied at everything in which it is not right to find pleasure. When he does feel pleasure, he does not indulge the feeling in excess of what is fitting; nor if pleasures are withheld from him, does he grieve thereat, nor does he keep craving to supply their loss;—or, if he has a desire for them, he indulges it only in moderation and not more than is right, nor at unseasonable times. But such things as tend to promote his health and well-being, and are at the same time pleasant, or such things which are only in the very slightest degree detrimental to his health and well-being,—for all such things the temperate man does strive, with moderation, however, and in a proper manner. A man indulges his desires contrary to what is fitting when he desires pleasures which are found to be detrimental to his life, or at any rate to his well-being. The temperate man has a character very different to that, and regulates his desires by the standard of Right Reason.

iii.—Subsidiary Considerations of Temperance and Intemperance.

(*a*) COMPARISON BETWEEN INTEMPERANCE AND COWARDICE.

Intemperance has a closer affinity to a voluntary act than cowardice has. The motive of intemperance is pleasure, the motive of cowardice pain; and of these two motives pleasure is an object of desire, pain an object of aversion. Pain again distracts and weakens the nature of the man who is subject to it; whereas pleasure acts in no such way. Hence pleasure is regarded as a more culpable motive, since it is easier for a man to become habituated to refrain from pleasure than it is for him to endure pain. Many such cases occur in actual experience where self-restraint is easily learnt, and the practice thereof attended by no danger. But in the case of cowardice the reverse is true, the practice of courage being painful and full of risk.

Intemperance involves a greater degree of self-consciousness and of will than cowardice does.

But it would seem that cowardice as a mental state is not voluntary in the same sense nor in the same degree as single *acts*

of cowardice are. In itself cowardice is painless and therefore voluntary; but particular circumstances of danger so utterly distract a man through the intensity of pain involved, that he turns coward for the moment, throws away his arms and in other ways acts unseemly. Hence particular acts of cowardice seem at times to be compulsory.

Yet cowardice is voluntary when it is the result of a formed state of mind.

In the case of the intemperate man, on the contrary, particular acts of self-indulgence are voluntary, since he feels a desire for them and strives to attain the means for them. But since no man feels a desire to be intemperate, intemperance in itself, as a mental state, is not voluntary.

But since intemperance as well as cowardice is voluntary, we must examine whether they are both voluntary in the same degree. It would appear that these states are not parallel, but that intemperance is more voluntary than cowardice. Now the cause of cowardice is pain: we become cowards from being afraid of pain; but it is pleasure that produces intemperance. Of these two motives pleasure is an object of desire, pain an object of aversion; but what we do for the sake of what is desirable is more voluntary than what is caused through a thing that is an object of aversion. Again, pain distracts and weakens the nature of the man who is under the influence of it, whereas pleasure has no result of the kind whatever.

Consequently intemperance is more reprehensible than cowardice. Since a man is praised or blamed on the score of voluntary good or evil, it is evident that good and evil are respectively more praised or blamed in exact proportion as each is more or less voluntary. Again, it is an easier task to shake off intemperance than cowardice. The processes of habituation by which tendencies of this kind are rectified, are in the case of cowardice fraught with danger (the practice of courage in war, or in the midst of similar perils by means whereof we learn to throw off our cowardice, being itself a danger, or very like one), whereas on the other hand lessons of self-control are absolutely free from perilous consequences. The inference is that intemperance is more voluntary than cowardice.

But it would seem that cowardice in itself is voluntary in a different sense to that in which special acts of cowardice are voluntary. Cowardice in itself—that is to say as a mental state—is painless: by nothing painful are we compelled to be cowards; hence cowardice is the more voluntary. But as for deeds done by reason of our cowardice—deeds done under the influence of pain or fear—we do them under the influence of a kind of constraint which drives out of us all self-control, and induces us to throw down our arms and in other respects to behave ourselves unseemly. For this reason special acts of cowardice are less voluntary than the mental state itself.

In the case of intemperance, however, the reverse is true. No one desires intemperance for its own sake, nor does any one wish to be intemperate. But as for particular acts of intemperance, we do them with real enthusiasm. Hence intemperance in itself is less voluntary than specific acts thereof.

(*b*) COMPARISON BETWEEN INTEMPERANCE AND THE FAULTS OF CHILDHOOD.

We also apply the term 'intemperate' to characterise the faults of children, seeing that they bear a kind of resemblance thereto. Whether intemperance be

The nature of intemperance may be

illustrated by its etymology.

derived from youthful weakness or *vice versâ*, is quite immaterial to the present question, though grammatically it is evident that the first alternative is the true one. Indeed the transition of thought from the one case to the other seems to have been not inaptly made. A temper ought to be 'chastened' or curbed, which strives after things that are base and admits of rank and rapid growth, and that is the character both of intemperate desires and specially of children. Desire is the law by which children live, and the craving for pleasure is most conspicuously exhibited among them.

Temperance is synonymous with 'chastisement,' 'discipline,' or 'correction'; and the intemperate man is therefore one whose desires are not 'chastened' but are insubordinate and uncontrolled.

If then this temperament be not submissive nor brought under control, it will grow to a woful extent, since there is in the mind of the foolish, an insatiable desire for pleasure whatever the source from which that pleasure may come, and the working of the desires strengthens such other desires as are kindred thereto, and, where those desires are strong and violent, they drive out of the mind all power of reflection.

It is very needful, therefore, that the desires should be moderate and simple, and that they should be in no way antagonistic to Reason. A temper in which the desires are thus controlled, we call submissive and well-disciplined, since the appetitive soul ought to live in obedience to the law of Reason, just as a child should live obedient to the command of his Tutor. In the case of the temperate man, therefore, the whole of the appetitive part of his nature ought to be attuned to a perfect harmony with Reason. The aim of the temperate man is like the aim of Reason—the attainment of a noble ideal: —the temperate man is eager for what is right and seeks the right manner and the right time for compassing his desire; and such is the ideal of life which Reason ordains.

Reason should hold the same position and exercise the same authority as Tutors do over children.

(*c*) HERE WE MUST CONCLUDE OUR EXAMINATION OF TEMPERANCE.

We also apply the term 'intemperance,' to characterise the faults of children: when children are ill-behaved we call them 'undisciplined.' Faults of this kind bear, that is, a kind of resemblance to the 'intemperance' or want of self-control which has been described above. To inquire, however, which of these ideas is derived from the other, helps in no way to elucidate the question under discussion:—only it is fair to say so much, that it is more rational to suppose that the latter is so named from the analogy of the former, and that the term was applied to intemperance from the comparison of childish faults by a metaphorical transition. This metaphor seems to have been used not inaptly, but with the

utmost propriety: just as one is bound to chastise a child when striving after things that are base, and to confine his impulses within a proper limit, so also ought desire to be moderated (or 'chastened') when it is assuming a rank growth. Unless the child be controlled by his Tutor, he will fall outside the limits of what is fitting, since he has an appetite for pleasure that is insatiable, especially caused by the waywardness of his youth. Desire also, unless it be moderated and chastened by Reason, will grow to a rank excess; and strengthened as it is by the activities which are in sympathy with it, ofttimes it drives all power of thought out of the mind.

Consequently our desires ought to be moderate and simple, and in no way to be antagonistic to Reason. Desires which are thus controlled we call submissive, temperate, or chastened; so that the opposite frame of mind, both in the case of children and of the desires, is properly called 'intemperance' or want of control. Just as a child ought to live according to the command of his Tutor, so ought the impulsive part of our nature to live by the law of Reason. In the temperate man therefore, the whole nature formed by the emotions ought to be attuned to the perfect harmony of Reason. The aim which Desire sets before itself is the same as that of Reason—the attainment of a noble ideal. The objects which the temperate man desires, the manner in which he expresses those desires and the seasons of their gratification, are all noble and becoming; and such also are the conditions which Reason prescribes.

Let this account suffice to explain the nature of Temperance.

BOOK IV.—EXAMINATION OF THE VIRTUES

(Continued).

INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS.

LOOKING to the appetitive or purely self-regarding instincts of the soul, we shall have next to consider the virtues which regulate the disposal or acquisition of money; and first of Charity or Liberality.

Charity or charitableness may be defined as 'the attitude of mind which the perfect man shows in regard to questions of property.' It is the manifestation of the 'law of fitness' (τὸ καλὸν) in the way in which money is bestowed or earned, where the bestowal or the earning is not a question of justice but of philanthropy.

If charitableness be the ideal which virtue sets before men in such relations, there are two ways in which that ideal is vitiated,—by avarice on the one hand and by prodigality on the other. Avarice leads men to neglect the needs of others while selfishly absorbed in their own 'interests,' and is thus the state of mind which characterises narrow and selfish natures. Prodigality is the exact opposite of this:—it is 'generosity gone mad'—the state of mind of those who are so unmindful of their own interests as to ruin themselves for the sake of others [though it must be noted that prodigals are sometimes reckless not through unselfish generosity but from a dissolute love of their own pleasures, and thus one class of prodigals is a class of sensualists].

We will first consider charitableness *per se*, and then compare it with its vicious extremes.

1.—CHARITY.

(i.) CHARACTERISTICS OF CHARITY AND OF THE CHARITABLE MAN.

The object-matter under review being money, a man will only deal rightly with money if he has the virtue corresponding thereto.

What then is the right use of money? Surely not its safe-keeping merely, nor its acquisition, but its proper bestowal: money is only put to its proper uses when it is virtuously bestowed or expended; and that for many reasons. Virtue is active, not passive; to give, is actively to do good; to receive, is to be the passive recipient of good. No thanks nor praise are bestowed upon one who receives, but rather upon one who

gives. It is a harder task to give aright than it is to abstain from taking wrongfully. To forbear taking wrongfully is a mark of justice rather than of charity. To give charitably does more good, and makes the giver more beloved, than any other action does.

The general principles of true benevolence may be seen (1) actively, and (2) passively :—

(1.) Actively, in regard to *giving :* the measure of true charity, its object and inspiring motive, is τὸ καλὸν. Charity is the application of the 'law of the mean' to the claims of society upon our good will ; and it shows all the features of moral fitness and the delicate adjustment of the relations involved which Right Reason (ὀρθὸς λόγος) prescribes. Consequently whatever the charitable man does will be gracefully done. He will give only to the poor and needy upon whom his help is fittingly bestowed. He will give just enough to effect the desired relief, and his gifts will be sent just at the time when the succour will be most effectual. His benevolence will in fact in all ways give proof of the nobility of the giver ; and it will be given ungrudgingly. As the charitable man knows that a noble deed is more precious than great riches, he will take delight in his gifts and give cheerfully and readily.

(2.) Passively, in regard to the amassing of wealth, the charitable man will here also show a delicate appreciation for the rights and feelings of others. He will not be so eager for wealth as to be unscrupulous of the source whence it comes ; nor will he be importunate in his desire to gain it. His soul is the soul of a benefactor, unused to favours from others. Nevertheless he will not refuse the legitimate revenues of his own estates, nor neglect the proper care of his own concerns, that he may have funds enough for future benefactions.

There are other features to be noted in the charities of the benevolent man. He is not without discrimination in his charities, but confines himself to cases where his help will have real merit and moral beauty. He is also unselfish in what he does : in his love for his moral ideal (τὸ καλὸν) he will leave what is insufficient for his own use. Even if he has but little that he can give, he will give according to his means, knowing that the essence of charity is the spirit of the giver. [It is, of course, not to be expected that a charitable man should be wealthy : he is too unselfish to be anxious about his own interest as other men are. As a rule the charitable man is one who was 'born rich,' and who has never felt the sting of poverty like those who have toiled for their wealth and who clench it with morbid love.] He will also economise his charities, so as, whatever the amount of his wealth, he may employ it to the greatest possible effect and do with it the greatest possible amount of good. Nor will he let his charities *ruin* him : to go beyond his means will be a sign not of benevolence but of prodigality.

To sum up : charity is the observance of the moral law of fitness both in reference to the bestowing and to the acquiring of money. Between both of these relations there must be sympathy and consistency. Right giving and right receiving are mutually consequent the one upon the other. If either a man receives rightly but gives wrongly, or contrariwise, if he gives rightly but receives wrongly, the symmetry and perfection of his moral nature is violated : he has no true (ἕξις) disposition of charity. Of course the most charitable of men may make a mistake, but then he will be sorry for it. If, for instance, his charity proves to be mistim

and fails of τὸ μεσὸν, a perfect effect, he will grieve, but his regret will be moderate and rational. Not only so ; but the comparative indifference he feels for money will render him very liable to be overreached : the courtesy and complaisance of his dealings will often be a snare to him.

(ii.) CONTRASTS BETWEEN CHARITY AND PRODIGALITY.

The ideal which the law of charity implies, is marred by the prodigal on the one hand and by the miser on the other. The prodigal is excessive in giving and careless of receiving ; the miser is keen to receive and reluctant to give.

There are two kinds of prodigality which may be considered separately.

1. Prodigality in its strictest sense means the combination of two faults—excessive giving and defective receiving. That is a combination of faults which soon cures itself. The prodigal exhausts his property by extravagant benefactions ; and necessity teaches him the lesson of prudence. Age and experience tend to habituate him to self-control. The root of his fault is rather in folly than in vice ; and a riper knowledge of the world and the teachings of his own life may cure him of that folly and bring him to a state of real charity. [Anyhow, prodigality is *better* than avarice, not only because it is curable, but also because it is of benefit to mankind, while avarice is fruitless and barren.]

2. But, as a rule, prodigality is associated with other and worse vices. Foolish generosity is associated with unlawful or unscrupulous gains : those who spend foolishly, acquire recklessly—careless whence the funds are drawn, so only that they can give as they list. But as there is nothing noble (καλὰ) before the eyes of such, they are not really generous : their gifts have the stamp of selfishness upon them, and are generally provoked by vanity or self illusion. Herein is the vicious point about prodigality : it involves other vices worse than itself, and thus becomes the handmaid of dissipation. The prodigal is thus often a sensualist : his easy generosity to others provokes an equal self indulgence to himself. Nevertheless if he can only meet with proper control and be brought under favourable influences, this easy, self-indulgent good-nature of his youth may be sobered down to the ideal of perfect virtue.

(iii.) CONTRASTS BETWEEN CHARITY AND AVARICE.

Worse than prodigality is avarice, both as being incurable and as fostering some of the worst passions of human nature. There are two ways in which Avarice displays itself, as meanness in giving or sordid rapacity in receiving. Sometimes, though not often, these two aspects of avarice are seen united in the same person ; but they generally branch off into distinct types.

1. Some men are deficient in giving, without being dishonest in receiving ; such as are the stingy, the parsimonious and the niggardly. These all agree in giving nothing to anyone ; but there are diverse motives why they will not receive dishonestly. In some cases there is a natural sense of equity and a religious shrinking from positive wrongdoing ; and that is the type of simple meanness, or as we say, of one who would 'split a

pea.' The motive for honesty in others is a selfish fear lest if they accept any favour or take anything belonging to others they may be compelled to make a return; and as their meanness revolts from giving, so they shrink from receiving.

2. Others are excessive in receiving, and have for their motto 'Quocunque modo;' such as are usurers, brothel keepers and others of that class, who will do or suffer any infamy to gratify their low avarice. It is immaterial almost what such men do with their wretched earnings: the stamp of baseness is upon all they touch, and their whole character is vitiated thereby. [It must be understood of course that such men's gains are petty gains: tyrants who are equally unscrupulous upon a large scale come under a different category.]

2.—MUNIFICENCE.

(i.) CHARACTERISTICS OF MUNIFICENCE DELINEATED.

Every virtue is limited to a particular subject-matter; and as there is an essential difference between the ordinary conditions of life and striking and extraordinary circumstances in which money is expended, so there will be a corresponding difference in the virtues therein displayed. The virtue which regulates the outlay of money on ordinary occasions, is, as we have seen, Charity. The virtue which enables a man to make an extraordinary expenditure with propriety and effect, is Munificence.

The sphere, therefore, of the Munificent man is the sphere which grand opportunities present. Considerations of time, of place, of circumstance, must modify any general conceptions of what a 'grand opportunity' is, but the munificent man will show a true appreciation of all such considerations, and will act accordingly. He is a kind of 'moral artist' where a great occasion arises, skilful to produce the splendour of a grand effect upon a grand scale. His aim throughout is the realization of moral beauty (τὸ καλὸν) in the outward circumstances of his career; and therein he attains his own perfect satisfaction. Whatever conduces to that end and aim, he gives generously and ungrudgingly. He is so absorbed in the aim before him that small economies will never occur to him; and whatever he does, he does in the spirit of the charitable man, though on a grander scale. Even where the scale of his charity is not greater than that of common liberality, he will produce a more striking effect. Munificence does not consist in mere costliness, but in grandeur of conception. The charitable man may spend as much, but the munificent man will produce a more splendid and graceful result.

The most natural expenses, however, wherein the munificent man can display his excellence, are costly expenses—public sacrifices, erection of Temples, the offices of the State. It follows that only public men and wealthy men can be properly munificent: there must be a fitting correspondence between the act and the agent. A poor man is a fool if he attempts to act munificently. Those to whom great undertakings are proper, are the nobly-born, those who inherit great traditions, or who have themselves great reputations, and wealth to add lustre to their prestige.

But there are also expenses of a *private* character in which munificence may be appropriately displayed. Such is the munificence which the entertainment of strangers, a marriage feast, the fitting up of an establishment, call for, though permanency of effect must be an element in the consideration. In all such circumstances the munificent man will preserve the relation that is fitting between means and ends, the outlay and the effect produced.

(ii.) THE EXTREMES OF MUNIFICENCE.

The vain-glorious and ostentatious man apes the gestures and character of the munificent man, and meets with no success. His attempts at munificence are ill-timed, awkward, and ungraceful. He fails to adjust his outlay to the circumstances in view, and he is ever out of harmony with his surroundings. The motive, again, which actuates him is not (τὸ καλὸν) the sense of right, but rather a vulgar seeking for admiration; and failure stamps his whole career.

Meanness is the other extreme; and its touch spoils the fairest endeavours, and mars the whole effect of the most promising undertakings. It is the low calculation of parsimony which gives what it has to give in a grudging spirit. It never gives *quite* enough, and is ever fearful of having given too much.

3.—ELEVATION OF SOUL.

(i.) THE SPHERE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF MORAL ELEVATION DELINEATED.

The conception of the Munificent man who is grand and noble in the display of wealth, leads to the conception of a man who is grand and noble in all his surroundings. If a man have high merit, not in any isolated particular, but in his whole life and character, and shows the consciousness of his merit, he may be called 'a man of elevated soul.' If, on the other hand, a man esteems himself less highly than he ought, he is humble-minded; while if his estimate of himself is in excess of his real merit, he is then vain-glorious or conceited.

The sphere then of Moral Elevation is what is high and meritorious; and whether we look to the standard of the Gods or to that of great men, we see that *honour* is the highest of all good things. Moral Elevation will, therefore, be concerned specially with honours. But honour implies desert or merit. If, therefore, the man of elevated soul is right in claiming the highest honours, he must have the highest personal worth: he must not merely be a good man but a perfect man. The consciousness of his elevation is but the glow and lustre which arise from the combination of all the virtues existing in his soul in their most intense and complete form.

The possession of perfect virtue, and the consciousness which arises therefrom, give him a peculiar attitude in regard to external things, and in particular in regard to honours. He knows that they cannot either add to his worth or take away from it. He only accepts honours because honour is the best tribute which men are able to pay to goodness. Still the honours which he accepts must be marked honours, and

conferred by distinguished men; the ordinary compliments of life are not worthy of his notice.

As it is with honours so also with the other good things of life. Prosperity or adversity are things external, and he holds the same dignified mien in regard to them which might almost be mistaken for superciliousness and apathy. It seems, however, the truth that prosperity is more congenial to his character and more naturally his lot. Wealth and family and high station seem to be the natural concomitants of a character which knows so well how to bear itself gracefully and nobly: they indicate a superiority which is nothing unless it be associated with nobility of soul. This truth is again and again exemplified in the case of men who inherit great traditions or who attain to high station which from lack of virtue they cannot adorn. Such men cannot bear the burden of their prosperity, but wax wanton and disdainful and insolent; and their attempts at grandeur and dignity are but the feeble caricature which confounds insolence with goodness.

(ii.) RELATION OF THE MAN OF ELEVATED SOUL TO THE VIRTUES GENERALLY.

1. Courage. He is courageous, but he does not expose himself to risks where little glory can be won. He reserves his heroism for grand and striking occasions, where the display of his bravery will be glorious to him, whether the issue to himself be life or death.

2. Benevolence. He is a charitable man, ever ready to give and loath to receive. If he does require a kindness, he never rests until he has repaid it, so as to be under obligation to no man: he loves rather to bestow favours upon others. To receive a favour is to be in a position of inferiority; to confer a favour, of superiority. As he knows that outward superiority is due to the inward superiority of which he is conscious, he prefers by his bounties to make his superiority manifest to all men.

3. General intercourse of life. He loves to overtop the mighty, while towards the lowly he is conciliatory and gentle. He avoids places where honour is cheaply won, or where others are in the ascendant. He never interests or bestirs himself, except where great honour is to be won, or great exploits achieved. He is open and sincere in his dealings, whether to show aversion or to express sympathy. Afraid of no one, he scorns dissimulation—unless at times a good-humoured disdain makes him ironical. He has nothing of the courtier or of the flatterer about him, though he unburdens himself to a friend. He is free from enthusiasm for anything except his own ideal. He never nurses revenge, as he will not demean himself to remember an injury. He does not concern himself about other people's business, nor talk needlessly about his own. He is sparing of censure just as he is slow to praise. He is indifferent to the petty cares and vicissitudes of life, as they have no real concern to him. He shows his self-sufficiency by the very character of his establishment, his purchases being what is grand rather than what is useful or productive. Lastly, in his personal demeanour he carries about with him the consciousness of his greatness: the deep voice, the measured words, the solemn tread, are but the outward marks of inward dignity,

and well indicate the character of one who, being of highest worth, esteems himself accordingly.

(iii.) RELATION OF MORAL ELEVATION TO ITS EXTREMES.

1. Self-abasement, or humility, is an attitude of mind which shrinks from the honours which are its due. There seems to be some lurking defect in a character which thus abases itself. It is almost incredible that a man should willingly abandon good things, if they were really his due. Anyhow, such a habit has a tendency to lower a man's moral ideal: the plea of unworthiness which makes a man retire from great honours, makes him also shrink from taking part in great or noble achievements.

2. Self-conceit impels men to attempt what is beyond their ability to execute: and such men are laughed at for their failure and for their folly. This is a habit compounded of ignorance and vanity, and suggests a real defect in the moral ideal—the defect of mistaking external pomp and circumstances, for real glory and dignity.

4.—LOVE OF HONOUR.

UNCERTAINTIES OF THE EXACT IDEA IMPLIED IN 'LOVE OF HONOUR.'

Besides the special and extraordinary occasions of honour in which Elevation of Soul is shown, there are the ordinary honours of common life in which virtue may also be shown. The man who shows a laudable ambition within the range of ordinary experience, is praised for his 'love of honour,' if it be in accordance with right. But here is a difficulty: what is 'right' in regard to such honours? Something very undefined and difficult to grasp. The shifting phases of circumstance, and the very nature of society as a complex organism, render it almost impossible to fix an absolute 'point of view.' The terms in which we commonly speak of 'ambition' are equally vague. Love of honour is used, like 'ambition,' in both a good and a bad sense. In itself colourless, it derives its form and meaning from the associations with which it is blended. Yet, we may be sure, there *is* an ideal existing in the mind of the perfect man, and reproduced in his life, notwithstanding the fluctuations of society and the uncertainties of nomenclature.

5.—GOOD TEMPER.

(i.) GENERAL CONCEPTION OF GOOD TEMPER.

In the regulation of the feelings of anger there is also an ideal state; but the exact term whereby to express it is open to ambiguity. It may, however, not inappropriately be called 'Good temper' or 'Mildness'—though such an expression seems to suggest something like a defect of indignation.

As an ideal, Good temper must of course conform to the conditions which Right Reason prescribes. It must be fired into anger when the

occasion is fitting and where there are objects to justify it; and its anger must be shown in a proper manner and at a fitting time. Its tendency however will rather be to gentleness than to severity.

(ii.) GOOD TEMPER CONTRASTED WITH ITS EXTREMES.

1. Entire absence of temper, or 'passionlessness,' is reprehensible. It seems to argue a servile callousness and insensibility, to submit to outrage and insult and to have no instincts of self defence. It is at any rate folly to brook all such contumely.

2. Excess of temper is found under manifold varieties, all of which violate the perfect law. It bursts out against the wrong persons, at wrong times, with insufficient provocation, and lasts for too long a time; though of course all these errors are not combined in the same person. There are two principal classes of 'extremely angry' men—the passionate and the sulky. (α) The passionate are easily provoked and easily appeased; such are liable to sudden and violent revulsions of feeling, quick-temper leading them constantly into excess. (β) The sulky nourish their anger for a long time until they can gain perfect revenge; such suffer from suppressed anger, and are implacable and vengeful.

Of these two extremes the excess is in itself worse and is more difficult to cure; and it is unhappily the more prevalent. But the boundary line is difficult to define, as it is difficult to particularise all the circumstances which may arise; and wherever such circumstances arise, the judgment of the agent must decide for himself how far his conscience will sanction anger or forgiveness. Such occasions are eminently 'cases of conscience.'

6.—COURTESY.

(i.) GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF COURTESY.

In the ordinary intercourse of life there are men who will acquiesce in anything and allow no stint or limit in the praises which they bestow; and there are others who are the very reverse, and show a constant antagonism to everybody and to everything. Both these extremes miss the moral ideal. The true attitude of mind in regard to society is that of a generous friendliness which prefers to give pleasure wherever pleasure is possible without injury to the higher interests of life. But it is a friendliness stript of emotion or personal affection; and void of partiality it is unswervingly true to requirements of justice and social well-being. The rule of the courteous man is the rule of the 'beautiful' and 'the expedient;' and whether he cause pleasure or pain, he will act conscientiously by that rule. He will deliberately cause pain in cases where disgrace or injury to himself or others would be the result of his acquiescence. Still he will remember what is due to each man, according to his station; and will by all means promote pleasure of his associates where honour and conscience permit. If he causes pain to others, it is only because pain is the least of evils in that case.

(ii.) EXTREMES OF COURTESY.

1. The man whose law is the law of pleasure, violates the ideal of courtesy. If he simply follows pleasure, he is obsequious; if gain enter into his calculations, then he is a flatterer.

2. The man who violates the ideal of courtesy by way of defect is the peevish irritable man who quarrels with everyone.

7.—SINCERITY.

There is a virtue to be exhibited in the words which a man uses, independently of the consequences which flow from them. Truthfulness, or sincerity, is the perfection of human converse. It is 'a mean' between the pretentiousness of the boastful man and the false modesty of the diffident man.

The characteristics of Sincerity are, therefore, a religious horror of falsehood as a thing disgraceful and base *per se*, an uprightness and integrity more delicate and penetrating than even justice itself. It is the disposition to speak the truth, though nothing seems to depend upon it; and it has its roots in an honesty of purpose and its fruits in honesty and truthfulness of life. In its shrinking from exaggeration it is inclined, if anything, to understate the truth; reticence being less offensive than exaggeration.

VIOLATIONS OF SINCERITY.

1. Boastfulness is the generic term to express various modes in which the ideal of integrity is violated in the direction of excess. (α) If boastfulness have no special purpose to serve, it is the outcome of emptyheadedness and vice; the boastful man of this type being a vain, foolish and worthless character. (β) If, however, boasting has a purpose to serve, and that purpose be glory or honour, it is not so very reprehensible; but if its object be gain, it is a very discreditable habit. It is of course under either aspect a state of the *will* and not a merely latent tendency, and the will requires to be acted upon either by (α) the bent of the character or (β) a special motive operating at the moment.

2. Self-depreciation is that undue fear of exaggeration which leads a man to say less than the truth, especially when speaking of his own merits. [There is, however, another form of self-disparagement, which is either 'false modesty,' or 'pride aping humility,' and thinly disguises a conceited vanity.] Though self-depreciation is a falling short of perfect sincerity and straight-forwardness, it is often, in its moderate forms, the mark of a graceful refinement.

8.—HUMOUR.

There is an element of rest in life, and rest gives room for relaxation, and relaxation calls for the exercise of an appropriate virtue. That virtue is humour—'a mean' between frivolity and moroseness.

(i.) CHARACTERISTICS OF PERFECT HUMOUR.

The playful versatility of good-humour is analogous to the lithesome movements of the body. Its essential feature is that 'good-taste,' 'tact' or 'dexterity'; and that is best represented by the character of a perfect gentleman. There is a characteristic difference between the humour of an educated and of an uneducated man. The open scurrility of the Old Comedy is a very different thing from the polished innuendo of the New. Perfect humour, therefore, must be the humour of a gentleman; and this condition will apply not only to what a man says, but also to the approval he gives of the jests of others. As there are things which a man will not do himself (and which even the legislator forbids him to do), so there are things to which he ought not to listen: he must be 'a law to himself.'

(ii.) CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EXTREMES.

1. Buffoonery is wit, stript of all considerations of delicacy or opportuneness.
2. Boorishness is poverty of invention, combined with peevishness of temper.

9.—SENSE OF SHAME.

Sense of Shame is not, properly speaking, a virtue; it is rather a physical emotion like fear than a formed attitude of the moral nature. Its definition as 'an apprehension of dishonour' shows that it is rather emotional than moral. It is indeed but a check upon the passions of youth, and is inappropriate to age. Old men ought not to do anything for which to be ashamed: an honest life will be conscious of no evil, whether absolute or conventional evil. To be liable to a feeling of shame would be to argue the existence of passions which none but youth should know. Even in the case of youth it is only an hypothetical good:—'if he were to do so and so, he would feel shame.' Better never to do evil than having done evil to feel ashamed of it.

TRANSLATION.

C.—LIBERALITY.

i.—Characteristics of Liberality explained.

(*a*) THE SPHERE OF LIBERALITY DEFINED.

Definition of liberality.

Continuing our examination of the social virtues, let us now discuss the virtue of liberality, which is commonly regarded as the perfect attitude of mind in regard to questions of property. The praise which is bestowed upon the liberal man is not for his exploits in war, nor for his behaviour under circumstances where self-control is tested, nor yet for the justice of his decisions, but has regard simply to the disposal or acquisition of property and more particularly to its disposal ('property' being here used to denote anything which has a value which can be estimated in current coin).

Liberality also is a form of excellence shown by the appetitive soul, and, therefore, it is a virtue which we may examine immediately after Temperance. Now liberality is an ideal state of mind in regard to money—an ideal which we realize, that is, when we spend neither more nor less than what is right, but give all that we have to spend in a befitting matter, upon deserving objects, and with right motives. When the liberal man is praised, it is not for his services in war, nor for acting as the temperate man acts, nor yet again for the equity of his awards (as the just man is), but for his dealings in the bestowal and acquisition of property; and praise is more abundantly accorded him for the way in which he gives; ('property' being here used to include everything which has an appreciable value in current coin).

(*b*) MODES IN WHICH THE PRINCIPLE OF LIBERALITY IS VIOLATED.

Failure of charity from excess or defect.

The states of excess and defect in money-matters are prodigality on the one hand, and avarice on the other.

We apply the epithet 'avaricious' uniformly to those who are more eager than they ought to be in regard to money. On the other hand we sometimes use the term 'prodigality' with complex associations.

We call men 'prodigals' when they are weakly self-indulgent and spend their property upon vicious indulgences; and consequently men of this stamp are accounted the most dissolute of their kind, as having many vices combined in one. But they are not called prodigals in the strict and natural sense of the word: the word 'prodigal' is intended to mean one who has a single thought, that of wasting or ruining his property, the prodigal being one who is ruined through his own fault: *i.e.* the wasting of his property seems to be a form of 'self-destruction,' since his very life and livelihood depend upon the possession of means. It is in this strict sense, therefore, that I now employ the term 'prodigality.'

Use of words: complex associations of 'prodigality.'

Liberality is, therefore, the ideal state in regard to money, while avarice is the corruption by way of defect, and prodigality the corruption by way of excess.

But we speak of prodigality not only as an excess in regard to money, but sometimes we call even sensualists 'prodigals,' inasmuch as they squander large sums to gratify their selfish tastes, and prodigality of this type we call a vice. It is for this reason that prodigals of this class are the most abandoned of men, since they have many vices all in one, being at once ruined in fortune and dissolutely abandoned in the pursuit of pleasure. Hence they are not *properly* called by a single name indicating only a single vice (since the term 'prodigal' is intended to imply one who has only a single vice, that of ruining his substance —the 'prodigal' being one who is ruined through his own fault, since the wasting of his substance seems to be a form of self-destruction, life and livelihood depending upon the possession of means). However, we call those also who are weakly self-indulgent, and who spend their money upon their own sensual gratifications, 'prodigals;' though we confine the term 'avaricious' to those who grasp after money more keenly than is right, and who are defective in regard to liberality.

(*c*) THE VIRTUE OR VICE OF A THING DEPENDENT UPON ITS USES.

Now whatever admits of use may be put to a good or a bad use; and as wealth is one of those things which are capable of use, and a man puts a thing to its best use when he has the virtue related thereto, it follows that a man will put wealth to its best possible use when he has the virtue related to money: when, that is, he is liberal-minded.

The right use of money is the virtuous disposition of it according to charity.

Now since it is possible for us to use everything which admits of use, well or ill (*e.g.*, our reputation or our food), and wealth is of precisely this nature, since there is a definite use for it in the conduct of life, it is, therefore, possible to put wealth to a good or bad use; and inasmuch as a man will put a thing to a proper use only when he has the virtue related to that thing, he will only put his wealth to its most perfect use when he has the virtue related to money—when, that is, he is liberal-minded.

(*d*) THE SPECIAL USE OF MONEY IS IN SPENDING RATHER THAN IN RECEIVING.

The characteristic of charity is a virtuous spending rather than virtuous receiving.

Now the use of money seems to consist in spending and giving, while the acquisition of money lies rather in the receiving and safe keeping thereof; consequently it is more distinctly characteristic of the liberal-minded man that he gives to proper persons than that he receives from proper persons, or than that he refrains from taking whence he ought not.

1. It is a greater proof of moral worth that a man confers benefits upon others, than that he receives them himself, and that he himself performs noble actions, than that he refrains from disgraceful ones. It is obvious that the effect consequent upon giving is that a man does a kindness to another, and is thus an instrument for noble deeds; whereas the effect consequent upon his receiving is that he is himself the recipient of favours, or at most that he takes no unfair advantage.

2. Thanks are accorded to one who makes a gift, not to one who abstains from unlawful gains; and of course praise is greater in proportion.

3. It is easier to abstain from taking than it is to give: men are far less disposed to give away what is their own than to forbear taking what is another's.

4. Again, it is only those who give who have the name of 'charitable:' those who forbear taking are not praised on the score of their charitableness, but, if at all, with special reference to their justice; while those who simply receive what is their due are absolutely not praised at all.

5. Again, charitable men are, as a rule, more personally beloved than any other class who are esteemed for their own worth, inasmuch as they are serviceable to their fellows; but their service depends upon the gifts they make.

Now the use of money is nothing else whatever but spending and giving. The receiving and saving of money seems to be not use but possession. Consequently the charitable man is more concerned with the expenditure of money than with the acquisition of it; and it is of more importance for him to know in what manner he ought to spend, and with what motives and upon what persons, than it is for him to know in what manner he ought to receive, and with what aims and from what class of persons. In fact the charitable man is concerned, as has been shown, with the use of wealth; and use consists in giving rather than in receiving.

1. It seems to be a much greater merit to do a kindness than to receive one, to perform noble acts than to abstain from vicious ones; and in the case of giving there is involved at once a kindness done to another and a noble deed performed by one's self; whereas, in receiving, there lies only the having a

favour conferred on one, or at most an abstention from dishonourable behaviour (for to receive from proper sources is to have a favour done one; and to abstain from receiving whence one ought not, is to abstain from unrighteous courses).

2. Conduct which is more highly praised, is more closely akin to virtue; and the act of giving in a rightful manner is more highly praised than the act of receiving in a rightful manner: since thanks and the praise consequent thereon fall rather to the man who gives than to the man who abstains from receiving.

3. Virtue is concerned especially with what is more difficult; and it is more difficult to give rightly than to receive or not to receive rightly: it is far more disagreeable to us to give up our own than it is to dismiss from our minds the property of another. Consequently, it is more suitable to the character of the charitable man to give rightly than it is to receive or not to receive rightly.

4. In fact we do not call men by the name of charitable simply because they do not receive from improper sources, but because they give to fitting and proper persons, the former being considered rather just than charitable and receiving praise on the score of their justice, while on the other hand, those who simply receive from the sources they are entitled to receive from, are absolutely not praised at all (*i.e.* a man is only praised when he does something disagreeable to him with a virtuous motive, but a man who receives whence he has a right to receive, undergoes no inconvenience at all).

5. Lastly, charitable men are beloved more than any other class of virtuous men, inasmuch as they are useful to their fellows; but their usefulness consists not in their forbearing to receive basely but in their giving nobly.

Hence it is that the charitable man is thought to have more to do with giving than receiving: he is in fact one who bestows his wealth upon proper objects, and has always in view what is noble and right.

(*e*) GENERAL CONDITIONS REQUISITE IN CHARITABLE GIVING.

In order to perfect charity there must be:

1. A sense of moral fitness.
2. A beautiful effect.
3. A deserving object.
4. An adequate amount.
5. An appropriate occasion.
6. A cheerful spirit.

Now all actions that are conformable to virtue have in themselves a noble effect and are inspired by a noble motive. If, therefore, a man has the virtue of charity, he will give from a noble motive, and his gifts will have a noble effect. Those to whom he gives will be deserving recipients of his bounty; and both the amount and the occasion of his bounty will be equally suitable and appropriate. He will invariably observe the conditions requisite to rightful giving. Moreover, whatever he does he will do cheerfully, or at any rate without pain, inasmuch as every act that is conformable to virtue is pleasurable to the agent, or at any rate devoid of pain—least of all can it be positively painful.

If a man fail to meet these tests—if he gives to unworthy objects, or if he gives without any reference to a virtuous ideal, but to satisfy some lower aim, he is not a charitable man, but must be styled by some other name. Nor again is he charitable if he gives with reluctance or pain, since such an one would fain choose money in preference to noble acting, and that is very unlike the liberal-minded man.

I say that the motive of the charitable man will be a noble one, as in fact every action regulated by virtue must be inspired by a noble aim. But not only so: not only must charitable actions have a noble motive, and be done in favour of proper persons, and at fitting times, and observe all the other conditions which are entailed in rightful giving, but further they must be done with pleasure to the agent, or at any rate without regret. A man who gives with a feeling of reluctance has not grown to be a charitable man: he may perform charitable actions, but he is not in himself charitable:—he has not attained to the moral dispositions of heart involved in charity, otherwise we would have had no feeling of pain, all actions regulated by virtue being either pleasurable or devoid of pain.

If a man fail to meet these conditions—if he bestow his money upon unworthy objects, or without any noble motive, but from some other aim, he is not a charitable man, but must be styled by some other name. For similar reasons, neither is a man charitable if he bestow his gifts with reluctance, as has been explained: since a man of that stamp values his money more than noble acting, and on that account he is not a charitable man.

(*f*) GENERAL CONDITIONS REQUISITE IN CHARITABLE RECEIVING.

The charitable man will never receive from sources whence he ought not, since such an acceptance of money is inconsistent with the character of one who regards not money as of high importance.

But the money expended in charity must be properly obtained: the charitable man will draw from his own funds but never ask help from others.

Nor will he be importunate for money, since it is not like the character of one who is himself a benefactor to have benefits conferred upon him lightly and without reserve.

Still he will receive from proper and legitimate sources, *e.g.* the revenues of his own estates,—not as though it were meritorious so to do, but as a thing inevitable in order that he may have the means wherewith to make gifts to others; and he will not be indifferent to the care of his own property, desiring as he does by the help thereof to assist the needs of others.

But while on the one hand the charitable man will only give according as Right Reason prescribes, so on the other hand he will never receive from sources whence he ought not to receive; and since he does not prize money highly, he will not ask for it: a man who loves to confer benefits on others, is not easily prevailed upon to receive a benefit himself. Still he will receive from legitimate sources, as of course the revenues of his own estates—not that he thinks it meritorious to earn money, but because it is essential for him so to do in view of the gifts which he has to make. Consequently he will not be indifferent to the care of his own property, since he desires by the help thereof to assist the needs of others.

(*g*) SOME FURTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHARITABLE MAN.

But he will not give to all alike indiscriminately, that so he may keep enough wherewith to give to deserving persons at fitting times, and where his bounty is

He will not be reckless of his gifts,

meritorious. It is, again, quite characteristic of the charitable man that his generosity in giving is so extreme that he leaves insufficient for himself: it is a sign of his perfect charity that he does not look to his own interests but to the good of others.

though he will freely give what he can ill spare.

But charity is to be measured by relation to the means of the individual, not by an absolute standard: the quality of charitableness does not consist in the multitude of the things that are given, but in the formed character of the giver, which leads him to give to the extent of the means at his command. There is therefore nothing to prevent a man whose gifts are less than another's from being, for all that, the more liberal of the two —provided, that is, that the store from which he has to draw his gifts be less.

The spirit of the giver, and not the extent of the gift, is the measure of charity.

[The most charitably-minded men seem to be found among those who have not amassed their wealth for themselves, but received it by inheritance, the reason being that they have had no experience of actual want, and are also free from that inordinate love for their own which parents have for their offspring, or poets for their works. Yet it is no easy thing for a charitable man to be also wealthy, since he takes no care either to acquire or to preserve his wealth, but is ever ready to bestow it upon others, and prizes not money for its own sake, but only for the sake of the gifts which it can provide. Hence it is laid as a charge at Fortune's door that those who are most deserving of riches are the least affluent of all;—though that is an anomaly which very naturally occurs, since it is not possible for a man to have wealth if he take no care how he may gain it, neglect and loss being universally associated.]

The nobly-born the most charitable.

In virtue of his charity he will most assuredly never give to unworthy objects, nor at unseasonable times, nor violate the proprieties in other ways: otherwise he would cease to act according to the law of charity: exhausting his resources upon improper objects, he would have nothing left to spend upon objects that really deserved his sympathy. As has been shown, a man only has the virtue of charity when his expenditure is not only proportioned to his means but is also confined to worthy objects.

Mutual interdependence of the conditions of true charity.

[The man who spends beyond his means is extravagant and prodigal. It would be improper then to call tyrants 'prodigals,' as it seems not easy to exceed the limit of their resources, whatever gifts or expenditure they may make.]

Nor will he give indiscriminately to all alike, that so he may keep enough to give to those who deserve his charity, where the occasion is fitting and meritorious.

It is also a characteristic of one who is zealously charitable, that his generosity in giving is so great, that he actually leaves insufficient to himself: that being a sign of perfect charity—not to look to one's own need. Charity is not estimated by reference to the greatness or to the variety of things which are given, but in accordance with the proportion which things given bear to the means of the giver—that being the standard by which a generous disposition on the part of the giver is tested. Hence, there is nothing to prevent a man who gives less, being a more charitable man than one who gives more—provided that the man who gives less, has a less store from which to make his gifts.

[It is found that men who have not had to make money for themselves, by their own exertions, but have gained their wealth by inheritance from others, have the reputation of being more charitable. Men who are *born* rich have never felt the pains of want, and for that reason do not love their wealth with overweening affection; whereas those who have amassed riches for themselves, are like parents and poets—strongly enamoured of their own productions. But liberal men are not able to be very rich, since they are neither prompt to receive nor provident in guarding their property, but are rather disposed to lavish in charity all they have, and do not prize money for its own sake, but only for the gifts it enables them to make. Hence we find fault with Fortune, because liberal men are not in affluence, though deserving of wealth and possessions. Still that is a state of things which might not unreasonably be expected: if a man takes no care to amass money, how is it possible for him to be rich? That is a truth of universal application: it is impossible for a man to have anything, if he will not take the measures necessary to procure it. Hence, the liberal man will not be able to be affluent, if he neither collects money from new sources, and yet scatters abroad what he has of his own.]

Moreover, the charitable man never gives to improper objects, nor on any occasion that is not right, lest, if he spent his money upon unlawful things, he might be found incapable of meeting lawful claims, and fail to give to worthy objects on fitting occasions. As has been shown, a man is only charitable when he is spending in proportion to his means: the man who gives at random is a prodigal. Hence we do not call 'tyrants' prodigal, though they give vast sums and keep no limits in giving, since the extent of their resources seems to exceed the extent of their gifts, and it is found that their means are greater than their expenditure.

(*h*) RÉSUMÉ: CHARITY THE MORAL IDEAL IN REGARD TO WEALTH.

Charitableness the law of Reason applied to all questions and incidents of wealth. Right giving as essential as right receiving.

Since, therefore, charity is an ideal frame of mind in regard to the giving or receiving of money, the charitable man will give his money, or expend his money, only upon proper occasions and to proper amounts, alike in small as in great concerns; and he will feel pleasure in so acting. [He will also *receive* what is lawful for him to accept from lawful sources. The virtue of charity being an ideal fitness in regard both to giving and receiving, the charitable man will act rightly in both relations:—*i.e.*, there is consequent upon suitable giving a corresponding receiving, whereas improper receiving is inconsistent with proper giving. These two conditions, therefore, of proper giving and proper receiving, being mutually consequent

upon one another, are found combined in the same person; whereas conditions which are not so consequent but are opposed to one another are not found to coexist, as obviously they cannot, in the same individual.]

But if it should happen that he has spent his money contrary to what is right and appropriate, he will feel regret, but his regret will be temperate and seasonable. For it is a mark of virtue for a man to have feelings of pleasure or of pain in a suitable degree, and on fitting occasions.

Again, the charitable man is courteous and affable in his dealings, and is a man capable of being overreached, since of course he sets no store on money, and is more likely to be distressed if he has omitted to spend what he ought to have spent, than to be pained at having spent upon that which was not worthy of his charity. He is not one who would acquiesce in the maxim of Simonides. [On the other hand, the prodigal goes wrong upon these points as well as upon others: he never feels the proper pleasure in worthy objects and occasions, nor does he grieve where he ought to feel pain. This aspect of prodigality will be clearer as we proceed with our analysis.]

The sense of fitness which charity has makes a man's whole demeanour sober.

Since, therefore, charity is an ideal frame of mind in reference to the giving and receiving of money, the charitable man will make gifts and expend his money upon worthy objects and to proper amounts, as well in great as in trifling concerns; and, whether he gives, or whether he receives, he will show a cheerful disposition, and will maintain a proper balance and fitness, since charity is an ideal 'mean,' as well in regard to the taking as to the giving of money. It is consequent upon a man's giving rightly, that he should also receive rightly; and that he should do both with pleasure.

Hence he will feel pain if he fail to give, or to receive, according to a fitting proportion; and yet the pain he feels will not be extravagant or unseemly.

The charitable man is also courteous and accessible in money relations, and is pleasant in all dealings that relate to money, inasmuch as, despising money as he does, he is not very much distressed if he is overreached or injured. He is more distressed if he has failed to spend what was fitting for him to have spent, than he is if he has spent what was fitting for him not to have spent. The spending on occasions beyond what is right, is simply a loss affecting the purse, and that does not so very much grieve the charitable man; whereas, on the other hand, failing to spend upon proper objects, becomes a loss in regard to duty and to virtue, and for that reason, causes keener pain. Hence, he will not either accept the counsel of Simonides when suggesting the opposite attitude of mind. On the other hand, the prodigal is in error invariably both in regard to pleasure and to pain: he neither rejoices in worthy objects, nor does he show his joy in a proper manner (as will be explained more clearly in the course of our analysis).

ii.—Contrast between Liberality and Prodigality.

(*a*) DESCRIPTION OF PRODIGALITY AS A VICE *PER SE*.

When either of these conditions—of right giving or of right receiving, is violated, the result is vice.

Now we have already shown that there are states of excess and of defect in regard to money, in prodigality on the one hand and avarice on the other, in the relations both of giving and of receiving (and here we put expenditure generally in the category of 'giving'). Prodigality is a state of excess in regard to giving without equivalent, and is a state of defect in regard to receiving; while, contrariwise, avarice is a state of defect in regard to giving, and of excess in regard to receiving—only on a small scale.

But it is rare that both conditions are violated simultaneously in the same person: in regard to the excess of giving and defect of receiving.

But these opposing characteristics are rarely found united, since it is not easy for a man to give to every object if there be no source from which he himself receives [for the term 'prodigal' cannot be, it would seem, applied to any but *private* individuals (not to tyrants), and the means which such persons have of giving are soon exhausted]; though of course this type of extreme generosity would seem to be vastly superior to that of the avaricious man, as being more easily reformed under the influence of advancing age and personal exigencies, and being thus capable of attaining to a perfect state. Such an one has, in fact, some of the attributes of the charitable man: he gives and is not fond of receiving, though he does neither the one nor the other rightly, nor in a becoming manner. If only he could be habituated to self-restraint, or were in some other way to reform, he would be a man of real charity. He would give to none but deserving objects, nor receive from any but legitimate sources.

The prodigal is more foolish than vicious.

Hence the prodigal does not seem to be really depraved in disposition: it is not proof either of a wicked or ignoble disposition to exceed in giving and not receiving, but rather of a foolish one. A man who is prodigal after this fashion seems to be much better than a sordid man, as well for the reasons referred to above as also because the prodigal benefits many, but the sordid man no one, not even himself.

Charity, then, is the ideal state of mind in regard to money; the vicious extreme in one direction being prodigality, and in another direction avarice. Prodigality exceeds in giving and in non-receiving, and is deficient in receiving. On the other hand, avarice is excessive in receiving, and defective in giving.

Though both these states of mind are at variance with what is fitting, yet avarice is worse than prodigality. In the first place, prodigality is not able to endure as a permanent condition: when resources are all spent, it quickly changes, *i.e.*, wealth speedily fails those who spend if from merely private resources they keep giving immoderately, without receiving from any new fund of their own. On the other hand, avarice has no such cure for itself: if, on the one hand, his wealth increase, the avaricious man grows no better, and, on the other hand, if his wealth be exhausted, he becomes far worse. In the second place, it is possible for the prodigal to be cured as well by the influence of time, as by experience of the evils which flow from want, and so he may attain at last to a proper frame of mind. In fact, the prodigal is near to the perfect state:—*i.e.*, he gives and is not fond of receiving, though his gifts are made to unworthy objects, and in an improper manner. Consequently, if only it could become habitual to him to give to worthy objects only, and only on worthy occasions, he would be a man of real charity, bestowing his gifts on deserving persons, and refraining from taking from improper sources.

In this view the prodigal does not seem to be really depraved in heart: it is no mark of a wicked or ignoble nature to exceed in giving and to refrain from taking, but rather of a foolish one. Hence the prodigal is a better man than the miser, as well for the reasons given above, as also because he does good service to his fellows, whereas the miser benefits no one, not even himself.

(*b*) PRODIGALITY ASSOCIATED WITH OTHER VICES.

As a rule, prodigals are indifferent *how* they gain the means of spending.

But, as has already been shown, the greater number of those who are prodigal not only *spend* their money improperly, but also *acquire* their money from unlawful sources, and are on that score as well as others, void of charity. They grow to be grasping after money, prompted by the desire to spend, and by their inability to spend as lavishly as they would without money. The means of spending soon fail them; hence they are forced to provide funds from new sources. At the same time, from the indifference which they feel for what is noble and honourable, they make their gains with little scruple from any source whatever. In the passion they have for giving, it is a thing quite indifferent to them *how* they give or whence the funds are drawn. Hence the gifts of such men are not really charitable gifts: they are not nobly conceived, nor have they a noble motive, nor are they bestowed in a proper manner; at times they make men rich whom it were fitting to be poor, and while they will give nothing to men of sober and respectable lives, they lavish favours freely upon those who flatter them or in some way afford them amusement.

The recklessness of their expenditure is often owing to personal dissipation.

Hence, prodigals are for the most part sensualists: reckless in their expenditure, they lavish their wealth upon their own lusts, and inasmuch as they do not live with any noble aim in view, they are diverted to the pursuit of selfish indulgences.

However, though the prodigal swerves into

vicious practices like these, if he be unchecked in his course, yet, on the other hand, if he meet with guidance and control, he may, for all his extravagance, still attain to a perfect ideal of what is fitting and right.

Hitherto I have been speaking of the prodigal who is excessive in the gifts he makes, and is defective in what he receives; and we assumed this type to be an extreme compared with the charitable man. But as a rule, prodigals are also for the most part avaricious, being excessive as well in the receipts they accumulate as in the gifts they make: they are of a grasping disposition, owing to the desire they have to spend, and their inability to indulge their desire. Their own resources being soon exhausted, they are compelled to replenish them by other means; and at the same time, as they have no regard for what is fitting, they try to gain money from any and every source, as chance may enable them. They simply care for giving; but as for how they ought to give or whence they ought to receive—for that they have no further concern. Hence their gifts are not really charitable gifts: they are not nobly conceived, nor have they a noble motive, nor are they bestowed in a proper manner; but at times such men enrich those whom it were fitting to be poor; and while they will give nothing to men of sober character, they lavish their wealth freely upon those who flatter them, or who afford them some amusement.

Hence prodigals are for the most part sensualists as well. In consequence of their not living according to the law of Reason, they fall away to the pursuit of pleasures; and in consequence of being habituated to spend lavishly, they grow to be extravagant in their own selfish lusts, and are therefore intensely sensual.

But while, on the one hand, the prodigal falls to this low depth of depravity, if he be left without guidance or control, on the other hand, if he be brought under discipline, and meet with proper supervision, he may still attain to a virtuous ideal.

iii.—Contrast between Liberality and Avarice.

Prodigality less vicious than avarice.

On the other hand, avarice is incurable. It is old age and the varied forms of helplessness, which are thought to make men avaricious. It is, moreover, more thoroughly innate in men than prodigality is, the mass of men being more fond of saving than of giving.

1. Avarice, *pure and simple*, is the combination of rapacious gains with parsimonious expenditure.

It is also a fault of widest range, and assumes many shapes, there being apparently many forms which avarice may take. Consisting, as it may, of two conditions, defect of giving and excess of receiving, it is not found in all cases 'full-blown' and absolute, but in certain cases, each aspect has a separate growth:—*i.e.*, some men err from excess of receipts, others from defect in their outlay.

2. But it is often found detached as, (a) Parsimony and honesty;

1. The one class, under such appellations as 'stingy,' 'parsimonious,' 'niggardly,' are entirely defective in giving; nevertheless, they do not covet other men's goods, nor even desire to obtain them. [This self-restraint is owing on the part of some of them to a certain sense of equity, and a religious fear of what

is base. This certainly is the motive from which some of them act, or at any rate profess to act—that they may never be compelled to do a disgraceful deed. Of this class is the skinflint and others of his stamp—named as they are, from the excess of their care never to give to anyone under any circumstances. On the part of others, on the contrary, the motive of their self-restraint is a motive of fear—the idea, that is, that it is not easy to take the things of others without offering to others in return of one's own: they are best pleased, therefore, neither to accept a gift, nor to make one.]

2. The other class, on the contrary, are excessive in respect of taking, from the fact of their receiving from any, and every source, whatever they can; *e.g.*, those who practise unprincipled professions, brothel-keepers and men of that class, and men who lend small sums at extravagant rates. All such men receive gains from unlawful sources, and to an unlawful amount. But the stigma of 'unlawful gains' is common to all of them, since, for the sake of gains, and of contemptible gains, they all incur foul disgrace.

(β) Parsimony and dishonesty (or want of high principle).

I say 'contemptible gains,' because, since those who receive considerable sums in illegitimate ways—*e.g.*, tyrants who sack cities and pillage temples, are not properly denominated 'uncharitable' or 'illiberal,' but rather scoundrels, sacrilegious and unjust, on the other hand, the gambler, the pickpocket, and the robber, do belong to the class of those who are avaricious, since they make disgraceful gains. It is for the sake of gain that both the one and the other carry on their traffic, and incur foul shame, the robber class running perilous risks in the hope of the booty, and the gambler making a profit out of his friends, to whom he ought rather to make gifts. Both of these classes, therefore, are lovers of base gain, wishing as they do to make their gains by unlawful means; and all such acquisitions are, without exception, contrary to the law of charity.

Fittingly, then, is avarice called the opposite of charity, as well because it is a greater evil than prodigality, as because men fall into worse error in respect thereof, than in respect of the prodigality which is described above.

Let this analysis suffice to describe charity and the vices which are opposed thereto.

On the other hand, avarice is incurable: there is no hope even that the avaricious man may grow to be better from increased experience and advancing age:—the fact of a man's having gained experience of the affairs of life, old age itself,

and the evils which flow from old age, imbecility in all its forms and its sense of misery, make the feeling of avarice more intense by far. Apart from these considerations, men are naturally more inclined to avarice than they are to prodigality: the mass of men are fond of money, and grasping to gain it. There are not very many who are disposed to give, and prodigals are the rarest of all men to meet with. This, therefore, is a reason why prodigality is by far preferable to avarice—since, as has been shown above, it is manifestly nearer to the ideal of virtue.

But independently of this argument, avarice is an evil which has many shapes there seem to be many forms in which it is found. Being concerned as well with taking as with receiving, one class of the avaricious are viciously disposed in regard to giving, and another class in regard to receiving.

1. The one class neither give aught to anyone, nor are willing to receive aught from anyone—in some cases through a kind of natural fairness, and to avoid being constrained to do a base action, in other cases from apprehension lest they might be at some time compelled themselves to give, and from a consequent desire neither to receive nor to give. Men of this type are called niggardly, mean, stingy, implying that they are all defective in giving; and among them, of course, is the skinflint.

2. The other class are excessive in receiving, and comprises those who will do or suffer any infamy to gain an advantage, however wrong the manner, however unlawful the means. All men of this type are called lovers of base gains, such as are brothel-keepers, usurers, gamblers, petty thieves, and robbers: all of whom for the sake of gain,—and that a paltry gain—incur the brand of shameful infamy. [I say 'petty gain,' since those who run such infamous risks, and who receive money from unlawful sources in an unrighteous manner for the sake of *vast* gains, are not 'lovers of base gain,' but are designated 'miscreants,' 'sacrilegious,' and 'unjust':—such as are tyrants and those who sack cities and pillage temples.] The gambler receives money from improper sources (*i.e.* from his friends, to whom he ought rather to give,) but only in trifling amounts, and therefore it is that he is 'a lover of sordid gain.' The robber, again, incurs great risks, but only for the sake of a paltry gain; similarly the petty thief and others of his type.

There is good reason, then, why avarice is called the opposite of charity as being (1) further removed from charity than prodigality is (*i.e.*, it is a worse evil than prodigality), and (2) because men err in more numerous ways in respect of it than in respect of prodigality.

Let this account suffice to describe the nature of charity, and of the vices opposed to it.

D.—MUNIFICENCE.

i.—Characteristics of Munificence explained.

(*a*) SUBJECT-MATTER OF MUNIFICENCE AND OF ITS OPPOSITES DEFINED.

Contrasts between Munificence and Charity.

The subject for us to treat of next in order to Charitableness would seem to be Munificence—this also being, apparently, a form of excellence displayed in money matters. There is, however, this difference between the two: munificence does not apply, as liberality does, to all transactions depending upon money, but only to such as require great outlay, and therein surpasses liberality in the point of magnitude. As the name itself indicates, it is an expenditure conspicuous for its extent.

But the extent of the munificence must bear due relation to the nature of its object. There is not the same opportunity for munificence to an ordinary sea-captain as there is to the Chief of a Religious Embassy. The standard of propriety is not the same under all circumstances: it must be viewed in relation to particular persons, to the exigences of a particular time and place, and to the objects upon which the expenditure is made.

Munificence limited to grand and striking occasions.

Again, a man who spends worthily but only on slight or ordinary occasions is not styled 'munificent,' as the line runs:

"Oft to a wayfarer alms did I give."

The title of munificence must be limited to one who spends worthily on *grand* occasions. The munificent man is a charitable man, but the charitable man is not, for all his liberality, on that account munificent.

[The falling short of the munificent disposition is called 'meanness,' and the excess of munificence is called 'vulgarity,' 'want of taste,' and similar terms, not because such habits go beyond the mark in extent in proper objects, but because they show themselves off on occasions where they ought not to do, and that in an unworthy manner. These deviations shall be described more minutely later on.]

The subject for us to treat of next in order to Charitableness is Munificence, since each resembles the other in having for its subject-matter money and the expenditure of money. But there is this difference between them: charitableness is concerned with giving and receiving and expending, whereas munificence is concerned simply with expending. Again, charity is concerned with the expenditure of small and trifling sums, whereas munificence is concerned with great and important sums: as the name itself indicates, munificence is an 'expenditure conspicuous in magnitude.'

The extent, however, to which munificence may go is not identical in all cases: the same expenditure is not suitable under all circumstances, but such only as is relative to particular exigences. The outlay which is proper to an ordinary Sea Captain is not the same as that which is proper to the Chief of a Religious Embassy: it is only when the one or the other has expended what is suitable to the importance of his office—in a befitting manner and upon proper objects, that he is called 'munificent.' On the other hand, a man who expends what is indeed befitting both to himself and to the recipient of his bounty, but an amount that is not great, is not styled munificent at all, but only charitable, as for example one who says:

"Oft to a wayfarer alms did I give."

The munificent man is one who expends vast sums that are suitable to his own position and to that of the persons benefited thereby. Consequently the munificent man is charitable, but the charitable man is not in all cases munificent.

[The falling short of this ideal of munificence is called meanness, and the extravagance of it is called 'vulgarity' and 'want of taste,' and similar terms—states of mind which arise not from their going beyond munificence in extent of suitable expenditure, but from their making expenses upon unworthy objects and

in an unworthy manner. We shall have to speak with greater exactness of the vicious states which deviate from the perfect pattern of munificence by-and-by: we must now proceed to treat more definitely of Munificence].

(*b*) CONDITIONS TO WHICH THE CONDUCT OF THE MUNIFICENT MAN MUST CONFORM.

Munificence, as a virtue, must exhibit both the internal and external characteristics of a virtuous activity.

1. The munificent man may be characterised as a moral artist: he is a man capable of taking a true measure of moral opportunities; and so in making a great outlay, he shows perfect consistency and taste. As we explained at starting, the moral attitude which a man's mind assumes is not a fixed or absolute thing, but is coloured and determined by the separate acts out of which it is formed, and by the objects upon which it is exercised. Hence each act of expense which the munificent man makes will be of vast extent and suitable to his own character, and the results achieved will themselves also be correspondingly great and becoming. In this way the expense will be great and commensurable with the result.

Consequently, the result ought to be worthy of the expense, and the expense worthy of the result, or even go beyond it.

2. But the motive which the munificent man will have in view in his expenditure will be the moral ideal:—that is, a condition common to all the forms of moral excellence.

3. Moreover, he will have a delight in his expenditure.

4. He will also be ungrudging in his outlay, minute calculation being indicative of a paltry nature.

5. He will consider how a thing can be effected most nobly and most befittingly, rather than 'at what cost' or 'how most cheaply.'

6. He must of course necessarily be liberal, since the liberal man will also spend what he ought to spend and in a fitting manner.

7. Herein what is characteristic of the munificent man is grandeur—*e.g.*, grandeur of size; though charity is conversant with the same subject matter, the munificent man will, with the same outlay as the charitable man, make *the effect* of his charity much more splendid. Of course the excellence of a 'possession' is not the same as the excellence of a 'result'; a possession is most valued that is worth most—*e.g.*, gold; but a result is most valued when it is grand and noble. The contemplation of a grand achievement leaves an impression of awe; and such is always the effect of munificence. The perfection of a work, therefore, is 'magnificence on a grand scale.'

1. The munificent man, therefore, is, as it were, a moral artist, taking a view of his surroundings in accordance with reason, and arranging all the details of his action in harmony with the standard of perfect fitness: he is one who will make a great outlay in perfect taste, and as befits his character. The activities which flow from a certain state exhibit the consequences of that mental state, and for that reason a mental state or 'habit' is said to be 'defined' by the activities in which it issues (as was explained in Book II.). Consequently the expenses which the munificent man himself makes are great, and worthy not only of his own character but also of the work upon which they are made, which itself also is great. In this way the expenditure will be worthy of its result, and the result will justify the outlay; or if one must needs exceed the other, the result will be more splendid than the outlay: and this is more specially characteristic of the munificent man.

2. But the expenditure which the munificent man makes, will, in the first place, have for its motive the realisation of his moral ideal—that being a condition common to all the virtues—a motive which all good men must feel in common.

3. Further he will have pleasure in giving.

4. He will also be ungrudging in his munificence, and will make no petty economies which would bring him down to the level of the mean man.

5. In view of his own object he will consider how best and most effectively his work may be attained, and his chief consideration will be on that score. But in regard to the question of cost which may be suitable to that result, and in regard to any feeling that not a whit too much should be expended, but that the result should be attained with the smallest conceivable outlay—he does not consider that as of much account, petty calculations being rather characteristic of meanness.

6. It is essential also that, as has been shown, the munificent man shall be a charitable man, though the charitable man is not always munificent. The munificent man expends fitting sums in a fitting manner on fitting occasions (and so far he is the same as the charitable man), but he also spends great sums where great objects are at stake, and that is the special feature in his character which distinguishes him from the charitable man.

7. Often the munificent man, with an equal outlay, makes a work not the same as that of the charitable man, but one more splendid. For instance, let us say that it is necessary to make a sacred offering: the charitable man will offer some kind of golden vessel, and will have precious stones set in it, whereas the munificent man will build a great and beautiful Temple, and will erect statues in it, or, may be, he will build bridges or construct something else that is great and imposing, with no greater outlay than the charitable man makes. The work of the munificent man is a work in the absolute sense of the term, whereas the work of the charitable man is a possession rather than a work. The excellence of a possession is of course distinct from the excellence of a work. The excellence of a *possession* depends upon its being of the greatest costliness and value; for instance, gold and precious stones. The excellence of a *work* depends upon its being grand, and noble, and imposing, and that it is which is most consonant to the aim of the munificent man. The excellence of a work, in fact, is 'magnificence on a grand scale.'

(*c*) MUNIFICENCE BELONGS CHIEFLY TO PUBLIC LIFE AND TO GREAT MEN.

Now munificence belongs properly to those expenses which we call 'costly,' for example, offerings to the gods, erections in their honour, and public sacrifices, and to an equal extent to whatever concerns the whole subject of Religion, and such services rendered to the State as are objects of laudable

The special province wherein Munificence is displayed is that of extraordinary occasions where distin-

guished honour may be paid to Religion or to the State.

ambition; where, for example, men think it their duty to provide a magnificent Chorus, or to furnish a ship sumptuously, or to entertain their whole city at a feast. In each and all of these occasions the agent and his act are tested by reference to two points—what is his position, and what are his resources? It is necessary that the expenditure should be worthy of a man's position and resources, and that it should be not only commensurate with the result, but also suitable to the position of the agent.

The inference is that a poor man cannot be munificent, since he has no resources whereby he could make a large outlay with graceful effect: the man who attempts it under such circumstances, is a fool. Munificence is beyond the character which the poor man has to sustain, and contrary to what is right: what is truly right is relative to a man's own proper position. The persons to whom munificent expenditure is becoming are those who have traditions of the kind already stored up in their own lives, or in the lives of their ancestors, or in the lives of those with whom they are connected,—those, that is, who are nobly-born or illustrious, and have kindred advantages. All such conditions admit of grandeur and dignity.

The munificent man has these qualifications in the highest degree, and his munificence is chiefly shown in circumstances of this kind, as has been explained, these being occasions of the highest importance and most esteemed.

Works are munificent which are also costly—for example, offerings made for the sake of Religion, the founding of sacrifices and the erection of temples, services of laudable ambition to the State, the providing of Choruses and the furnishing of ships, or giving a feast to a whole city where that is necessary.

But not only must the results themselves be munificent and the expenditure consistently therewith munificent, but they must be becoming to the author of them, above all things on the score of expense. A poor man cannot be a munificent one: if he put his hand to great undertakings he will be a fool for attempting what is beyond his duty and the character which he has to sustain. The persons to whom munificence seems most becoming are those who have ofttimes done similar things or whose ancestors have been munificent.

The greater number of works are devoted to the State or to the service of Religion, these being chief occasions of munificence.

(*d*) MUNIFICENCE MAY ALSO BE SHOWN IN PRIVATE LIFE.

There are, however, analogous occasions even in private life.

In private life the occasions for munificence are such as occur once for all, for instance a marriage and similar events, or such as the whole city are interested in, or where men of high station are concerned—the entertainment of strangers, the dispatch of Legations, the making of gifts, or the return of gifts. It is not

upon himself that the munificent man spends his wealth, but upon public interests; and gifts have a kind of resemblance to religious offerings.

It is also the province of the munificent man to fit up his own house in a style to harmonise with his wealth, that too being a kind of proper splendour.

It is his genius also to spend his wealth by preference upon objects that are permanent, those being the noblest.

But in each and every occasion he will maintain what is seemly and beautiful: the same objects are not suitable to Gods and to men, in a temple and at a tomb. But in all his expenses every item is 'great' after its kind, and though a thing is absolutely most magnificent, when it is a great expense devoted to a great object, yet a thing is also magnificent relatively to its time and place.

There is a difference also between greatness in a result and greatness in expense. A very beautiful ball or cup shows munificence in a gift to a child, though the cost thereof be small and no effort of charity.

For this reason it is part of the munificent man, in whatsoever sphere he act, to act munificently: such a result cannot easily be surpassed, and is worthy of the expenditure.

Such then is the character of the munificent man.

But some works are of a private nature—such, that is, as are done once for all—wedding-feasts, building of houses and similar things; though it is more especially characteristic of the munificent man to spend his wealth upon public objects, or upon the service of God—certainly not in the very least upon himself.

It is farther a sign of munificence that a work is abiding and permanent, things of that kind causing admiration and being honourable to their author.

We ought, however, to seek for what is befitting in works in another fashion, and to consider what are the occasions to which special works are fitting and in character. The works which are becoming to a public object are not the same as those which befit a private object, nor do the same befit a temple as befit a tomb. Consequently the works of the munificent man are great and admirable when compared with other works of the same class or description. The tombs which he builds are grand, compared with other tombs; his temples grand, compared with other temples; his bridges grand compared with other bridges; and similarly in all his undertakings. In truth the munificent man does not simply look to the extent or greatness of work which are fitting to a certain class of work:—it is not the same thing for a work to be great absolutely on the score of expense, and for it to be great when compared with similar works of the same description, but there is a material difference. A very beautiful ball or cup is trifling on the score of expense, yet it is a munificent gift for children, and grand when compared with other gifts suited for children. Since, therefore, the grandeur that is relative to a particular category is distinct from the grandeur that depends upon expense, it is necessary for the munificent man to have regard to both aspects, and to act munificently in accordance with the scale of magnificence which is proper to each style of work. If carried out according to this rule, his work w be great and admirable and noble, and will not easily be surpassed by other wo of the same order.

Such then is the character of the munificent man.

ii.—Contrast between Munificence and its extremes.

(*a*) COMPARISON BETWEEN MUNIFICENCE AND OSTENTATION.

Ostentation is the caricature of outward display which indicates a want of inward nobility.

On the other hand the man who goes beyond these limits and is 'vulgarly ostentatious' falls into excess from spending his money in violation of what is right, as has been explained. On matters of properly trifling expense, he makes a large outlay, and displays a magnificence that is 'out of tune' with his surroundings—for instance, if, in feasting his fellow-guildsmen, he were to give a banquet as sumptuous as a wedding-breakfast; or if, in furnishing a chorus for comedians he were to usher them in in purple robes, on their first appearance on the stage (as the Megarians did). But the vulgar man will have no noble aim in what he does, but will simply try to make an exhibition of his wealth, fancying that by his ostentation he may gain attention; and where he ought to make a large outlay, he spends but a trifle, and where a trifle would do, he expends a fortune.

The character which exceeds the due limits of munificence and is 'vulgarly ostentatious' is that of the man who spends money in excess of what is right, and in an unseemly manner and upon improper objects:—that is the reason why he is said to 'go beyond the munificent man.' In view of trifling objects, of which the expense is trifling, he makes a great and vast outlay, and is anxious to be thought munificent in contravention of what is proper and of that which befits the spirit of true munificence. For instance, he feasts his fellow-guildsmen in the most expensive manner, just as though he were celebrating a wedding; and in finding a chorus for comedians on their entrance upon the stage, spending money enthusiastically upon them as for an object of common profit; or again, in the exhibition of comedies, in place of goat's skins, which were the proper coverings upon the stage, to have purple robes, like the Megarians did. In acting thus the vulgar man has not a noble object in view, but simply tries to make an exhibition of his wealth:—he fancies that by such means he will be thought famous, and where there is need of great expenditure, he spends but a trifle, and where there is need of but a trifling outlay, he spends lavishly.

That is the type of man who goes beyond the due limits of munificence, and is consequently styled 'vulgarly ostentatious.'

(*b*) COMPARISON BETWEEN MUNIFICENCE AND MEANNESS.

Meanness is the effort to disguise parsimony under a false magnificence.

At the opposite pole is the mean man—one who will fall short in every particular. He is a man who, in making a vast outlay, will spoil the whole éclat of the thing in some trifling detail. He is a man who is ever hesitating in what he has to do, and calculating how he can spend least, and bemoaning the spending

of that little, and fancying that he is ever doing more than he ought to do.

Both these dispositions—to spend extravagantly and to spend meanly—are vicious states of mind; yet they do not of course entail flagrant disgrace, inasmuch as they are not injurious to others, nor particularly unseemly.

The man who falls *below* the ideal of munificence (and is therefore called the *mean* man) is defective in every particular. Never having a noble motive in what he spends, he naturally calculates how he may spend the least possible sum, so far as circumstances admit. Ofttimes after spending more than the proper amount, when his work is positively looking to its consummation, in a spirit of petty economy he leaves it unfinished on the score of some trifling outlay. In every single thing that he does, he is constantly hesitating and calculating and fancying that he is really spending more than is necessary, and grieving that he has spent much.

Both these dispositions, meanness and vulgar ostentation, are faulty states, yet they do not entail open shame, because they are not injurious to others nor are so very disgraceful nor unseemly.

E.—ELEVATION OF SOUL.

i.—Characteristics of Elevation of Soul.

(*a*) SUBJECT-MATTER OF MORAL ELEVATION AND OF ITS OPPOSITES DEFINED.

Now the objects wherein Moral Elevation is displayed, seem, from the very force of the term, to be objects of greatness; but what precisely those objects of greatness are, we must proceed to inquire. In this inquiry it is quite immaterial whether we take under review the moral state as it is in the abstract, or as it is exemplified in the individual. The man then who has this characteristic of Moral Elevation seems to be one 'who esteems himself of high worth, and whose life is worthy of his profession.' [If he make this high profession upon insufficient grounds, he is a fool or infatuated person, and can never take rank among those whose lives are conformable to virtue.]

Definition of the μεγαλόψυχος.

The man of elevated character, therefore, is what I have described. But if a man be of little worth, and estimates himself accordingly, he has self-respect and modesty, but no dignity of soul. Moral Elevation requires grandeur of scale for its exercise, just as beauty requires greatness of size: small people

Three variations of this ideal: (1.) The modest man;

may be comely and well-proportioned, but not graceful or beautiful. If, on the other hand, a man does estimate himself as of high worth, but without deserving such a character, he is vain-glorious—though there are cases where a man may estimate himself too highly, without being a vain-glorious man. Again, if a man rates himself less highly than he ought to do, he has but little of moral dignity—if, that is, he rates himself below his real deserts, whatever those deserts may be, whether great or moderate or small; and this would seem to be pre-eminently the case when a man is really of high merit, since what would such an one have done if he had not been of this high worth?

(2.) The vain-glorious man;

(3.) The humble man.

In the greatness, therefore, of his estimation of himself, the man who has elevation of soul is at the farthest limit, but from the point of view of real propriety he holds the virtuous 'mean:' he does but estimate himself at a worth which represents his true character. Other men shoot beyond the mark, or fall short of it.

Let us now proceed at once to treat of Elevation of Soul. As the very word leaves us to infer, the objects wherein it is displayed are objects of greatness; and we have only to consider what precisely those objects are. It is evidently the same thing to consider Moral Elevation in the abstract or the concrete illustration of it:—it is quite immaterial whether we know its mental characteristics *per se* or the individual in whom they are found.

The man, then, who has greatness of soul displays his greatness upon grand objects, and grand objects are such as befit his own character:—when, that is, he is in himself a man of high merit, and judges himself to be worthy of high distinction. If he be only of slight worth and estimates himself accordingly, he is not called a man of moral dignity but of modesty and self-respect. The conditions upon which Moral Elevation depends are greatness of sphere. Compared with the modest man, the man of Moral Elevation bears precisely the same relation that the beautiful man does to the comely man: the beautiful man only exhibits his beauty in conjunction with grandeur of size, and the comely man requires his comeliness to be combined with insignificant stature, and is called 'well proportioned,' but never beautiful.

The man of moral elevation is, therefore, such as I have indicated. Of the characters which diverge from his ideal in either direction, the man who is extravagant in his self-esteem is vain-glorious, as estimating himself of high worth without deserving it. [However, a man who is worthy of high honour, but estimates himself even more highly, is not in every case vain-glorious.] On the other hand, the man who falls below a proper self-esteem is a man of abject spirit. He is a man who though deserving of high esteem, values himself below his deserts, or a man who is worthy of but little esteem and rates himself below that little. He is more entirely of an abject spirit, if he be worthy of high esteem and yet is not conscious of his own proper position: what kind of man would such an one be if in truth he were of but slight or insignificant desert? Such then are the types of character that deviate in either direction from the man of true elevation of soul. [Of course the man of moral elevation seems to be 'an *extreme* man,' in so far as he is concerned with great objects; but in so far as he takes his stand upon a basis of right unswervingly, and seeks neither for what is beyond what is right nor for what is on the hither side of it, he is within 'the mean' of virtue.]

(*b*) HONOUR THE PECULIAR PROVINCE IN WHICH MORAL ELEVATION IS SHOWN.

Seeing, then, that the man of moral elevation esteems himself of high value, and is worthy of that esteem, especially where the highest interests are involved, there is one thing with which he will be concerned more than any other. The worth or esteem in which a man is regarded, has relation to external goods; and of external goods, we should regard that as the greatest which we attribute to the Gods, and which men in high positions mostly covet, and which is the guerdon to be won in striving for the noblest aims. Such are the conditions of *honour*, that being the very highest of external goods. Honours, therefore, and disgraces form the province in which the man of moral elevation shows his character and attains his ideal. It is indeed evidently, without question, honour with which men of this type are concerned. It is honour more than anything else that great men lay claim to as their due, an honour that is relative to their various merits.

The μεγαλόψυχος shows the elevation of his soul in his attitude towards the greatest objects, and especially *honour*.

The man of abject mind, on the other hand, is deficient as well when measured by his own standard, as when measured by the standard which the man of moral dignity has before him; and the vain-glorious man is extravagant in his claims when measured by his merits, though he cannot even claim to surpass that rank in which the man of moral elevation stands.

Since the man of moral elevation is concerned with external goods, of which he is thought worthy according to his rightful due, he will of course be concerned with either money, or pleasure, or honour. Since, further, he is concerned with the greatest of the goods attainable among men (being, as he is, a man who estimates himself as worthy of the highest of those goods, and indeed deserves them), his special sphere will be the sphere of honour, honour being thought to be the greatest of all human and external goods; which is the reason why we pay the tribute of honour pre-eminently to the divine. The province therefore in which moral elevation is displayed is honour or dishonour.

Apart from these considerations, this truth is obvious from a simple enumeration of particulars. We see all men of moral elevation striving, more keenly than for anything else, for the honour that is fitly due to them.

On the other hand, the man of abject mind is deficient herein, as well when compared with his own standard (since he rates himself below his proper worth) as also when compared with the standard of the man of moral elevation. The vain-glorious man on the contrary is extravagant in his estimate when tried by his own standard, his pride being greater than his merit; but he does not surpass the high-minded man in loftiness of pride.

(*c*) RELATION OF MORAL ELEVATION TO THE IDEAL OF PERFECT VIRTUE.

But since the man of moral elevation is worthy of the highest honours, he must be perfect in character. If the man who is better than others is worthy of proportionately higher honour, the man who is 'noblest and best' is worthy of the very highest honour. It follows that, for a man to be genuinely 'noble of soul,' he must have a virtuous character; and it would seem, in fact, to be characteristic of such an one, that whatever is *grand* in each single virtue is found in him. It would be utterly inconsistent with a noble character, for example, to take to cowardly flight with arms swinging, or to commit an injustice. What motive could a man have that he should do shameful acts, when there is nothing in his eyes higher than his own ideal? If we look to the conditions of the case, the conception of a man of moral elevation must be admitted to be an utterly absurd one, if elevation of soul does not imply goodness of heart. A man would not in any way be worthy of honour if he were a bad man: honour is the reward of moral excellence, and is paid to none but to the virtuous.

But the attitude of the μεγαλόψυχος towards honour would be ridiculous, unless his claims were supported by a life of stainless goodness.

It seems, then, that elevation of soul is, as it were, a kind of lustre or beauty, arising from the possession of every form of moral excellence: while it gives to the virtues a richer development, apart from the virtues it is itself unattainable. The inference is, that it is a difficult thing to be in truth a man of elevated soul: since, in truth, it is impossible to be so, without possessing the formed character which we call 'gentlemanliness.'

In fact, 'Moral Elevation' is only the lustre of all the virtues intensified by harmonious combination.

Now the man of elevated soul deems himself worthy of the highest honours, and has a character that bears out his claim. It is essential, therefore, that, if a man would have an elevated soul, he should be himself of a noble character and thoroughly virtuous in all his dispositions—brave and just and excellent in every form of virtue. Regarding all things as insignificant and in no way worthy of himself, and being not deceived in this estimate of himself, but holding a true opinion, what motive could he have to do anything disgraceful or disreputable? How in fact is it possible that he should do anything of the kind?—such conduct would be inconsistent with the very conception of moral elevation. If he were a bad man, how could he be worthy of honour? If he were a bad man, and detected in base courses, and yet thought himself worthy of honour, he would bring himself into ridicule and contempt. Honour is the reward of virtue, and justly is paid to none but to the virtuous.

The man of elevated soul, therefore, has every form of moral excellence comprised in his own character. Elevation of soul is, as it were, a kind of efflorescence

of all the virtues: it is never found independently of the virtues, and where it is found it makes the virtues grander, richer, and more beautiful, giving to them their due relation and judging each to be worthy of what in truth it is. It follows that it is extremely difficult for a man to have an elevated soul, since it is impossible for him to be so apart from every form of moral excellence. Yet to possess every form of moral excellence, and that in the utmost perfection, is extremely difficult.

(*d*) RELATION OF MORAL ELEVATION TO HONOURS AND DIGNITIES.

The peculiar province, therefore, wherein a man shows his moral elevation, is that of honour and of dishonour. When great honours are conferred upon him by those who are themselves virtuous men, he will feel pleasure, but not extravagant pleasure, considering that he is but meeting with the reward that is his due, or even less than his due. There is, indeed, no adequate honour that could possibly be paid to perfect virtue. Notwithstanding, he will of course accept the honour accorded to him, for the reason that those who accord it, have it not in their power to bestow upon him aught that is greater. But as for the honour accorded to him by ordinary people upon trifling occasions, he will altogether ignore it: his merit is not to be measured by such a standard as theirs. In the same spirit he will act in regard to slurs cast upon him: fair or deserved obloquy will never fall to his lot.

Only the highest honours can be paid to him, and only such can he accept: his merits can only be measured by the loftiest standard.

In this special sense, therefore, the objects upon which the man of elevated soul shows his character are honours, as has been explained. But even in relation to wealth and power, and the alternations of prosperity and of adversity, he will hold the same equable and self-contained demeanour, whatever may befall him: in prosperity he will not be over-elated, and in adversity his sorrow will not overwhelm him. Even in regard to honour, his attitude is not such as to imply that it is the supreme good. Positions of power or of affluence are desirable only with a view to honour: those at any rate who hold them, wish by means thereof to be honoured. Consequently, when even honour itself is of trifling weight with a man, he will rate all lower aims accordingly. Hence it is that men of moral elevation are thought to be supercilious.

What is true of honour, applies *à fortiori* to all subordinate advantages.

But prosperous circumstances seem to contribute to the formation of moral elevation in the character. Men of high family, and those who have power or wealth, are thought worthy of honour, as being in a position of pre-eminence (and whatever exceeds

There are certain favourable conditions which foster the development of

moral elevation: but in all such cases perfect goodness is a primary and essential element.

in good, is proportionately honoured). Hence, such advantages as wealth or birth make the elevation of a man's character more striking still; and there are those who honour such men simply on these grounds. In strict truth, however, it is only the man of moral worth who deserves to be honoured. But where both these conditions, external advantages and personal excellence, are found combined in a man, he is more deservedly thought worthy of honour. On the other hand, those who possess such advantages, and yet are void of personal goodness, have no right to rate themselves highly, nor are they properly called men of elevated souls. High worth and a feeling of elevation are impossible, if severed from genuine and perfect goodness. Those who have nothing but wealth or family as their title to esteem, grow to be disdainful and insolent, since it is no easy task to bear with grace and dignity the burden of prosperity. Being incapable of enduring their good fortune, and fancying themselves superior to others, they look with disdain upon their fellows, while they themselves behave as wantonly as they may. They do but caricature the man of real elevation, though they have no resemblance to his character, and only succeed in such details as they may: *i.e.*, though they do not themselves act conformably to virtue as he does, yet they do, like him, look down upon others. It is only the man who has real elevation of soul, who justifies his contempt for others, his opinions being agreeable to truth: other men, according to their own caprice, despise one another.

The special province, therefore, in which moral elevation is shown, is honour and dishonour, as has been shown. When great honours are bestowed upon the high-souled man by eminent men, he feels pleasure in the thought that he is meeting with the tribute that is his due and of which he is worthy, or it may be, with even less than his real deserts. For perfect virtue of course there is no honour that could be paid by men that would be adequate. Notwithstanding, if he feels pleasure, it is only for this reason—that those who offer him honour are doing all that is in their power, and have no greater honour which they *could* offer. But as for honour accorded him by ordinary persons, he will absolutely ignore it—particularly if it is accorded for slight reasons;—for instance, if one were to honour an Achilles because he was well-skilled in playing the harp. In the same spirit he judges of the slurs cast upon him: he measures them by the standard of what is *due* to him.

A man shows, then, the elevation of his soul most chiefly, as has been explained, in relation to honours and dishonours. But he is also concerned, by consequence of association, with wealth and power, and with all forms of prosperity or adversity; and in such relations he will maintain the same equable moderation and propriety. He will experience no feeling that is unworthy of him in view of any vicissitude in these matters: in prosperity he will not be unduly elated, nor in adversity will he be overwhelmed in sorrow. He will never regard honour as the greatest good, nor will he comport himself in regard thereto as though it were.

But if he hold an attitude of indifference in regard to honour, much greater will be his unconcern in regard to wealth and power. Honour is more desirable than power or wealth, wealth and power being only desirable for the honour which they entail: the wish of those who are possessed of wealth and influence is that they may gain honour by means thereof. If, therefore, a man regards honour as a trifling thing, much more will he despise other things. Hence it is that men of elevated souls are thought to be supercilious, since they regard nothing on earth with real esteem.

But inasmuch as the gifts of fortune are thought worthy of honour, they too will contribute to the formation of an elevated character. Whatever is pre-eminent on the score of advantages is proportionately worthy of greater honour. But the prosperous man is pre-eminent on the score of goods. Hence prosperous circumstances help to form an elevated character. The prosperous man regards himself as worthy of great honour—on the ground of his good fortune; and for that reason alone he is honoured by some. In strict truth, however, the only man who is worthy of honour is the man who is noble in his own personal character. Still, where both personal merit and external advantages are combined in the same person, such an one is thought worthy of greater honour than the man who simply has personal excellence to commend him. On the other hand, a man who is simply a prosperous man, abounding in external goods and having nothing in common with personal merit, such an one does not deserve to be honoured at all, nor can he rightfully lay claim to high distinction, nor is he styled 'a man of moral elevation,' at any rate by the standard of Right Reason. It is impossible for any one to have elevation of soul independently of perfect virtue, as has been already explained. This is the reason why, for the most part, persons in great prosperity are found to be disdainful and insolent: without personal excellence it is no easy task to bear the burden of prosperity with true grace and moderation. Such men as these, being incapable of bearing good fortune with propriety, fancy that their prosperity makes them better than their fellows, and are consequently disdainful towards them, though they themselves act in all respects irrationally and as chance suggests: they essay, that is, to copy the man of elevated soul, and yet are utterly unlike him. If the man of real elevation despises others, he is entitled to do so, since what he thinks about himself is always true; and if, as is the case, he ventures on great undertakings, and is reckless of great risks, he has a virtuous motive in view and is intent upon great results. On the other hand, those whose merit is only in external advantages, pay no honour to personal worth, nor wish themselves to excel in virtue; and though they despise others, and wish their general conduct to resemble the conduct of the high-souled man, so far as in them lies, they fail to make the copy like the original from the fact of their having no personal merit of their own.

(*e*) RELATION OF MORAL ELEVATION TO COURAGE.

The man of moral elevation does not expose himself to trifling risks; nor is he fond of incurring risks at all, since there are few things for which he cares sufficiently. Still he is willing to face a great crisis; and when he *does* incur peril, he is unsparing of his life, knowing that under certain conditions it is not worth his while to live.

The μεγαλόψυχος is brave, but he does not deign to show his bravery except on grand occasions.

Again, the man of moral elevation is not constantly running risks: he is not one who incessantly exposes himself to danger, seeing that he does not heed mere casual opportunities, nor rush into peril for any slight or trifling cause. Still, he is the man to face a great crisis; and when he hazards himself on behalf of some great gain, or some grand interest, he is not sparing even of his own life.

(*f*) RELATION OF MORAL ELEVATION TO BENEVOLENCE.

The μεγαλόψυχος is the munificent giver of bounties to others, but scorns to be the recipient of favours himself.

Again, the man of moral elevation is of a disposition to do men service, though he is ashamed to have a service done to him. To confer a kindness is a mark of superiority: to be the subject of a kindness, of inferiority. If then a kindness is done to him, he will return it with increase: in this way, the man who did the kindness first will after all be the debtor for a greater kindness, and the person benefited.

Further, men of elevation are thought to remember those whom they may have helped, and to forget those who have helped them. If a man has received a favour, he is inferior to the one who has conferred it, but his wish is to be the superior. He has pleasure in hearing of his own good deeds, but it is distasteful to him to be reminded of his own obligations to others. [Hence Homer pictures Thetis as silent of her services to Zeus; and in the famous embassy the Spartans do not remind the Athenians of their services to Athens, but of the benefits which they have themselves experienced at their hands.] It is in fact the characteristic of moral elevation in a man that he has to ask nothing or scarcely anything from others, but himself to render assistance to others heartily and readily.

Again, the man of elevated soul delights to confer benefits upon others, but feels ashamed to have benefits conferred upon himself, to benefit others being an indication of superiority, to be the recipient of benefits, of inferiority: a man who has an exalted opinion of himself is pained at an inferior position falling to his lot. If, when a kindness has been shown to him, he chooses to do a kindness in return, he gives more than he has received, in order that he may make the man who commenced the offices of kindness after all a debtor to himself.

Further, a man of elevated soul seems to wish constantly to bear in mind those who have been kindly treated by him, and to forget those to whom he has himself been placed under obligation—not from any ingratitude (how indeed could that be, seeing that he gives more than he receives?), but because it is more natural to him and more befitting his character to confer a benefit than to receive one. He thinks it worthy, therefore, of his consideration and recollection that he does a kindness, that being noble and suitable to his character; but he disdains to remember that an obligation was conferred upon him, since he wishes ever to be in a position of superiority. When, therefore, men make mention of kindnesses, he hears of his own with pleasure, but of those which others have done him with dislike. [Hence it is that in the story of Homer, Thetis does not recount her services to Zeus, nor make mention before him of the good offices she has shown him, but only of the obligations which she has herself received at his hands. Similarly the Spartans wishing to gratify the Athenians, bring into the front the kindnesses which the Athenians have shown to them.] There is this further characteristic of the man of elevated soul, that he does not ask anything, or only with reluctance, from any one, though he himself is ready and willing to assist others wherein they wish for his assistance.

(*g*) RELATION OF MORAL ELEVATION TO THE CONDUCT AND DEMEANOUR OF SOCIAL LIFE.

Enumeration of the distinctive traits which mark the μεγαλόψυχος in his intercourse with his fellows and in his own personal deportment.

1. Again, the man of moral elevation comports himself with an air of greatness towards those who are in high position and prosperous circumstances, and with moderation towards those who are only moderately well off. It is a difficult thing, and proportionately grand, to overtop the mighty, and an easy thing to rise above ordinary men; and while there is nothing ignoble in a man's showing off his dignity among the great, it is a vulgar thing to do so among the humble, just as it would be contemptible to show off one's strength against the weak.

2. Again, he does not intermingle with ordinary occasions of honour, or where others have the ascendancy.

3. Again, he takes his leisure and is unconcerned except where great honour may be won or a great work achieved. He sets his hand to few enterprises, and such only as are great and famous.

4. Again, he is necessarily open in his antipathies and open in his preferences: to disguise his feelings of liking or disliking would indicate his being afraid. He cares more for truth than for reputation, and so he talks and acts without reserve. He is free of speech because of the contempt he has for men and things. Hence he is a truth-loving man,—except where he gives way to the irony of humour (and he is ironical, in a good-humoured way, towards the world at large).

5. Again, he cannot live in complaisance with others—unless it be with a friend. Complaisance is a slavish characteristic: hence all flatterers are servile, and all the lowly are flatterers.

6. Again, he is never fired with admiration, since there is nothing that is great in his eyes.

7. Again, he never feels malice: it is inconsistent with his character to carry in his heart the memory of a grudge against another, least of all the memory of injuries: rather it is his habit to pass them over.

8. Again, he is not fond of talking: he will not converse either about his own affairs or about the affairs of his neighbours. It is no concern of his that he should be praised, or that others should be blamed.

9. Again, he is not lavish of praise; so neither does he speak evil of others, not even of his enemies, unless it be by way insult.

10. Again, in view of the necessary ills of life, and of trifling cares, he is not in the very least disposed to bemoan or deprecate them, since to assume such a demeanour would indicate that he was seriously concerned about them.

11. Again, his disposition is to acquire for his possessions things grand though unproductive rather than things that are productive and useful: such a disposition being a greater indication of self-sufficiency.

12. Lastly, the proper carriage for one who is conscious of his greatness must be sedate, his voice deep, and his diction measured. The man who concerns himself about few things is not prone to hurry; nor is a man vehement if he thinks nothing important. A shrill voice and hasty steps come to a man through care.

Here we must leave our picture of our 'perfect man who is conscious of his greatness.'

1. Again, the man of elevated soul is haughty in dealing with men of high position, inasmuch as he does not regard with awe any kind of external advantage, in consequence whereof men in positions of authority claim to be entitled to reverence. On the other hand, towards men of moderate means and station he is courteous and complaisant, inasmuch as men of that class are more self-restrained and modest. Moreover, to overtop men of high consideration is a troublesome effort, and awe-striking to the beholder, and on that account specially befits the high-souled man, whereas it is easy to surpass ordinary men, and there is nothing grand in so doing. There is, again, nothing ignoble in 'standing on one's dignity' among eminent personages; but to do so before those who are of lowly rank is contemptible—just as if a man had made an exhibition of his bodily strength at the expense of weakly people, or of those who were enfeebled by sickness or old age.

2. Again, he will not go about seeking where he may be honoured:—such conduct would indicate littleness; nor will he be willing on any occasion whatever to be present where others take the lead, lest he should obtain only second honours, though worthy of the highest.

3. Again, he is not eager for action, but leisurely and unconcerned. What he is ever striving for is to take part in great enterprises where great issues are involved and whence great honour is to be gained. Such occasions rarely occur; and therefore there are few things in which he engages, though those in which he does engage are great and famous.

4. Again, he is unreserved in his hatred or in his friendship to those whom he regards as his friends or foes. He knows unfailingly that his feelings of liking or of aversion are conformable to right, and he does not dread the disapproval with which the world at large views his conduct. He is more concerned about truth and propriety than about his own reputation; and therefore it is that he is open in his friendships and open in his antipathies, and whatever he says he says openly, and whatever he does he does openly, owing to the disdain which he feels, as has been explained, for the opinion which the world has of him. Consequently he is bluntly self-assertive, and invariably speaks the truth (except when, perchance, he is humorously ironical with the common herd); and with them he says but little about himself, from not wishing to receive honour from common people.

5. Again, he lives and has intercourse, not with chance companions, but with his own friends. To associate with one who is not a friend, and to give him a

share of one's table and of one's house, is not the sign of moral elevation, but of a servile and obsequious nature. The obsequious are lowly, and, contrariwise, all who are lowly are obsequious.

6. Again, he is not fired with admiration, nor enthusiastic overmuch about ordinary things, since personally he considers nothing grand.

7. Again, he bears no malice nor ill-will: even the injury done to him by his enemies he considers a trifling matter, and as nowise calculated to mar his dignity, owing to the pre-eminence of his own excellence; especially as to cherish a feeling of ill-will, and to take account of things that are past, particularly of ill-deeds, is a sign of no elevated nature:—the man of true elevation pushes them out of sight. If he deigns not at all to make mention of the services which have been rendered to him (as has been explained above,) because there is nothing great in that, and it is but his due that services should be rendered to him, with much greater reason will he refuse to mention or to bear in mind the insults which he has received from his fellows.

8. Again, he does not endure to recount the exploits either of others or of himself. He has no interest in the praises bestowed either upon himself or upon others; nor yet does he concern himself that others should be blamed.

9. Again, as he is not lavish of praises, so neither does he speak evil of others: not even does he assail the character of his foes, except in their presence (since it is inconsistent with a magnanimous nature to put insult upon the absent).

10. Again, in view of the ills of life which are inevitable or trifling, he is not eager to deprecate them nor to bemoan them, if he stand in need of aught. Regarding nothing as great, and concerning himself about no human interests—how is it possible for him to act thus abjectly?

11. Again, esteeming what is beautiful above what is profitable, he regards objects of beauty, though unproductive, as better than those which are productive and useful (when these latter are not beautiful). In this spirit he judges of property, of trees, and of slaves. He will not possess such slaves as will be most profitable, but such as are beautiful and of virtuous life.

12. Lastly, the gait proper to a man who is conscious of his elevation is thought to be a slow one: his voice deep and his diction measured. It is impossible for a man who is concerned only about few things to be anxious and hurried, (the objects about which the world generally is excited being trifling in his eyes); nor for a man to be vehement, who regards nothing as great. The people who are eager, and who talk loudly, are those who have fluttered themselves about something and entertain a deep anxiety about it.

Such is the picture which 'the perfect man, conscious of the elevation of his soul,' presents in the world.

ii.—Deviations from the ideal of Moral Elevation.

The man who has the opposite defect of these qualities is 'the little-minded man,' while he who falls into excess is a braggart. But neither of these extremes seem to be vicious men: they are not actively injurious to others, but only misguided and in error.

The extremes of *μεγαλόψυχία*.

The man who is defective in moral elevation is a little-minded man, while the man who has an extravagant sense of it is a braggart. Yet neither the one nor the other is, strictly speaking, vicious: they are not actively injurious to society but simply misguided and in error,—so far, that is, as they diverge from what is fitting and the perfect ideal.

(*a*) CONTRAST BETWEEN MORAL ELEVATION AND SELF-ABASEMENT.

Humility argues some latent fault or sense of demerit,

The man who abases himself when deserving of great position, voluntarily deprives himself of the good things of which he is worthy, and seems further to have some defect in his character, from the fact of his not laying claim to his proper goods, and in fact ignoring his own merits:—surely if he had been conscious of merit, he would have striven to attain the honour due to it, honour being confessedly a good thing.

and reacts upon itself as tending consciously to lower the moral ideal.

Nevertheless, men of this stamp seem not to be so much dullards as diffidently indolent; still their self-abasement seems to make their characters morally worse. Men make the aim of their moral ideal to correspond with their own worth; but humble-minded men, having a low ideal and a low aim of life, abstain from noble achievements, and from noble pursuits from a sense of their own unworthiness; and for the same reason forego also the external advantages which are due to merit.

The man who abases himself, when deserving high dignity, is unconscious of his own merit, and hence deprives himself of that of which he is truly worthy; and in this respect he is injurious to his own self, since he fails to do himself good in consequence of his being ignorant of what properly belongs to himself. If he had known his own worth, he would have striven to realize the advantages due to it. Such a man, however, is not to be called a fool, but rather a dullard.

But this is not the only respect in which the man who abases himself, injures himself: there is another aspect of the case. In consequence of his ignorance of himself, he becomes positively deteriorated in character. He stands aloof from virtuous and ennobling achievements, and from grand enterprises, on the plea of humility, as being unworthy to take part therein. In the same spirit he foregoes the external advantages which would fall to him, on the plea that he regards such things as beyond his merit to accept.

(*b*) CONTRAST BETWEEN MORAL ELEVATION AND SELF-CONCEIT.

Conceited men love 'the pomp and circumstance' of honour, yet have not the merit which might give honour reality and meaning.

Self-conceited men, on the other hand, are fools as well as ignorant of their own selves; and that manifestly. As though they were men of worth they set their hands to famous enterprises, and are in the issue proved to be incapable of achieving them. They are men who deck themselves in fine raiment, and use a pompous manner, and exhibit all the airs of a false magnificence, anxious that all the prosperous turns of their life should be known of all men, and constantly speaking of them, ascribing them to themselves in the hope that by such means they may receive the honours which they covet.

The self-conceited man, on the other hand, foolish as well as ignorant of himself, applies himself to enterprises which are beyond his qualifications to accomplish. Not having it in his power to deck himself with virtue, he plumes himself upon his fine apparel and pompous manner and the splendour of his surroundings. Fancying himself a man of importance by these means, he wishes to be thought a prosperous and fortunate man; and endeavours to make the incidents of his prosperity known unto all men, and he is constantly talking about his success, with the idea that by such means he may gain the honour which he covets.

(*c*) CONTRAST BETWEEN SELF-ABASEMENT AND SELF-CONCEIT.

The opposite of Moral Elevation is Self-abasement rather than Self-conceit; it is the more prevalent fault and is worse in itself.

Now although self-abasement and self-conceit are both of them opposed to Moral Elevation, the opposition is greatest between Self-abasement and Moral Elevation, since self-abasement is more constantly found and is, in itself, a worse evil. As has been shown, it makes the character of the man who shows it to deteriorate, and diminishes his personal worth. But self-conceit, though it is an evil in itself, does not make the man who shows it, to be less virtuous in other respects: the self-conceited man, for all his vanity, does not lose any of the good qualities which he possesses, but at times is the more induced, to satisfy his vanity, to take in hand noble and virtuous enterprises, thinking himself worthy of such a distinguished rôle. Again, self-conceit will not always, and under all circumstances, increase: the self-conceited man comes to have a better knowledge of himself by experience—failing to receive the honour which he seeks, as is generally the fact, he is forced to be more sober-minded. Consequently self-conceit is readily cured, and is unable to adhere permanently to a man. Self-abasement on the other hand is constantly growing more inveterate: the character being reduced to a state of deterioration, as has been explained, the spirit and temper becomes humbled; and the spirit being humbled, the whole character becomes worse and the spirit, through the character, degraded. Thus self-abasement is constantly growing more inveterate, and whatever his experience, the humble man grows to be no better. Easily accomplishing the works he undertakes (works that are trifling and below the level of his capacities), he is unconscious, as it were, of his own proper standard of excellence, and as he seeks an honour which is inferior to his worth, he gives no offence to anyone, and consequently is never reproved for his humility so as to be cured of it, as the self-conceited man is of his vanity.

For these reasons, then, self-abasement is a worse evil than Self-conceit, and is more difficult to be eradicated. Consequently it is more antagonistic to Moral Elevation than Self-conceit is.

F.—LOVE OF HONOUR.

(*a*) DEFINITION OF THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF LOVE OF HONOUR.

Now the honour which forms the province of Moral Elevation is, as has been already shown, high honour; but there seems to be another virtue connected with honour which would appear to hold almost precisely the same relation to Moral Elevation that Charity does to Munificence. Both Charity and Love of Honour

Love of honour is relative only to the ordinary honours of common life.

are virtues distinct and apart from what is on a grand scale, and have for their province circumstances of ordinary or trifling importance, in relation whereto they dispose us to a frame of mind which is lawful and right.

Now it is *great* honour which forms, as has been shown, the province of Moral Elevation; but there is another form of virtue connected with honour, bearing the same relation to Moral Elevation that Charity does to Munificence. Just as Munificence differs from Charity in the range of its extent, though both alike have money for their object, so does Moral Elevation differ from Love of Honour, in that the one is concerned with great honours and the other with smaller honours.

(*b*) CONFUSION OF NOMENCLATURE BETWEEN LOVE OF HONOUR AND ITS EXTREMES.

The uncertainties of nomenclature reflect the uncertainties of the point of view under which 'ambition' may be regarded.

Just as in the receiving and giving of money there is one state of mind which is a perfect balance, and, in antagonism thereto, a disposition to exaggerate or to fall short of that ideal, so it is also in regard to the pursuit of honour—there is excess of what is right, and falling short of it, and the observing of the perfect standard, *i.e.*, the seeking of honour from rightful sources and in a rightful manner. We blame the ambitious man as one who is straining for honour more eagerly than is right and by means which are not right, and at the same time we blame the unambitious man as one who does not aim at having honour done to him, even for noble deeds. Yet there are occasions when we do the very reverse—when we praise the ambitious man as of a manly and noble spirit, and at the same time praise the unambitious man as being one who is unpretending and self-controlled (as we explained at the outset).

It is clear then that as the term 'loving such and such a thing' may be predicated in several senses, we do not always apply the epithet 'honour-loving' to the same objects, but when we use it as a term of praise we apply it to the pursuit of honour which rises above the aims of the many, and when we use it as a term of censure we apply it to an ambition that is absolutely in excess of what is right. Since then the 'middle term' or normal state has no distinctive name, the extremes both contend for it, as for debateable ground; but of course there is an absolute mean in whatever conditions there is excess and defect.

So then there are men who strive after honour more than is right and less than is right; and there are times when their ambition is normal and virtuous. The mental attitude at any rate of the man who loves honour rightfully, is praised (though it has no distinctive

name) as being 'an ideal moderation' in respect of honour. Compared indeed with self-seeking, love of honour appears to be want of ambition; and compared with the unambitious spirit it appears to be ambition, and, in a kind of sense, both one and the other seem to change places, according to their different aspects. [This is indeed a tendency which seems to prevail also in regard to the virtues generally.] In this case, however, the extremes seem to be opposed to one another, because the ideal state has not received any distinctive name.

Just as in regard to the receiving and giving of money there is an ideal 'mean' which may be violated either by excess or defect, so also in the pursuit of honour it is open to a man to find the perfect law or to exceed that law or to fall short of it. It is possible for him to aim at honour extravagantly or insufficiently, or again, in accord with what is fitting and right and as Right Reason requires. We censure and we praise men ofttimes in regard to their pursuit of honour: hence it is clear that some men seek after honour in a befitting manner and others improperly, and of these latter some transgress by excess and others by defect. For instance, we *blame* the ambitious man as one who strives after honour beyond what is right, and we blame also the unambitious man as one who wishes not to receive honour, even on the ground of noble achievements. There are again times when we *praise* the ambitious man as of noble spirit and a votary of glory, and praise also the unambitious man as one who is unpretending and modest (as we explained at the outset).

This inconsistency arises from the fact that the extremes have a resemblance to the mean, and that the mean has no distinctive name, and is therefore named from the extremes. There is nothing to prevent the mean state being called either ambition or want of ambition. A man may be said to love honour, as he loves riches, in many senses. The love which he has may be shown in many ways: he may love beyond what is right or below what is right, or according to right itself. Hence the name will have a corresponding uncertainty, and the man who loves a thing (whether it be rightly or wrongly) will be said to love such and such a thing; and when we praise a man by name as a lover of such and such a thing, we consider that he is pre-eminent in his striving for honour though he exceeds not 'the right,' but only the low standard of the many; and when we blame the lover of honour, we expressly designate by the term one who exceeds what is right therein. The case stands precisely the same in regard to the man who is unambitious.

There is, therefore, an ideal 'mean' or fitness in the pursuit of ordinary honour, even though there is no distinctive name for it: wherever there is excess and defect, there must necessarily be a standard of reference or 'a mean;' consequently since men strive after honour both more and less than is right, the perfect striving must necessarily be that which is practised in accordance with what is right; and this perfect striving is commended of all. Yet it is a virtue that cannot be characterised by any name of its own. Contrasted with ambition as an extreme it appears to be want of ambition, and contrasted with the want of ambition, ambition. Contrasted with both ambition and the want of it, it appears to be either one or the other, in so far as it shares the nature of both. [This same fluctuation of meaning occurs in regard to the virtues generally: the mean state, sharing the elements of either extreme, is called by both their names:—in so far as it avoids the one it seems to incline towards the other. But the oscillation is more constant in regard to ambition, because the ideal state has no distinctive name.] Consequently the extremes do not even seem to be opposed to any kind of 'mean,' but rather to one another: want of ambition seems simply to be opposed to ambition.

are virtues distinct and apart from what is on a grand scale, and have for their province circumstances of ordinary or trifling importance, in relation whereto they dispose us to a frame of mind which is lawful and right.

Now it is *great* honour which forms, as has been shown, the province of Moral Elevation; but there is another form of virtue connected with honour, bearing the same relation to Moral Elevation that Charity does to Munificence. Just as Munificence differs from Charity in the range of its extent, though both alike have money for their object, so does Moral Elevation differ from Love of Honour, in that the one is concerned with great honours and the other with smaller honours.

(*b*) CONFUSION OF NOMENCLATURE BETWEEN LOVE OF HONOUR AND ITS EXTREMES.

The uncertainties of nomenclature reflect the uncertainties of the point of view under which 'ambition' may be regarded.

Just as in the receiving and giving of money there is one state of mind which is a perfect balance, and, in antagonism thereto, a disposition to exaggerate or to fall short of that ideal, so it is also in regard to the pursuit of honour—there is excess of what is right, and falling short of it, and the observing of the perfect standard, *i.e.*, the seeking of honour from rightful sources and in a rightful manner. We blame the ambitious man as one who is straining for honour more eagerly than is right and by means which are not right, and at the same time we blame the unambitious man as one who does not aim at having honour done to him, even for noble deeds. Yet there are occasions when we do the very reverse—when we praise the ambitious man as of a manly and noble spirit, and at the same time praise the unambitious man as being one who is unpretending and self-controlled (as we explained at the outset).

It is clear then that as the term 'loving such and such a thing' may be predicated in several senses, we do not always apply the epithet 'honour-loving' to the same objects, but when we use it as a term of praise we apply it to the pursuit of honour which rises above the aims of the many, and when we use it as a term of censure we apply it to an ambition that is absolutely in excess of what is right. Since then the 'middle term' or normal state has no distinctive name, the extremes both contend for it, as for debateable ground; but of course there is an absolute mean in whatever conditions there is excess and defect.

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Just as in regard to the receiving and giving of money there is an ideal 'mean' which may be violated either by excess or defect, so also in the pursuit of honour it is open to a man to find the perfect law or to exceed that law or to fall short of it. It is possible for him to aim at honour extravagantly or insufficiently, or again, in accord with what is fitting and right and as Right Reason requires. We censure and we praise men ofttimes in regard to their pursuit of honour: hence it is clear that some men seek after honour in a befitting manner and others improperly, and of these latter some transgress by excess and others by defect. For instance, we *blame* the ambitious man as one who strives after honour beyond what is right, and we blame also the unambitious man as one who wishes not to receive honour, even on the ground of noble achievements. There are again times when we *praise* the ambitious man as of noble spirit and a votary of glory, and praise also the unambitious man as one who is unpretending and modest (as we explained at the outset).

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There is, therefore, an ideal 'mean' or fitness in the pursuit of ordinary honour, even though there is no distinctive name for it: wherever there is excess and defect, there must necessarily be a standard of reference or 'a mean;' consequently since men strive after honour both more and less than is right, the perfect striving must necessarily be that which is practised in accordance with what is right; and this perfect striving is commended of all. Yet it is a virtue that cannot be characterised by any name of its own. Contrasted with ambition as an extreme it appears to be want of ambition, and contrasted with the want of ambition, ambition. Contrasted with both ambition and the want of it, it appears to be either one or the other, in so far as it shares the nature of both. [This same fluctuation of meaning occurs in regard to the virtues generally: the mean state, sharing the elements of either extreme, is called by both their names:—in so far as it avoids the one it seems to incline towards the other. But the oscillation is more constant in regard to ambition, because the ideal state has no distinctive name.] Consequently the extremes do not even seem to be opposed to any kind of 'mean,' but rather to one another: want of ambition seems simply to be opposed to ambition.

G.—GOOD TEMPER.

(*a*) DEFINITION OF THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF GOOD TEMPER.

There is an ideal in the regulation of the feeling of anger.

Now, good temper is a virtuous attitude of mind in regard to the feelings,—though the ideal state has no distinctive name of its own, and the extremes are almost as undefined. But we generally apply the epithet 'good-tempered' to the perfect character, though it is a term which inclines rather to suggest a deficiency of indignation (for which again there is no special word in use).

Excess of temper may be designated as a kind of passionateness. The emotion which it implies is anger, of which the exciting causes are many and various.

Now good temper is a virtuous attitude of mind in regard to the feelings of anger; and the state of mind which exaggerates the law of good temper is called passionateness, while the state of mind which falls below the limits of good nature into utter apathy, has no distinctive name. The emotion, however, in the regulation of which good temper consists, is indignation,—an emotion which is roused by many different causes.

(*b*) GOOD TEMPER NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH VIRTUOUS INDIGNATION.

Anger must be limited to such occasions and circumstances as Right Reason defines.

Now, the man whose anger is roused only on fitting occasions, and against none but proper subjects for resentment, and, moreover, whose anger is shown in a becoming manner and at a fitting occasion, and is continued only so long as is right, that man is praised. If, therefore, good-tempered indignation of this kind is praised, the man who shows it may be called par excellence 'the good-tempered man'—a term which is intended to denote a man of unruffled and unperturbable mien—one who is not carried away by momentary feeling, but is only wrathful against such persons, and for so long a time as Right Reason enjoins. But a man of such perfect good temper, seems to err on the side of defect since he is loath to take proper retaliation, but is rather disposed to condone the injuries done him.

Now the man who never shows his anger except in a proper manner, at the right moment and against those who deserve his resentment, is commended; and he accordingly is the good-tempered man:—such seems to be the character of one who is unruffled and imperturbable, and is not led away by momentary feeling, but leads on his own feelings precisely as Right Reason enjoins. Such an one seems to have a tendency rather to the defect, inasmuch as he is reluctant to retaliate, and is rather disposed to condone the injuries done him.

(*c*) THE ENTIRE ABSENCE OF 'TEMPER' CENSURABLE.

Deficiency of temper, on the other hand, whatever it be called—whether a species of impassionateness or what not, is censurable. Those whose anger is never roused against objects which deserve it, are thought to be fools, as are they also who are never incensed as they should be, nor when they should be, nor at things at which they should be. Such an one seems to have no proper feeling nor sense of pain: if he shows no anger, he is thought incapable of self-defence. But to put up with insults laid upon oneself, or to suffer one's relations to be insulted, is the callousness of a slave.

The entire absence of anger is a vicious state: to submit to outrage and insult argues the callousness of a slave.

Deficiency of temper, on the other hand, is blamed as a fault, whether it be called insensibility or what not. To show no resentment where it is right to be angry, and to overlook insults put upon oneself and one's friends, is utter folly and nothing but the callousness of a slave.

(*d*) EXCESS OF TEMPER VIEWED UNDER ITS VARIOUS FORMS.

But excess of temper is shown under all kinds of aspects. It may be shown against the wrong persons, or at wrong times, or in an intemperate manner, or on too slight provocation, or too implacably. All these faults are not of course found combined in the same person: anger could never possibly exist under so many aggravated shapes. Evil has a tendency to destroy itself; and if it be concentrated and complete, it becomes intolerable.

Extravagance of anger is even more blameworthy.

There are these separate types of excessive anger:

1. (*a*) The passionate, who are easily provoked to anger—against unfitting objects and on unfitting occasions, and that to an extravagant degree, and who, nevertheless, are soon appeased of their resentment—and that is the point about them in which they show to best advantage. This change of feeling comes upon them, from the fact that they do not try to check their tempers, but make instant reprisals in the way that they are seen to do, through the impetuosity of their anger, and having done so are calmed again.

1. The passionate quickly incensed and as quickly appeased.

(*b*) The quick-tempered, who are hasty to an excess, being roused to passion against any cause, and at any object. Hence their name.

2. (*a*) The sulky, who are hard to pacify, and who nourish their anger for a long time, since they keep it suppressed. But

a respite comes on so soon as they have their revenge. Vengeance appeases their anger, kindling pleasure in place of their pain. But until the desire for vengeance is satisfied, they have a heavy burden within: inasmuch as their feeling is disguised, no one even tries to soothe them, but for a man 'to chew the cud of his anger' by himself, requires time. Such people are a sore trouble to themselves, and to their best friends as well.

2. The sulky and vengeful who cherish anger until they have had full revenge.

(*b*) The vengeful we call those who are incensed on occasions where they ought not to be, and to an undue degree, and for too long a time, and who are not reconciled without vengeance or punishment.

But excess of temper is shown under all kinds of aspects. A man falls into excess when he is angry contrary to the proprieties, whether of place, or of time, or of circumstance, or of person, or of his general surroundings. Nevertheless, a man who exceeds in one point does not invariably exceed in all:—that is indeed almost impossible. Evil cannot possibly cohere as a system, if there be no element of good under any of its aspects: it destroys its own self, and if it be pure and uncompounded, it becomes insupportable.

(This particular evil, the abuse of passion, is found under various types:)

1. (*a*) The passionate are quickly roused to anger, and that against men who are unworthy of it. But they are as quickly pacified; and that is the best point they have about them. They are liable to these sudden impulses and alternations because they do not try to suppress their anger nor to disguise it, but let themselves be hurried away by feeling, and avenge themselves by the means within their power then and there. After taking speedy vengeance through the impulse of the moment, they forthwith cease from their anger.

(*b*) The quick-tempered are vehement to an excessive degree and enraged at anything and on any occasion: hence the name which they bear, derived from the extremity of their feeling.

2. (*a*) The sulky and those who are hard to reconcile, show their anger for a long time. They do not at once make their passion known, but suppress and try to disguise it; but they only cease from their anger when they have repaid a full requital of evil to those who have distressed them. Vengeance causes pleasure in their hearts, and hence assuages their grief; but until this is done, they feel a burden within, and carry their resentment about with them. Owing to the fact that they do not make their anger known, they do not meet with sympathy from their fellows, nor does any one attempt to soothe them. Hence they suppress their anger until it is melted by its own action upon itself, or mentally 'digested;' and that is a process which requires time. Men of that sort are wearisome to themselves no less than to their best friends.

(*b*) Such men are also called 'vengeful,' since they are incensed where they ought not to be, and on unseasonable occasions, and to an unreasonable extent, and show their anger for a very long time, and are not to be reconciled unless they have requited evil to those who have irritated them. Such men are difficult to live with and are a nuisance to their associates.

(*e*) DIFFICULTIES OF DEFINING ACCURATELY THE LIMITS OF THE EXTREMES.

We incline to regard the excess of anger as more widely opposed to the virtuous ideal than its defect. Excess is more generally

prevalent: it is more characteristic of human nature to avenge oneself rather than to forgive. Again, in the intercourse of life, ill-tempered men are worse than the easy-going.

Excess of anger worse than the defect; yet it is impossible to define the exact limits of either. No system of rules can anticipate the complications of circumstances.

But here a truth must be repeated, which has been already stated on a previous occasion, and which is obvious from the explanations now given of anger: Ethics are not casuistry. It is not easy to determine the precise limitations of anger:—the manner under different circumstances, the persons, the precise occasions, and the proper length of time that anger should be shown; nor the exact point up to which anger is justly shown, or a man sins through anger. The man who transgresses but slightly, whether on the side of excess or on the side of defect, is not censured. Sometimes we praise those who are defective in anger and call them 'gentle': at other times we call those who give vent to their anger 'manly,' as being able to rule their fellows. It is not easy, therefore, to explain by a formal definition, the extent and the manner to which a man must transgress, in order to be blameable: any decision must depend upon the circumstances of the special case, and upon the Moral Sense taking all those circumstances under review.

But so much, at any rate, is obvious, that a frame of mind which is equable and in harmony with its surroundings, is praiseworthy—a state of mind in virtue of which, when we are angry, we are angry only against persons, and on occasions when our anger is right and shown in a proper manner, and justified by all the circumstances. On the other hand, cases of excess or of defect are blameable, though, if the error be only slight, the blame is only slight; but if the error be serious, then the blame is greater, and if the error be extreme, then the blame is extreme. It is clear then, that the attitude of mind which we ought to hold herein, is the 'mid course' of a virtuous moderation.

The consideration of the states of mind concerned with anger may now be dismissed.

So then the ideal state of mind in regard to anger is Good-temper; the excess of the feeling, passionateness; while the defect of the feeling may be called impassionateness, or an infatuated stupor, or insensibility.

Now, though both the excess and the defect are opposed to the mean, passionateness is more completely opposed thereto than impassionateness is, since (1) it is more generally found (men devoid of passion being a very rare class); and (2) the passionless man is pleasant to associate with, while the passionate man is a troublesome companion, and his fault the worse on that account, destroying as it does the sweetness and sociableness of human intercourse.

It is clear, then, that a kind of 'mean state' is the perfect good and virtue in regard to the regulation of anger, and that the states on either side of it of

excess and defect, are evils. What that 'middle state' is, has been described—the curbing of anger except where it may be shown against persons who deserve it, and then shown only in a proper manner and on proper occasions. But what the proper point is at which to curb our anger; what the occasions are when we shall be only doing what is right to be angry; what is the fitting time of anger, what the place, who the fitting person to show it—these and such like points it is impossible to define exactly. Considerations of special application and particular circumstances are indefinite and indefinable, as was shown at the outset of this Treatise. What is fitting at one time, is not what is fitting at another: the conditions of special circumstances never remain fixed at one and the same point. The general principle is all that we can lay down, that, in regard to every emotion, the attitude of virtuous moderation is praiseworthy, while states of excess and of defect are blameworthy; and those states of mind which deviate only slightly from the mean, not growing to be very conspicuous, are therefore not very much blamed, whereas those states which are very much removed from the virtuous ideal, are very much noticed and strongly censured. Hence it is plain that the attitude of mind which we ought to hold, is the attitude of a virtuous moderation.

This must satisfy as a description of the moral states concerned with the temper.

H.—COURTESY.

(*a*) COURTESY THE IDEAL OF SOCIAL INTERCOURSE.

Courtesy the mean state between servility and offensiveness.

Now in the intercourse of society—in the common life we have to live, in the mutual offices of word and deed which we have to render, there are some men who appear obsequious in their courtesies, praising everything where praise may conduce to pleasure, and placing themselves in antagonism to nothing, but fancying it their duty to avoid all possible offence to those whom they meet. Others, again, from a standpoint the very opposite of this, are in constant antagonism to everything, and reck not one whit that they are causing pain;—and who are properly called 'cross-grained' and 'quarrelsome.'

Courtesy is a kind of friendliness, but is devoid of all emotion; and is strictly defined by 'the law of honour.'

There can be no question but that both the habits of mind above described are reprehensible, and that the only attitude which is laudable is one which steers a mid course between these extremes—an attitude which will lead a man to approve only of what is morally right, and to show his approval in a proper way, or, if it be necessary, to show his annoyance in the same spirit. No distinctive name has been assigned in Greek to this 'mean state,' but it has a very close resemblance to friendliness: the man who keeps the mid course of virtue herein has precisely that type of character which we mean to describe as 'the considerate friend' (though the friend combines also an element of affection). There is this

difference, then, between 'courtesy' and friendliness: courtesy is devoid of an emotional element and of the feeling of affection towards those in whose society it is displayed. It is not owing to any affection or aversion that a man has, that he regards the conduct of others in a proper light, but simply because he has a certain moral nature. He will take the same line of conduct in dealing with those who are unknown as with those who are known, with those who are familiar as with those who are strangers to him—only in every relation he will act in a manner that harmonizes with the circumstances: it is not fitting that he should interest himself to the same extent in regard to his own relations as in regard to foreigners; nor, again, has he the same right to cause them pain.

But there are other states of mind manifested in the associations which men form one with another, and which depend upon what they say and do therein. In regard, then, to these associations a man may be praised or blamed, as he comports himself therein.

The mean state is, of course, commendable, and states of excess or defect reprehensible; and so, in the associations referred to, there is evidently a state of excess and of defect, and a 'mean.' (1) Some men desire never, under any condition, to give pain to those whom they meet, and so have a word of praise for everything, and are anxious to seem to give pleasure to everyone, and never to be in opposition to anyone upon any point. (2) Others are diametrically opposed to these and are offensive to everyone and find fault with everything, and nothing that is ever done is satisfactory to them, and they are in antagonism to everyone upon every point.

Both these extremes are blamed. The man who is praised is one whose demeanour therein is consistent with right—who blames what he ought to blame, praises what he ought to praise, and finds satisfaction where it is right for him to be pleased.

Now the man who showers his praise upon everything is called an obsequious person or a flatterer; and the man who finds fault with everything, 'cross-grained.' The man who, on the contrary, keeps inviolate the truth of fact in dealing out praise or blame, may be called a candid friend: so far as depends upon himself, his attitude resembles that of friendship. There is, however, no special name for the ideal state in social intercourse: a term must be borrowed from analogous associations. The virtuous attitude towards society would be friendship, if it included the idea of affection: it differs from friendship in that it is found apart from personal affection:—*i.e.*, it is not owing to the affection or to the hatred which he has that such a man approves or blames what is said or done, but simply from the motive of realizing his ideal, and because he has acquired a state of mind to love that ideal. In virtue of this moral state of his he holds an attitude of equal impartiality to those who are known, as to those who are unknown to him, towards those who are familiar, as to those who are not. The objects which he praises or which he blames, are invariably what such as he ought to praise or blame; and his feeling thereto is never greater or less than is right—except that his impartiality is not quite absolute: *i.e.*, where it is his duty to cause pain, he will not be so free in his strictures towards those whom he does not know as towards those whom he does, nor towards those who are strange to him as to those with whom he is familiar; and similarly in regard to the pleasure he causes. The same freedom is not fitting toward strangers as towards friends.

(*b*) CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF COURTESY.

The courteous man will promote the pleasure of all with whom he associates, so far as he can consistently with his allegiance to the higher laws of truth, and justice, and honour.

The general principle may therefore be assumed that in all his intercourse the courteous man will show a becoming attitude towards all those with whom he mingles. Having 'the noble' and 'the expedient' before him as his standard of reference, he will make it his aim to avoid offence, or to contribute to pleasure, as may best accord therewith. The sphere with which he seems to be concerned being that of pleasure and pain attendant on social intercourse, wherever it is ignoble or injurious to join in such pleasures, he will show his disapprobation thereof and deliberately prefer to cause pain. Again, if any matter entail disgrace or shame, and that in no slight degree, or even injury upon the author of it, whereas opposition on his part to such a course will cause only trifling pain, he will not acquiesce in its adoption, but will show his disapproval of it. Again, he will make his intercourse with men of high position vary from that with ordinary men; he will mingle on very different terms with men who are known and with those who are unknown, and so on through all the shades of social gradation, he will pay to each what is due to his rank. Though preferring as a matter of principle to contribute to the pleasure of others, and scrupulously careful not to cause them pain, yet he will guide his conduct by the consequences which are involved therein (I mean by considerations of what is noble and expedient), if those consequences in the future outweigh the pleasure or pain of the present. In view of a grand pleasure in the future, he will inflict a slight pain in the present as the price of it.

Hence it is that, with his eye fixed always upon what is noble or what is expedient, the good man will cause either pleasure or pain to those with whom he comes into contact, as may accord with his own ideal.

Now the habit of courtesy is manifested in regard to the pleasures and pains which are found in social intercourse; and wherever pleasures have no reference to what is morally good, he will not share them with those whom he meets, but will rather show his disgust when he finds others taking delight therein. With this moral ideal before him, he will prefer to have the appearance, to such people, of being disagreeable rather than pleasant—especially if such a pleasure entail serious disgrace or harm upon the man who indulges in it. He will, under those circumstances, prefer to give pain and cause some slight disgrace, and to relieve a man of a greater pain and of a more serious disgrace, rather than to give him a slight solace by sharing with him his present joy, and afterwards to involve him in overwhelming grief.

Again, he will not mingle on the same footing with ordinary men as with those in high position, but will show to everyone the deference that befits his rank, and throughout the various shades of rank among those whom he meets,

he will, for his own part, adapt the method and amount of his intercourse thereto: he will bestow praise upon everything according as may be right, and censure everything upon grounds that may be right, and on occasions that may be right. He will seek above all things to contribute to the joy of others, and will prefer that for its own sake as a matter of principle, and to cause the very least possible pain, or only moderate pain, and that not for its own sake, but in view of the benefits to be derived therefrom. When, for instance, he causes pain in view of a great pleasure to follow, he does but pain gently, taking scrupulous care always to avoid vulgar irritation.

(*c*) CONTRAST BETWEEN COURTESY AND ITS EXTREMES.

Such are the main features in the life of the courteous man, though in Greek there is no one term in which they are all summed up.

Excess of courtesy degenerates into servility and flattery.

But in regard to the case of a man who contributes to pleasure, there are two other phases. If a man make it his aim to be agreeable and has no consideration for aught else, he is obsequious; but if his courtesy is shown in the hope that some advantage may accrue to himself thereby, in the shape of money or of such things as money will buy, then he is a flatterer.

On the other hand, the man who is disagreeable to all men is, as has been shown, 'cross-grained' and quarrelsome.

Defect of courtesy is peevishness and irritability.

These extremes appear to be opposed one to the other (rather than to the mean), inasmuch as the ideal has no distinctive name of its own.

Such then is the character of the man who holds a mid-course of a virtuous moderation in regard to the pleasures and pains which attend social intercourse. But he has not been characterised by any special name of his own, though he might be called, in one sense, a friend, on account of the similarity of his attitude to friendship, as has been explained.

Looking to the states on either side of this 'mean,' the man who goes into excess of courtesy—if he praises everything and expresses satisfaction at everything, without an ulterior motive, seeking simply to be agreeable, he is called obsequious; but if his courtesy is shown in the hope of some advantage accruing to him in the shape of money or of what money can buy, he is a flatterer.

On the other hand, the man who falls short of courtesy, is called 'cross-grained' and 'quarrelsome'—a man, that is, who is disagreeable to everyone and finds fault with everything.

But inasmuch as in the case of courtesy as elsewhere, the ideal state has no distinctive name, the extremes do not seem to be opposed to any kind of 'mean,' but simply to one another.

I.—SINCERITY.

(*a*) SUBJECT-MATTER OF SINCERITY AND OF ITS EXTREMES DEFINED.

There is a mean state in regard to exaggeration which has almost the same sphere of action as courtesy; and, like courtesy,

it has in Greek no distinctive name. But it is not on that account less important to describe the virtues of this class: by detailing the conditions which attach to each phase of character we shall the better understand the nature of morality, and be the more convinced that the 'virtues are mean states' by seeing how, under all connections, 'the law of the mean' applies to all the virtues alike.

Sincerity the virtue of human converse.

Now, in dealing with the life which men pass in common, the description which has been already given of courtesy, describes social intercourse as it tends to pleasure or pain: we have now to treat of the sincerity or insincerity, the straightforwardness or the want of it, which men show in the words they use, the demeanour they adopt, the professions they make one towards another.

It is thought, then, that 'the boastful man' is one who lays claim to distinctions which do not belong to him, or one who claims distinctions in excess of what belongs to him. On the other hand, 'the diffident man' seems to repudiate the good qualities he really has, or to depreciate them. Midway between these two extremes is the ideal character—that of the man who is straightforward and sincere, honest in life and truthful of speech, one who simply acknowledges the facts as they are about himself without either exaggerating or underrating them.

Sincerity the mean between boastfulness and diffidence.

But it is possible to act in each of these several ways either with an ulterior motive or not. Unless there be some special motive to influence a man's conduct on a particular occasion, the words he uses, the things he does, and the way of life he adopts will follow the general bent of his character. Viewed in itself, and apart from such a special motive, falsehood is evil and reprehensible, truth noble and commendable; and so the man whose character it is to speak the truth (avoiding unswervingly all extremes) is worthy of esteem; while those who deviate from truth in either direction, and particularly those who are boastful and exaggerate, are deserving of censure.

In the sphere of those associations which men form, and the intercourse they have one with another, there are still other habits of mind displayed. The social relations into which men are thrown with one another are twofold: such relations arise either in reference to the words and actions of those whom they meet, or in reference to their own individual dealings with others. In regard to the first of these relations the moral dispositions which arise have been already detailed: in regard to the latter class of relations there are other dispositions which we will now discuss.

Now when a man speaks of himself and of his own actions, he states what is either true or untrue. If he says what is untrue, he either says what is in excess of the truth, or what is below the truth. If, however, he speaks truly, and says

what is neither an exaggeration nor an understatement of the facts, the habit of mind corresponding thereto is called truthfulness, and the man who possesses it is called truthful.

Understatement and exaggeration are practised, like all other habits of the same type, in certain cases for a special purpose, *e.g.* to gain glory or wealth, or some other advantage. They are also found in other cases where no such motive exists. Some men say of themselves less than their merits entitle them to say, and others again say more, not because they are wishful to have a certain reputation, but because they are ignorant of their own selves; this, however, is a phase of character which very seldom occurs. For the most part, where a man has no special motive for doing or saying what he does, then it is the general bent of his character which determines the colour of his words and actions, and indeed of the whole direction of his life. Since then falsehood is in itself reprehensible, while truth is commendable, the state of mind which keeps inviolate the ideal in this case also, is that which is worthy of esteem, and that is truthfulness, while the states of mind which exaggerate or fall short of that ideal are reprehensible, and they are forms of falsehood; exaggeration being in excess of the truth, 'reserve' being an understatement or defect of the truth.

(*b*) CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SINCERE MAN.

We will now proceed to speak of each of these characters separately; and first, of the sincere or truthful man.

Sincerity the expression in life of an upright and truthful character.

Now in speaking of the 'sincere man' I am not referring to one who speaks truthfully in regard to matters of compact, nor in regard to matters which fall within the sphere of Injustice or Justice (such questions belonging to a different form of moral excellence), but rather of the man who is truthful both in word and deed where no material interest is involved, and is truthful simply from having a moral nature which impels him to the true; and such an one would seem to be an honest man. One who loves the truth, and speaks the truth even on points of immaterial importance, will even more surely speak the truth in questions which are material; since he has grown to have a horror of falsehood *per se*, he will have the same horror of it as a thing practically disgraceful. Such a character is worthy of all esteem.

In relation to the extremes, the sincere man inclines rather to say what is below than what is beyond the truth, because such a reticence is more in harmony with his character, as is obvious, exaggerations being specially repulsive to him.

We will now treat of each of these characters separately, and first of the ideal or standard by which the extremes must be regarded :—*i.e.* of the sincere man.

Now the sincere man is not identical with the man who speaks the truth in matters relating to agreements and similar questions which come under the sphere of Justice or of Injustice (such points forming the province of another and separate virtue), but he is a man who, apart from any sanction of law or of justice, and apart from any urgency of social good, is truthful of speech and consistent in life, simply because he has a moral nature disposing him to

sincerity, and is actuated by the very noblest of motives. He is a man who in all that he says about himself wishes to appear in the eyes of others precisely in the character that in reality he bears. Such an one will of course be an honest man. When men are truthful even in matters where there is no compulsion to be so, much more will they be true where they are bound to speak the truth in view of the good of society. If a man has a religious horror of falsehood *per se*, because it is an evil, surely he will avoid it by all means in his power when it entails positive disgrace—when, that is, it is not only an evil *per se*, but is recognised as such by the world at large. Such, then, is the character of the truthful man, and he is worthy of all esteem for guarding himself as he does from what is evil and disgraceful.

In relation to the extremes, if it be necessary for him to deviate at all from the strict line of absolute truth, he will incline to the defect, not the excess: an understatement seems to be more in harmony with his character, exaggerations being always offensive to him.

(*c*) CHARACTERISTICS OF BOASTFULNESS.

Boastfulness has a different complexion according as it has a special motive, or is the natural outcome of the character.

The man who lays claim to qualities superior to what he really possesses, without any particular object to serve, has a resemblance to the vicious man—otherwise he would have had no pleasure in falsehood; but obviously he is rather empty-headed than wicked. If on the other hand he has a purpose to serve, and that purpose be glory or honour, he is not so very blameable (considering that it is his disposition to boast); yet if that purpose be gain or what is instrumental to gain, his conduct is much more unseemly.

The boastful man, however, is what he is, not from having a latent power of boasting, but in virtue of the disposition of his own will—*i.e.*, he is boastful in virtue of a certain bent of his own nature, and in consequence of having formed a certain character; precisely in the same way as the liar is, properly speaking, one who takes pleasure in sheer falsehood, though there are also those who lie from the eagerness with which they strive after honour or gain. So, when men boast themselves from a motive of ostentation, they lay claim to qualities for which they may be praised or congratulated; but when their aim is gain, they lay claim to qualities from which advantage might be reaped by their neighbours; they claim, for instance, to be clever soothsayers or doctors, and their pretensions, when unfounded, are yet of a nature to escape detection. These useful qualities are, therefore, those to which boastful men generally lay claim and upon which they found exaggerated pretensions, since all the advantages which I have named are found therein.

The boastful man is one who lays claim to higher qualities than he possesses, and supports his pretensions by word and deed. Now if he has no motive to serve in making these pretensions, he seems to be a feeble fellow—otherwise he

would have no pleasure in falsehood, though obviously he is rather 'empty-headed' than vicious. But if he has an end to gain by his pretensions, and if that end be glory or honour, the braggart is not so very reprehensible; if, however, the end he has in view be money, or what amounts to the same thing as money, his conduct is much more unseemly.

Now boastfulness does not consist in the latent power which the boastful man has: otherwise, if that had been the case, boastfulness would not have been reprehensible—*i.e.* it would not have belonged to the category of things voluntary and within our own power. Boastfulness depends upon a disposition of the Will, and consequently it is shameful as well as reprehensible:—*i.e.* it is a certain state of the moral nature. It is thus in virtue of a certain attitude of mind that the boastful man comes to be what he is; precisely in the same way as the liar who makes the pretences he does, not for the sake of glory or of money, but from sheer love of falsehood in itself.

Those, however, who boast themselves with a view to glory lay claim to the possession of qualities whence praise accrues or the congratulations of others. Those again who boast themselves with a view to profit lay claim to the possession of qualities which are serviceable to their neighbours—knowledge, for instance, of medicine, or of soothsaying. There are men who pretend to be skilful doctors or soothsayers in order that, by being thought serviceable to those who resort to them, they may make a profit of their dupes.

Such, then, is the character of the boastful man.

(*d*) CHARACTERISTICS OF SELF-DISPARAGEMENT.

On the other hand, those who disparage themselves by understating what they mean, appear to be more winsome and seemly in their moral nature. The motive which they seem to have in speaking thus is not a sordid one, but only the avoidance of what is pompous or self-conceited. What such men are mostly found to deny is their own meritorious deeds, as Socrates used to do. As for those who make an ostentatious claim to merely trifling merits which are seen by all, they only show the affectation of snobs, and are deservedly despised. At times the boastful arrogance of such men peers out as 'the pride which apes humility' or the scant raiment of the Spartans. Extreme self-abasement is as much the cloak of vanity as is extreme boastfulness. However, those who show the diffidence of reserve only to a moderate extent, and depreciate themselves only in regard to things which are not very conspicuous nor plain, are thought to be men of good taste, and to show a graceful refinement.

Self-depreciation may be either a delicate and praiseworthy reticence, or a vulgar affectation.

But obviously it is the boastful man who is the opposite of the truthful man, since he is more mischievous than the diffident man.

On the other hand, 'the diffident' or 'reserved' man is one who lays claim to less merit than he might. Such a man is of course more delicately-minded than the boastful man. The motive for which he disparages himself is not a sordid one, but because he shrinks from ostentation or pomp and the assumption of grandeur. So then, the man who in self-depreciation repudiates the honourable

qualities which belong to him, as Socrates, for instance, used to do, seems to be a man of fine and delicate feeling. If, however, he repudiates not only great and distinguished qualities but also trifling merits, and pretends not to be able to perform things which it is palpable that he can achieve,—such a man is called an 'affected snob,' and is deserving of contempt. For similar reasons such a man is sometimes called vain-glorious, acting in the spirit which the Spartans showed in the matter of their dress. Self-abasement is as much a sign of vanity as is self-exaltation. When, however, men use this reserve of speech in moderation, they appear only to show good taste—when, that is, they do not show their diffidence in matters that are trifling and cheap and perfectly obvious.

So then the diffident man and the boastful man are both in opposition to the truthful man, but the boastful man is the more widely opposed of the two. Boasting is a more mischievous evil than diffidence, as is obvious from the reasons given above.

J.—HUMOUR.

(*a*) SUBJECT-MATTER OF HUMOUR AND OF ITS OPPOSITES DEFINED.

Times of relaxation have their own exigencies, and admit of the display of a special virtue.

But there is an element of rest in the conduct of life, and during rest there are pastimes for men which are attended by amusement; and here, too, as in more serious pursuits, intercourse may take a graceful shape, and a man may say the very things which he ought to say in the most perfect manner, or listen to the words of others in the same spirit: (though there will be a difference whether the man is a speaker or listener, and between the character of the audience, whatever it be in either case).

It is evident that here, too, is a sphere of circumstance in which the ideal of perfect propriety may be violated either by excess or defect.

Now those who are extravagant in their indulgence of humour are thought frivolous and vulgar people, being as they are eager for frivolity, in season and out of season, and more intent upon exciting laughter than on speaking what is becoming, or avoiding pain to the object of their ridicule.

There are others again who could never of themselves have uttered a joke, and who show irritation against those who do; and they are regarded as morose and soured.

But since there are times of relaxation and rest in human life, and in such times of relaxation there is a kind of pastime which goes hand in hand with diversion, there seems to be, here as elsewhere, a mode of intercourse which is at once graceful and virtuous, and it is possible for a man who requires such relaxation to say just the things which ought to be said and to say them in the most graceful manner, and in the same spirit to be a listener only when the subject is decorous and the manner in which it is said and the occasion of saying it are equally appropriate (though there is a difference between listening to things and saying them, whatever the character of the things said be in either case).

It is evident, therefore, that in this kind of intercourse (as in that which is

more serious,) there is one state of mind which is an extravagance, another which is a deficiency, and, between the two, the perfect mean of virtue.

Now the extravagance of humour is called buffoonery, and those who show it, buffoons and vulgar people: such are they who indulge in excess of merriment, and are more anxious to excite laughter than they are to say what is becoming or to avoid paining the object of their ridicule.

The defect of humour is moroseness and sourness, and those who show it are morose and sour: such men never utter a joke of their own, and are annoyed at and detest those who do.

(*b*) CHARACTERISTICS OF REAL AND PERFECT HUMOUR.

Those who exhibit playfulness in good taste are called 'quick-witted,' being as it were lively and versatile. The playful movements of their wit seem to be movements of the character; and just as the nature of bodies is indicated by their movements, so is it with the character. As, however, the sphere of merriment covers the very surface of society, and the mass of men delight in playfulness and the making of jests to an extent beyond what is right, frivolous people are also styled 'quick-witted' as being amusing and pleasant to their companions; though from what has been already said, it is clear that there is a difference, and that no slight difference, between the two.

Humour is a graceful adaptation of wit to the phases and circumstances of character.

A further trait, characteristic of perfect humour, is that of tact or cleverness; and the man of tact and cleverness is known by his making only such remarks himself, or listening to them in others, as befits the character of a considerate and right-minded gentleman. There are, of course, certain things which it is consistent for a gentleman to say himself, or to listen to in others, in the way of fun, and the fun of a gentleman is a very different thing from that of a clown, as, again, the fun of an educated man is from that of an illiterate boor. This is a truth which we may see illustrated in the comedies of the Old School as contrasted with those of the New. In the Old Comedy wit meant scurrility and obscenity: in the New Comedy it means innuendo. These points make no slight difference in view of what is decorous.

Tact and cleverness, combined with gentlemanly instincts, essential to perfect humour.

May we, then, define the man who makes a display of perfect humour by such limitations as that of his 'saying only what becomes a gentleman?' or by the condition of 'his avoiding giving pain to his hearers?' [or by the terms of 'his giving them pleasure?'—Is not such a limitation too vague, seeing that the idea of what is hateful or agreeable differs with different temperaments?]

But the character of what he himself says will determine also the character of the things to which he will listen, since a man seems himself to do what he endures to hear from others. Certainly there are things which he will not do: there are certain modes of scoffing which are of the nature of insult, and there are certain modes of insult which lawgivers forbid men to employ. [Still there are perchance sallies of humour which he is constrained to make.] The man then who is courteous and high-minded will comport himself throughout as though he were 'a law to himself.'

Such, then, is the ideal character therein, whether the name given to him be 'a man of tact' or of social versatility.

The ideal state is playfulness or politeness, and those who show it are those who are polite. Their politeness is, as it were, a kind of quick-wittedness, the shifting phases of their character seeming to be like the movements of the body; and such is the aspect of those who disport themselves in good taste, and show their humour in a proper manner and on proper occasions. Just as physical movements show the character of bodies (*e.g.*, movement upwards indicating fire and whatever is light, movement towards a centre indicating a heavy substance, and similarly in regard to bodies generally), so also from the outward movements of men that are obvious to all, the mental dispositions of the soul and the phases of the character are made manifest.

Now since soured men are very rarely found, and the mass of men delight in amusement and jokes, what is amusing is thought a good rather than what is solemn. Consequently buffoons are called 'quick-witted' as being amusing and pleasant. But from what has been said it is obvious that buffoons differ not inconsiderably from those who are really quick-witted and humorous.

Men of this class who are quick-witted are also men of tact, and the quality they show may fairly be called 'tact.' It marks the man of tact to say himself, and to listen to others saying, only such things as befit the character of a virtuous and high-minded gentleman. There are certain things which specially befit a gentleman to say and to listen to in the way of amusement. The pleasantries of the gentleman are a different thing from those of the vulgar, and those of the educated man are distinct from those of the uneducated. This difference may be illustrated from the Old and New Comedies. There are some comedians who represent low and vulgar life, and fancy that what is shameful is amusing and agreeable; and there are others who represent clever, virtuous, and gentlemanlike characters, and use innuendo. These various phases differ in no slight degree in respect of seemliness.

Whom, then, do we recognize as the ideal character in the amusements of life? Is he not the man who jokes cleverly, and who shows himself a gentleman in the best sense—one who is not offensive to his hearers, and is positively pleasing and agreeable? That may be our definition of the ideal in respect of social amusements.

This definition, however, seems in a way to be indefinite. The feelings of hate are not always entertained towards the same objects, nor do all men have pleasure in the same objects: one thing appears pleasant to one man, and another to another, and different things are painful to different persons. But what a man delights in, that it is about which he talks, and that it is which he does in his intercourse with his fellows. He utters himself such jests as he endures to hear from others. For there are some things which he will never say: there are certain taunts which lawgivers restrain men from employing. The joke is of the nature of a taunt. Inasmuch then as the objects which we hate, or in which we find pleasure are undefined and undefinable, it is consequently difficult to fix with scientific precision the nature of the ideal character in social

amusements. The man who is high-minded and courteous will behave as though he were 'a law to himself.'

Such then is the character of the ideal character herein, whether the name given to him be 'quick-witted,' or 'full of tact.'

(*c*) CHARACTERISTICS OF BUFFOONERY.

On the other hand, the buffoon is the slave of his own merriment. He cannot refrain from deriding either himself or others, if only he can raise a laugh, though he say things which a courteous man would under no circumstances say himself, and even some things which such a man would not suffer others to say in his presence.

The buffoon indulges his wit irrespectively of all limitations.

The buffoon, on the other hand, in the craving he feels for merriment abstains from no single opportunity of saying or doing aught that would provoke laughter, and therein he spares neither himself nor those who listen to him. In order simply to excite amusement he shames himself and his hearers by saying and doing things which a courteous man would on no terms say and do; and sometimes things which he would never endure to hear.

(*d*) CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BOOR.

The boor, again, is a man useless on all occasions of social relaxation. Never contributing any amusement out of his own fund, he is surly to everybody else who does. Yet relaxation and amusement seem to be essential elements in the conduct of life.

The boor is one who dislikes the sunnier side of life.

The boor, again, is a man useless on all occasions of social relaxation. He is neither agreeable himself and he loathes those who are differently disposed. Such a character is censurable, inasmuch as relaxation and amusement are essential, in view of the conditions of human life.

(*e*) REVIEW OF THE VIRTUES MANIFESTED IN SOCIAL INTERCOURSE.

There are, then, the three excellences which have been described shown in the intercourse of life, and they all have relation to the mingling of mind with mind in conversation or in business. The points upon which they differ are that one has regard to simple truth, the other two are concerned with what is agreeable. Of these latter, the one excellence is shown in times of gaiety, and the other in the social gatherings which take place in the general conduct of life.

There are then three forms of excellence shown in life in the intercourse which men have one with another. One form of excellence finds its sphere in Truth, having for its extremes on either side flattery and reserve; and two other excellences find a province in the Agreeable, of which one is what is called

courtesy, having for its extremes on either side, flattery and peevishness, and the other is versatility and tact, of which the extremes are buffoonery on the one side, and sourness and boorishness on the other: for of course both the courteous and the versatile man cause a certain amount of pleasure in life.

K.—SENSE OF SHAME.

REASONS WHY A SENSE OF SHAME IS ONLY A *QUASI*-VIRTUE.

Sense of shame only a quasi-virtue: it is rather physical than moral.

It is improper to speak of the sense of shame as though it were one of the virtues. It has a nearer resemblance to an emotion than to a permanent state of mind. The definition, at any rate, which is given of it, is that it is 'a certain apprehension of dishonour.' The results which it produces are very nearly akin to a sense of fear in presence of dangers: those who are affected with shame turn red, just as men turn pale when in fear of death. It is evident, therefore, that both these states are physical conditions; which seems to be characteristic of a passing emotion, rather than of a confirmed habit.

Sense of shame is properly predicated only of the young, and it is a very doubtful compliment to pay even to them.

Again, this is an emotion which is not suitable to all times of life, but only to the period of youth. We consider it the duty of those who are young to be modest and bashful, owing to the constant faults they commit, living as they do the life of emotion and under its control, and, on the other hand, owning the restraint of shame.

Again, while we praise the young when they are bashful, no one would ever eulogise an old man on the ground of his being shamefaced: we think it the duty of an old man never to do anything on the score of which shame might arise. Shame is indeed no element in the life of an honest man, seeing that it is only occasioned by what is evil, and evil deeds he must never commit. As for some things being disgraceful *per se* in their veritable nature, while other things are only disgraceful conventionally, the difference is immaterial: we ought never to do a disgraceful deed of any kind, so that for neither ought we ever to feel shame. It marks a depraved nature to be of such a disposition as ever to do an act that is disgraceful.

At best it is a hypothetical virtue: innocence is better than repentance

Again, for a man to have such a disposition, as that he *would* feel shame if he *were* to do aught disgraceful, and on that account to fancy himself a virtuous man —that is an absurd idea:—shame only arises at voluntary acts, and the virtuous man will never

of his own accord do vicious acts. At best, shame would only be conditionally a good thing:— *i.e.* if a man *were* to do so and so, he *would* feel shame; but that is not a condition which applies to the virtues. (though *if* a man sins, it is better to repent).

Again, though shamelessness is an evil, as also the absence of awe in doing shameful things, none the more on that account is it a good that a man who commits evil deeds should feel shame. Even self-control is not a virtue, but only a complex combination of virtue and vice; but of self-control a discussion will be held in the progress of the work.

We will now treat of Justice.

Now a sense of Shame is not a virtue. It is not a permanent state of mind, but only a passing emotion. So much is clear from its definition: it is defined as 'an apprehension of dishonour.' Very nearly the same conditions are found in the man who is ashamed as in the man who is fearful in regard to dangers. The man who is ashamed turns red, just as the man who is afraid of death turns pale. Both these sensations, shame and the fear of what is terrible, are evidently in a sense *physical* sensations; and being such they seem to be rather emotions than habits (and indeed they are never called habits).

Again, the emotion of shame is not suitable to all times of life, but simply to the period of youth. It is right that the young should be modest and bashful on account of the many errors into which they fall. The young commit constant faults, inasmuch as they are influenced by feeling rather than by reason; and thus, called to order by a sense of shame, they become better. Hence all young men who are modest are commended; whereas no one would commend an elderly man on the ground that he was shamefaced. An elderly man ought not to commit deeds from which shame might arise. Shame of course is no characteristic of a virtuous man, since it only arises from evil courses.

Again, though some things are disgraceful in veritable truth and *per se*, while other things are not so intrinsically but only by repute, it is a man's duty to flee from both alike if he would be virtuous. By thus fleeing from what is shameful, he will never experience a sense of shame.

Again, as for a man fancying that the simple act of feeling shame is in itself a sign of a virtuous character, on the supposition of his doing any shameful act, and fancying that this attitude of mind, itself incidental of evil, is virtuous,— that is absurd. Shame is caused on the consciousness of disgraceful deeds; but the virtuous man will never voluntarily do on any occasion a disgraceful act.

It is obvious, therefore, that shame is not a form of virtue, but rather an emotion. It is not under all circumstances commendable, nor can it absolutely and in itself be called a virtuous condition, but only conditionally. For example, if it should befall a man to commit a fault, it is right that he should have a sense of shame for his fault. But the virtues do not come under this condition: they are rather permanent states, inasmuch as they are under all circumstances inherent in the soul.

Again, though shame seems to be a kind of 'mean' and is midway between nervousness and shamelessness, and the man who shows shame is praised while censure is given as well to those who are shameless in regard to disgraceful deeds as to those who are more sensitive than is right in reference thereto (whom we call the 'nervous'), shame is not any the more on that account a virtue. Though virtue is a mean state, not every mean state is a virtue: the two terms are not convertible.

[So neither is Self-control a virtue but a kind of combination of virtue and vice. But an explanation will be given of this in the progress of this work.]

We will now treat of Justice.

BOOK V.—EXAMINATION OF THE VIRTUES

(Continued).

INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS.

L.—JUSTICE.

THE examination of the Moral Virtues concludes with Justice, which in one sense comprehends all the others. This subject occupies the whole of the Fifth Book, and is presented under a variety of changing aspects which represent a long vista of theories advanced by previous thinkers. At one time Justice is rightness of life, the perfect and unswerving allegiance of the will to the requirements of the moral law; at another time it is the fair apportionment of civil honours or social burdens to the proper subjects of them; at another time it is the redressing of wrong, the award of punishment to adjust the inequalities of fraud and crime.

The method of the Book is less developed than in the other parts of the Treatise. The transitions are less obvious, the repetitions more frequent. The first half of the book seems to be occupied rather with the distinctions of Justice and of Injustice as they are found in common life, and in the public relations of the citizens. The latter half leads rather to questions of casuistry, and to the grounds and origin of Justice.

The whole book will fall not unnaturally under XV divisions, which rarely cross one another.

(i.) GENERAL CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE: THEIR DEFINITION AND DIVISION.

There are three main aspects under which Justice may be regarded—as exemplified in the actual conduct of men, as a state of mind leading to conduct, and as an external standard. These three aspects are mutually involved in one another, but are all essential to the conception, as will be seen from a consideration of the Definition and Division of Justice.

Justice as a virtue must be a formed state of mind or fixed tendency, (ἕξις), not a mere capacity for doing certain things. A capacity for one thing implies a capacity for another; but a good tree cannot bring forth

evil fruit, and the mental habit of the just man is so fixed, that he cannot do other than just actions. The perfect attitude of morality (ἕξις προαιρετική) involves also a determination of the will which again is inseparable from 'wish' or 'desire.' The definition of Justice will, therefore, be 'a formed attitude of the moral nature, in virtue whereof we are capable of performing just actions and actually do so, and have further a personal desire for what is just.' Injustice is the reverse of this—'a habit which leads men to the commission of what is wrong and to wish for what is wrong.'

The actions, however, which result from such a state of mind are various. If we take the case of a man who is unjust, we find the term used to denote either a man who is universally vicious, or a law-breaker in the widest sense, or else a man who is unfair in his dealings—one who is 'unequal' in the apportionment of what lies within his own power to divide between himself and others. We can at once infer what the opposite of the unjust man is: he is either a man whose life fulfils all the requirements of law in their widest sense; or else, in a more particular sense, is one who takes no advantage of others, but gives to each their due. Justice itself therefore will either be what is lawful or what is proportionate: Injustice what is unlawful or else what is disproportionate and unequal. The field in which Injustice of this narrower kind will be displayed, will be that of the external goods of life. The unjust man will strive to get an undue share of the gifts of fortune, and shrink from bearing his fair proportion of life's burdens.

(ii.) CHARACTERISTICS OF UNIVERSAL JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE.

If, then, Justice be in its widest sense conformity to law, and law covers the same ground as morality, Justice and Morality will be coextensive. That such is the case is manifest. The aim of law is to promote social happiness: its provisions are designed to secure the well-being of the state, and its sanctions are framed for the repression of those crimes which mar that well-being. The man, therefore, who obeys the laws promotes, so far as in him lies, the good of his fellows. He is a morally perfect man, and his perfection is of the highest order. He achieves what is so difficult of achievement—the exercise of virtue towards others: he is not good in the merely passive sense; but he is actively benevolent and true in his dealings with the community. The only difference between Justice and Righteousness is this: Justice, while involving precisely the same moral conditions as Righteousness from the subjective point of view, has further relations with others, and is thus 'righteousness manifested in action.'

Injustice is the exact reverse: utter and consummated depravity practised to the injury of others—not merely viciousness of nature, but the practical outcome of viciousness as seen in deeds of wrong from which society suffers.

(iii.) CHARACTERISTICS OF CIVIL JUSTICE AS DISTINGUISHED FROM UNIVERSAL JUSTICE.

The following arguments may be used to show that Universal is distinct from Particular Justice. 1. The coward often gets no advantage

from his cowardice, and therefore is not overreaching; while conversely the man who is overreaching is not otherwise vicious. 2. An action is altered in character by the motive for which it is done. Adultery for gain is a different thing from adultery for passion. 3. Overreaching will not come under the category of any other vice; and as all the varieties of moral failure must be classified, it must necessarily form a class by itself.

But the *genus* of Universal Justice is the same as that of Particular Justice: they both have reference to other men. The objects, however, with which Particular Justice is concerned, are wealth, honour and social advantages; whereas the objects upon which Universal Justice is exercised, are the various aspects of the moral ideal. For the purposes of the present examination, Universal Justice, or the realization of the moral ideal in practical life, may be dismissed: it belongs more properly to the sphere of Statesmanship and will be dealt with in the Treatise on Politics.

(iv.) DIVISIONS OF CIVIL JUSTICE INTO (1) DISTRIBUTIVE, (2) CORRECTIVE.

Civil Justice, as the application of the principle of equality to the transactions in which the citizens are concerned or in which they take part, has a twofold character corresponding to two main aspects of civil life—the adjustment of honours and burdens, and the remedying of wrongs. It is thus either 'distributive' or 'remedial.'

1. Distributive Justice is the 'assigning to each his due' in regard to the honours and emoluments, the burdens and responsibilities which enter into the common life of the citizens. What is 'due to each' is what is 'equal'; and therefore distributive justice is the assigning to each member of the state 'the equality' which is relative to his position.

2. Corrective Justice is the adjustment of the mutual rights which citizens have in their transactions and arrangements one with another. If those transactions are voluntary, such as are the contracts which men make for buying and selling, remedial justice rectifies any unfair advantage which one citizen may have taken over another. If again those relations are involuntary, remedial justice redresses the wrong done by the infliction of punishment; whether the wrong be of the nature of fraud, as theft or perjury, or whether it take the shape of violence, as outrage, assault or assassination.

Application of Mathematical formulæ to the principles of Civil Justice.

Since what is unjust is what is unequal, what is just must be what is equal; and since what is equal is a mean between two inequalities, what is just will also be a mean. But if the just is what is equal and a mean point, what is the principle by which this equality is determined? Evidently the principle of proportion, of which the geometrical form will be applicable to Distributive Justice, and the arithmetical form to Corrective Justice.

(v.) DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE EXPLAINED.

Distributive Justice proceeds after the method of geometrical proportion. It does not regard the persons affected by the division of honours as simple units, but takes their separate worth into the account. It equalizes the honours to be divided with the character and merits of the persons among whom they are to be apportioned. For instance, the honour assigned to Ajax will bear precisely the same relation to the honour paid to Achilles, that the worth of Ajax does to the worth of Achilles. Each term will therefore be compared with each other; and this may be done either separately or in combination. If these considerations are neglected, and the differences between the persons and the things be not taken into the account, the distribution will be unequal, and there will be injustice.

(vi.) CORRECTIVE JUSTICE EXPLAINED.

Corrective Justice, on the other hand, proceeds on the method of arithmetical proportion, having simple regard to the equalizing of a wrong, without respect of persons. Its province is that of contracts and the transactions which are incidental to the personal relations between the citizens with one another. In these transactions one may gain an advantage over another, or inflict direct injury upon another. It is the business of the Judge to whom recourse is made by the persons aggrieved to take away from the aggressor or the man who has reaped the advantage from the transaction, an equivalent: he inflicts a punishment which will represent the measure of the wrong done. No account can be taken of the condition of the persons affected: the law simply looks to the violation of a contract, and redresses the wrong independently of the accidental associations of the case. A case of wrong is set right with the same impersonal impartiality as that with which a mathematician cuts off a section from the greater of two lines and adds it to the less. That is also the principle of commerce—exchange being regulated by reciprocal accommodation, in which each gives as much as he receives: the buyer gets a fair equivalent for his money, and the seller for his goods.

(vii.) EXAMINATION OF THE PYTHAGOREAN THEORY OF JUSTICE. RETALIATION.

There is a theory in some respects identical with the above—that Justice is 'retaliation.' The Pythagoreans, who held this view, claimed for it the authority of Rhadamanthus; and it has indeed much to commend it, if it be duly qualified and adjusted to the actual circumstances of life. But, boldly stated, it does not apply either to Distributive or to Remedial Justice. (1) In Distributive Justice retribution cannot always be in kind—'an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth.' Regard must be paid to the differences which persons and circumstances make: an exact and literal retribution would create a worse wrong than that which it professed to right. (2) In Remedial Justice the relations between the wrong and its remedy are necessarily diverse;

and justice demands a proportionate and analogous retribution, not one identical in kind.

Nevertheless retribution plays an important part in social life, and is an essential element in Justice. The return of kindnesses is the principle of gratitude: the return of injuries is the principle of punishment. But for the mutual interchange of kindly offices, the inner life of society would be destroyed; and but for the avenging of wrongs, all freedom would be undermined. Still the theory must not be applied without ample qualification: the retribution must not be an absolute one but be 'according to a due proportion.' That is the very principle of exchange. Society does not consist of a single class but of diverse classes: there are physicians, farmers, builders, vintners, &c.; and their various claims and capabilities must be adjusted to a proper scale of proportion. They must first of all be compared one with another, and their relative values must be determined: the degree in which the one exceeds the other, or falls short, must be estimated. For example, if a vintner and a farmer wish to exchange commodities, a comparison must be made between a sack of corn and a bottle of wine, the corn being worth twenty-four shillings and the wine eight, it will be evident that the proportion which the corn will hold to the wine is that of 3 : 1; and hence the vintner will give three bottles of wine for one sack of corn.

But what is the standard or measure of value? The most time-honoured standard, and that which is most rooted in the nature of things, is that of *demand:* the value of a thing is determined by our need of it and the uses which it consequently serves. But practically the value of a thing is determined by what it will fetch: by universal convention money is the measure of value—money being the representative of want. Money represents a permanent possibility of supply: it is the security for the supply of numberless things which a man may not want for the present but which money will get for him at any time in the future. It is therefore the universal medium of exchange: there is nothing but what has a value, and that value can be estimated in money. Hence it is that money makes all things commensurable—capable of being compared one with another; and though in itself money is purely a thing of convention and of artificial value, yet its associations have rendered it not merely a sign of value, but as valuable as commodities themselves.

(viii.) JUSTICE CONSIDERED AS A 'MEAN.'

The moral virtues generally seem to depend entirely upon subjective conditions: they are themselves 'mean states,' and the ideal of which they are the expression is embodied in the moral consciousness. But in the case of Justice the moral conditions are rather external than internal. Justice is not merely nor mainly a state of mind, but rather conformity to outward law. The wish to do what is right is of course an integral part of the conception, but no less important is the knowledge of the requirements of positive law, and the fulfilment of those requirements in practice. Justice is, therefore objective—a standard fixed by the statesman, and involved in the constitution of society: the

corresponding attitude of mind is the desire and intention to regulate one's own conduct in conformity with that standard.

(ix.) DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE UNJUST ACT AND THE UNJUST CHARACTER.

It will consequently happen that at times the dispositions of the agent may be perfectly right and his act perfectly wrong, or conversely that the act will be just, though the disposition of the agent is to be unjust. The justice of the act is no proof of the justice of the agent, nor is the justice of the agent certain security for the justice of his act.

(x.) METAPHORICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE IDEA OF JUSTICE.

Justice in the strict sense of the term can only exist among citizens who share equal rights and have an equal claim to the protection of the law. Those who share in the government, and who have relations towards one another defined by law, can injure or be injured by one another. When a citizen has less than his fair share of the common emoluments or honours of the state, he has recourse to the law to redress his injury; and when a citizen has had an advantage taken of him by another, the state equalizes the wrong done. The redressing of wrongs does not depend upon individual caprice, but upon the unfaltering standard of law.

Justice in this sense as 'the adjustment of social relations between citizens in view of the harmonious development of the State' cannot exist among slaves or children. The justice which regulates the conduct of a father in dealing with his children, or the conduct of a master in dealing with his slaves, is only justice in a metaphorical sense. The child is a part of his father, and no one can injure himself. The slave again is a kind of possession. There is therefore no place for wrong among such beings as children or slaves: they are on no basis of equality with free citizens: they cannot claim the rights which are secured to those who are 'free and equal': they have no recognised position in the State.

(xi.) DISTINCTION BETWEEN NATURAL AND POSITIVE LAW.

The basis of Justice has been variously sought in Nature and in Law. Natural right is that which is independent of society, and has a sanction binding on the reason whether any particular nation accept it or no. Positive right is that which owes its sanction to the enactments of law. Natural right is unalterable: positive right may be abrogated by the power which enacted it. Natural right is the expression of immutable reason: positive right is a thing indifferent, *per se*, and deriving all its obligation from the penalties which sanction it.

But as there are diverse kinds of commonwealths, so there are diverse kinds of laws: and this diversity has made men think that Justice is only convention or compact, and not a thing in itself immutable. But the changes in Justice refer only to such aspects as come within the cognisance of law: there is still an ideal independent of and superior to the exigencies of society. The genus is the same, though the species present innumerable variations.

(xii.) JUSTICE CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO THE WILL.

It was shown in detail in Book III., that the Will was the essential aspect of morality, and the conclusions there arrived at may be repeated here. In the analysis of moral action it was shown that a man was not to be accounted good or bad unless his will co-operated in a certain line of conduct. If an action is not agreeable to the agent, the character of that act is accidental: it may in its outward consequences be good or evil, but it is impossible to infer from it the state of the agent.

There are two conditions essential to voluntariness: (1) knowledge, and (2) power. The agent must know the circumstances of his action, its tendency and the various conditions which determine its nature. He must also have moral freedom, and act without compulsion except from his own conscience. Otherwise the act is involuntary, and its character accidental.

The injuries therefore which men do will fall under three classes:

1. Wrongs which are done through ignorance of the circumstances, and which are errors or mishaps, as when he is unaware of the instrument he is using, and who it is that he is striking.
2. Wrongs which are done with an evil intent and maliciously.
3. Wrongs which are unintentional though the agent was not unconscious of what he was doing; such as are the wrongs done through passion.

These different kinds of wrongs will be regarded with different degrees of censure. Some are pardonable and others are not. Acts are pardonable which are done through an error, or ignorance of the circumstances, or through justifiable passion. Acts are not pardonable when done in consequence of a state of mind which is neither natural nor worthy of man.

(1) *Can the Will consent to the suffering of a wrong?*

There seems a contradiction of terms in supposing that the suffering of injury can be a voluntary act. Yet there is a difficulty in understanding how certain acts can be otherwise than voluntary. Perhaps the solution of the difficulty may be found in the fact that there is a difference between being injured and suffering an injury. Just as a man may do unjust things either voluntarily or involuntarily, though no one can act unjustly except by deliberate choice; so, too, a man may suffer what is unjust, voluntarily or involuntarily, though no one can suffer unjustly except against his will. In the proper sense of the term therefore, the suffering of injury is always an involuntary act. If Glaucus gives an exchange with Diomede which is unequal, he is not acting against his own will, though he suffers loss. Nor again is the sensualist injured voluntarily: what he suffers is against his reason and real wish.

(2) *In an unjust distribution, who is unjust?*

Is the man who makes an unjust distribution unjust, or rather the man who profits by it? The man who makes the distribution has the responsibility of originating the action, and he is to blame rather than the man who receives the distribution: his will is free, whereas the

will of the man who receives the distribution is not free. The latter simply is the recipient of what is assigned to him, and the fault does not lie at his door.

Is the man who assigns to himself less than his due thereby wronged? Certainly not: though he appears to receive less of external goods, in fact, he is no loser. The loss which he appears to undergo is compensated for by far more precious advantages. He gains the praise of moderation, of scrupulosity, of generosity, and of kindred virtues. He conciliates the goodwill of his neighbours who trumpet his liberality.

(xiii.) DIFFICULTY OF THE ATTAINMENT OF JUSTICE.

Men commonly think that it is an easy thing to be just for the reason that the opposite, injustice, is within our own power and dependent on our own will. But Justice is not simply the performance of just actions, but the performance of them with a certain intention, and as the outcome of a certain frame of mind. It requires therefore a certain mental habit, or formed disposition of character, which only the discipline of many years can instil into us.

Men think again that it is not difficult to know what is just and what is unjust, since the requirements of justice are comprised in legal codes which are published for all men to read and digest. But Justice does not depend upon the knowledge of abstract principles, but rather in the details of action, in the fine distinctions of circumstance which have to be moulded and adjusted according to those abstract principles.

Justice applies only to those who are equal.

There are some who are immeasurably beyond ourselves, and to whom therefore we can never assign too much of worldly honour and dignity: such are the magistrates, or our parents. There are others who are correspondingly below us, such as convicts and others, who are so degraded that we can never assign them too little, lest they should abuse such things to their own destruction. Those to whom Justice, as the principle of equality, must be shown, are such as are sharers in common burdens and have an equal claim to the honours of the state, and neither a greater nor a less claim than ourselves.

(xiv.) RELATIONS BETWEEN EQUITY AND JUSTICE DETERMINED.

It is evident that the equitable is not identical with the just, because we praise the equitable man as being morally better than the just man when the equitable man yields something of his strict rights, which the just man will not do; and, further, the equitable man is spoken of synonymously with the good man. But neither is Equity contrary to Justice: both alike are estimable and meet with the approbation of the moral sense.

The differences between Equity and Justice are mainly these. Equity is better than legal Justice: it softens the absolute rigour of written law and amends the wrongs which abstract right might cause. It does not depend upon written words and 'the letter which killeth,' but upon

the moral sense and educated perception of the good man. It does not deal with universals, but with particulars—not with general propositions, but with actual circumstances. Written law is of necessity sometimes at fault. The nature of circumstances presenting an ever-changing aspect cannot be always anticipated: the variations of the conditions of actual life baffle such generalization. Again, laws are always framed as universal propositions; and must, in fact, become a kind of equity if they are to be applied honestly to particular cases.

It follows that Equity is a supplementing or rectifying of the omissions of the law or of provisions which are not adequate to meet the complications of particular circumstances. The equitable man interprets the intention of the legislator in framing the law; and applies the same principle in spirit to the determination of his duty in the actual circumstances before him. He endeavours to place himself in the position of the legislator, and to act as he would have acted had he foreseen such contingencies.

Equity may, therefore, be defined as a rectification of legal enactments in such aspects where the law fails in a particular case owing to its universality. The equitable man accordingly is one whose desire is to waive his own strict rights, though the law would justify his claim, and whose temper leads him to interpret the law to his own hindrance rather than to that of his neighbours.

(XV.) FURTHER SOLUTION OF TWO QUESTIONS RELATING TO JUSTICE.

(1) *Can a man injure himself?*

The arguments already advanced will have made it evident that a man cannot injure himself. There are, however, writers, who produce the case of the suicide as evidence that a man *can* injure himself. "The suicide," they say, "does an evil deed tacitly forbidden by law—since law forbids all slaughter which it does not expressly enjoin. Moreover, the suicide has no injury to requite, but deliberately does an evil deed; and of course against himself." . . . . Nay, but it is not the man himself who suffers harm (since it was shown that no man is injured of his own will), but rather the State; and it is the State consequently which inflicts a penalty upon him, depriving him of sepulture.

There are yet other arguments to show that suicide is not self-injury. (1) Injustice implies relations with others: a man cannot isolate one part of himself against another, so as to fulfil this condition of Justice. (2) A man cannot be agent and patient in one. (3) A man cannot be injured voluntarily. (4) All crime is harm to others: a man cannot harm himself. (5) The whole theory of 'the voluntary' is at variance with such an idea.

(2) *Is it worse, to do an injury or to receive one?*

Both alike, as departures from the ideal of the mean, are evils, but the doing of injury is associated with a depravity in the agent, and is therefore, *per se*, the greater evil.

TRANSLATION.

L.—JUSTICE.

i.—General conceptions of Justice and of Injustice.

(*a*) PROVISIONAL DEFINITION OF JUSTICE AND OF INJUSTICE.

In treating of Justice and of Injustice the points which we have to consider are: (1) what kinds of actions they are in which Justice and Injustice are displayed, (2) what kind of a 'mean' justice is, as an ideal frame of mind, and (3) what are the 'extremes' between which Justice, as abstract 'right,' lies. The inquiry will be carried on according to the same plan as our previous investigations.

Scope of the inquiry, and explanation of terms.

We see at once that all men are willing to define Justice as 'a state of mind of such a complexion, that in consequence thereof men are enabled to do just deeds, and in fact do deal justly and have a desire for what is just;' (and that contrariwise Injustice is 'a state of mind which leads men to act unjustly, and to desire what is unjust.')

This view of Justice may, at starting, be assumed as indicating in outline its real nature.

[Justice is described as a 'frame of mind,' not a mere capacity, because the conditions involved in a 'frame of mind' are very different from those involved in a mere faculty or intellectual capacity. A faculty or an intellectual capacity seems to be the same for opposites; but a frame of mind, as a permanent disposition, cannot produce opposite effects. For instance, from a healthy state of body the only functions that can be developed are healthy functions, and not such as are destructive of itself:—we say that a man walks healthily when he walks as a man in perfect health should do.]

Justice a formed tendency (ἕξις), not a capacity (δύναμις).

We will now at once proceed to treat of Justice and of Injustice, and show the nature of the actions in which they are displayed, the nature of the 'mean' which

makes Justice an ideal frame of mind, the nature of Justice as 'abstract right' and a 'mean' term between extremes, and the nature of the extremes which lie on either side of this ideal 'right.'

We will conduct our inquiry upon the same method as that which has guided us in our inquiry into the other virtues.

Now we see that all the world calls Justice a frame of mind by the possession of which we are enabled to perform just actions, and in fact do act uprightly and desire what is just. Injustice men define on the same principle: they call Injustice a frame of mind, in consequence of which we act unjustly and desire what is unjust. We may here assume the accuracy of these common views; and define Justice and Injustice respectively, in outline, as 'a frame of mind in virtue whereof we do (or do not) desire what is just.'

[We must always attach to the moral virtues the condition of wish or purpose: it is impossible for them otherwise to be defined—except as modes of purpose or of will:—it is owing to the wish that a man has to be temperate and to act justly that he grows to be temperate and just. Of course in the case of faculties and intellectual capacities, the possession of power is essential, the wish to exercise that power is not essential: if a man have the power of curing disease, he is a physician whether he use his power or not; and similarly in the case of the other intellectual powers. In the case, however, of the moral virtues, the conditions are changed. The power of doing just actions is often within the means even of an unjust man, but the desire to do just actions is characteristic of none but the just. Hence a man is just even though he be unable to perform just actions, provided he has the desire and possesses the frame of mind which characterises Justice. In the same way a man is unjust if he has the *wish* to be unjust, whether he carry out his purpose or not. Further, every faculty or intellectual habit is conversant with things that are contrary one to another: by one and the same science a man may know contraries; *e.g.*, one and the same science, that of Medicine, is concerned both with health and with disease, and by one and the same faculty contrary results are brought about. But a *moral* habit is incapable of producing contrary results. In virtue of our Justice we do not perform actions that are, indifferently, just or unjust, any more than the movements of a diseased body are the same as those of a sound body.]

(*b*) DIVISIONS OF JUSTICE AND OF INJUSTICE.

Division of Justice into Universal and Particular (derived from its concrete opposite).

In many cases, however, the nature of a moral habit may be inferred from its corresponding opposite; and in many cases, again, moral habits may be understood from the concrete objects in which they reside. If, for example, the nature of sound health be manifest, the nature of its opposite, bad health, becomes equally plain. Again, from the nature of those who have sound health, the nature of sound health may be inferred, and from sound health may be inferred the conditions which produce it. If sound health be a certain compactness of flesh, it necessarily follows that bad health is a certain flabbiness of flesh, and further, that the cause of sound health is that which produces compactness of flesh.

Furthermore it follows, for the most part, that if one term be predicated in a variety of ways, its opposite is predicated in corresponding ways:—if there be, for instance, many senses in what is 'right,' there will be many senses in the term 'wrong.'

It seems that the attributes 'just' or 'unjust' are predicated of a person in various senses; yet inasmuch as the similarity of idea is very close, the distinction escapes notice, and it is not like other terms which have the same sound, but a sense so widely different, that their divergence is plainly marked. (In such cases generally the difference which appeals to the eye is considerable: for instance, (the Greek word for) 'key' is applied in an equivocal sense to the bone below the neck of animals, and to the instrument by which we fasten doors.)

Let us now take the case of the term 'unjust,' and see in what different senses a man is called 'unjust.' It appears to be commonly applied to (1) the law-breaker, (2) the overreaching and unfair man. It is consequently clear that the just man will be (1) the law-abiding man, and the (2) fair-minded man. What is 'right' or 'just,' then, will be (1) what is sanctioned by law, and (2) what is fair and equal: what is 'unjust' or 'wrong' will be (1) what is in violation of law, and (2) what is unequal.

However, the tendencies of habits may be inferred from those that are the exact contrary: if, for instance, a man knows that sound health is a compactness of flesh, he will infer that bad health is a flabbiness of flesh. Again, the nature of habits may be gathered from the conditions which produce them. Take, for instance, the case of health: the condition which produces the habit is healthfulness—*i.e.*, that which tends to promote health. Now if we know that healthfulness is that which produces compactness in the flesh, we know that good health itself is that very compactness in the flesh.

There is this further consequence involved in habits, for the most part:—if of two contrary habits the one be predicated in a variety of senses, the other is predicated in correspondingly opposite senses. For instance, if Temperance is a term with a variety of significations, Intemperance will have a corresponding variety of significations; and if Justice be an equivocal term, and predicated of a variety of persons, Injustice will present the same character. [The limitation 'for the most part' is made of this statement, because there are certain habits to which this 'law of contraries' is not found to hold. For instance, 'loving' is opposed to 'hating;' but 'loving' is not a simple idea, but implies in Greek (1) affection, or (2) kissing with the lips; whereas 'hating' implies one single idea—that of aversion. These exceptions, however, are very rarely found: generally and for the most part a habit is predicated in the same senses in which its opposite is predicated.]

Since, then, Justice is predicated in a number of senses, Injustice will be predicated in an equal number of opposite senses. Commonly it is thought that Justice and Injustice have but a single signification, inasmuch as the ideas implied therein do not differ vastly from one another. Terms which are equivocal and have a variety of significations, only become apparent when the facts which they represent exhibit a palpable difference between one another. 'Key,' for example, is a term applied to the bone next to the neck of an animal, and to the instrument by which we fasten doors. In such cases, inasmuch as the difference in the things indicated is considerable, the equivocation and the variation of meaning are palpable.

Since, then, Justice and Injustice are predicated in many senses, let us take the case of the Unjust man, and distinguish the senses in which the attribute 'unjust' is applied to him. The term 'unjust' is applied (1) to the man who violates the laws, and (2) to the man who is unfair. Consequently the opposite character, the

Just man, will be one (1) who observes the laws, and (2) who is fair and equal; and 'wrong' or injustice *per se* will be (1) 'what is in violation of law,' and (2) what is unequal.

(*c*) SPHERE OF JUSTICE AND OF INJUSTICE.

The objects which the unjust man seeks to compass are 'the good things of life' (or if needs must be) the least of the evils of life.

But since the unjust man is overreaching, the objects which will concern him, will be the good things of life —not however *all* good things, but such as form the province of good or bad fortune—things which in themselves and abstractedly are blessings though to individuals sometimes the reverse. (Though all men pray for these good things, and eagerly pursue after them, they are wrong in so doing; their prayer ought rather to be that things which are blessings *per se* may be in truth blessings to them, and their own choice should be of things which are good for their own selves.)

The unjust man does not invariably choose 'the more,' but in some cases he chooses 'the less'—*i.e.* where his choice lies between things which are absolutely evils. Inasmuch, however, as the lesser evil seems to be in some sense a good, and the overreaching temper is concerned with what is good, the man who chooses the lesser evil is consequently thought to be an overreaching man. He has at any rate an unfair share of the advantage in question. ('Unfairness' is a comprehensive term common to all aspects of injustice.)

But since the unjust man is overreaching, and the overreaching spirit has reference to some form of 'good,' the object in reference to which the unjust man is overreaching will be some form of 'good.' Yet the 'good' which he seeks is not that which is good for his own self, and which would make him in himself a better man. He does not seek to become more temperate than his neighbours, nor more skilled in medicine than the physicians, nor more charitable than other liberal men, nor does he seek for any other of the goods which are 'good' absolutely and in themselves, and which render the possessor thereof good. The goods in reference to which he seeks to surpass his fellows are such as, while absolutely and in themselves 'good,' do not help him to progress in goodness, but ofttimes positively make him worse than before. Such goods are riches and power and bodily strength:—these become in the case of the bad man material for increased depravity. So it is with the good things generally which form the province of good or bad fortune. The mass of men make their prayer for such things, and eagerly pursue after them. Yet they ought not so to do, but rather to pray that these things, which are good in themselves, may render them good, and be a benefit to them, and not render them worse than before. If the choice lie open before them, they ought to prefer, not the things which are good absolutely, but things which are good for their own selves, and such things as will have the effect of rendering them better in themselves. But the unjust man prays, for himself, for the goods which contribute to good fortune, and in reference thereto he always seeks to gain an advantage. He also makes his choice of the least of the evils involved in bad fortune, considering the lesser evil to be a good. Inasmuch as he

is always overreaching, and the object in reference to which his grasping spirit is shown is the 'good,' herein also he seems to be overreaching. He is also an unfair man, unfairness or inequality being a comprehensive term common to all the varieties of injustice: the law-breaking man is in a way an unfair man, just as the grasping man is.

ii.—Characteristics of Universal Justice and Injustice.

Now as the law-breaker was seen to be unjust, and the law-abiding man just, it is clear that all the requirements of law are also requirements of justice. The requirements of law are such as are defined by the science of Jurisprudence, and every such enactment we say is 'just' or 'right.'

So far as Justice is conformity with law, it must reach to every sphere of action to which law is applicable.

But the laws make provision for every kind of circumstance, making it their aim to secure what is beneficial either for the state at large, or for the best men in the state, or for the ruling class, whether it be determined by merit or in any other similar way. In one sense therefore we call things just which are productive or preservative of happiness, and of the various ingredients of happiness for the whole social community. Law enjoins, for example, citizens to perform the duties of the brave man—not to quit their ranks, nor to take to flight, nor to throw down their arms. It enjoins, again, the exercise of self-control—to refrain from adultery or insolence. It enjoins, again, the practice of patience and meekness—to forbear striking or railing. Through the whole range indeed of the virtues and vices, it enjoins a certain line of conduct and forbids its opposite; and when a law has been correctly drawn, its provisions are true and just, though if it be passed on the chance of the moment, its provisions are less beneficial.

Justice of this kind, or perfect conformity to law, is identical with the perfect excellence of the moral nature—not indeed viewed absolutely, but in relation to society. Hence it is that Justice is often regarded as the most effective of all the Virtues; and neither the Hesperus nor the Morning Star seem so marvellous in their beauty; and among the adages of daily life we say:

As law is applicable to every circumstance of life, the fulfilment of law will be the perfection of every phase of life: Justice will thus be Righteousness.

"In Justice every virtue is contained."

It is indeed the perfection of the moral nature in the highest sense, because it is the outward expression or exercise of that perfection: it is perfected virtue, because the man who possesses it is able to display his goodness towards others, and not

merely in his own life. There are many men who are able to exercise moral virtue in their domestic concerns, but fail to be equally virtuous in their relations with the world at large. The saying of Bias is therefore very apposite to such cases: 'Power is the touch-stone of character'—*i.e.* a man who wields power stands in relation to other men and his life is bound up with that of the community. For this very reason it is that Justice is thought to be 'the good of our neighbour' pre-eminently among all the virtues, inasmuch as it brings a man into definite relation with his fellows: *i.e.* it effects what is for the interest of others, whether the ruler or the community at large. He, then, is most depraved who practises wickedness as well in his own life as in his dealings with his friends; and he is most virtuous who displays his goodness not only in his own character, but in his intercourse with his neighbours—which is indeed a hard task.

Justice, then, of this kind is not merely an element or department of Virtue, but is itself complete and perfect virtue; nor is its opposite Injustice a mere form or division of Vice, but is itself coextensive with vice. The point in which the aspect of the one differs from the aspect of the other, is clear from what has been said. Justice as a state of mind is identical with perfect virtue, but the mode of its manifestation is different:—when reflected upon others, it is Justice, but when viewed simply as a disposition of a particular kind it is Virtue.

But since the law-breaker is in a sense an unjust man, and one who keeps the law a just man, it is evident that all things which are 'lawful' are in a sense things which are 'just.' Things are lawful which are defined by the science of Jurisprudence, and such things are called just:—every enactment of the laws being, as we say, a requirement also of justice. It consequently is found that Justice is conversant with precisely the same class of relations as are the laws.

But the laws make provision for every detail of life, aiming to realize whatever is advantageous for the different forms of social polity, whether the constitution which they establish be a democracy or an oligarchy or of some other type. The acts which the laws enjoin are such as cover the whole field of moral virtue, for instance, acts of temperance, of justice and of courage. They enjoin the citizen not to quit his post, nor to take to flight—which is the conduct proper to the brave man; nor to commit adultery nor to wax insolent—which is the business of the temperate man; nor to strike nor to injure another—which is the characteristic of good temper. Similarly in regard to the virtues and vices generally, the law orders a certain line of conduct and forbids the opposite. When a law is scientifically framed, it is a right law viewed by the standard of Reason and Science; but when it is framed at random and without consideration, its provisions and its sanctions are not in accordance with true science nor with the real fitness of things. Nevertheless, those sanctions and provisions relate to what is good or evil, that being the aim and end of all law as such.

If, then, the requirements of law are coextensive with those of Justice, and it is found that the sphere of law is coextensive with the sphere of Justice, then Justice comprises every form of moral excellence, and is itself perfect virtue, inasmuch as it embraces all the virtues and is itself complete virtue. The only point in fact in which Justice is distinct from universal virtue is this: Virtue as

a state of mind is a thing apart and independent and simply exists *per se*, whereas Justice is a perfect state of mind not absolutely but brought into relation with other society. The exercise of all the virtues with a view to the interest of one's neighbours—that is what Justice implies.

For this reason Justice is thought to be the most effective of all the virtues; and neither the Morning nor the Evening Star are so bright nor marvellous in their lustre. According to the common adage men use :—

"In Justice every virtue is contained in miniature."

It is virtue in its most perfect form because it is the *exercise* of perfect virtue. The man who possesses justice is able to practise his virtue in his intercourse with his neighbours and not by himself merely. There are many men who benefit by their virtues their own selves, but are unable to help others by means thereof. The saying of Bias is, therefore, very apposite : 'Power will bring the character to the test,' power being nothing else than the communication of the moral virtues to the wellbeing of society. For this reason also Justice seems to be 'the good of others,' alone of all the virtues, because it seeks what is good not for a man's own self but for others also ; either, that is, for the state at large or for the ruler of it. The man then who injures both himself and his friends by his wickedness is most depraved, whereas the man who uses the moral excellencies which he possesses not merely for his own private good, but for the good of his neighbours also, is a man of perfect virtue, unselfishness being indeed a hard matter to practise.

Justice, then, of this kind is not a mere division or element of virtue, but is itself complete and perfect virtue ; and for similar reasons, Injustice is no mere element of vice, but is itself complete and consummated vice. [The point in which universal virtue differs from Justice of this kind, has been already explained.]

iii.—Characteristics of Civil Justice.

(*a*) SPECIAL SENSE OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE DEFINED BY CONDITIONS OF EQUALITY.

Arguments to prove that Universal Justice or Injustice is distinct from Particular Justice or Injustice.

But the special object of our present investigation is that form of Justice which ranks as one of the divisions of virtue rather than as co-extensive with it. There *is* such a narrower form of Justice, as we have just said. In the same way in regard to Injustice we must examine into that form of it which is a distinct kind of vice.

Herein is proof that such a special form of Justice exists. When a man's character takes the shape of ordinary depravity, though he is an evil-doer, he gets no advantage from his evil-doing ; as, for instance, if he has thrown down his shield through cowardice, or has abused his neighbour through ill-temper, or failed to succour the need of his friends through niggardliness. Conversely, when a man takes unfair advantage of others, his over-reaching is often not in the direction of any one of these special vices (certainly not in the direction of *all*), yet still he acts in pursuance of a certain depravity of nature (otherwise we should not censure him), and, in consequence, of injustice. It follows,

therefore, that there is a special kind of injustice which ranks as a form of universal injustice, and that there are acts of injustice which rank as special forms of universal Injustice or Unlawfulness.

Again, suppose a man to commit adultery: if his motive be to make gain thereby, and he receives the reward he seeks, he would appear to be unjust rather than sensual, his act being obviously prompted by gain; whereas if his crime be owing to his lust, and he pays the price of it and is injured thereby, he is sensual rather than overreaching.

Again, in the case of offences generally, reference is invariably made to some particular form of vice; for example, if a man has committed adultery, his crime is put down to his sensuality, or if he has deserted his comrade in action, his conduct is put down to his cowardice, or if he has assaulted anyone, his act is put down to passionateness. On the other hand, if a man has made *a gain* of another, his act is not imputed to any other depravity except simple injustice.

But there is another kind of Justice which is a special form of moral excellence, just as there is a kind of Injustice which is a special form of moral depravity.

The following may be a proof that there is such a special form of Justice, and of Injustice. The man who shapes his life after the various forms of depravity, may be called an evil-doer, but by no means an overreaching man. Such is, for instance, a man who throws away his shield through cowardice, or who abuses his neighbour through ill-temper and inability to control the impetuosity of his passion, or who fails through illiberality to assist with his wealth the wants of his neighbour:—men of this type are evil-doers, but not overreaching in any sense. Consequently the overreaching man is concerned with some other form of depravity, since his grasping has relation neither to any one of these vices nor to all combined. There is, therefore, some special form of injustice ranking as a division of universal injustice; and there are certain acts corresponding which are particular forms of injustice, and separate divisions of universal injustice and violation of law.

Again, supposing that one man commits adultery for the sake of gain and in fact receives his reward, while another man does so to gratify his own pleasure and is injured by his conduct and spends his substance upon his passions, the latter would be called a sensual but not an overreaching man, whereas the former would be called overreaching and unjust, but by no means a sensualist. Consequently, there is a form of injustice which does not include dissoluteness, and, therefore, is not identical with universal injustice, but is a special form of it.

Again, every evil action is referred to some particular vice; for instance, adultery is imputed to sensuality; flight and the throwing away of the shield, to cowardice; abuse and striking, to passionateness. But to gain the property of others and advantages which in no way belong to oneself,—that is referred to no other cause beyond injustice.

(*b*) COMPARISON BETWEEN UNIVERSAL AND CIVIL JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE.

It is consequently evident that besides Injustice as a whole (which is equivalent to vice) there is a special division of Injus-

tice, ranking as a part of the whole, though having a common name inasmuch as its definition falls under the same *genus*:—*i.e.* both forms have their significance depending entirely upon relations to others; but whereas the objects with which Civil Justice is concerned are honour, wealth, safety, or something, if such can be found, in which all these are comprised, and it is inspired by the pleasure which comes from gain, the objects on the other hand with which Universal Injustice is concerned are precisely the objects with which the virtuous man as such is concerned.

Distinctions between Universal and Civil Justice correspond to distinctions of their subject-matter.

It is clear, then, that there are several forms of Justice, and that there is a special form distinct from Justice as a whole. We must now try to grasp what that special kind of Justice is, and what are its characteristics.

Well then, acts of injustice are divided into acts of law-breaking and acts of unfairness; and acts of justice are divided into acts conformable to law and acts of fairness. The Injustice described above will therefore be co-extensive with the violation of law.

But just as what is 'unequal' and what is 'more' are not identical but distinct, as standing in the relation of a whole to a part, (the 'more' being always 'unequal,' but the unequal not always 'more',) so the 'unjust' and Injustice, in the civil or particular sense, are not the same as the universal forms, but are distinct from them, the one being 'parts,' the other 'wholes.' That is to say, Civil Injustice is a part of Universal Injustice, and for similar reasons Civil Justice is part of Universal Justice. We must therefore treat of Justice in its particular aspects, and of Injustice in its particular aspects, and of the acts corresponding in the same manner.

That form of Justice, then, or of Injustice which has a range co-extensive with the whole of virtue (the one being the practice of the whole of virtue and the other the practice of the whole of vice in its relation to society) may be dismissed from the present inquiry. As for the acts which correspond to these forms of Universal Justice and Injustice, it is evident how they must be defined. The mass of things 'lawful' pretty generally correspond with the acts performed in virtue of the complete excellence of the moral nature: *i.e.* the law enjoins us to live in conformity with each single virtue and deters us from conforming to any single vice. Again, the causes which produce this perfect virtue are the various enactments of law which have been made to regulate education in its bearings on social life. [We must leave

Universal Justice may be dismissed from the point of view of the present Book.

for future discussion the question whether the education of individuals, in virtue whereof a man is 'good' in the absolute sense of the term, belongs to the Science of Statesmanship, or to some other. It is surely not the same thing in every case to be a good man and to be a good citizen.]

It is, therefore, evident that there is a special form of Injustice though called by the same name as Universal Justice (the definition of either kind belonging to the same *genus* inasmuch as both alike have their manifestation in the practice of goodness in relation to society). This special form of Injustice differs however from Universal Injustice inasmuch as the objects with which it is concerned are wealth and safety and the pleasure that comes from gain (or some similar conception if there be any, embracing all such objects); whereas the objects of Universal Injustice are all such as the virtuous man is conversant with.

It is clear then from what has been said that the term 'injustice' is used in a variety of senses, and that there is a special form of it distinct from human perfection in the wide sense of the term. We must now proceed to explain what this special form of Justice is.

We have already shown that the 'unjust' is divided into (1) what is in violation of a law, and (2) what is unequal or unfair, and that the 'just' is divided into (1) what is conformable to law, and (2) what is fair and equal. Justice, therefore, in its fullest sense is concerned with what is conformable to law, and Injustice in the wide sense with what is in violation of law [as well as unequal].

But since what is 'more' is not identical with what is 'unequal,' but the 'unequal' represents a whole of which 'the more' is a part (*i.e.* what is 'more' is always 'unequal,' but what is 'unequal' is not always 'more') there will also be another form of Injustice relating to the unequal; and these forms of Injustice will not be identical, but Injustice which is concerned with what is 'more' will be particular injustice, whereas the Injustice which is concerned with the 'unequal' will be universal injustice. Particular injustice which bears the relation towards consummate injustice of a part to a whole, is concerned with what is 'more,' (and this is what is meant by an 'overreaching' or 'grasping spirit'). From these considerations it may be inferred what particular Justice is, so far as may be in outline; but we shall have to treat of it with greater precision.

Universal Justice, therefore, as has been explained, is perfect virtue and the practice of virtue in its entirety (just as Injustice is complete vice) in virtue of its conformity to law. Now Law does not merely order us to perform the actions of every virtue (as has been shown in previous explanations), but it trains the citizens so that they may become virtuous and attain to a state of mind representative of absolute virtue. It is not the same thing to do deeds of virtue and to have a disposition of virtue: and consequently it is a different thing to be a good *citizen* and to be a virtuous *man*. A man is virtuous when he has a disposition of virtue: a citizen is a good citizen when he performs (from whatever motive) acts of virtue whereby he will benefit his own fellow-citizens in his public life and generally is helpful towards his fellows.

[Here a question may be raised as to the sense in which education belongs to the Science of Statesmanship—the education I mean in consequence whereof a man grows to be virtuous. That is a point upon which we shall have to speak later on.]

Justice and Injustice, therefore, in their widest sense, are what I have described.

iv.—Division of Civil Justice into (1) Distributive and (2) Corrective.

Of Justice in its narrower sense and of the just relation corresponding thereto, there are two forms:

1. One form of Justice, as equality in the relations of civil life, is exhibited in the distribution and apportionment of honour, money, and the advantages generally which may be divided among such as have a common share in the constitution; since in all matters of that kind it is possible to have what is equal or what is unequal compared with others.

Justice considered as the principle by which the 'rights' of individual citizens are regulated and adjusted and vindicated.

2. The second form is 'corrective' or regulative of transactions between man and man; and as some transactions are voluntary and others involuntary, this form of Justice has two subdivisions. (*a*) Voluntary transactions are such as buying or selling, lending or borrowing, accommodation, trust, or hiring; the voluntariness consisting in the fact that the initial start in all such matters is voluntary. (*β*) Involuntary transactions are either fraudulent or violent. Fraudulent transactions are, for example, theft, adultery, witchcraft, procuration, enticing of slaves, assassination and false witness. Violent transactions are such as outrage, bonds, death, abduction, maiming, calumny, insult.

Of Justice in the special sense of civil equity and of the just relation corresponding thereto, there are two forms:

1. One form is exhibited in apportionments among different citizens; when it is necessary to apportion money or honour or anything else that is divisible among such as take rank in the civil community. In all such matters equality and inequality, what is less and what is more may be assigned to different people. For this reason it is a distinctive form of Justice to divide and to apportion to each according to principles of right.

2. The other form is corrective or regulative in transactions between man and man. Of this form, again, there are two subdivisions, inasmuch as *contracts* are divided into two kinds, one being voluntary and the other involuntary.

(*a*) Voluntary transactions are such as buying, selling, lending, securing, accommodation (when for instance a man gives up his house or his horse to another to make use of), depositing, hiring of a slave or of a craftsman. Such arrangements are called voluntary because the man who has taken or used such things will voluntarily give them back—and at any rate received them in the first instance voluntarily from one who gave them freely and because he desired to do so. And so they are called 'voluntary.'

(*β*) Involuntary transactions are called either fraudulent or violent. *Fraudulent* contracts are such as theft, adultery, witchcraft, procuration, the cheating of anyone's slave, assassination, false witness. *Violent* contracts are such as blows, bonds, death, ravishment, maiming, calumny, insult; and they are so called because a man who offends in relation thereto receives secretly and violently either money or pleasure, and pays back the price thereof in the courts of law, either through fine or death or being outraged or degraded.

There are, then, these two forms of Civil Justice, one relating to the distribution of goods the other to matters of contracts, which again are either voluntary or involuntary. We will now proceed to speak of each form with greater precision.

v.—The Principles of Distributive Justice explained.

Since the unjust man is unjust in his dealings, and a thing that is unjust is a thing that is unequal, it is clear that there is a

'mean point' in reference whereto such inequality is viewed; and this 'mean point' is what is 'equal.' (Of course there must be what is equal in any sphere of action in which there is 'more' and 'less.') If then what is unjust is what is unequal, what is just must be what is equal—an inference which all will draw without discussion; and as what is 'equal' is a 'mean point,' what is just will also be 'a mean point.'

Whatever is 'equal' is a mean. The just is 'equal;' the just is a mean.

But 'the equal' implies two quantities at least. It necessarily follows, therefore, that what is 'just,' as being a 'mean' and a thing that is 'equal,' should imply a reference not only to a certain standard but also to certain particular persons: *i.e.* in so far as it is 'a mean,' it must be a mean between certain quantities—'more' or 'less,' and in so far as it is an 'equal,' it must mean an equality between two quantities, and in so far as it is 'just,' it implies a reference to particular persons.

Justice as 'a mean' implies two quantities and two persons affected by those quantities.

It necessarily follows that what is 'just' implies four terms at the least: for there are two persons concerned, and the shares which they receive are two. And the relation will be the same between the persons as between their shares. If, that is, the persons interested are not equal to one another, they will not receive equal shares; nay, if those who are equal fail to receive equal shares, or if those who are unequal share equally, thence arise feuds and contentions in states.

Justice, therefore, takes the form of a proportion.

[This principle is further evident from the use of standards of merit. All men admit that what is just in the distribution of honours must be conformable to some standard of merit—though all do not accept the same standard; *e.g.* the lovers of democracy say that the standard should be [coextensive with] freedom, the oligarchs say that wealth is the true standard or high birth, and the lovers of an aristocracy say personal excellence.]

Equality measured by some standard whatever that standard be.

Justice is, therefore, something 'proportionate.' Proportion is not only applicable to pure number but to quantity generally: it is an equality between ratios, and there must be four terms at least involved in it. [As for 'discrete proportion' it is obvious that that implies four terms. But so also does 'continuous proportion,' since it employs one of its terms as two and names it twice over; *e.g.* 'as A is to B, so is B to C.' The term B is, therefore, used twice; and B being put down twice over, the terms of the proportion are four.]

Discrete and continuous proportion.

Justice, then, (as a due proportion in the distribution of honours) involves four terms at least, and the ratio between the members of the two pairs of terms will be the same, since the persons interested and the things at stake are divided similarly. The proportion will then be—A : B :: C : D (or, *alternando*, A : C :: B : D); and hence the whole A + C (which the distribution unites together) is proportionate to the whole B + D; and if they be united in the manner indicated, the distribution unites them in conformity with justice.

Relation between the four terms of the proportion in Distributive Justice.

The joining together, therefore, of the term A to the term C, and of the term B to the term D, is what is just in the distribution of honours; and this kind of justice is a mean point between whatever violates a due proportion; what is proportionate being a mean and what is just being proportionate.

Mathematicians call this kind of proportion 'geometrical' (as opposed to 'arithmetical' proportion) because in geometrical proportion the whole is related to the whole precisely as each term is to each. [This proportion is of course not continuous, since the person interested and the object at stake cannot be one in number.] Justice of this kind, therefore, is 'proportionate.'

Arithmetical and geometrical proportion.

On the other hand what is 'unjust' is what violates a due proportion; and such a disproportionateness is found in the forms of 'the more' and 'the less.' Such is the effect found in actual experience. The man who commits injustice has 'more' than is due to him of what is good; and the man who is injured has 'less' than he should have of the good. Conversely in the case of what is 'evil:' the lesser evil becomes an item in the account of what is 'good,' compared, that is, with the greater evil, since a lesser evil is more desirable than a greater one, that which is desirable being a good, and that which is more desirable being a greater good.

Injustice the violation of proportion.

This, then, is one aspect or form of Justice.

What is 'just,' therefore, is what is 'a mean,' and what is 'equal,' and what is 'proportionate;' and Justice is the principle which produces a true 'mean' and 'equality' and 'proportionateness' in civil life. What is just is a 'mean' because it is midway between what is 'too much' and what is 'too little,' between what is above the right proportion and what is below it; in that respect being like all the other virtues, since the law of the mean is applicable to all the forms of moral excellence. But its equality is a characteristic peculiar to Justice: it renders to each man what is appropriate and fitting for him to receive: and what it gives is equal relatively to the recipient (*i.e.* things which are appropriate are things which are fair and equal, and what is fitting is in a sense what is appropriate). Moreover, since Injustice is inequality and what is unjust is what is unequal, it will only be natural that Justice should be an equality and that what is just should be equal, as being a mean between what is 'too much' and what is

'too little.' In any course of action in which 'the more' and 'the less' find a place, it is a consequence that there should be room for what is 'equal.' In fact without any argument of ours, that is the view which is universally approved—that what is just is (what is) equal.

Justice is also 'proportionate' because it makes what has to be divided proportionate to the recipients according to a standard of distribution. The things which are given bear the same proportion to one another that the recipients do to each other. If Achilles is, let us say, worth double of Ajax in respect of bravery, the honour which must be paid by the just man to Achilles, will be twice as great as that which he will pay to Ajax.

In so far as Justice is a 'mean,' it is a mean between many extremes, since the things which lie outside 'the mean' are many, being distant therefrom in varying degrees of nearness or remoteness. In so far, again, as Justice is an 'equality,' it is an equality between two specific things—the recipient of the gift and the gift itself. ('Equality' is a term of relation and always implies some two objects between which there must be an equal relationship.) In so far, again, as Justice is proportionate, it implies, at the least, four terms. Proportion must of course always lie between four objects, being as it is an equality between two ratios, each ratio consisting of two terms; and so any proportion must imply four objects. Suppose, for instance, that the ratio is twofold or threefold: there is then a scheme of relation between two quantities, one of them being double, and the other half, the other—as 20 is related to 10. Hence there must be two terms in every single ratio. If we take this same ratio in two other terms, *i.e.* between 12 and 6, we can then form a proportion, and we shall have 'as 20 : 10 :: 12 : 6;' and so proportion will always consist in four terms at the least, though of course it *may* consist of more.

[If it happens that we have taken *three* terms and constructed a proportion out of them, *e.g.* as 20 : 10 :: 10 : 5, then, as we take the 10 twice over, there are thus found to be four terms. This kind of proportion is called 'continuous,' whilst that which consists of four distinct terms, is called 'discrete.' Both kinds alike are distinguished by Mathematicians as 'Geometrical Proportion,' on account of there being yet another kind of Proportion which is called 'Arithmetical Proportion,' which is of this nature: 'A exceeds B, by as much as C exceeds D.']

But distributive Justice is proportionate according to the standard of geometrical proportion—for reasons which we will now state.

Let us assume that the thing which is to be distributed is honour, and that the persons among whom the honour is to be conferred are Achilles and Ajax. The honour in the one case ought to bear the same relation to the honour in the other that Achilles does to Ajax; and the honour of Achilles ought to bear the same relation to Achilles that the honour of Ajax does to Ajax; or, combining the terms together, the relation which Achilles honoured bears to Achilles ought to be the relation which Ajax honoured does to Ajax; and, inversely, the relation which Achilles honoured bears to Ajax honoured, ought to be the relation which Achilles bears to Ajax.

Now the whole proportion when it is of this form is suitable to distributive justice, being as it is of the kind which can be discovered not in arithmetical proportion, but solely in geometrical. It is shown by the geometrician that all these forms of proportion are found in geometrical proportion. But that it is impossible for them to be found in arithmetical proportion is clear from the following considerations. Suppose that there are four quantities in arithmetical proportion, 4, 3, 6, 5: then 4 exceeds 3 by as much as 6 exceeds 5. But if you combine the quantities in either ratio there will no longer be a proportion in the arithmetical sense: *i.e.* if 6 and 5 be added together the whole will exceed 5 by 6, whereas if 4 and 3 be added together the whole will exceed 3 by 4. Consequently these quantities only show an arithmetical proportion while disjoined (*i.e.* there is the same excess of 4 over 3 as there is of 6 over 5). If however these quantities are combined, there is no longer a proportion:—11 exceeds 5 by *more* than 7 exceeds 3.

For these reasons, then, distributive justice is proportionate, according to the

principles of geometrical proportion, but that not of the continuous but of the discrete kind. The terms implied in it must be four in number, since it is impossible that the thing given and the recipient of the gift should be one in number. Justice of this kind is proportionate so far as it consists of distributions —when, that is, a man receives what is proportionate to his merit, whether honour or money or what else there be that is to be divided. By such principles it is that peace and good order are established in communities; since by different conditions civil strife and feuds and incriminations arise—when, that is, equals do not receive equal treatment, or those who are unequal are dealt with as equals. There is, moreover, this further point which makes it clear that a man who would effect an arrangement of society in accordance with justice aims at what is proportionate. All men consider that to be just which corresponds to each man's individual worth, but as to what the 'worth' is, on account whereof a man is to be honoured, all men do not agree in their views. The lovers of a democracy say that the only condition of merit is personal freedom; the oligarchs say that wealth is the ground of merit, and aristocrats say that it is personal excellence. Since, then, there are these divergent grounds of merit, if any one be desirous of apportioning honour to each man according to his worth, and upon a principle of justice, he will not make the apportionment equal but proportionate. Justice, therefore, is the proportionate, as has been explained.

On the other hand, what is unjust is what is wide of the proportionate relation —when, that is, the distribution is made on a principle of excess or of deficiency compared with the worth of the recipients; and that is a result which is found in the general effects of wrong doing. The man who commits a wrong strives to get more good than the person injured and the person injured has less good in consequence. Conversely in the case of evil, the wrongdoer has less evil and the person injured has greater evil in consequence, since the lesser evil is more choiceworthy than the greater, and is sought for as a greater good.

Such, then, is the distributive form of Justice: we may now treat at once of the other form.

vi.—The Principles of Corrective Justice explained.

There is one remaining form of Justice, Corrective Justice, which finds its sphere in business transactions between man and man whether entered into freely or not.

The sphere in which Remedial Justice is exercised defined.

Corrective Justice has a character quite distinct from Distributive Justice. Distributive Justice, dealing with the apportionment of public goods, proceeds invariably on the principle of geometrical proportion described above:—if distribution be made to the citizens out of the public funds, the various apportionments must bear the same ratio to one another that the respective contributions of the different citizens do. (Conversely the injustice which is the direct opposite of this kind of Justice, is in contravention of this kind of proportion.)

On the other hand the Justice which arises from the transactions dependent on mutual intercourse, though a kind of equality, as Injustice is inequality, yet is not an equality according to the standard of geometrical but of arithmetical, proportion. In this view of Justice (as 'corrective' or 'remedial') it is immaterial

Remedial Justice determined by the principles of arithmetical proportion.

whether the good man has cheated the bad man or whether it be the bad man who has cheated the good man; or, again, whether the man who has committed an adultery be a good or a bad man. The law looks simply to the different degrees of injury in different cases; and where there is one man who has committed a wrong and another who has suffered it, or one man has done a harm and another man been the victim of it, the law treats the *persons* affected as equal (and deals simply with the inequality caused by the wrong). Wrong being an equality between the author of a wrong and its victim, the judge endeavours to make matters equal between them. When, for instance, one man has been struck and another man has dealt the blow, or when one man has been killed and another man has done the murder, the action of the one and the suffering of the other form a division into two unequal parts; but the Judge endeavours to make the relation equal by the infliction of punishment, thus taking away from the man who has profited a proportionate amount of his 'gain.' [In transactions of this kind the advantage to the aggressor is called his 'gain,' while the result to the victim is called his 'loss'—though in some cases the term is inappropriate; yet when the whole circumstance is measured out in its consequences to the different parties, the consequence to the one is 'gain' and to the other is 'loss.']

The inequalities in contracts may be represented as 'loss' and 'gain'—too much and too little, which the Judge must equalise.

The 'equal,' therefore, is a mean point between 'too much' and 'too little,' and 'gain' is too much and 'loss' too little, in inverse ratio to one another—too much of good and too little of evil, or too little of good and too much of evil; the mean point between the two being, as we have shown, the 'equal' which we assert to be 'the just.' Corrective Justice will, consequently, be a mean point between 'loss' and 'gain.' Hence when men are at issue between one another, they betake themselves to the judge, since to have recourse to the judge is to have recourse to justice, the very purpose and *raison d'être* of a Judge being, as it were, to act as a living embodiment of Justice. Men in fact seek in a Judge an ideal of a right; and they sometimes call them 'Mediators,' as feeling that if they can find in them 'a mean' or ideal standard of reference, they will be sure to meet with Justice. Justice, therefore, is a kind of mean if the Judge be a mediator.

Now the Judge equalizes the wrong. Just as if a line be divided into two unequal parts, he takes away from the greater section that part by which it exceeds the half, and adds the same to the less. The whole being divided into two equal parts, men

say that they have their own when they receive exactly as much as their rivals. The equal is a mean point between the greater and the less, according to the principles of arithmetical proportion. [This is, indeed, the reason why Justice is called δίκαιον ('division') because it divides things into equal portions, just as though one were to call Justice an equilibrium and the Judge a balancer.] Suppose, for instance, that two lines being equal a part be taken from the one and added to the other, this other line exceeds the first by twice the amount subtracted from it; whereas if the part subtracted from the one were not added to the other, this other would have only exceeded this first by once this part. Therefore the line which is added to, exceeds the mean by once the part added; and the mean again exceeds the part subtracted from, by once that part.

From these considerations we may learn what we must take away from the term which has more and what we must add to that which has less. We must add to that which has less the amount by which the mean exceeds it, and we must take from the larger term the amount by which the mean is exceeded.



Let the lines A A, B B, C C be equal to one another. From A A take E A. Add C D (equal to E A) to C C. Then the whole C C D exceeds A E by Z D, and also B B by C D.

This principle applies to the arts generally: they would have been annihilated but for this law of compensation —if, that is, the power of production had not produced just the quantity and the quality required for exchange, or if the consumer had not consumed a corresponding quality and quantity. The very terms 'loss' and 'gain' are derived from the associations of voluntary exchange. To have more than one's own is called 'gaining,' and to have less than at the commencement is called 'losing;' for example, in buying and selling and in other transactions generally where the law allows freedom of contract. But when a man has neither more nor less, but the outlay and return are equal, then men say that they have their own, and neither lose nor gain. Justice, therefore, is a mean point between a kind of gain and loss, in matters outside the sphere of the voluntary, so that men have what is 'equal' after, as before, such transactions.

Application of this principle to the law of supply and demand.

The second form of Justice is the Corrective, which has to regulate the transactions between man and man whether voluntary or involuntary, fraudulent or violent. This kind of Justice also proceeds according to a certain scheme of pro-

portion—not geometrical proportion which was found to be the method of the first kind, *i.e.* Distributive Justice, but *arithmetical* proportion. Distributive Justice, in making a distribution of public funds among the citizens, gives to each one in due proportion, according to their respective merits and the contributions which they have severally made towards the public revenues. All citizens are not alike in position, nor do all contribute to the same extent, and so they receive not equal but proportionate shares.

On the other hand Corrective Justice, being what is 'fair' in regard to men's dealings with one another, has for its terms the person who has injured and the person who is injured: it gives to them not what is proportionate but what is equal. The equality which the wrong-doer destroys in taking away from the person wronged some good thing of his and transferring it to himself, this equality is restored by the just man when he exacts from the wrong-doer just as much as he has gained from the person he has injured: in this way he gives to each of the parties what is 'equal.' Since then there are four terms (1) the person injured, (2) the person who has done the injury, (3) the treatment which the person aggrieved has suffered from the man who has injured him, and (4) the punishment which the wrong-doer has undergone at the hands of the Judge,—it follows that there is an *arithmetical* proportion between these terms. The Judge causes the person injured to recover precisely the same advantage over his aggressor that his aggressor has gained over him. It thus happens that Corrective Justice is a kind of pattern of this kind of proportion. It is quite immaterial in view of this kind of Justice whether the man who commits the fraud be a good man and the man defrauded a bad man, or whether the man who commits adultery be a bad man, and the man who is injured be a good man: in all cases alike the Judge who sets right the wrong has simply to look to equality. The two parties are regarded simply as persons who have done or suffered wrong; and the amount which the wrong-doer has gained, whether in the shape of pleasure or of money or of fame, from the person whom he has injured (and to that extent, therefore, gained an advantage over him) this amount the Judge gives back to the person injured, either by fining the aggressor or by degrading him, or by torturing him, or by putting him to death. It is also possible for us to see this principle of proportion in this kind of Justice in another way, by making, that is, the terms of the proportion continuous:—'as the aggressor is to the person aggrieved, so is the Judge to the aggressor' (whereby the aggressor receives from the Judge precisely equal treatment to that which he had himself meted out to his victim).

Since, then, Injustice introduces a disproportion of 'more' and 'less' alike in things good as in things evil (though inversely, of course, since the man who aims at the greater good chooses the lesser evil) whereas Justice introduces equality—an equality that is a mean between the greater and the less, it is evident that Justice of this kind is an ideal state between 'loss' and 'gain.' [Every form in which wrong is suffered may be called 'loss,' and every act of wrong-doing and of unfair advantage may be called 'gain' whether it be money, or fame, or anything else for which a man wishes to act unfairly.] Corrective Justice is, therefore, a mean between loss and gain. Consequently when men are at issue with one another they betake themselves to the Judge for protection, thinking that in this way neither of them will be wronged (and hence of necessity neither of them will make a gain), but will obtain the perfect mean between loss and gain. They consider in fact that the Judge is a living embodiment of Justice to make straight all wrongs: and they call him a 'mediator' in the belief that by virtue of their appeal to him they will obtain the 'mean' which is the fair and right. Some people call in not one only but two or three 'mediators' in their disputes. Hence it is obvious that what they seek is the 'mean,' regarding it as the same thing to seek what is a mean and to seek what is just. The 'just,' therefore, is a mean.

In truth, then, the Judge is himself a 'mean,' introducing as he does a mean as an ideal, and equalizing the inequality which arises from injustice. For illustration, suppose the line A B D C D A to be unequally divided

at the point D, if one wished to divide the line into equal parts, he would take away from the greater segment B D the excess by which it is greater than D A, (*i.e.* C D which is equal to D A) and add that amount to D A, and would thus make A C equal to B C, and find in the point C the whole line B A divided into two equal parts. Precisely the same result is found in regard to the inequality which Injustice causes. Corrective Justice, taking away from the gain of him who has done the injury that which represents his advantage compared with the person injured, and transferring that amount to the injured man, effects an equality and mean state between them. It is in fact for this reason that Justice is so called because it implies etymologically a division (as though one were to call it an equipoise, and a Judge a personal balance.)

Just as in the case of a line when it is divided into two parts, because one of the two equal segments is a mean, according to arithmetical proportion, between the greater and the less; so also 'the just' is a mean between the greater or the lesser loss or gain—being less than the greater and greater than the less. That what has been said in the case with respect to a line is evident. B D exceeds C A by C D, and C A exceeds A D by C D; therefore B D, C A, and A D hold a proportion to one another, of the arithmetical kind. But C A is the middle and is equal to C B (which is less than B D but greater than A D, exceeding and being exceeded by the same C D): thus B C D A.

It is further evident from hence that the just and the equal is a proportionate mean between loss and gain, according to arithmetical proportion. Let there be three straight lines equal to one another, A A, B B, C C. Let A A be bisected in E, and C C in Z. From A A take A E. It is evident that C C will be greater than E A by C Z. Let the part taken from A A be added to C C, extending C C to D. It is then evident that the whole D C is greater than E A by D C and C Z. If then it should be necessary to introduce again equality between these three lines, we can effect it by means of B B. By applying B B as a rule to C D, we can remove the excess; and by applying it to A A we may make up the deficiency; and thus the extremes will be equal to one another. The line B B which restores the equality, is a mean, according to arithmetical proportion, between D C and E A since D C exceeds B B by D C, and B B exceeds E A by D C.



It is evident from the preceding arguments that the same relation is found in the application of Corrective Justice. In the case of the arts also this principle applies. The arts only flourish and hold together so long as we find ourselves in need of their productions, and feel precisely the same amount of want of the arts that corresponds with the labour and loss which the artists sustain in the exercise of their craft. It is only possible for the artists to subsist, so long as they supply their own need from the resources of those who stand in need of their productions. If while the craftsmen labour at the production of works of art, those who support their arts (*i.e.* those who have need of the arts) are not affected to an equal degree with the producers but the consumption or demand is much less than the supply, in such a case there is nothing to prevent those arts from decaying and perishing. For this reason, in the arts also there is need for the 'mean' and the 'equal'—*i.e.* for that which is midway between loss and gain.

These terms, then, 'loss' and 'gain,' are applied in the strict sense only to voluntary contracts though they are also so understood in reference to involuntary transactions. The term 'to gain' is applied absolutely to the 'acquiring of more than one possessed;' and in the same way 'to lose' is applied to the getting less than one had at starting. To keep one's own is called neither loss nor gain but a kind of mean between the two. Hence 'the just' is a mean point between loss and gain. I am here referring to the circumstances which arise in involuntary transactions when a man receives precisely what he had before he had any injury done to him or did any injury—before, that is, he made a gain or suffered a loss. Gain in voluntary transactions is neither unjust nor is it remedied by Justice, since the law has granted freedom of choice in voluntary compacts.

vii.—Examination of the Theory of Retaliation.

The theory of the Pythagoreans needs to be modified and qualified: in its bald statement it is untrue.

There is also a view held by some that 'Retaliation' in its simplest sense is Justice; as the Pythagoreans maintained it to be, defining Justice, without limitation, as 'Retaliation inflicted upon another.' Yet this principle of retaliation is one which does not properly apply either to Distributive or to Corrective Justice; though its advocates are anxious to dignify it as the 'justice dealt out by Rhadamanthus':

> "If each man suffer as he wrought, the law of right is equal made."

Such a principle is, in many instances, at variance with Justice. Suppose, for instance, that a man exercising authority has struck another, he ought not to be struck in turn; or if a man has struck a magistrate, he ought not merely to be struck but be punished judicially. Moreover the voluntariness or the involuntariness of an act makes a wide difference in its character.

In commercial transactions, however, the bond of union is that kind of Justice which consists in retaliation, proceeding not by way of equality but of proportion: it is in fact by requiting in due measure that the state holds together. Men have either wrongs which they seek to requite (and if they could not requite a wrong, their lot would seem to be a slave's lot); or they have kindness to requite (and if they fail to requite kindness, there is a failure in the interchange of good offices by which men are held together in society). Hence it is that they make the Temple of the Graces to confront our view in our streets—to encourage mutual good offices, that being the characteristic feature of a Grace: it is a duty, that is, to requite the kindness of one who has done a favour, and again, on being benefited oneself, to initiate new favours to others.

Now the drawing of the diagonal of a parallelogram shows the return that is proportional:



For example, let the Builder stand at the point A, the Shoemaker at the point B, a house at the point C, and shoes at the point D. In this case the Builder must receive from the Shoemaker some

product of his labour, and himself in turn must give back some of his own. If, then, there be in the first instance an equality according to proportion and then a requital be afterwards made, the desired result will be attained. If, on the other hand, the adjustment in the first instance be not proportionate, there is no real equality nor does the compact hold good. There is nothing to prevent the work of the one being superior to that of the other: their values ought therefore to be equalised. This indeed is a principle which applies to the arts generally: they must have been destroyed had there not been producers producing and consumers consuming precisely the same quantity and the same quality relatively to one another. There is no interchange of offices between two physicians, though there may be between a physician and a farmer, and generally between all who are different from one another and not equal. Such persons must first of all be brought to an equality.

All things, therefore, between which exchange is possible must in some way be made commensurable with one another. For this purpose it is that coinage has come into vogue, forming in a way 'a medium of exchange.' Money measures the values of all things, and hence their relative superiority or inferiority to one another; how many pairs of shoes, for example, it is right to exchange for a house or for food. It follows, therefore, that the relation which a builder bears to a shoemaker ought to determine the number of pairs of shoes compared with a house or with so much food (otherwise no exchange or commerce will be possible). And this cannot be determined unless the things are in some sense equal.

Money the medium by which exchange is effected.

Hence it is necessary that there should be some one standard by which all things can be measured (as was explained above). In real fact this standard of value is the 'demand' which holds all things together: if men were to be in need of nothing, or if their wants did not correspond to one another (*i.e.* A. wanting B.'s goods, and B. wanting A.'s), there would be no exchange or not a reciprocal one. But as representative of this demand, coinage has come into use by general agreement, and hence it has derived its name 'currency,' because it is established by current usage and not by nature, and because it is within our power either to change it or to render it useless.

But 'demand' is the real standard of value.

A proper requital will therefore be made when the terms of the exchange have been equalised, so that the product of the shoemaker bears precisely the same relation to the product of the farmer that the farmer himself does to the shoemaker himself, compared together. But after they have made the exchange, one must not

then a second time bring a consideration of their primary relations (*e.g.* of the dignity of the farmer over the shoemaker) into the scheme of proportion: otherwise the one extreme will have both the superiorities. The adjustment of values between the farmer and the shoemaker must be made at the time when each of the parties retains his own produce: they are then made equal to one another and capable of trading, inasmuch as proportionate equality can be established between them. Let A. represent a farmer and C. his produce, B. a shoemaker and D. his manufacture: D. must be equalised to C., so that if the farmer be worth twice the shoemaker, the manufacture of the shoemaker must be doubled to be equal to the produce of the farmer. Unless it had been possible for each man to be proportionately recompensed in this way, there could have been no commerce.

The proof that it is 'demand' which binds men together, as it were in a principle of unity, is shown by the fact that when men are not in want of one another's products (either both parties or at least one), they do not exchange; as we do of course when one man wants what oneself has, for instance wine, giving, perhaps, in exchange part of an export of corn. The basis of exchange has therefore to be laid in the principle of equality.

Value of money as a representative of future possibilities, and a guarantee of the satisfaction of future needs.

But with a view to future exchange, though one requires nothing for the present, money is a kind of security to us that we may have any article when we do require it. He must, if he carries money with him, be able to get what he wants. Money, however, is subject to the same fluctuations as goods are: it has not the same unvarying value, though it tends more than other things to remain fixed. Hence it is right that everything should have a value put upon it; since then there will be facilities for exchange, and if that be so, there will be commerce. Money, therefore, as a standard equalises things after making them commensurable. Of course there would have been no commerce had there been no exchange, nor exchange had there been no equality, nor equality had there been no common standard. In real truth it is impossible to make things commensurable that are so very wide apart; but looking to the law of demand it is possible to estimate the values of things sufficiently for the purpose of exchange. There must, therefore, necessarily be some one common standard; and that has been settled by common agreement (hence also the name by which it is called 'currency'). Money makes all things commensurable, all things being measured by money as a standard of value. For example, let A represent a house, B ten minæ, and C a bed. A therefore will be half B (if a house be

worth five minæ or equivalent thereto). Let C., the bed, be worth a tenth part of B. It is clear, therefore, how many beds are equivalent to a house—*i.e.* five. It is indeed clear that this was the mode of exchange before currency came in: in point of principle it is quite immaterial whether five beds be given for a house or the money value of five beds.

Now the Pythagoreans used to affirm that Justice was Retaliation—suffering, that is, the very same treatment which one deals out to others, and that the sentence of Rhadamanthus had reference to this view:

"If each man suffer as he wrought, the law of right is equal made."

Yet this principle of retaliation is not truly applicable to any of the divisions of Justice. Neither Distributive nor Corrective Justice is of that character. In the case of a distribution, it is not always possible that the citizen should be rewarded by the State with the same *kind* of service which he may have conferred on the community. Suppose that he has killed a Tyrant, how can he be requited after the same manner? Again, in the case of Corrective Justice this principle is in many cases incongruous. If a man has assaulted a magistrate, he ought not simply to be struck in return but judicially punished; and if, on the contrary, a man wielding authority has struck one of those who are subject to him, it is not right that he should have the same treatment dealt out to him. Again, if a man has, unwillingly and unwittingly injured his neighbour, it is not right that he should have an injury done to him in return.

It is possible, however, that this principle of 'equal requital' may be just in transactions of mutual exchange, where there is something given and something received; for instance, in the services or wrongs which men do towards one another, or in the interchange of manufactures between men of business:—only in such cases one ought to interpret the principle of requital not by the standard of equality but of proportion. A man who has struck an officer, has wounded the good order of the State, and must not be struck in return but be put to death. A man, again, who has injured his neighbour's wife, must himself also be evil-entreated, but not with an exactly similar requital, but by a requital that is *proportionate* to the offence. If a wrong-doer is not to be visited with evil to himself, social life will be an enslavement and tyranny; though, on the other hand, if he were to be visited with punishment of the very same kind as his crime, the result would be absurd and a new deed of shame ensue. The case is precisely similar in reference to the requital of favours, and the receiving and doing of kindnesses. With a view to the equal adjustment of social relations it is necessary that the man who has received a favour should make an equal return and requite the favour done, and moreover himself initiate a second series of kind offices. Unless such a return be made, the social intercourse which binds the state together and makes its harmony secure, will be destroyed. Hence it is that there is a Temple of the Graces erected in every city—that the Graces may be honoured by an interchange of kindly offices. But it is not possible that the kindness should always be identical in kind with that which requites it: only it must be proportionate. One man, for example, gives to another that which he needs, whilst he himself receives back from his friend something of which he stands in need; and thus whilst he is favoured he makes his friend to feel the same favour himself. If, on the other hand, he were to receive back precisely what he has given, what mutual benefit is there therein? Consequently, kindnesses conferred and kindnesses bestowed must not be identical in *kind*, but proportionate the one to the other.

This view will be made yet more evident by the following considerations. Interchange of services and the requital of services are forms of 'commerce,' and all such forms of commerce relate to what is in 'demand' (*i.e.* for which

others have want). A man seeks to have a share in that of which he feels a need. To be in want of anything is to be in want of what is unlike one's own: a man does not need himself, nor the things belonging to himself, nor the things which he can produce of himself; but the things which he seeks to share with his neighbour are things which he has not got nor is able to produce. Shoemaker does not need shoemaker, nor physician physician; but the shoemaker needs the physician and the physician needs the shoemaker. Hence it is evident that kindnesses relate to things dissimilar. The kindnesses, therefore, interchanged or requited will not be of the same nature, but in order that they may be regulated by principles of Justice, the equality between them must be understood as an 'equality according to proportion.' The shoemaker will give shoes to the builder, but he will receive from the builder such things as are helpful towards the building of a house, to an extent proportionate to the favour which the gift of shoes implies. The farmer, again, will have yet other things to give, and yet other things to receive, according to a due proportion. For it is, of course, possible that the production of the one to be more valuable than the production of the other. The shoemaker will not give merely a pair of shoes to the builder in return for a house, but it is necessary for him to contribute, in order to make a fair return, precisely as much as the builder has lost on the construction of the house: otherwise the exchange between them will be unequal and their mutual obligations unfair.

It is necessary, therefore, to maintain equality in good offices, only it must be an equality regulated by a due proportion—as is produced by the drawing of the diagonal, the diagonal is a straight line drawn from one corner of a parallelogram to the opposite corner:



Let the four terms be arranged as a parallelogram: Builder, Shoemaker, Shoes, House,—Builder at the point A, Shoemaker at the point C, House at the point B, Shoes at the point D. Since then the Shoes are placed below the Shoemaker, as D is under C, and House under Builder, as B is under A, in their respective interchange with one another the Builder will be conjoined to the Shoes, as A is joined to D, and the Shoemaker will be conjoined with House, as C is to B. In this way the commerce between the two will be according to the principle of the diagonal—not by simple reciprocity but in accordance with their relative proportions.

Hence it is necessary that things which are exchanged should bear a certain relationship and agreement with one another. There are, of course, certain things which are well-nigh incapable of being exchanged, through being incommensurable: for instance, the product of the flute-player and of the builder. It is for this reason that coinage has been adopted, since coinage can be exchanged for any kind of production, and estimates the value of every kind of work. By means of coinage we find out how many pairs of shoes a house is worth, or how much food or how much of productions generally. Unless the value of each thing can be ascertained, the exchange of things or relations of commerce cannot possibly be sustained. Giving and receiving more than the true value of a thing is not exchange nor a matter of commerce.

It is consequently necessary that there should be some one common measure for all things by which we are enabled to measure all things and by means whereof we ascertain the value of each separate thing. In the nature of things, and in strict truth, 'demand' or 'want' is the measure of all values. In the proportion in which a man has need of anything, in that exact proportion he wishes to have a share of it. Unless one wanted what another had, or did not wish for it to the same extent as another wanted one's own things but less

eagerly, then there would be no exchange. But if a man does stand in real need of a thing, he gives up what is his own and receives in return the things of others. It is 'want' or 'demand' then which by nature and in real truth is the measure of the value of things; since want brings all men to one common level. By custom, however, and usage in which all concur, money is the standard of value. [Hence the derivation of the word money or 'currency' because it was not instituted by nature but by our own selves, and depends upon ourselves to change it and to make it useless.] Money, therefore, is the measure, as has been explained, of the value of things; and though there is no need of it for its own sake, it is, as it were, a representative of want. When, therefore, the value of each thing has been ascertained by means of these measures, the exchange of different works can be equipoised according to a due proportion.

But the proportion will be based upon a principle of reciprocity: only so is it possible for the exchange to be equalized. Proportion is called 'reciprocal' by mathematicians, when, for instance, A is to B as C is to D; and as A to C, B to D. If, therefore, the things to be exchanged are proportionate after such a ratio, as also those who effect the exchange, then the exchange will be a fair one. Suppose the Shoemaker at the point C, the Farmer at the point A, Shoes at the point D, Corn at the point B. Let it be assumed that the Farmer compared with the Shoemaker is of double importance: it will follow that the Corn will be double in value to the Shoes. If then the ratio is 'as the Farmer is to the Shoemaker, so are Shoes to Food or Corn,' then there will be twice as much of the shoes as of the corn, and (in the case imagined), they will become equal to the corn. Unless the exchange be made in this way, we ought not to bring the terms into a scheme of proportion, since it is impossible for them to be equalized. If the proportion should run: 'as the Farmer is to the Shoemaker, so is the product which the Shoemaker receives from the Farmer to the product which the Farmer receives from the Shoemaker,' in that case there is no equality. An interchange in the real sense of the term and a proper commerce can only be effected when the parties to the exchange stand to one another in a position of fair requital and fair return.

It is evident, then, that want is the bond which holds communities together, and want which causes the interchange of men with one another, and promotes their union. When men have no need of one another, they make no exchanges nor do they share their interests with one another; nor do they when one man has need of the other but there is no reciprocal need on the other side—there is no mutual intercourse in such cases on equal terms. On the contrary, there is commerce when another wants what oneself has, and oneself wants what that other is able to supply.

But since ofttimes the Farmer needs the product of the Carpenter while the Carpenter does not need the product of the Farmer, in order that mutual interchanges may not even then be hindered, coinage has been adopted. By giving money to the Carpenter the Farmer receives from him an equivalent of his product. Money is, therefore, a kind of security to the Carpenter that when he needs any of the Farmer's produce, he will gain from the Farmer by means of his money whatever he may find himself in need of. Even upon these terms, and in such cases, because of the prospective requirements of the Carpenter, exchange and intercourse is brought about. Money is potentially almost everything of which one man can stand in need from his fellow. The demand for money is the most permanent of all demands—though it is a demand which is not under all circumstances equally strong. In times of plenty there is a great demand for money; but in times of dearth money is of no such avail. One would not wish to give up even a little corn in return for great wealth. Still, for the reasons which have been given, the demand for money is more uniform than for anything else. Everything must, therefore, have a value affixed to it. In this way it is possible for exchange and commerce to take place. From the fact of all things being measured and valued in money, an equality arises, and in consequence of equality it is possible for an exchange to be made. But it is not in every case possible for equality to be secured without money. There are

certain products of the arts which are so distinct one from the other that they are absolutely incommensurable and hold no relationship one towards another; whence it is impossible to find an equality between them. But inasmuch as one man has need of another's product—in consequence of this need money was adopted as being one common measure which measures all things. It is not from the nature of things and in real truth that money is such a standard (since it is no part of things which are measured), but by a kind of usage of our own and agreement of society. Being thus found to be a mean point between things in themselves incommensurable it renders them commensurable, and equalizes their relative values. This truth will be more plain by reference to a diagram. Suppose A be a house and B ten minæ and C a couch. Suppose the house to be worth five minæ and the couch one. Then B, the ten minæ, is worth ten times C, the couch, and twice A, the house. The house, then, is equivalent to half ten minæ. Since then the house is half B and the couch a tenth part of B, and the half of ten is five, the house is therefore worth five times the couch. The house has then become commensurable with the couch through the medium of money which has become a common measure. If then it is commensurable, it may also be made equal: *i.e.* if the couch be multiplied five times, it will be equal to the house.

viii.—The sense in which Justice is 'a Mean' defined.

The nature of Injustice and of Justice has now been described; and from the explanations which have been given it is clear that 'just-dealing' is a mean point between doing a wrong and suffering a wrong: for doing wrong is getting more, suffering wrong is getting less than what is right.

Justice and Injustice are not simply 'moral dispositions,' but conformity with an outward standard of fairness, or the reverse.

But Justice as a moral state is not 'a mean' in the same sense as the virtues described in the last book: it is not simply a balance of mind, but rather conformity to an outward standard of right. Injustice, on the other hand, is conformity to the violations of right. Justice may accordingly be defined as a state of mind in virtue whereof the just man is said to be capable of doing and disposed to do, what is right, and to assign to himself in his relations with others and to others in their relations with one another only what is just—so as not to apportion to himself more of what is desirable and to his neighbours less, nor conversely in the case of what is injurious, but, on the contrary, only to apportion to himself what is fair and equal by the standard of due proportion, and similarly in dividing anything to third parties.

Injustice, on the other hand, is the very reverse: it is a disposition in virtue whereof the unjust man is wishful to do what is unfair and wrong; wrong being an excess of what is beneficial and a deficiency of what is hurtful—in violation of due proportion. Hence Injustice is both an excess and a defect, as being a conformity to excess and defect—in one's own case excess of what is

absolutely beneficial, and defect of what is harmful, while in the case of others, though the general result will be similar, the violation of proportion may be in any way that it may chance.

In the case of an act of wrong, to suffer the wrong is to fall short of the due proportion, while to commit the wrong is to go beyond it.

This account may be regarded as a sufficient explanation of what are the respective natures of Justice and Injustice and, *pari ratione*, of Right and Wrong in their widest acceptation.

The nature of Right and of Wrong has now been explained so far as relates to the distribution of honours and the correction of grievances—so far, that is, as Justice is Distributive or Corrective; and from the definitions which have been given it is clear that 'Just dealing' is a 'mean state' between doing a wrong and suffering a wrong—*i.e.* between 'more' and 'less,' since doing a wrong is nothing more than getting more where one ought to have had an equal share, and suffering a wrong is getting less than one's share.

Now Justice is not 'a mean state' in the same sense as the virtues previously described. Each of the other virtues is a 'mean' between two vicious states, exceeding the one and falling short of the other. For instance, Temperance is a mean between Insensibility and Dissoluteness; and Courage is midway between Cowardice and Recklessness, and so with the virtues generally. Justice, however, has not on either side of it two vices to which it is opposed: it stands in opposition to Injustice alone. It is, however, a 'mean' because, while Injustice involves inequality, Justice itself aims at what is equal, and has the power of producing equality. What is equal is a mean between what is more and what is less—and that is the reason why Justice is a 'mean,' whereas Injustice is an extreme, as being conformity to extremes.

Justice is further 'a state of mind' in virtue whereof the just man is, of deliberate choice, disposed to do what is right and to apportion what lies within his power in such a spirit as to make it his rule to apportion only what is suitable as well towards others as to himself, if it should be necessary, and to show himself a model to others, by giving, that is, in his distribution, not the greater good to himself and the lesser to his neighbour, or the less of what is harmful to himself and the greater portion to his neighbour, but what is fair and equal to all alike in relative proportion; and in the same spirit enjoining others (as well as himself) to act fairly in making distributions. Such then, is the character of Justice.

Injustice, on the other hand, is the entire reverse. It is an excess and a defect in regard to things beneficial or harmful, contrary to due proportion. In distributions the unjust man exceeds his neighbour in regard to beneficial things and falls short of him in regard to harmful things; and again when he has to make an apportionment among others, there again he acts contrary to due proportion—only that he does not make the same men to have the superiority or inferiority in regard to the same things, but acts as chance directs. Hence in the commission of wrongs there is both excess and defect — the 'too much' and 'too little.' The 'too much' is to do a wrong, the 'too little' to suffer one: midway between the two is what is equal, *i.e.*, what is just.

The above account may be accepted as an explanation, in a wide and general sense, of the nature of Justice and of Injustice, of Right and of Wrong.

ix.—Distinction between the Unjust Act and the Unjust Character.

Since it is possible for a man to commit acts of injustice, without being in himself unjust, we may ask: What is the character

of those particular acts of injustice by committing which a man is, *ipso facto*, unjust in any specific line of injustice, such as that of the thief, or of the adulterer, or of the brigand?

Morality of the agent distinct from the morality of the act.

A question of this kind as stated above will be quite immaterial. [It is the motive of the act and not the act itself which indicates the character of the agent.] For instance, a man may commit adultery, with full knowledge who his associate is, yet not from any cause originating in the will but under the influence of passion. Such an one does a wrong act, but he is not in himself unjust: he is not any the more a thief though he has stolen, nor an adulterer, though he has committed adultery. Indeed this distinction applies to the virtues generally.

[It has been already shown how the principle of Retaliation in such cases bears upon the principle of Justice.]

Here a question arises into which we must examine: as there are certain classes of unjust acts by committing which a man acts wrongfully but is not in himself unjust, what specifically are these acts?

In the first place we will show that it is possible for a man to act wrongfully without being in himself unjust; *e.g.* to steal without being a thief, or to commit adultery without being an adulterer. For instance a man who stole the sword of a lunatic to prevent that lunatic killing himself, committed a theft but is not a thief; and the man who committed adultery in order that he might be enabled to grow rich, committed adultery yet is not an adulterer, but only fond of money; and, again, if a physician deceives an invalid upon the hope that he may thereby save him, he does an act of deceit but is not thereby a deceiver. It is clear, therefore, that it is possible for a man to commit an act of injustice without being unjust according to that special form of injustice an act of which he commits.

We may define the nature of the acts in one general statement; all such acts as a man commits not for the sake of the end which is natural to that special form of wrong an act of which he commits, but for the sake of some other end, whether good or bad—in respect of all such acts he does wrong without being unjust. For instance the physician deceives, but he is not a deceiver: the aim which he has before him is not the deceiving but the recovery of the invalid. Similarly the man who steals the sword of a lunatic, does not seek to gain an advantage for himself, or secretly to gain plunder from his neighbour, as the thief does, but the aim which he has before him is the safety of that lunatic. [Now every action derives its character from the 'end' which is before it. Hence, too, its definition and consequently also its name, the name being only an abbreviated definition.] We do not either speak of a general as a builder or carpenter because he constructs battering rams and other warlike engines in his sieges. He does but perform the acts of a builder or of a carpenter, and he is only said 'to construct.' Inasmuch as he has regard to the 'end,' not of the builder but of the general, he is not called a builder but a general. Similarly a man who violates his neighbour's wife without having a deliberate purpose prompted by lust to do so, but actuated by greed of gain, is not adulterous but avaricious.

It is possible, therefore, for a man to do a wrong without being unjust according to that special form of injustice, an act of which he commits; nay, he may really be in *no* sense unjust, as in the case we supposed of the physician, or else unjust according to some other form of wrong-doing, as in the case we supposed of the adulterer—in the manner which has been explained. It is possible, also,

in other ways for a man in committing a wrong not to be unjust, when, for instance, he does a wrong unwillingly: a man who has by night missed the thief and killed one who is not a thief, has committed a wrong but is not unjust in himself.

[In regard to the principle of retaliation, it has been already explained in what spirit it must be instituted in order to be just.]

x.—Metaphorical application of Justice to Children and Slaves.

But we must not lose sight of the fact that the 'Right' which we have under investigation is Right used in the strict sense of the term—the Right which is bound up with the life of citizens. Such a Right can only exist among those who share a life in common with the object of satisfying their every want—among those, that is, who are free and equal, whether their equality be measured on a principle of relative or of absolute standard. Wherever such a condition is not found, among such persons there can be no social rights on the part of one as against another: there can only be a kind of justice metaphorically implied from similarity of relations. Rights can only exist among those who are ruled by a common law; and law can only exist among those who can injure one another (a legal sentence being a distinguishing of what is right from what is wrong). But where there is room for injustice, in such cases there is room also for the doing thereof; though the converse is not true that where there is the doing of unjust acts, there is also injustice. Injustice is the assigning to oneself too much of things absolutely good, and too little of things absolutely evil. [This is the reason why we do not allow an individual man to rule over us, but only Reason: the individual man makes the distribution of things in his own interest, and grows to be a tyrant. But the ruler is the guardian of what is just, and consequently of what is 'equal' also; and if he be just, he thinks no advantage due to himself—he assigns no superiority to himself of what is absolutely good (unless it be 'proportionate' in reference to his own claims). He acts therefore in the interest of others; and hence men say that 'Justice is another's good'—as was mentioned in a previous chapter. Some kind of reward has, therefore, to be given to the ruler; and that reward is the honour and dignity shown to him. Where such rewards fail to satisfy, rulers grow to be tyrants.]

Justice can properly only exist between equals who can claim the protection of the law.

The rights which are exercised over slaves and children are not the same as those exercised over citizens, though there is some similarity between them. For no injury is possible against a man's own possessions, in the strict sense of the term; but the

slave and the child (so long as he be of tender age and be not independent of the parent), is, as it were a *part* of a man's own self, and no one forms such a purpose as that to injure his own self. Consequently no injury is possible on the part of anyone against his own self; and therefore neither are the terms 'right' or 'wrong' applicable to them as they are to citizens. Right and Wrong imply a relation to *law*, and can only be predicated of those among whom 'law' has naturally found a home—among those, that is, among whom there is established an equality for ruling and being ruled. There is therefore a greater claim to 'rights' on behalf of a wife than on behalf of children and slaves: such rights being involved in 'Economic Justice;' which nevertheless is specifically different from 'Civil Justice.'

Justice can only exist between children or slaves and citizens in a metaphorical sense.

There is yet another kind of 'Right' which is not right in the strict sense of the term—I mean, for instance, the rights of a father and the rights of a master. These relationships do not constitute 'rights' in the strict sense of the term, though they bear a similarity in a certain sense to the rights of citizens between one another. I mean by the 'rights of a father' the authority which it befits a father to exercise over his children; and by the 'rights of a master' the authority which a master must exercise over his slaves. In the proper sense of the term, therefore, and in real truth, 'rights' are such as form the province of Distributive and Remedial Justice, the Justice, that is, which regulates the mutual relations of citizens, and which is based upon a principle of proportion whether geometrical or arithmetical. Rights can only exist between those among whom law is established; and law is established only between those who are capable of suffering wrong and of committing wrong. Law and the sentence of law is a distinguishing between the just and the unjust—and these are relationships appropriate between citizen and citizen, who are able to injure one another, owing to the desire which each man feels of giving a greater share of absolute good to himself and a lesser share to his neighbour; and conversely of things harmful. This is the reason why we do not allow an individual to rule the state, following as of course he would his own individual caprices; but we regard the laws as sovereign, to prevent a ruler from ruling for his own interests or assigning to himself too great a share in the distribution of good things, and to secure a due proportion to all alike. Unless a ruler be thus 'conditioned,' he will become a despot. The true ruler is one who has no other wish than to guard the interests of Justice, whether as absolute or as relative equality: he does not rule for the sake of himself, but to promote the interests of others. (Hence Justice has been described as 'the good of others'). It is to compensate their disinterestedness, that many compensations have been instituted for worthy rulers—public honours or rewards. Whenever a ruler is not satisfied with rewards of this character, he makes an attempt at a tyranny.

Civil Justice is, therefore, called Justice in the perfect sense; but 'the rights' of a father or of a master are imperfect rights. A man cannot possibly be unjust towards himself or towards a special part of himself, nor does a man form a purpose of injuring his own possessions. But a child stands in the relation of 'part' to his father, so long as he is under his control and dependent upon his foresight. Similarly the slave is a kind of succour to his master so long as he is a slave and is subject to his master. But no man plots harm against that which is a utility to himself. Where, then, it is not possible for injury to exist, neither can there be 'rights' in the perfect sense of the term (*i.e.* such rights as

exist between citizens), but only 'rights' in an analogous sense. 'Civil rights' can only exist among those who live under a common law. Between father and son, master and slave, there is no common law, for the reasons which have been given—because, that is, there cannot even be an injury of one to the other. 'Civil rights' can only exist between those among whom there is an equality in respect of ruling and of being ruled. The relationship, therefore, of husband towards his wife is more nearly a claim of 'right,' than is the relationship of a man towards his son or slaves. This former kind of relationship constitutes Economic Justice, and has a closer resemblance to Civil Justice than the latter has. Yet even Economic Justice is itself also distinct and apart from Civil Justice.

xi.—Distinction between Natural and Legal Justice examined.

The origin of moral obligation to be sought partly in the law of Nature, partly in the commands of the State.

Looking, again, to Civil Justice, to the rights incident to social life, we see one element therein determined by nature, and another element the expression of positive law. Natural Right is that which in every land has the same authority and does not depend upon its being recognised or not by public opinion. Legal Right, on the other hand, is an ordinance which originally is quite colourless in character and might have been shaped one way or another, but which when once it has been definitely enacted, has an importance of its own; for example that the ransom for a captive should be one mina, or that a goat rather than two sheep should be sacrificed on certain occasions; or again such cases where enactments are made to meet particular emergencies, as that of instituting a sacrifice to Brasidas, or where special decrees of the Ecclesia are passed.

The obligations of Natural Law are not weakened by the actual changes to which it is liable in the State.

It is a view held by some writers that all questions of 'right' are questions of law and not of nature, on the ground that a thing fixed by Nature is a thing unalterable, everywhere holding an unquestioned sway (just as fire burns as certainly among the Persians as it does here) whereas the provisions of Justice are, as we see, perpetually changing. This view does not represent the truth of the case—except up to a certain point. Among the Gods of course Right is utterly unalterable. Among men, however, *though everything is subject to change*, there is a kind of Right which exists from the very nature of things: still, though there be that which is 'right by nature,' there are other forms of right which have no such sanction.

What the character of Right is which exists by nature and yet belongs to the world of change and chance, what on the other hand is the character of Right which does not exist by nature but is the expression of law and dependent on convention is now

evident, if in fact both alike *are* liable to be altered. The distinction will be found applicable to the features of our nature generally. By nature the right hand is stronger than the left; and yet it is conceivable and possible that some men should be born ambidexter. As for those provisions of Justice which are regulated by convention and by the expediency of the moment—they resemble the fluctuations in weights and measures. The measures for wine and corn are not equal in all places, but where men buy they are larger, where men sell they are less. Similarly those provisions of law which are not dictated by nature but enacted by man, are not uniform in all places any more than are the forms of government (though according to nature there is one single type of constitution which is most perfect for every land).

Again, every one of the provisions of Justice, and every one of the enactments of law, stands in the position of a Universal to the particular details that fall under its range. The circumstances of action are manifold, while every provision of Justice and enactment of Law is a unity as being universal and absolute.

In the rights which appertain to the life of citizens, one element is derived from nature, and another from positive law. Natural Right is understood to be that which in every land exerts the same authority and which approves itself to all alike; for example, that a man who has borrowed money should pay back his loan, since it is an universally accepted view that 'each man should have his own.' On the other hand Legal Right is of such a character that before it was enacted it was indeterminate or colourless and was regarded as neither just nor unjust, and only became a 'right' after it had been determined by law; *e.g.* that the price for the purchase of a slave should be one mina. Before this law was enacted to regulate the purchase of slaves, the price was undefined and was left to the choice and wishes of the slave owner. But after this law had been passed, the price was no longer optional, but it is a point of justice that the owner should sell his slave on such and such terms. Similar in character also are those special provisions which relate to isolated incidents, as for instance, the edicts of the assembly; as when, for instance, it seemed good to the Senate and to the people to crown Demosthenes, or to call Themistocles 'Olympius.' Before these decrees were passed these matters were indifferent, but when once decreed they are regarded as matters of right.

But there are some who think that there is nothing right by the nature of things, but that all 'rights' are the creations of law. 'Everything,' say they, 'which is ordered by nature is immutable: fire warms everywhere and at every time equally among ourselves as in Egypt. On the contrary, the provisions of Justice are alterable and changeable: it is held among some tribes to be just to borrow and not to repay; and similarly in other relations the same provisions are not universally regarded by all alike as just. Hence all the requirements of Justice are only the enactments of law; and there is nothing fixed by Nature.' In reply to this theory, we may observe that the provisions of Justice are not absolutely unsettled and reversible; and even though among men there *were* this uncertainty, yet at any rate among the Gods it needs must be that Right is unalterable so that there is a certain form of right which exists by nature. The fact that persons who are morally diseased, and whose minds are corrupted, do not recognise this right does not affect the question. The man who says that honey is sweet does not speak falsely, though persons whose palates are vitiated by disease think the reverse. Precisely so Natural Right is recognised by some and

repudiated by others. The first class is composed of those whose tastes are natural and healthy, the second class is composed of those whose nature is perverted and who are infatuated. It is clear, then, that there is nothing to prevent there being a Natural Right, though some men think that there is no such thing.

But since both legal and natural Justice are mutable in the sense which has been explained, in what way can they be discriminated, both being mutable? The distinction is evident. Justice must be examined in its own nature whether it is of universal benefit as being immutable, and whether its abolition is liable to bring about mischief. If it be of absolute and universal benefit, it is Natural Right; if not, it is only conventional. Though it is conceivable that all men should use the left hand no less than the right, yet the right hand is obviously stronger by nature than is the left. The provisions of legal right, though observed by natural convention are like weights and measures, which are found to be different in different lands. The measures used for wine or corn are not equal everywhere; but where they buy wine and corn they make the measures greater, and where they sell them, less. Such requirements as have not a natural basis, but are established by man and adopted by mutual compact, present the same aspect:—they are not uniform in every place. Not even is there one form of government among all people though there is one that is ideally best according to the constitution of things; just as natural right is one and the same everywhere in well ordered communities.

The relation which Right and Law hold to the actions performed in such communities is that of Universal to Particular. The things to be done are multiform, whereas Right, whether natural or conventional, is One; as being Universal or General. It does not order a particular Hero to be honoured, nor a particular honour to be paid him; but generally that every Hero without limitation shall have honour done to him.

xii.—Justice and Injustice viewed in relation to the intentions of the agent.

(*a*) JUSTICE IN FACT DISTINGUISHED FROM JUSTICE AS AN ABSTRACT RELATION.

Settlement of nomenclature and distinction of synonyms.

Now there is a distinction between 'unjust conduct' and injustice as an abstract relation, and between 'just conduct' and justice as an abstract relation. An unjust relation is determined either by nature or by human ordinance; and when it has been consummated in action it becomes 'unjust conduct,' though before it is carried into effect it is simply 'Injustice' (as an idea and apart from persons and circumstances). There is a corresponding difference between 'just conduct' and justice in the abstract—(though the common name applied to the action of the individual is 'just-dealing,' 'just conduct' being rather a rectification of an act of wrong). We shall have to examine further into these divisions of Justice, and determine the character of its several varieties and the subject-matter with which they are severally concerned.

Now there is a distinction between 'just conduct' and 'justice,' and between unjust conduct and injustice. Justice *per se* is a relation viewed without limitation and absolutely, whether determined by law or by nature; *e.g.* that the murderer should be put to death. But when this relation becomes embodied in

particular circumstances, and a particular murderer is put to death in a particular manner, then the relation becomes a fact and is called 'the meting out of justice' (*δικαίωμα*). The same distinction holds good between injustice in the abstract and injustice in fact. The name, however, which is generally given to a just action, whether it consist in the punishment of injustice, or in the rewarding of virtue, is *δικαιοπράγημα*, 'just dealing'; *δικαίωμα*, *i.e.* 'the meting out of justice,' being specially applied to the punishment of injustice. We shall have to consider by and by how many different forms there are of right dealing and of meting out justice. For the present we must treat of prior questions.

(*b*) ACTS OF JUSTICE MUST BE *VOLUNTARILY* PERFORMED.

Justice in the agent implies the co-operation of the will.

Acts of justice and of injustice being, then, such as have been above detailed, a man acts wrongfully or deals rightly when he *voluntarily* does the one or the other. When on the other hand he acts *involuntarily*, he acts wrongly or rightly, not in the true sense of the term but only incidentally. In such cases men are but the instruments of results to which there is an accidental quality of being just or unjust. An act of right or an act of wrong is limited, and defined by its voluntariness or involuntariness. When an act of injustice is voluntary, it is censured and is an act of wrong. Hence there is a form of injustice which is not an act of wrong—unless there be the element of voluntariness entering into it. By 'voluntariness' I mean (as has been explained before) the performance of an act, in the sphere of what is within our own power, which a man does knowingly and without any ignorance either of the person, or of the instrument, or of the tendency of his act—*e.g.* who it is that he is striking, what his weapon is, or what its tendency; and in each one of these particulars acts neither accidentally nor under compulsion (as he would if, for instance, some one were to take hold of his hand and with it strike a third person:—in such a case he would not act willingly, the action not depending upon himself). Again, it is possible that the person struck on a particular occasion is a man's father, while the man himself knew only that he was striking some one, or a bystander, and was unconscious that it was his own father. A similar distinction might be drawn also in regard to the tendency of an action, and indeed in regard to the action as a whole.

The co-operation of the will involves (1) Knowledge of the circumstances, (2) Freedom of action.

That, then, is involuntary which is either done in ignorance, or else, if not done in ignorance, not within a man's own power or actually forced upon him. There are in fact many things, even in the sphere of what takes place by the course of nature, which we do knowingly, and many influences in the same

sphere to which we are knowingly subject, in no single case of which is there any consent or dissent of ours possible; for instance, in growing old or in dying. In doing what is just or unjust alike, it is possible for a man to act accidentally. A man may restore a deposit lodged with him unwillingly and through fear: such an one must not be said either to act justly or to deal fairly, except through the accident of circumstance. In the same sense, a man who fails to restore a deposit through pressure from without and against his own intentions, must be said to act unjustly through stress of circumstances only, and *per accidens.*

Such, then, being the conditions of 'right' and 'wrong,' as has been explained, a man acts wrongly or rightly, when he *intentionally* performs acts of the one kind or the other. When, on the contrary, he acts against his will, he neither acts wrongly nor rightly in the true acceptation of the words but only under the accidents of circumstance. These (unintentional) actions *in themselves* are neither unjust nor just. Since they are involuntary, the definition of unjust dealing, which is confined within the limits of the 'voluntary,' will not accord with any of them. They are themselves called just or unjust from accidental associations, because the equality of justice or the inequality of injustice accidentally attaches to their actions, and those who do them are therefore said to deal fairly or unfairly. But viewed absolutely, if an action of injustice be voluntary, it will also be unfairness on the part of the agent and unjust dealing. But apart from its voluntariness, a man may have done an unjust act, and yet his action will not be unfair dealing: the man is not in himself unjust even though he does unjust things. As was demonstrated in the previous examination, it is possible for a man to do unjust things without being himself unjust: a man will only be unjust when his action depends upon himself and there is no one to constrain him, and he knows and is not ignorant of all the surrounding circumstances. For instance, he must know whom it is that he is striking, and for what reason he strikes. What these circumstances are we defined in our discussion of the voluntary and involuntary. The case is similar in regard to those who do just deeds. A man will only be just and his action will only be 'just dealing' in the true sense of the term when it is done voluntarily. A man who restores a deposit entrusted to him, through fear, neither deals fairly nor is just, unless the term be so applied to him from accidental associations. We must draw these distinctions with yet greater precision and accuracy.

(*c*) INTENTIONAL INJURIES DISTINGUISHED FROM ACCIDENTAL WRONGS.

In regard, again, to things which are voluntary—we sometimes do them as the result of deliberate preference, and at other times without such preference: where we show preference our preference means a previous determination, and where we have no preference, our actions take place without previous determination.

A new classification of wrongs may, therefore, be made into (1) voluntary and (2) involuntary.

Now there are three kinds of harm which may be done in the intercourse between men. 1. Acts attended with ignorance are 'mistakes' or 'errors;' as for instance when a man acts and neither

the person nor the object nor the tendency nor the instrument are what he supposed them to be: as when a man imagined that he was not throwing his missile, or that it was a different person he was aiming at, or that the tendency was different, and it turned out in the end that the result was not what he expected: he may not have intended to wound but only to puncture, or he may have wounded the wrong person, or done so in a wrong manner. When, therefore, hurt is done contrary to the expectation of the agent, it is a misfortune; and when, though not contrary to expectation the injury is done without malice, it is then an error. A man commits an error when the first origination of the cause was under his own control: he is but the victim of misfortune when the origination of the cause is external to himself.

2. When, however, a man acts knowingly but not through premeditation, his act is an act of wrong (such, for instance, as are the wrongs to which men are led through passion and other impulses which are irresistible and natural). In such cases men commit wrong as causing injury and committing errors, and their acts are acts of wrong, yet are they not necessarily on that account in themselves unjust or evil-minded, since the harm done is not owing to their evil intention.

3. On the other hand, when an act is done out of deliberate purpose, then the perpetrator is himself unjust and evil-minded.

Hence it is that acts proceeding from passion are properly regarded as not proceeding from malice aforethought. In such cases it is not the man acting in passion who begins the act and is the cause of it, but rather the man who provoked him. Moreover the question is not about the act having taken place but about the justice of it, since anger arises where there is the appearance of injustice. Questions of anger are not like questions of contract where men are at issue as to a thing having been done or not, and where one of the parties must necessarily be a cheat (unless they are acting through forgetfulness); but in cases of anger men agree about the *fact* and only dispute on which side justice lies. The man who laid the plot against the other knows of course, but whilst his victim thinks himself wronged, he persists in denying it. If, however, a man injure another of deliberate malice, he then commits a wrong; and in the way of injuries such as these a man who commits a wrong is *ipso facto* unjust, since his act is contrary to proportion and in violation of equality. For similar reasons a man is just when he deals fairly out of deliberate preference for right, and he deals fairly if only he acts willingly.

The influence of anger on the commission of wrongs.

In the case of wrongs done unwillingly, some such wrongs are pardonable, and others are not. All the errors which a man commits, not merely in a state of ignorance, but actually in consequence of his ignorance, are pardonable. But when such acts are not owing to ignorance, though the perpetrators thereof are in a state of ignorance in consequence of a passion which is neither natural nor proper to man, then they are not pardonable.

Venial wrongs distinguished from such as are unpardonable.

The injuries which are done in the intercourse between man and man are partly voluntary and partly involuntary. Of involuntary injuries some are called 'errors' and others misfortunes. An error arises when a man injures another against his will though giving a certain cause or occasion of the injury. Suppose a man to be shooting an arrow on a road in which it was conceivable that a traveller might pass, and actually to have killed someone; he was an involuntary homicide, yet he afforded an occasion of a man's death by shooting an arrow in such a spot. A misfortune arises when an injury occurs contrary to all expectation; as for instance when a man shooting in a desert, as it so chanced, killed a person passing by. In this latter case the harm has been done contrary to expectation and against probability, and the man who caused the harm contributed in no way to it, except by way of accident, the cause of death being entirely extraneous to him.

Of the wrongs again which are voluntary, some are said to arise from a settled purpose and others not. Of settled purpose are wrongs such as have been deliberated upon beforehand—when, that is, a man after consideration and deliberation inflicts harm with the simple purpose that he *may* commit harm. Wrongs which do not come from a settled purpose are such as proceed from passion and not from previous deliberation; for example, when a man injures his neighbours promiscuously, constrained by sudden frenzy, or when a man has stolen from being overwhelmed by want, not wishing to do wrong in itself but only to soothe the pains of hunger. But whether his acts proceed from settled purpose or no, in either case they are called 'wrongs.'

If we look, however, to the persons who are agents in these wrongs, the man who injures another of malice aforethought is unjust in himself and evil-minded; whereas the man who does so from being stirred up by strong feeling, whether a natural feeling like anger or grief, or an unconquerable feeling like hunger or fear, such an one is not unjust in himself nor evil-minded.

For this reason a distinction is made by Judges between the case of a man who is defending himself from that of a man who commenced the aggression. The man who acts in passion does not commence the wrong but the man who provoked him to wrong. The latter is accused as the wrong doer, having been the cause of the injury. In this view the man who commenced the feud denies that he did so, whereas the man who defends himself, while admitting the injury which he has done to the man who assailed him, calls it only a requital or retaliation, inasmuch as he was stirred to anger not of his own motion but by the man upon whom he has wreaked vengeance. The point at issue in such cases does not stand on the same footing as in matters of contract. In questions of contract the matter at issue is a matter of *fact*; for instance, whether a man received a deposit or a loan, and having received it failed to restore it; and if this fact be proved, the man is *ipso facto* unjust and evil-hearted—unless it be that he repudiated the transaction from having forgotten it. In a case of passion, however, the *fact* is admitted and is evident (*i.e.* whatever a man does in anger he does openly); but the question at issue is whether he struck the blow justly or unjustly. Consequently the man who commenced the feud and plotted against the other, being conscious of his injustice, for that reason does not admit that he is the assailant; while on the other hand the man who was

provoked by him thinks that he is not unjust, and therefore admits the harm which he has done to his assailant.

It is evident from this consideration that whatever wrongs a man does through passion or through strong emotion and not through evil intent, he is not in respect thereof unjust in himself. On the other hand, when a man does wrong of malice aforethought, he is unjust and evil-minded, not only in respect of Corrective Justice, but also in respect of Distributive Justice—if, that is, he apportions aught to himself in violation of equality and proportion. For similar reasons a man is just according to the different kinds of justice when he does what is right not through feeling but for the sake of 'the Good.' A man who has dealt fairly being stirred thereto by a feeling, whether of pain or of love, has indeed performed just actions but is not just in himself.

But since there are some cases of involuntary wrong which meet with pardon and others which do not, we must explain which of them are pardonable and which of them are not. Whatever errors a man commits not only in ignorance but also in consequence of that ignorance, are pardonable. But the errors which a man commits not in consequence of ignorance, though in a state of ignorance, but in consequence of passion—I do not mean such passion as is natural and human, like that caused by fear or pain or hunger or some other compulsion, but some merely luxurious craving, as, for instance, to drink wine of fine bouquet or to eat partridge—such errors are not pardonable. It is of course possible for a man to err at once 'through ignorance' and 'in a state of ignorance;' for instance, a man being in a state of ignorance in regard to the Universal that 'it is wrong to drive away one's father,' may also drive away his father by night in ignorance who he is. A man who does not know the Universal is said to act 'in a state of ignorance,' while the man who does not know the particular fact is said to act 'through ignorance.' If a man know neither the one nor the other, he is said to err 'in ignorance' and 'through ignorance,' and he of course is pardoned. A man is said to act 'in ignorance' when he is ignorant of the universal that 'it is wrong to steal,' but steals, not because he is ignorant but in consequence of wickedness and passion,—a passion that is neither unconquerable nor natural, as has been shown.

(*d*) VOLUNTARINESS APPLIES TO THE RECEIVING OF WRONG EQUALLY WITH THE DOING OF IT.

Difficulty in understanding how a wrong can be voluntarily suffered.

Here we must pause to ask whether we have sufficiently defined suffering and committing wrong: is such a case possible as that which Euripides has described when he writes in his quaint way:—

> "I slew my mother:—there is the simple truth."
> "With her consent and thine? or hers, not thine?"

Is it, as a matter of fact, possible for a man to be injured of his own accord, or is it not? Or is the receiving of injury in every case involuntary, just as the doing of injury is in every case voluntary? Or is it the fact that the rule is not absolute, but the receiving of injury, like the doing of injury, is sometimes voluntary and sometimes involuntary? So too in respect to having right done to one; as every case of right dealing is voluntary, it is reasonable that having right done to one, and having wrong done to one, should be mutually opposed in respect to their

being voluntary or involuntary. Yet it would seem a strange thing if to be righted were always voluntary, since some men have justice done to them not of their own accord.

Distinction between suffering a wrong and suffering wrongfully.

One may, however, raise this further question: Is every man who has suffered a wrong injured, or is the case of suffering analogous to that of acting, since in the case both of acting and of suffering it is conceivable for a man to have his due share of what is just only *per accidens* and without his own will entering into the case. Clearly the same principle applies also in respect to what is unjust, since it is not the same thing to do unjust deeds and to be unjust, nor to suffer unjust things and to be wronged. Similarly also in regard to dealing fairly and being fairly dealt by. It is surely impossible to be wronged unless some one commits a wrong, or to have right done to one unless there be some one to do it.

Suffering wrongfully does not even apply to the case of the sensualist.

If, again, to wrong any one is in the absolute sense of the term to injure him voluntarily, and 'voluntarily' mean with a knowledge of the person injured, of the means and manner in which he is injured, and if the man of weak will does injure himself, he will be wronged voluntarily, and it will thus be conceivable for a man to injure his own self. But this very point is one of the questions under dispute—whether it be possible for a man to injure himself. Again, a man might through his own sensual folly be injured by another voluntarily on the part of that other, so that it is possible for a man to be injured of his own accord. The definition may not be correct, but we must add to the terms 'hurt any one willingly, knowing the person, the instrument, and the manner,' the further limitation 'against that person's wish.' A man, therefore, is injured by his own consent and suffers what is unjust but is never wronged with his own consent. No one wishes for harm to himself, not even the weak sensualist, but he acts contrary to his wish. No one wishes for anything but what he fancies to be a good, and the sensualist does the very things which he thinks that he ought not to do. As for the man who gives away his property as Homer says that Glaucus gave to Diomede:

"Golden armour for brazen, the worth of a hundred oxen for the worth of nine."

—such a man is not wronged, since the giving of a gift depends upon a man's own self, whereas the suffering of a wrong is not within a man's own power, but there must exist some one to do the wrong. In regard therefore to being injured, it is clear that it is not a voluntary act.

It may be thought, however, that our definition of the Just and Unjust is as yet incomplete. Since the doing of wrong is opposed to the suffering of wrong, and we divided the doing of wrong into the doing of wrong voluntarily and the doing of wrong involuntarily, the suffering of wrong must also be distinguished according as it is voluntary or involuntary. Such a distinction is approved by Euripides, who says that it is possible to suffer wrong intentionally on one's own part. His verses run something like this :—

> "I slew my mother :—there is the simple truth."
> "With her consent and thine? or hers, not thine?"

Since these terms are mutually opposed, it is necessary either that every case of wrong doing should be voluntary and that every case of suffering wrong should be involuntary; or else that as cases of committing wrong have been distinguished into voluntary and involuntary, cases of suffering wrong should be similarly distinguished, that the several terms may be mutually opposed to one another. The case seems to stand upon the same footing in regard to doing right and having right done to one. Yet to suppose that every case in which right or wrong is done to a man is voluntary, that is absurd. Ofttimes a man is set right against his will—when, for instance, he has done wrong and is punished for it. Similarly, it is not true that there is any case in which wrong is voluntarily incurred: in all cases when a man is wronged it is against his will; though when a man has right done to him it is sometimes against his will, sometimes with his own consent. When a man does wrong and is punished for it, he is set right against his will: when a man suffers wrong, and is avenged of that wrong, he is righted with his own consent.

What has been now advanced may suffice to explain the case of right being done to a person. We must now explain with greater precision the case of wrong being done to a person, and show that it is not possible that suffering wrong should be intentional.

First of all we will state the reasons from which it seems to be inferred that a man may be voluntarily injured. Now since to injure anyone unjustly, with knowledge of the injury done and the person injured, and without any ignorance of the whole circumstances attending the injury, incited to the injury of one's own motion and not constrained thereto from without—since, I say, this constitutes intentional wrong-doing, it follows that to be voluntarily wronged is to suffer hurt contrary to justice, with knowledge of the injury and of the person committing it, with all the attendant circumstances, and yet to submit to the wrong while having it in one's power to shake it off. That such a phenomenon is found in fact is obvious. The weak sensualist is in fact injured by others, while he knows the whole circumstances before him, yet submits to the wrong though he has the power of shaking it off. It is possible, therefore, for a man to be wronged of his own accord. Moreover the weak sensualist injures his own self, and that, moreover, voluntarily. Hence for a man to injure his own self voluntarily, is to suffer what is unjust. Yet a man does, at times, bear injustice intentionally: for instance, men of scrupulous fairness in making distributions receive by their own wish less than their due share, a thing which though unjust is voluntary. Such men are therefore injured voluntarily. There is then a certain form in which injury may be incurred voluntarily. But the contrary view to this holds that it is impossible for anyone to be injured voluntarily. A man is only injured when he suffers some injustice contrary to his own wish. To suffer aught contrary to one's own wish is opposed to the very definition of the voluntary: hence it is not possible for a man to *wish* to be injured, not even if he be weakly sensual. Even the sensualist wishes for what is good for himself and does not endure to be injured in the strict and unqualified sense of the term: if he submits to a particular injury he fancies that he will not be injured thereby. He considers that he ought to do such things as will be profitable to him, but practically he does things which harm him, fancying that they are not harmful. Hence it is not possible for a man to be injured of his own choice.

In this way the objections drawn from the contrary are solved. A man does

wrong when he injures anyone voluntarily, contrary to the wish of the person injured. Similarly a man has wrong done to him when he suffers unjust treatment contrary to his own wish. But to suffer unjust treatment voluntarily is not the same thing as to be wronged. Just as to do what is unjust is not in every case to act unjustly, nor is the man who does unjust things unjust (as was shown above) so neither is every one who suffers unjust treatment, necessarily wronged. But just as the physician who deceives his patient, or the person who steals the sword of a madman does what is unjust without being unjust himself, inasmuch as he looks to the safety of the invalid, and does not cause him to lose but to gain, so also a man who in distribution takes less than his worth, does not injure himself even though he suffers what is unfair. He submits to be rated below his merit not in order to injure himself but rather that he may profit thereby, gaining a reputation for moderation and scrupulous fairness. Moreover even if he does submit to injure himself, he is not thereby wronged, since he does not suffer injustice contrary to his own wish (and nothing but that is suffering wrong). A man who gives in exchange what is better for what is worse—as Homer says that Glaucus made a present to Diomede of

> "Golden armour for brazen—the worth of a hundred oxen for the worth of nine,"

—is not wronged, since he gave by his own wish. A man who is wronged is injured against his will. It is not possible, therefore, for a man to be wronged of his own accord, though it is possible for him to suffer harm of his own accord.

(*e*) STATEMENT OF SOME QUESTIONS OF CASUISTRY BEARING ON THE ABOVE.

Who is unjust in the case of an unjust distribution, the man who makes it or the man who profits by it?

But there are still two questions for us to discuss connected with the subjects of which we have proposed to treat: (1) does a man who *makes* a division contrary to true merit act unjustly, or the man who profits by it? and (2) is it possible for a man to be unjust to himself? Now if the position assumed above be possible and the man who makes the unjust distribution does wrong and not the man who profits by it, then, if a man assigns to anyone but to himself an advantage knowingly and voluntarily, this man injures his own self. This is precisely what 'moderate' men appear to do; since a man of scrupulous moderation is willing to take less than his share. But this is not an unvarnished view of the case. The person who seemed to be cheating himself was—it may so have chanced—coveting another good, such as fame or the glory of disinterestedness. Moreover the difficulty is solved by reference to the definition of 'wrong-doing': the man suffers nothing 'contrary to his own wish,' and consequently he is not injured at any rate on this score, or if at all, his injury is simply loss.

Yet it is evident also that the man who makes unfair distribution does a wrong, but not the man who profits by it in every case. It is not the man to whom the unjust share accrues who does the wrong, but the man to whom it has occurred to do the wrong

voluntarily. This is the point upon which depends the origination of the actual movement towards action, and this origination rests with the man who makes the division, not with the man who gains by it.

Moreover, since acting is predicated in many senses, and there is a sense in which even inanimate things kill, or the hand, or the slave who does his master's bidding, so the distributor of an unjust apportionment may be the instrument of wrong, without being himself an evil-doer.

Again if a man makes a decision in ignorance, he does no wrong in the sense of legal justice, nor is his decision unrighteous, though in another point of view it is unjust; since justice according to law is different from abstract justice. If, on the other hand, he has given a decision knowingly, he seeks to gain an advantage thereby either of favour or of revenge. The man who from such motives has given an unjust decision has an advantage thereby, precisely as if he had a share in the proceeds of the injustice. For instance, a man who in a case of that kind has assigned away a field, has perhaps gained a sum of money if not the actual land.

There is the point also which must be explained—whether the wrong is done by the man who distributes things unjustly and not according to proportion, or by the man who receives more than his proper desert. It appears that the man who makes the distribution does a wrong in the absolute sense of the term, and the man who receives the profits does a wrong in the way of being an accidental accessory. That man does a wrong *per se* who makes an unjust distribution of his own choice; and a man acts from his own choice when the cause and the original movement of action rest with himself. Now the original movement to action in the case of a distribution rests with the man who makes it: the man therefore who makes an unfair distribution does a wrong *per se*, and not the man who receives the benefit of that unfairness, since, as has been shown, the origination of the act does not rest with him.

The doer of unjust things is not *ipso facto* said to do wrong, except by accident: for instance the hand, or a sword, or a stone are said to kill, though the cause of death does not rest with them, nor do they act from their own motion: they are indeed instrumental to evil but are in no way evil in themselves. If then, a man, who has made an unfair decision in ignorance of the laws, made his decision outside the range of legal justice, he has done no wrong according to law nor is his decision unrighteous. He does wrong, however, in another way—I mean of course in the way of natural right. Legal right is one thing, natural right another. Suppose, for instance, that there is a law that a hero should have a larger share in distributions, and that the man who was making the distribution being in ignorance of this law, ranked the hero only on an equality with the rest. Since he was ignorant of the law he has committed no wrong in respect of legal justice (inasmuch as the man who acts wrongfully through ignorance is not a wrong-doer). Yet since it is a law of nature to requite our benefactors, and this man neglected this law (not being ignorant of it, as it is a law of nature), he is unrighteous judged by that law. If, again, he had knowledge both of the positive law and of the law of nature, and yet neglected both and made an unjust decision, and assigned an advantage to one to whom it was not due, not only did he thereby cause the recipient to gain an advantage but himself also has an advantage likewise. In fact, whether through friendship or through hate or through bribes he

was led astray, he has participation in the wrongful gains. The advantage to himself in which he participates is either favour with a friend, or revenge against an enemy, or a sum of money. Hence he shares in the profits of injustice with the direct recipient. Suppose a man has assigned a field to whom it did not belong for a sum of money: he is said to have shared the field with the man who received it: yet he himself did not receive the field but a sum of money. Similarly the man who has acted unfairly in distributions, to serve his own interests or to oblige a friend, participates in the advantage gained and has a share of the fraud. The direct recipient has an advantage and has done what is unfair; but he is not a wrong-doer unless he persuaded the better judgment of the distributor by bribes or by some other inducement. But the distributor does have an advantage in the manner which has been described and is himself unjust.

xiii.—Complexities of Justice make the attainment of it difficult.

Justice seems to be within our own power and easy of attainment; but it is one thing to do a just action, another thing to do it in the proper spirit.

Now men think that the doing of injustice rests with themselves, and therefore that justice is an easy thing to practise; yet such is not the case. Of course it is an easy thing and within our own power to commit adultery or to assault one's neighbour or to place money into his hands; but to perform these acts as a consequence of a certain moral disposition that is no easy task nor dependent upon our own selves. In the same way people think that it is nothing abstruse to know what is just and what is unjust, on the ground that it is not difficult to comprehend the matters for which the laws make provision. Just acts, however, are no evidence of a just nature, except *per accidens:* only when just acts are performed in a just spirit or when a just arrangement is carried out in a just spirit, is right really done. Right in this sense is a more serious thing to understand than it is to know the secrets of health. To know the nature of honey or of wine or of hellebore or of caustic or of amputations is doubtless easy enough; but to know how to apply such things so as to secure health, to apply them to the proper subject or at the proper time —that is a serious business, equivalent in fact to being a physician. For this same reason some think that the doing of injustice is not less characteristic of the just man than is the doing of justice, on the ground that the just man will, not less, nay even more than the unjust man, be enabled to perform the various forms of crime—to commit adultery and to assault his neighbour; and similarly the brave man will be the better able to throw away his shield and to turn his back in battle and flee any direction that it may happen. But to be a coward or unjust does not consist in the mere performance of acts of cowardice or injustice (except *per accidens*), but in doing them as the outcome of a certain frame of

mind; precisely as being a physician or causing health is not the mere amputating or not amputating, giving drugs or not, but the nice observance, in doing so, of certain limitations and conditions.

The class defined to whom justice can be shown.

Now the relations of justice can only exist among those who have a share in what is absolutely good; and of things absolutely good they can have 'too much' or 'too little.' There are indeed those to whom an excess of such things is impossible, as surely it is to the Gods; while on the other hand no portion of such things is good for others, *e.g.* as for those who are incurably wicked, but every good thing is harmful: and there are others again to whom such things are only beneficial up to a certain point. This fact only shows that 'Justice is human' and must reflect the varieties of human life.

Now there are some who think that the doing of wrong or right is an easy thing, and that concurrently with a man's wishing he has therewith the power to become just or unjust. But the facts of the case do not stand thus. The doing of just acts or of unjust acts, the giving of money or the assaulting of one's neighbour, are easy enough and in the power of whoever will. But to have a moral disposition towards justice or injustice (which requires length of time and moral discipline to gain) in virtue of which dispositions alone it is that a man is called just or unjust—that, I say, is a matter not enough under our own control to make it easy for us to gain such dispositions concurrently with our wish to gain them.

In the same way they consider that the knowledge of what is just or unjust is an easy matter; and as for having a capacity to learn such things, they fancy that there is nothing abstruse in *that*, since, they say, it is not difficult to understand the matters in reference to which the laws make rules. These enactments of law they maintain to be the requirements of justice; though indeed they are not except from the associations of accident. The law absolutely enforced in the letter—carried out on every occasion alike and by anyone whom it may chance—is not justice: it must be enforced and carried out in a manner that is right and at a time that is right and by the persons to whom it rightfully belongs. To know these multitudinous limitations of each single law is more difficult than to know the varied conditions of health:—though in regard even to health it is easy to know the nature of honey or of wine or of hellebore or of caustic or of amputation, yet how one ought to arrange these various remedies so as to conduce to health—to whom they ought severally to be applied and on what occasions, is a serious task,—no less, in fact, than the whole art of the physician.

It is for this very reason indeed that some persons think that the just man has the capacity for acting unjustly no less than the just man has, nay, even more so, owing to the power he possesses of doing unjust things: he would be able, for instance, to strike one who had never injured him or to steal what is not his own, just as the brave man would be able to throw away his sword or to flee. Yet the doing of unjust deeds is not to be unjust, nor is it the same thing to be a coward and to do the acts of a coward—except through an accident of circumstance. To be a coward or unjust is to do acts of cowardice or of injustice with a moral nature corresponding thereto; when, for instance, a man flees not simply from a wish to do so, but because he is stirred by a strong impulse to cowardice, or when he commits a wrong through having a dishonest nature. In the same way to be a physician and to heal men is not to amputate, or to administer drugs, or the reverse, but to do so in the right manner, and at the right time, from being possessed of the mental attitude of the physician.

We have now defined the nature of Remedial and Distributive Justice, what

their nature is viewed speculatively, and how they are limited by circumstance ;—the subjects which were set before us to treat. We have now to explain what the relation is between what is just and what is equitable, and between justice and equity. We must, however, first add one other proviso to our Theory of Justice :—what is just either remedially or distributively can only exist in those things which have some share of what is absolutely good, *e.g.* wealth or fame, in which excess or defect is discoverable. In respect of fame a man may exceed what is right or fall short of it ; so also in regard to wealth. In the case of things which present this character what is sought is equality and proportion ; and where these are involved, there is need both for distributive and for remedial justice. Among the Gods of course inequality has no place, nor is either excess or defect possible among them : hence among them there is no need for justice like ours. Nor again is there any place for Justice among men who are utterly vicious, or who are corrupted by luxury or by general depravity. If men are to have a chance of growing strong, it is necessary that they should have some sound part whence as a starting point the physician may proceed to call the health back again. Men who are utterly corrupted cannot possibly be cured ; hence among them right has no place. Right can only exist among such as wish for things that are just and do what is just according to human strength, and, again, fail only in such ways as are natural for man.

xiv.—The principle of Equity solves the complications of Justice.

As closely connected with the previous subject it remains for us to treat of Equity and of the equitable, and to show the relation between Equity and Justice, and between the equitable and the just. It is evident, if we examine into the matter, that these two qualities are not identical nor yet distinct in kind. Sometimes, for instance, we praise what is equitable and the equitable character in such a way as, even when praising a man on general grounds, to use the term as a synonym instead of the term 'good,' showing thereby that what is most equitable is also most excellent. At other times when following out the definition of Justice, it seems to us absurd that the equitable should be praised though a thing contrary to what is just. *Either* what is just is not good, since the equitable, being other than the just, is good : *or*, if both are good, they are identical.

Relation between Equity and Justice.

A difficulty does indeed arise through these considerations in reference to what is equitable. Yet all these views are under certain aspects rightly held ; they are none of them antagonistic to one another. What is equitable is just though more excellent than a certain kind of justice, and though more excellent than a certain kind of justice, is not a distinct and separate thing therefrom. The just and the equitable are therefore identical, and though both qualities are virtuous, equity is the more excellent.

Equity more excellent than Justice in certain cases.

The difficulty is caused by the fact that though the equitable is just, it is not a justice conformable to law but a rectification

thereof. The reason of this is that every law is universal and abstract, yet there are cases in reference to which it is impossible to legislate rightly by general provisions. In cases, therefore, where it is necessary to make general provisions though it be impossible to do so rightly, the law assumes the general principle which holds good in the main while fully aware of the liability of error in its application. Nevertheless, the law acts rightly: the error does not rest with the lawgiver nor with the law but with the nature of the circumstances with which it has to deal, the subject matter formed by action being from the outset of this complicated character. When, therefore, the law speaks generally and something happens in reference thereto which is beyond the universal provisions of the law, in such cases it is only right that, where the lawgiver has passed over some consideration and made an error through having spoken in the abstract, we should in practice correct this aberration—an aberration which even the lawgiver himself would prescribe if he were present, and for which he would have legislated if he had foreseen.

Equity a rectification of *legal* Justice.

Wherefore Equity is just and more excellent than justice of a certain kind—not better than justice in the abstract but better than the flawed condition incidental to abstract justice; and this is the nature of what is equitable—a rectification of law on points where law is at fault owing to its universality. This is in truth the reason why every circumstance of life is not regulated by law —*i.e.* there are certain circumstances for which it is impossible to frame a law, and hence a special decree is needed to meet them. The rule for what is indefinite must itself also be indefinite, like the leaden rule in Lesbian architecture: the rule is not fixed but shifts itself according to the shape of the stone; and so must the decree be accommodated to meet the nature of the circumstances.

The nature then of the equitable is clear: it is itself 'just' and more excellent than justice of a certain kind. It is also clear from this point of view what is the character of the equitable man. He is one who deliberately prefers as a matter of choice what is equitable and carries out his choice in action. He does not insist upon the rigour of his rights to his neighbour's hurt, but is willing to take less than his due though the law would support his extremest claim. The frame of mind involved in such a character is Equitableness, being a form of Justice and involving the same mental conditions.

The character of the equitable man defined.

The subject which comes next for us is the nature of Equity and of the equitable, and the relation which Equity holds to Justice and which the equitable

holds to the just. These qualities are not all identical, nor yet are they distinct in kind. Inasmuch as what is equitable is more highly praised than what is just, the equitable man seems to be more estimable than the just man. Moreover we apply the term to the characteristics of goodness generally, when it is necessary to praise any of the virtues: we say that such a virtue is more equitable than such an other, indicating thereby not what is more just but what is more excellent. In this view Equity seems to be a distinct virtue, separate from Justice. But on the other hand as we follow out the terms of the definition it seems evidently absurd that the equitable should be commendable, if it be something distinct and apart from Justice. If it be commendable, it must be just, since everything commendable is just, and justice is perfect virtue as was demonstrated in a previous chapter; and *vice versâ*, if it is not just, neither is it commendable; else if what is equitable is commendable, what is just is not commendable.

A difficulty, therefore, arises through these opposing views. But both views are rightly held—both that Justice and Equity are one and that they are distinct; and these views are in no way opposed to one another. What is equitable is just, and more excellent than justice of a certain kind. Not as distinct from justice in kind, is it better than justice; but as being a division of another kind of justice, to which it is allied. Justice and equity being both of them excellent 'the equitable just' is the more excellent.

This difficulty has been brought into prominence by the fact that though the equitable is just it is not after the pattern of legal justice since it is not comprised within any law, but is a rectification of legal justice. The reason for this rectifying process is that all law is defined universally. But there are certain kinds of particular circumstances wherein it is not possible for the law to apply according to Right Reason, on account of the law being definite and exact and having regard to a definite and specific end, whereas particulars are indefinite and inexact and change with the changes of circumstances. For instance the law orders that without restriction every foreigner who mounts upon the city walls should be put to death. But in a particular case a foreigner mounted the walls and was conspicuous for his heroism. If then we were to apply the law to a distinguished champion and put him to death, we should act contrary to Right Reason and to Justice. The case is similar in many other instances. The fault does not reside in the law, nor in the lawgiver, but in the very nature of circumstances. Inasmuch as it is impossible to comprehend within one formula all varieties of detail, being as they are indefinite, it takes the general rule as a standard, and legislates with due regard thereto. It was not because the lawgiver ignored the possibility of mistake, that he left the law without further limitations, but because it is impossible for the nature of circumstances to be comprised within the limits of a definition, since circumstances are contingent and variable. The subject-matter of action is vague and undefined, and the complexities which it presents are manifold. Hence it is that lawgivers aim at reaching what happens in the majority of cases. It very rarely occurs that a foreigner mounting the walls in time of war has benefited the State: it is more conceivable that he should ascend the walls to the injury of the State.

Since then it is necessary to know how one ought to keep laws of this character, and when one ought to enforce them and against whom, it behoves us to have a certain frame of mind in virtue whereof we shall be able to correct the errors of a too-rigorous justice. Such a disposition is Equitableness, in virtue whereof the deficiency of law is made good, and the error consequent thereon rectified, and those further qualifications made which the law itself passed by, through not knowing all the circumstances in the way of detail. The equitable man will say that every foreigner who mounts the walls must be put to death, *if he has done so with the purpose of making a conspiracy*, whereas if he has distinguished himself by good service, let him be entitled not only to protection but also to public honours. This is what the lawgiver himself would have said, if at least he had been present; and this is a case for which he would himself have legislated if he had known. In the same spirit the equitable man will make right other laws of the same tendency. Wherefore 'equity' is 'right'—more excellent than a

certain kind of right—not than right in the abstract, but of legal right which is at fault through its universality. This is the very nature of the equitable—a rectification of law so far as it fails and is deficient through its universality. This is the reason also why all things which are rightfully performed are not in accordance with law—laws are universal and are concerned with what takes place only for the most part. Hence the need which arose for special decrees which men engaged in public life adopt to meet the exigencies of special circumstances, which are shifting and uncertain. A rule must be indefinite when the circumstances to which it is applied are indefinite—like the leaden rule used in Lesbian architecture which shifted about so as to accommodate itself to the character of the stone. It is after the same fashion that special decrees change their tone to meet the alternations of circumstances.

It has now been explained what is the equitable and what is equity—*i.e.* that it is 'right:' it has been shown what its relation is to right in the abstract and that it is better than a certain kind of right. It is evident from these distinctions what is the character of the equitable man: he is one whose purpose it is to act justly and fairly and who carries out his purpose: he is one who does not insist upon a too rigorous justice to his neighbour's hurt, but is disposed to concede his own claims, though he has the law to support them. The corresponding frame of mind is Equitableness, which is a species of justice and not a distinct or separate state of mind apart from justice.

xv.—Further solution of questions of casuistry bearing on Justice.

(*a*) CAN A MAN INJURE HIMSELF?

As for the question whether it be conceivable for a man to act unjustly to himself, the answer is clear from the considerations given above. It is clear that a man *cannot* act unjustly to himself.

Discussion of the case of the suicide, who seems to inflict injury to his own self.

It is, indeed, maintained by some that he *can*. 'Certain aspects of justice,' they say, 'are general enactments of law covering the whole field of virtue. The law does not, for example, order a man to slay himself, and whatever the law does not positively order in reference to matters of this kind, it forbids. The suicide therefore acts in defiance of this tacit prohibition of law, and therefore also does wrong.'

'Again,' they say, 'when a man does harm without having any harm to requite, he does a wrong purposely, with full knowledge, that is, of the person wronged and of the object to be gained thereby. But the man who slays himself through passion, does so purposely, in contravention of Right Reason: he therefore does wrong.'

Well, but *whom* does he wrong? Is it not the State, rather than *himself?* He meets his death voluntarily, but no one is wronged voluntarily. It is the State which is wronged, and therefore the State inflicts a penalty: there is a certain infamy attaching to one who has destroyed himself as being a man who injures the State.

The suicide only injures the State.

Moreover, under that view of Justice in which a man is unjust

who simply does an unjust act without being entirely vicious, *i.e.* according to the view of particular Injustice, it is not possible for a man to injure *himself*. (Particular Injustice is of course a distinct thing from Universal Injustice. A man who is unjust in this narrower sense is depraved to a certain extent only, like the coward, not as though he had vicious tendencies fully developed. It is not, I say, possible for a man to injure *himself*, even in this restricted sense of wrong:—(1) otherwise the same thing could be both added to and taken from the same person, which is impossible, for where there are relations of right and wrong, there must necessarily be a number of persons between whom those relations should subsist. (2) Further, while the doing of injury is a voluntary action and proceeds from a settled purpose, so also is it prior in point of time to the suffering of injury: a man does not seem to be doing an injury, if he is requiting in kind an injury which he has received. But if a man could injure his own self, he would be at one and the same moment agent and patient, the victim of a wrong inflicted by himself. (3) Again it would be possible for a man to be injured *voluntarily*. (4) Besides all these considerations there is this: no man does a wrong except under the form of a definite act falling under some definite division of crime affecting other people. If a man commit adultery, it cannot be with his own wife; if a burglary, it cannot be through his own walls; if a theft, it cannot be of his own property. (5) In fine, the theory of a man's injuring his own self is refuted by the terms of the definition which was given, that injury, as such, is constituted by involuntariness on the part of the sufferer.

Reasons given to show that a man cannot injure himself.

We must now treat with greater fulness the subject of 'being injured' and examine whether it be possible on any occasion to be injured intentionally.

Since then Justice and Injustice are either Universal (Justice in that sense being coextensive with perfect virtue as has been shown, and Injustice with perfect vice) or else Particular, it is evident that it is not possible for a man to injure himself either in the way of Universal or of Particular Injustice:—though the opposite opinion is commonly held, on the following grounds. Since the law does not order a man to kill his own self, suicide is contrary to law (inasmuch as the law forbids what it does not positively order); and since also what is contrary to law is unjust, a man who has killed himself is unjust. But when a man commits a wrong, he wrongs someone: it is, therefore, evident that he wrongs himself; and in the case assumed he has acted voluntarily:—he is, therefore, voluntarily wronged. Again, a man who hurts anyone contrary to law and not in the way of requital or returning an injury of his own, but initiating the wrong himself, purposely commits a wrong, since he knows the injury he is doing and the person whom he is injuring and the other circumstances attendant on the action. But the man who has slain himself through anger is neither avenging himself nor is he ignorant of the person affected (*i.e.* himself), and the harm he is doing

and the circumstances of the case. Consequently he commits a wrong, and if he does that wrong purposely, he is wronged of his own accord.

Such, then, are the grounds on which it is thought possible that a man may willingly injure himself in the way of universal injustice (which is the opposite of universal justice *i.e.*, the display of universal virtue)—to slay oneself in anger being opposed to the law which regulates anger. That this view however is untenable, and that it is impossible for a man to injure himself, was proved by the arguments given in a previous chapter: the definition of 'being injured' is opposed to the very conception of the voluntary.

So far, however, as this view maintains that the man who has killed himself voluntarily does a wrong, it is a true view; but so far as it maintains that the suicide wrongs himself, it is an untrue view of the case. The suicide is not wronged in himself since the evil is not contrary to his own wish: it is the city which is wronged since the city thereby loses a general, or a soldier, or a householder, or simply a citizen, and that contrary to its own wish. Consequently, as being injured by his act, the state exacts satisfaction from him, requiting him by such means as are possible for it to do:—it does not permit his body to be buried.

It has thus been demonstrated that in the way of Universal Injustice injury is not voluntarily received. But, again, in the way of Particular Injustice, *i.e.*, Covetousness, how is it possible for a man to injure himself? If to do a wrong in the way of injustice of this kind is nothing else than to gain an advantage over another, the man who injures himself will have 'an advantage over himself:' and if one part of him has an advantage, another part will suffer loss. The same act therefore will be both an adding to and a taking from himself—which is a thing impossible. Justice of this kind involves a relation between two people at the least:—otherwise it would be possible for Justice to be both a taking away and an adding to—a being injured and an injuring at the same moment.

Again, it is necessary that the man who does an injury should inflict the harm before the person injured can retaliate, and should do so voluntarily and of set purpose: a man who retaliates in kind the treatment he has himself received, does not seem to do a wrong. For the same reason a man who injures *himself* must necessarily both inflict an injury and receive an injury, since it is the same person who is both agent and patient, who inflicts the injury and receives it. It necessarily follows that if there be an injury that injury must imply a relation between several persons. It is impossible then that a man should injure his own self. But besides these reasons there is this: the man who does an injury is nothing else than a man who commits some special and defined act of wrong: unless his act can be brought under the category of some moral relation, it is impossible for him to commit a wrong, or indeed to do anything else whatever. Acts of a definite and tangible character are such as theft, outrage, assault, burglary. But no one steals what is his own; no one breaks through the walls of his own house; no one outrages himself; no one assaults himself. In fine, it is proved to be a mistake to say that a man does an injury to his own self or is voluntarily injured,—by the very definition of receiving an injury which is 'to suffer what is unjust contrary to one's own will.'

(*b*) IS IT WORSE TO RECEIVE A WRONG OR TO COMMIT A WRONG?

The doing of injury being associated with an evil disposition is a worse evil to a man than the receiving of injury.

But it is evident that both to do a wrong and to be subject to a wrong are alike evils, the one alternative being to have more, the other less, than what is fair and right. True justice is the 'perfect mean'— a result like healthfulness in relation to medicine or good condition in relation to training. Still it is a worse evil to do a wrong than to suffer one. To

do a wrong is associated with vice and is morally reprehensible, whether vice be consummate and unalloyed or of a form akin thereto (since it is not every voluntary act of wrong that is attended with vice), whereas to receive an injury is free from vice and injustice.

Viewed in itself, therefore, the receiving of an injury is a lesser evil, though through actual association there is nothing to prevent its being the greater evil. But art is not concerned with the accidental: it says, for instance, that pleurisy is a worse evil than a fall, though under special circumstances the fall might prove the more fatal,—for instance, if it chanced that in consequence of his fall a man were captured by the enemy and put to death.

Remarks upon the Platonic Dualism involved in the idea of 'self-injury.'

Again, it is only through association of ideas and by way of analogy that a relation of justice is conceived, not as between a man and his self but between a man and certain parts of himself; but then it is not every kind of justice with which this is compared, but only that which exists between a master and his slaves or household. There is the same relation between them as between the rational and the irrational parts of man's nature. Keeping this distinction therefore in view, it seems that there can be injustice towards a man's own self, because in these separate parts there is a certain capacity for suffering in contradiction to their respective inclination; consequently, as though there were one element governing and the other governed, these parts have a certain kind of justice involved in their relations one with another.

With regard then to Justice and other Moral Virtues the purpose of our inquiry may now be held as concluded.

But it is evident that both the receiving of wrong and the doing of wrong are alike bad since both of them fall outside of the perfect mean: to do wrong is an excess, to receive a wrong a defect, while to fare justly is what is equal and a mean—as much as healthfulness is in medicine and good condition in training. Both then are evils; but the greater evil is to do wrong. To do wrong is a moral evil and is censured as such—an evil either under the form of perfect vice (or universal Injustice) or of particular vice. Again it is either voluntary and attended with deliberate purpose (which is to do wrong in the absolute sense), or else though voluntary not attended with deliberate purpose (which is only akin to wrong doing and is not wrong doing in the perfect sense):—it is not every act of voluntary wrong doing that is hurtful to one's neighbour and 'unjust.' On the other hand to receive an injury is of course an evil, yet it is not morally censurable, since a man is not injured on account of his own depravity or any other fault of his own.

But though the receiving of wrong is, when viewed absolutely, a lesser evil than the doing of wrong, yet through accidental associations there is nothing to hinder its being actually worse, since it has often happened that the receiving of a wrong has been the occasion of worse mischief than the doing of that wrong. For example, a man through being injured may have been so infuriated as to have set fire to the house of his aggressor, and in consequence thereof it has

chanced that the whole city has been set in conflagration. Still, notwithstanding such accidents, the doing of wrong is the worse evil: nothing is made less than itself through mere accidents: pleurisy is not a lesser evil than a fall, though it has happened that in consequence of a fall a particular individual was once upon a time captured by the enemy and put to death.

The just and the unjust, Justice and Injustice are therefore, in the true sense of the term, what they have been described. There is, however, another kind of Justice so-called not in the strict sense of the term but by way of metaphor and similarity with real justice: such is the kind of justice which a man shows towards his own belongings; *e.g.* as a master towards his slave, or as a father towards his son. In this aspect the soul is said to be just or unjust in reference to the various parts of itself: the rational part is distinct from the irrational part—the rational part ruling and ordering, the irrational part being ruled and ordered. It is, of course, with this aspect in view that some consider that a man may act justly or unjustly towards himself:—since at one time the Reason follows the irrational part of the soul, and at another time is in opposition to it as when a man acts contrary to his own inclinations. The various elements in the soul then bear the relation to one another of governing and governed; and there is the same relation of justice between them as between ruler and subject.

Here we must conclude our explanations and discussions about Justice and the rest of the Moral Virtues.

BOOK VI.—EXAMINATION OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES.

INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS.

In the analysis of the active virtues we have assumed that there is a recognised 'ideal' which each of those virtues aim at realizing. Now this ideal is not a merely conventional one, nor is it the standard of individual fancy: it is an ideal determined by Right Reason—an ideal which only they whose minds are perfectly balanced can hope to compass.

But what is 'Right Reason?' If Morality is to rest upon an absolute standard, and that standard is to be the final appeal and guide of life, it is essential that this standard should be fully understood and its nature adequately defined. The subject of 'Reason' is indeed a wide one, and makes it necessary that we should make a review of the whole intellectual nature of man, and show the connection between the various parts of the rational organism.

GENERAL REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY.

It will be convenient to classify the various parts of the soul on the principle laid down at the end of Book I., as 'rational' or 'irrational,' and after subdividing each part to show their mutual connection.

A. Irrational Elements are:—

1. The nutritive part—which is purely physical:

2. The sensitive part (*τὸ αἰσθητικὸν*), which is subsidiary to higher processes in the case of man, the *φαντασίαι* which it creates being embryo forms of Reason:

3. The appetitive part (*τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν*), which, though not itself rational, is assimilative of Reason. In animals desire (*ἐπιθυμία*) is wholly irrational, but in men it is combined with a power of calculation and deliberation (*βούλευσις*), and forms the Will (*προαίρεσις*).

B. Rational Elements are determined by the varieties of subject-matter with which they have to deal:—

1. The scientific part (*τὸ ἐπιστημονικὸν*) is concerned with eternal verities which admit of neither change nor variation.

2. The calculative part (*τὸ λογιστικὸν*) is concerned with 'contingent matter'—things which are within the power of man to modify, or change.

If we accept these conclusions it will be clear what are the steps by which the mind arrives at truth, whether intellectual or moral.

1. Intellectual truth, or 'truth of conception,' is the result of sensation (αἴσθησις), intuition (νοῦς), and scientific conception (ἐπιστήμη), the mutual relations of which will be explained later on.

2. Moral truth, or 'truth of life,' involves an irrational as well as a rational movement of the mind. It is the union of Desire and Right Reason; when the pursuit or avoidance of a thing within the field of Desire is the result of a corresponding process of Right Reason, then a good life is the outcome of the process. Moral falsehood, or failure of life, points to a want of harmony between these processes; as when the Reason is sound but the impulses depraved (ἀκρασια); or to misconceptions in the Reason, as when 'the evil' is mistaken for 'the good' (ἀκολασία). [The term 'Will' (προαίρεσις) is used to express the union of desire and reason, irrespectively of the goodness of the desire or the rightness of the Reason: *i.e.*, the Will may be either virtuous or vicious, since it is simply defined as 'Intuition blending with Impulse,' or as 'Impulse fashioned by Reason.' On the other hand, 'Right Reason' implies not only right conceptions of mind, but also desires and impulses disciplined into conformity therewith: *i.e.*, Will is the spring of actions that may be either good or bad: Right Reason is the spring of none but virtuous actions.]

The faculty, therefore, by which we attain to absolute truth is seen from its function to be distinct from the faculty by which we attain to moral truth, the latter being of a complex character, emotional as well as rational.

We will now examine each one of the Intellectual Virtues by which truth is attained. 1. Concerned with necessary matter are Intuition and Science, which are both combined in Philosophy. 2. Concerned with contingent matter are Practical Wisdom and Art. We will first of all explain the general characteristics of each of these Virtues, and then give a more explicit account of Practical Wisdom, which is the most perfect form that Reason can take in dealing with moral problems and the circumstances of practical life.

1. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SCIENTIFIC MIND.

The subject-matter of Science is 'necessary truth:' what is 'contingent' is variable, with no fixity or permanence. Necessary truth is a knowledge of what is eternal, indestructible, and uncreated. The function of Science is by means of these necessary 'first truths' to demonstrate other truths equally necessary involved therein. The instrument which Science employs is the Syllogism, which from necessary propositions previously known draws a necessary conclusion. These 'necessary propositions' are in some cases apprehended by 'immediate inference' as intuitions of the Reason. But as there is not one Science merely, but many sciences, some being subordinated to others, the conclusions of the higher sciences become the axioms of the subordinate sciences; for instance, the demonstrations of Geometry are the axioms of Optics.

Science may therefore be defined as 'the faculty which enables a man

to demonstrate truths from propositions which involve the conclusion, yet which are in many cases themselves incapable of being demonstrated.'

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ARTISTIC MIND.

Art is the application of Reason to the production of material things. Its sphere is therefore 'contingent matter'—things which depend upon man to construct or not to construct. Practical Wisdom is also concerned with 'contingent matter;' but the end of Practical Wisdom is action, and the end of Art is production. The function of the artistic faculty is (1), to consider how best a particular object may be constructed out of a particular material; (2) how it may receive its most perfect form; and (3) to produce the desired effect. Art seems to have a great affinity to chance; but chance produces its happy effects contrary to expectation, art from deliberate design.

Art involves a rational conception of its own ideal, and both the ideal and its conception must be true; and it leads to production, as cause does to effect. If on the contrary there be an unreal or false conception of an ideal of production, there is an inartistic state of mind, leading to failure in production.

3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MORAL MIND.

The 'Moral Mind,' or the mental attitude denominated 'Practical Wisdom,' may be inferred from concrete instances of it. The general conception we have of a man of 'Practical Wisdom' is, that he is able to estimate aright what concerns his own interests, and that not in a narrow sense, but the interests which concern a good and happy life: he is not merely one who can calculate rightly what is best at particular crises, but one who can determine wisely what befits life as a whole.

The sphere of Practical Wisdom is therefore the same as that of Deliberation—what is good and evil for man, so far as depends upon our own power to modify or effect. Its fear is not coextensive with contingent matter as distinguished from necessary matter, but with that part of contingent matter which falls within human choice, and which is subject to our own control. Pericles and men of his stamp, are very good instances of what men of practical wisdom can effect, and ought to effect, in shaping life according to a national pattern, and using circumstances as instruments of noble ends.

That such is the sphere and function of Practical Wisdom is evidenced by its connection with temperance (*σωφροσύνη*), with which it is etymologically related. Temperance is the perfect attitude of mind in regard to pleasure and pain, and consequently the moral safeguard of Practical Wisdom. Practical Wisdom is a right conception of the 'ends' of life and especially of the great end, the Summum Bonum, the perfection or happiness of man. But this conception is blunted and destroyed by Intemperance or Vice, which gives a corrupted view of man's destiny and work. When pleasure exerts an undue ascendancy over the mind, or when pain is unduly feared, the intuitions of the Moral Sense are all obscured; and a wise deliberation as to the path of duty is impossible.

The good and evil of life is confused together; and happiness is sacrificed to the dearly bought pleasure of a passing satisfaction.

It will be seen, therefore, that Practical Wisdom is 'the Mind controlled by Morality and Reason;' it is the perfection of the Reason, flowing out of a healthy state of the moral consciousness; and like the consciousness it is inseparably associated with the life, admitting neither of forgetfulness nor of 'more and less.' It is a state in which moral and intellectual elements are blended with each other in harmonious perfection, so as to vivify and actuate the whole consciousness.

4. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INTUITIVE MIND.

Intuition is the faculty by which the mind gains a knowledge of those universal truths which are the starting points of demonstrative reasoning. All science depends for the truth of its demonstrations upon certain first truths or universal principles; but these truths are not themselves capable of being demonstrated. It is clear then that there can be no science or demonstration of first principles; nor can they come within the cognisance of Philosophy, since Philosophy uses demonstration upon certain truths; nor under the cognizance of Art or Practical Wisdom, which are concerned with contingent matter. The inference is that these ἀρχαὶ are the subject-matter of νοῦς or an Intuitive Faculty.

5. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PHILOSOPHIC MIND.

The term 'philosophic' is sometimes used in a relative sense, to denote the 'finish' or harmony of proportion which an accomplished artist gives to his work. In this sense philosophy is nothing more than the exactness which distinguishes true art.

In its proper sense, and used absolutely, Philosophy means the finish or perfection of knowledge. The philosopher or metaphysician is one who understands not only the deductions which flow from the various Sciences, but the principles also upon which knowledge quâ knowledge, and truth quâ truth depend. He is one, therefore, who can appreciate the connection of truths, because he knows the causes and first truths of all things.

Philosophy may, therefore, be defined as 'the union of Science with Intuition'—a state of mind in which an intuitive knowledge of first truths is blended with a scientific knowledge of the truths deduced therefrom.

Philosophy is thus distinct from Practical Wisdom as being concerned with the grandest truths. Man is not the highest study in the world; and the wisdom which regulates his interests is not the highest wisdom. The interests of men are shifting and changeful, and form many distinct kinds of wisdom, as Practical Wisdom branches off into Statesmanship, Domestic Economy, Legislation, etc. But Philosophy is one, and deals with the unity of things immutable, eternal and divine. Man indeed is the noblest of creatures, but there are existences grander than man. [These contrasts between Philosophy and Practical Wisdom may be illustrated by the different rôle played by the students of Philosophy, such as was Thales or Heraclitus, and the men of practical wisdom, such as were Pericles and statesmen generally.]

SPECIAL ANALYSIS OF PRACTICAL WISDOM.

Philosophy is thus the perfected Reason of man dealing with matters that are divine and eternal; whereas Practical Reason is the perfected Reason dealing with what concerns human well-being. The function of the one is contemplation; that of the other deliberation. The sphere of the one is necessary matter; the sphere of the other is contingent matter.

Yet Practical Wisdom resembles Philosophy in this respect;—it involves a knowledge of universal truths—of the general principles or 'laws' which govern human society.

The moral character, however, which is perfected by Practical Wisdom, is shown pre-eminently in action; and action is not so much a matter for general laws as for the perception of particulars. The knowledge of particulars seems, therefore, to be more important than the knowledge of universals; it is more important, for instance, to know that 'this is fraudulent,' than that 'whatever is fraudulent is wrong.' But of course a knowledge of the universal truth is implicitly involved in the perception of the particular.

The circle of human interests is a wide one, and the circumstances with which a man has to deal expands with the society to which he belongs. In a rudimentary civilization a man has only the well-being of the family to consider, and his wisdom will consist in the foresight with which he administers his domestic economy. In the complex organism of the State larger interests are involved; the relations between citizen and citizen require a many-sided wisdom for their beneficial adjustment. The power of framing wise laws, of providing for the rival claims of rich and poor, of averting the dangers of international crises, will be variously denominated Legislation, Statesmanship, or Policy; but the mental attitude involved is one and the same in every case, whether the interests of a man's own self be all that is at stake, or whether vital problems of policy or government have to be solved. Practical Wisdom is the capacity for dealing with human affairs in such a way as to produce the grandest results of moral beauty and of social well-being.

The vulgar view of Practical Wisdom is, of course, a much narrower one, namely, that to be practically wise is to be systematically selfish; and that to be practically unwise is to meddle with affairs of the community. Yet surely selfishness cannot succeed if pursued without regard to the condition of the world without. A man cannot isolate himself with impunity from the society in which he lives. Apart from other inconveniences, he cannot gain that common experience of life which would enable him to be as 'selfishly successful' as he would expect, unless he gains that experience which contact with the world alone can give. Mere knowledge will not supply the place of the 'teaching of experience.' The study of life is not like that of Geometry or of Mathematics: a boy may be clever in abstract reasoning, but he cannot distinguish the good and evil involved in the multiplicity of human interests until lengthened observation and variety of incident have matured his judgment.

The man of practical wisdom has therefore a faculty which enables him to understand what ought to be done at each particular moment.

This faculty is to Morals what Intuition is to Science. It is an *immediate* perception of ultimate truths; but the ultimate truths of Science are axioms, while the ultimate truths of Morals are particular facts. The consciousness, however, of the meaning of moral facts is more of a 'sense' than an intuition, though not such a sense as that of hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, or seeing. In this 'Moral Sense' the sensuous impression is blended with an act of reason. It is analogous to that sense by which we feel conscious that, for instance, a triangle is the simplest mathematical figure; though there is less of the 'sensuous imagination' in the moral fact than in the mathematical figure. In fact, the 'Moral Sense' must properly stand in a category by itself. While standing in a kind of antithetical relation to Intuition, in that both involve a knowledge of truths of which no proof is possible, it has also its affinities with Sense and Imagination and Reason.

ANALYSIS OF CERTAIN MENTAL STATES AKIN TO PRACTICAL WISDOM.

i. *Good Counsel.*—This faculty closely resembles Practical Wisdom, and has been properly styled one of its *partes potentiales.*

Before discussing what 'Good Counsel' is, we may see at once what it is *not.* It is not mere 'enquiry,' which has a much wider range than 'Good Counsel,' being equally true of 'Bad Counsel,' of necessary as of contingent matter. It is not 'science:' since a man who deliberates does not *know* (as the man of science must do), but is searching for knowledge. It is not 'clever guessing,' which is devoid of reflection and a thing of the moment. It is not 'acuteness,' which is only another form of guessing. Nor, again, is it 'opinion,' since that is concerned with truth and falsehood, whereas Good Counsel is concerned with 'good' and 'evil,' with what is beneficial or injurious.

The most general idea involved in 'Good Counsel' is that it is 'correctness:' not, of course, the correctness of science or opinion, but the correctness of that movement of mind which is involved in deliberation. Its whole essence lies in the process of inquiry, and its special feature in the rightness of that process.

There are however some further limitations to be observed in reference to it. The bad man in one sense deliberates rightly, and attains thereby to the 'end' which he has set before himself; but his end is a vicious one, and therefore his counsel is bad. Others, again, have virtuous aims, and succeed in realizing those aims, yet do so by unnatural or improper means, and are therefore devoid of good counsel. Others, again, have none of that readiness which should be characteristic of good counsel, but protract their deliberations needlessly and unduly. Others, again, are capable of good counsel upon particular points, yet fail in life as a whole: Good Counsel implies a wise calculation of all that tends to a good and happy life.

ii. *Moral Discrimination* has the same sphere as Practical Wisdom; it is not concerned with matters of Science nor of Opinion, nor is it one of the special Sciences, but it is wholly relative to moral action, so far as moral action comes within the scope of deliberation. But although Moral Discrimination and Practical Wisdom are both concerned with

the same objects, their respective attitudes in reference to those objects are very dissimilar. Practical Wisdom is concerned with action before it is done and with the doing of it; Moral Discrimination is concerned only with action *after* it is done and when complete. Practical Wisdom is imperative, issuing orders and imposing commands which the Will has still to carry out; Moral Discrimination is purely critical, as judging the rightness of conduct after it has been performed. The distinction between them is analogous to that between 'knowing' and 'understanding,' or between 'learning' and 'comprehending.' To 'understand,' or to 'comprehend,' is to exercise knowledge upon certain questions; and so 'moral understanding,' or 'moral discrimination,' is to judge aright of moral questions when they are put before one.

iii. *Charitableness* is the intellectual counterpart of Equitableness: it is 'the right judgment' of the equitable man. It is distinct from 'Practical Wisdom' as equity is distinct from goodness. Consideration, again, is the intellectual counterpart of 'Moral Discrimination,' differing from it in so far as the criticism of the equitable man may be said to differ from the criticism of the good man: it is the sympathetic appreciation which Equity shows in estimating the actions of others.

The attitude of mind involved in all these moral states is essentially the same: the moral faculty is indeed described by different names as it is occupied with different aspects of morality, but the different forms which it seems to take are inseparable the one from the other. The phenomena of morality seem to shift; and as morality is brought into contact with each new phase of circumstance, it seems itself also to assume a new character. If the question is one that concerns a man's own duty, the moral faculty is called 'Practical Wisdom;' if a verdict has to be given in reference to the conduct of others, 'Discrimination' and 'Charitableness' are called into play (charitableness being involved in goodness, and goodness being the indispensable basis of the moral faculty). But moral phenomena are moral *facts;* and these facts require a special faculty to deal with them, whether as isolated experiences or as embodying a general principle. This moral faculty is the 'Moral Sense,' the intuition of right and wrong; it detects the universal in the particular, and the particular in the universal: from the particular intuition of right it mounts up to the universal conception of happiness, and from the universal conception of happiness it deduces the duties of the particular moment. Whether justice or equity, honour or expediency, utility or selfishness are involved, the Moral Sense will lead a man to take the course that is ideally perfect under the given circumstances, regulating his own conduct by the ideal of perfection, and estimating the conduct of others in the same spirit.

This Moral Sense has sometimes been considered as the gift of nature: men speak of 'cutting their wisdom teeth' as though Nature were the cause of wisdom: it is not expected that a man will show considerateness and sympathy and discrimination and moral insight until age has matured his faculties. Morality begins and ends with the intuitio[n] right and wrong: all the demonstrations of moral truths depend this intuition as their first truth: and all moral questions themselves into questions of right or wrong. Old men who hav[e]

long and varied experience, have this power of moral intuition most perfectly developed; and we ought to pay the same deference to their dicta as to formal demonstrations. Experience gives the old a moral eyesight which enables them to see the (ἀρχαὶ) ultimate principles of morality, not merely as formal truths, but as particular facts of life: their 'intuition' of right and wrong is clear-sighted and unfailing.

EXAMINATION OF CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES WHICH HAVE BEEN FELT IN REGARD TO THE THEORIES ADVANCED IN THIS BOOK.

The following objections have been raised to the above conclusions:

1. If happiness consists in action, it has nothing in common with Philosophy, which consists in contemplation (θεωρία).

2. If moral virtue is a formed state of mind, or a permanent attitude of heart and will, it is not the creation of knowledge and consequently has nothing to do with Practical Wisdom. A man is not made healthy by a knowledge of Medicine, nor an athlete by a knowledge of the principles of training; nor is he made virtuous by a knowledge of his duties. What is the use, then, of Practical Wisdom?

3. Practical Wisdom is useless as well to those who are virtuous as to those who are not. Those who *are* virtuous are not more Virtuous from having Practical Wisdom; and those who are not virtuous can get the Wisdom they need by following the advice of others, just as a man follows the advice of his doctor.

4. Philosophy being concerned with grander objects than Practical Wisdom is, ought to have supreme authority; but in the theory of this book Practical Wisdom is made to be paramount, regulating all departments of life.

The following considerations may be advanced in reply to these objections:

1. In answer to the two first objections, it may be said that as Philosophy and Practical Wisdom are respectively the excellences of separate divisions of the soul, they must be valuable in and by themselves, whether they have ulterior advantages or no. A philosophic state of mind is, however, as much conducive to happiness as healthfulness is to health. The essential element in happiness is virtue; and one important element of virtue is philosophy, and a scarcely less important element is practical wisdom, which enables the virtuous intention to realise itself in virtuous action.

2. In further answer to the second objection, and in full answer to the third objection, we must recur to the actual origination of virtue in order to show how dependent virtue is upon Practical Wisdom.

There are two aspects of virtue—the moral act and the moral intention. The moral act may be viewed apart from the intention of the agent, and the intention of the agent may be viewed irrespectively of the character of the act resulting therefrom. A man may perform right acts without being right-minded, and he may be right-minded though his acts are baneful. When then men say that virtue is irrepective of knowledge, or that virtue is a moral state irrespective of

Practical Wisdom, they forget that the moral and intellectual life of men may not be separated in reality, however much they may be isolated for convenience of treatment.

The answer, then, to this objection may be given as follows:

(*a*) *Practical Wisdom implies moral excellence;* otherwise it is mere cunning or acuteness. The mere capacity for taking measures to gain a given object is in itself neither moral nor immoral; but if the aim set before a man be a vicious one, then the capability which a man shows for compassing it is Astuteness, whereas if a man have before him a virtuous ideal and take all the measures necessary for realizing it, then he has Practical Wisdom. In order, therefore, to have practical wisdom, a man must have moral virtue: if he starts from a wrong principle, the conclusion must be wrong, and if he starts from a virtuous principle, the conclusion must be right. But a man cannot have virtuous principles unless his will or disposition be virtuous. Vice or sinfulness distorts the soul, and causes false ideas of right and wrong to come into the ascendant.

It is evident then that Practical Wisdom is involved in the very idea of virtue: it is the successful carrying out of the instincts of the virtuous heart.

(*β*) Moral excellence apart from Practical Wisdom is inchoate and imperfect. There are, indeed, certain characteristics of goodness innate in man; there are certain tendencies which are natural to human nature. But goodness in the true sense is something established and permanent, and not a mere tendency of human nature. Natural virtue by itself is a thing uncertain and unstable; and moral states which are based simply upon these natural instincts, are often harmful and fatal to those who possess them. Children and animals have certain natural excellences, but having no intellectual foresight, their excellences are useless or even dangerous to them.

Natural virtue must, therefore, be distinguished from confirmed virtue. Just as Acuteness was distinguished from Practical Wisdom, so the natural aptitude for goodness must be distinguished from Matured Virtue. Practical Wisdom was shown to be impossible without moral goodness; and Moral Goodness (in the strict sense) is impossible without Practical Wisdom.

[An exaggeration of the importance of the intellectual element in virtue led Socrates to call the virtues 'modes of thought,' or 'intellectual states:' he should have simply defined them as 'states in accordance with Reason.' But it must not be supposed that conformity with Reason as an objective standard is all that is required in virtue: this conformity must be an inner harmony of the moral and intellectual natures. In the mind of the man who is perfectly virtuous, there is a development of Reason in perfect accord with a virtuous disposition of heart and will: such an one is 'a law to himself.']

It follows that as Moral Virtue and Practical Wisdom are inseparably intertwined with each other, there is no essential difference between the various forms of goodness, but there is a unity of virtue: in the single conception of Practical Wisdom all possible forms of Moral Goodness are combined. As for the natural instincts, they may exist in a greater or less degree in different temperaments; but if virtue be looked at in its perfected ideal, every shade of moral beauty is combined in it.

4. In answer to the fourth objection, we may say that it is untrue that Practical Wisdom is paramount over Philosophy. It is true that Practical Wisdom prescribes the conditions that may render Philosophy possible; but it is thereby in a position of subordination rather than of superiority. If Practical Wisdom lays down rules in reference to Philosophy, it is only in the interests of Philosophy, not of itself. When a man has attained to the philosophic state, Practical Wisdom has nothing that it can do for him; but while a man has still to acquire a philosophic mind, Practical Wisdom has rules and monitions which may greatly clear his course and facilitate his attainment of the end in view. Practical Wisdom holds the same relation to Philosophy that Medicine does to health, or Statesmanship to Religion.

TRANSLATION.

I.—ANALYSIS OF THE MENTAL POWERS.

(*a*) EXAMINATION OF RIGHT REASON AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE THEORY OF VIRTUE.

INCIDENTALLY to our definition of Virtue we laid down the principle that it is a man's duty to shape his choice, and to regulate his conduct, by the law of 'the mean' (or 'moral fitness of things'), and to avoid whatever goes beyond, or falls short of, that ideal. We stated further that it is 'Right Reason' which determines on each occasion what that ideal is in action. We have now, therefore, to show what 'Right Reason' itself is.

The moral ideal implies an intellectual standard which requires an explicit explanation.

In the case of the various moral states which have been already described, as indeed in the case of the habits generally, there is, as it were, a mark which a man possessed of 'Right Reason' keeps before his mind's eye, and in accordance therewith at one time heightens and at another time relaxes the tension of his aim; and there is consequently a certain fixed character, or ideal limit, in the various forms of moral virtue, which we may describe therefore as 'states of mind lying midway between excess and defect in conformity with Right Reason.'

Yet this account of the Moral Standard, though true, is vague and inadequate. It is indeed true enough to say that in the practice and cultivation of all things which admit of scientific treatment we ought neither to give our work an extravagant elaboration, nor on the other hand to be unduly negligent about it; still, if a man had only this general principle to guide him, he would not be one whit the wiser: he would not know, for instance, what remedies to adopt in the treatment of the body if he were simply told to apply 'such a method of cure as medical science and the physician skilled therein prescribed.' By analogy in regard to the states of the soul, it is necessary not only that the

principle referred to above should be true, but further that this principle should be distinctly elucidated, and that it should be shown what 'Right Reason' is and what is its definition.

Since in the arguments which we have previously used in discussing the theory of the virtues we assumed the chief point of the whole—that it is 'the mean' and neither the excess nor the defect thereof which in every emotion and in every action is what is praiseworthy and best, and our proper choice; and since we further said that 'the mean' was precisely that course which Right Reason commands, we must go on to explain what Right Reason is and what is its definition.

Now in all the mental states which have been described, as in the case of moral action and disposition generally, there is a kind of mark which a man who possesses Reason and is ruled by it, keeps before his mind, and in accordance with that mark heightens his feelings and invigorates his conduct if they be below what is fitting, or relaxes their tension if they be beyond what is necessary—and so also in any other sphere in which it is possible to raise one's aim beyond, or let it fall short of, the ideal. There is also a kind of rule and limit by means whereof this perfect 'mean' is recognized—as we say that the mean is found to be in conformity with Right Reason, and is midway between excess and defect. It is essential therefore that those who would wish to understand the nature of 'the mean' should understand the rule which measures and limits it:—and this rule and limit is Right Reason.

To say, however, that 'the mean' is what is regulated by the standard of Right Reason, without qualification, though a true, is in no way a clear, statement: 'the mean' is still obscure, except to those who understand also what Right Reason is. It is true enough to say, in regard to conduct of affairs or professions in which scientific treatment is possible,—that one ought not to labour more amply than is fitting, nor yet too insufficiently, but to maintain an ideal mean and the limits which Right Reason prescribes; yet it is impossible for a man by such a simple rule to understand what is really fitting. A man will not know the principles of medicine, nor the laws of health, nor the specific treatment which he ought to apply to an invalid, if he has only been taught that the laws of health and the principles of medicine are precisely such as medical science, and the professor skilled therein, would order him to apply. Such a view is clear enough, but the point of the inquiry is just as uncertain as before.

In precisely the same way in regard to the mean positions which the various attitudes of the soul ought to assume, it is necessary to give not only an account which is true in itself, but one which will guide the inquirer by imparting clear information:—*i.e.* to give a clear definition of 'Right Reason'—what it is, and what is its definition. Let us then proceed to treat of Right Reason, commencing our examination from the first principles of psychology.

(*b*) CLASSIFICATION OF THE POWERS OF THE SOUL.

General 'results' of Psychology.

In classifying the virtues of the soul we showed that they were partly intellectual and partly moral, some of them belonging to the emotional nature, and others to the reason. The moral virtues we have described in the previous Books, and we are now about to treat of the intellectual virtues; but before doing so we must recur to our analysis of the soul.

In the outline of psychology, given at the end of Book I., it was shown that there are two divisions of the soul, the one containing

Reason, and the other void of Reason. Following out the results of that analysis, we may now subdivide the Rational Soul, and assume that it contains two elements—(1) one being that element in virtue of which we have knowledge of those existences the principles whereof it is inconceivable should be varied, (2) the other being that element which is concerned with subject-matter the principles whereof are contingent and variable. [Corresponding of course to things distinct in kind there are, among the divisions of the soul, faculties distinct in kind which are naturally assimilated to the various provinces of existences—if it be true that it is in virtue of a certain adaptation or resemblance that knowledge inheres in each separate part of the soul.]

Of these two elements of the Rational Soul, one may be named the Scientific Faculty; the other the Calculative Faculty. Calculation is clearly distinct from Science, because 'to calculate' is the same thing as 'to deliberate,' and no one deliberates upon things which cannot be altered (and which are the special province of Science). Consequently the power of calculation is a distinct and separate element of that part of the soul which contains Reason. We must therefore try to grasp what is the most perfect condition of these different elements of the Rational Soul. The most perfect condition is of course the excellence or 'virtue' of a thing, and virtue has reference to the performance of some specific function proper to the special object in which it resides.

In the course of our previous discussions, when we made a division of the virtues of the soul, we said that some of those virtues were moral—such, that is, as belonged to the emotional element of the soul, while others were intellectual, such, that is, as belonged to the Reason. Of the Moral Virtues we have already treated in the previous books; we will now proceed to examine the Intellectual Virtues, among which we shall find Right Reason. First of all we must recur to psychology.

In the first Book we showed that there are two divisions of the soul, the one containing Reason, the other void of Reason.

Further subdividing the rational part, we may now affirm that there are two parts which contain Reason—the one by means of which we have knowledge of necessary existences, and of such as keep an unalterable fixity which it is inconceivable should be varied;—the other, that by which we have knowledge of things that are contingent and vary with times and circumstances. [Of course, since things which are knowable differ from one another, and are distinct in kind, it follows that the modes in which they are known should be also different in kind. It is quite inevitable that knowledge should be similar to the object that is known—that the knowledge of necessary matter should be necessary, and the knowledge of contingent matter contingent. Contingent knowledge is that which is not at all times true; and knowledge is falsified when the object known does not keep in the same state as that in which it is comprehended. But for a thing to change from the state in which it was, is a sign of its belonging to things which are contingent and change with the change of circumstances. The knowledge therefore of things which are contingent is itself also contingent. For the very same reasons the knowledge of necessary objects is itself necessary. In fact all knowledge arises in the way of a similarity and relationship; since

there is a certain adaptation and contact between the subject knowing and the object known.]

Since then knowledge is twofold, necessary and contingent, necessary knowledge may be called scientific knowledge, and contingent knowledge calculative or deliberative. To deliberate is the same thing as to calculate, since deliberation is concerned with contingent matter:—no one deliberates in reference to matters which cannot conceivably be altered, since it is inevitable that they should continue the same, and our counsel will neither move nor alter them. Since then the deliberative faculty is concerned with things that are contingent, and we hold the calculative faculty itself also to have the same sphere, the calculative and deliberative faculties will be identical. The deliberative faculty is therefore the other part of the calculative faculty.

But since our enquiry concerns the intellectual virtues:—*i.e.* those which are found in the reasoning mind, and the parts of the rational soul are the scientific and the deliberative, and in these parts we shall have to seek for the intellectual virtues, we must therefore try to grasp what is the most perfect condition of each one of these parts—that being the 'virtue' of each. Since further the virtue of an object must be considered in reference to its own proper functions, we shall have to inquire what are the functions which properly attach to the scientific and deliberative parts of the soul respectively.

(*c*) GENERAL RESULTS OF PSYCHOLOGY.

The powers concerned with moral and intellectual truth.

There are, then, three powers in the soul which determine the nature of moral action and of intellectual truth—Sensation, Reason, and Impulse. Of these powers Sensation is not the cause of any kind of moral action—as is evident from the fact that brute creatures possess the power of sensation, yet have no kind of capacity for moral action.

There are, then, three powers in the soul which determine the nature of moral action and of intellectual truth. The powers which deal with truth are Intellect and Sensation, because each of them is a form of knowledge, and knowledge has truth for its 'end.' The power which governs action is Impulse—in which is involved every movement originating action, and the cause of whatever is done. Intellect or Intuition perceives that such and such a thing ought to be done, and the physical movement which leads to action arises from Impulse. But Sensation is not the cause of any kind of moral action; as is evident from the case of irrational creatures: though they possess the power of sensation they are incapable of possessing moral activity. Moral action is the play of the soul in accordance with a deliberate plan. Hence Sensation is not productive of any kind of moral action; but it is Intellect and Impulse which set in motion every form of the moral life—the Intellect teaching the soul what is its duty, and the Impulse inciting it to the actual performance of that duty.

(*d*) ANALYSIS OF THE PRACTICAL REASON.

Moral Action the result of Impulse and Reason: Intellectual truth the result of Sensation and Reason.

Now in the play of Impulse there takes place either a straining after or a shrinking from an object, precisely analogous to the affirmation or denial which is involved in every exercise of the Reason. Inasmuch, then, as moral virtue is 'a permanent attitude of the Will' and 'Will'

is 'Impulse resulting from deliberation,' it follows that if the Will is to be virtuous, the Reason must deliberate truly and the Impulse must be guided unswervingly:—*i.e.* the Impulse must strain after the same things as the Reason pronounces to be right.

This form of Reason (*which issues in rational conduct*) and this form of truth (*which issues in a consistent life*) is called 'Practical Reason' and 'Practical Truth.'

On the other hand, where Reason is purely speculative and is concerned neither with conduct nor with production, its excellence or failure consists of truth or falsehood in the abstract. Of course the function of the whole of the rational soul is truth; but in the case of that part of the soul which is concerned with action at the same time that it is intellectual, the function is not truth simply but truth exercised harmoniously with right Impulse.

Precisely analogous to the processes of affirmation and denial which take place in the Reason, there is in the play of the Impulse a process of striving after or shrinking from an object before it. Since, then, moral virtue is 'a permanent attitude of the Will,' and 'the Will' is 'Impulse following after deliberation' ('Will' being equivalent to wishing and choosing an object which has been deliberated upon), it inevitably follows that, if the Will is to be good and virtuous, it should make choice only of such things as are good; and that when the Impulse desires what is good, then it is true and right. But it is not possible for the Will to wish for what is good, unless a rational deliberation teach it what *is* good. Hence it is necessary that 'Reason in council' should tell the Impulse what is true, and that the Will should make its choice accordingly:—*i.e.* the Impulse must strive to realize 'the good,' and there must be harmony between the utterances of the Reason which has deliberated, and the objects which the Impulse strives after.

This kind of Reason, *i.e.* the process of calculation and of deliberation, is called 'Practical Reason,' and the truth which is regulated thereby 'Practical Truth,' inasmuch as they have for their 'end' the practice of the good; and their function is the attainment of that 'truth of life' which has been referred to—*i.e.* the truth which is concerned with moral good and evil.

On the other hand, the business of that form of Reason which is speculative and not practical—is truth or falsehood *per se*; and it has for its 'end' the knowledge of what is true in the abstract, truth being in fact the business of everyone who is intellectual, and in the degree of his intellectual power. But a man who is not only intellectual but engaged in active life, has for his work the attainment of that kind of truth which is in harmony with virtuous action and with impulses that are truly and virtuously shaped.

(*e*) RELATION OF PRACTICAL REASON TO THE WILL.

The Will is, therefore, the spring from which moral action issues: it is the Will, that is to say, from which the movement of the limbs (which is the last condition necessary to action) arises: the Will is thus 'the efficient cause' of action (but not

The subjective conditions of which moral action is the outward expres-

sion, are Reason and Impulse combined in the unity of the Will.

the 'final cause'—the presentation of an aim to the mind being antecedent to the exercise of the Will).

The elements, again, out of which the Will takes its rise are—Impulse and Reason presenting to the mind an end to be attained. Apart from these elements, apart, that is, from (1) the intuition of the good and a rational perception of the means of realising it, and (2) an impulse of the moral nature to gain it, no purpose of Will can possibly be formed. No result, in fact, is possible, whether good or bad, in the active life of man without an exercise of Reason and a play of Impulse.

Contrast between Moral Action and Productive Action.

[Reason by itself stirs nothing into activity, but only when it is cognizant of particular ends and applied to moral action. But Reason of this practical kind is, in fact, Reason applied to production or art. Whenever an artist or a craftsman has a work to execute, he has an aim which he seeks to realise: his work is not an 'end' in and by itself, but it has reference to a specific purpose and is for the advantage of a particular person. It is otherwise with *moral* action: virtuous activity is an end absolutely complete in itself, and the Impulse has simply reference to this end.]

The Will may consequently be defined either as 'Intuition exciting an Impulse' or 'Impulse fashioned by Reason'; and, having such a Will, man is the mainspring of his own actions and a free agent.

The Will is, therefore, the source and cause of moral action; but it is not 'the final cause' (since we do not act with a view to the Will), but rather the 'efficient cause:' before we act we form a purpose of acting, and the 'end' is subsequent to the action.

The cause of 'Will,' again, is Impulse and Reason, which is synonymous with Deliberation. This is the second element of the Rational Soul, the calculative or deliberative element which seeks the truth not for its own sake simply, but with a view to the realizing of the good in action. For this reason—because Reason and Impulse are the elements out of which the Will takes its rise, it is not possible that the Will should exist independently of a rational process and a certain attitude of the moral nature. It is owing to the condition of the moral nature that the Impulse takes the direction of the good or of the evil.

But in so far as the Reason is speculative, it is the productive cause of nothing, since it stirs nothing into activity. Only so far as it is 'practical' is it the cause of those results which have been spoken of—Impulse, Will, and Moral Action.

[Moreover this practical Reason is the principle of the productive Reason. The difference between the practical and the productive Reason is this: The practical Reason, being concerned with the practice of the good, has for its 'end' simply the successful realization of the good:—it only looks up to this point, that it may carry out successfully what seems good to the Impulse. The productive Reason on the other hand is the actual and successful realizing of the good, and has for its 'end' human happiness. Again, while 'the end' of the practical Reason is absolute, 'the end' of the productive Reason is relative—having regard,

that is, to the interests of man and seeking a benefit to him. Since, then, the productive Reason has as the *beginning* of its own end that which is the very end of the practical Reason and of which it is the source and cause (*i.e.* the practice of the good)—since, I say, the productive Reason takes its rise in the realization of the good by the practical Reason, and the 'end' of the productive Reason, *i.e.* human happiness, is based on the consummation of the practical Reason, therefore it is that the practical Reason is said to be the cause of the productive Reason.]

Since, then, the Reason is the source from whence Impulse takes its rise, and Impulse the source whence the Will arises, Will may be defined either as 'Intuition guiding the Impulse' or as 'Impulse consequent upon a process of Reason.' These elements are found nowhere but in a rational creature, such as is man.

(*f*) THE PROVINCE OF THE WILL DEFINED.

If a thing has already taken place, it cannot come within the range of Will: no one forms a purpose of sacking Troy, its destruction having been accomplished long ago. When a thing is past, a man does not so much as deliberate about it: he only deliberates upon what is future and upon what is possible for him to achieve; what has already happened cannot conceivably be undone. Hence the truth of Agatho's lines:

The range of the Will is the same as that of Deliberation—things possible and future.

> "This is the one prerogative of which even GOD is deprived—
> To cause to be undone whate'er hath once been done."

It is truth, then, which is the business of both forms of the intellect: and consequently the mental states, in virtue whereof each of the forms of the intellect will attain to truth, will be the excellences of each.

Such, then, is the nature of the Will. But the subjects which form the province of Will (*i.e.* the things which we are able deliberately to resolve upon) are such as are contingent and possible, and, in particular, things which are still future. When things are past and gone, no one deliberates whether he ought to perform them; and when a man does not deliberate upon a thing, neither does he form a purpose of performing them, the sphere of deliberation being the sphere also of purpose (as was explained in the analysis of the Will in the Third Book). No one, for instance, forms the purpose of sacking Troy, that having been done centuries ago. Hence Agatho is justified in saying—

> "This is the one prerogative of which even GOD is deprived—
> To cause to be undone whate'er has once been done."

Such are the general principles which concern the Practical Reason. We have now to treat with greater precision and detail of the functions of the rational soul, as well in abstract science as in practical deliberation.

The function of both forms of intellect is, as has been shown, truth; and the function of each being demonstrated, it is obvious what is their virtue or excellence. The virtue of each thing consists in the function it performs—*i.e.* in carrying out properly and admirably its own peculiar function. The mental states, then, in virtue of which each one of these states will be enabled to attain to its own proper measure and style of truth, as nearly as may possibly be, will be the virtues of each.

II.—DEFINITIONS OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES.

Let us now re-examine in detail the nature of the Intellectual Virtues, taking our start from their simplest conception.

Enumeration of the intellectual virtues.

It may be at once assumed that the mental states in virtue of which the soul is true in whatever it asserts or denies, are five in number—Art, Science, Prudence, Philosophy, Insight. [Impression and Opinion must be excluded, because it is possible to gain misapprehensions through them.]

Let us now treat of the Intellectual Virtues in detail, taking our start from their simplest conception.

Since our inquiry is into the nature of truth, we have to examine in what ways the soul is able to attain the truth in the affirmations or denials which it makes; and how many mental states there are in virtue whereof we enunciate the truth. Well, they are five in number—Art, Science, Prudence, Philosophy, and Insight. [We omit Impression and Opinion as states which enunciate the truth only contingently and not invariably. Of the five faculties above mentioned, neither Insight nor Science are at any time mistaken :—it is their very essence to know the truth of necessity. But Art and Prudence and Philosophy are at times mistaken—not through their own fault, but owing to the anomalies which their subject-matter presents. A mental process is only in error through its own fault when the error is contracted consistently with its own laws. If on the other hand that process be in a sound state in regard to its own proper canons, and the mistake is caused by the varying nature of the phenomena with which it has to deal, then it cannot be called false in itself :—it is the impression or opinion which is at fault, and that is at times wrong in itself even though the objects known remain fixed and unaltered. Hence it is clear that the mental process is not in error through its own fault—any more than if one were to suppose that the Sun is a foot wide, or that the Moon derives its light from its own source : though these existences remain fixed in the position they always bear, the opinion and impression about them is in error.]

The faculties, then, which enunciate truth are five in number, as has been shown. We must now explain what is the nature of each of them. Though they have many points of resemblance one with another (for instance there are many points in common between Art and Science, and between Science and Philosophy, and so with the rest), yet still if we examine accurately into them, they are severally distinct, and the definition of each is distinct from each other.

i.—The Scientific State of Mind.

What the real character of the Scientific State of Mind is will be evident from the following considerations—if we needs must define it with logical precision instead of being guided by its resemblances to other states.

Science is concerned simply with *necessary* matter.

(1.) The idea which we all entertain of the Scientific Mind is this: a thing of which we have scientific knowledge is one which cannot conceivably be altered, whereas things which are capable of being varied baffle us to say whether they continue or no, so soon as they pass out of the range of sight. The object-matter

of Science, therefore,—that is, of things which can be 'scientifically known,'—is that which exists by an immutable law; and hence also it is eternal (since whatever exists of necessity is, in its own right, eternal), and, being eternal, is also uncreated and indestructible.

(2.) Again, every form of the Scientific Mind is capable of demonstrating the truths which it knows, and the object-matter with which the Scientific Mind is concerned is capable of being learnt. But all instruction starts from truths already known, as I have explained in my Analytics. One form of instruction proceeds by immediate inference, and another by means of the syllogism. Immediate inference, or the perception of simple axioms, is the basis upon which the universal rests, while it is the universal upon which the whole syllogism depends. There are, therefore, first truths upon which the syllogism depends, but which cannot themselves be demonstrated by it: they are consequently matter of immediate inference.

Science proceeds from *necessary* premisses to a *necessary* conclusion.

(3.) The Scientific Mind is, therefore, 'the mental attitude which enables a man to prove truths to demonstration' (with such further qualifications as I define in my Analytics). When a man has, in a kind of way, an inner conviction, and the primary truths upon which that conviction rests are known to him, he then has scientific knowledge; whereas if the primary truths are not better known to him than the conclusion deduced therefrom, he will not possess the scientific mind except through the chance of an accidental association.

Definition of Science.

The definition of the Scientific Mind may therefore stand as I have laid it down.

1. Now the Scientific Mind is a knowledge of necessary truths. The subjects of which we say that we have scientific knowledge are those which it is inconceivable should be altered, and the truth of which, on account of their immutable nature, is rootedly fixed in our minds. Truth which is concerned with contingent matter is not thus rooted in us:—after we have obtained knowledge of it, it is liable to alter, and ofttimes it ceases to be without our being conscious of the change, so that not even the definition and truth of it remain fixed, but are altered with the change of circumstance. On the other hand, a subject of which the knowledge is firm and fixed in our mind, is a subject which is necessary and at all times immutable. Such subjects are those which are eternal. It is necessary, therefore, that the subject-matter of the Scientific Mind should be eternal; and the Scientific Mind itself a knowledge of things eternal.

2. Again, every form of the Scientific Mind is capable of demonstrating the truths it knows, and the subject-matter with which it is concerned is capable of being learnt. But all instruction and learning proceed from knowledge already held (as I have shown in my Analytics). There are, therefore, primary truths upon which all Science rests. Now the primary truths upon which some of the Sciences rest, are immediate and incapable of demonstration, being proved by

intuitive inference:—such are the primary truths of geometry. The truths, again, from which other Sciences start, are demonstrable truths, which are proved by syllogism, as falling under some other science more elevated than themselves: such is the science of Optics, which use the demonstrations of geometry as its axioms. Immediate inference, therefore, is, as it were, a basis or first truth for those first truths or axioms which cannot be demonstrated—truths which, though universal, are apprehended from particular instances. But the syllogism which proves the demonstrated first truths of certain sciences has for its own axioms, or first truths, certain universal and undemonstrable conceptions. There are, therefore, principles, or first truths, of science—certain universal and common conceptions, which being posited or assumed we draw inferences therefrom; which conceptions are not proved by a syllogism but by immediate inference. From the science thus founded other science is proved and said to be subordinated to it. Hence it is that all science is proved from ultimate first truths which carry their own evidence with them.

3. The Scientific Mind is, therefore, a faculty which enables a man to demonstrate truths from absolute truths (and in virtue of their being absolute), and such as are primary and involve the reason of the conclusion, and so make their demonstration final and absolute (as we have explained in the Analytics). When a man is convinced of certain hypotheses, and the truths upon which a matter rests are *known* to him, then only is it possible for him to have scientific knowledge of that matter. If a man does not know the principles of a thing, and the premisses are not more obvious to him than the conclusion, he possesses scientific knowledge only through accidental association: such an one has not knowledge in his own right, and in virtue of the knowledge of the first truths inherent in him, but perchance only through having heard of them from other men. If he had known the conclusion in this way, by means of the first truths, he would have known the first truths better than the conclusion; since a thing by means of which another thing is known, is itself better known than the thing it proves.

The above definition must suffice as an explanation of the Scientific Mind.

ii.—The Artistic State of Mind.

The artistic faculty distinguished from the prudential faculty, though both are concerned with contingent matter.

But in subject-matter, which is 'contingent,' there is one part concerned with production, forming the province of Art, and another part concerned with action, forming the province of Morals. [For the validity of this distinction I must rely upon the arguments of my Public Lectures.] Hence also 'the mental state which leads to *action* guided by Reason' is a distinct thing from 'the mental state which leads to production guided by Reason': they are not, therefore, involved the one in the other, since action is not production, nor is production action. Since, for example, Architecture is a form of Art, and is defined as 'a certain faculty leading to production upon a rational plan,' and there is no kind of art but what is such 'a mental state leading to production upon a rational plan,' nor any such mental state but what is an art, it follows that the Artistic Mind is the same thing as 'a mental capacity capable of production in conformity with a true standard of Reason.'

Now every form of Art is concerned with the creation of objects,

or with the designing of objects, or with the investigation of means whereby some result may be obtained, in the sphere of contingent matter, where the efficient cause rests with the designer, and not with the thing designed. Art has nothing to do with things which exist, or which come into existence, by a necessary law, nor with things which exist by the order of Nature; since all such things have their cause inherent in themselves. Since, then, production is distinct from action, Art must necessarily be concerned with production and not with action; and in a kind of fashion Art has the same field as Chance, just as Agatho says:

"Art has wooed Chance, and Chance has wooed Art."

Definition of Art.

The Artistic Mind, therefore, is a mental faculty which leads to production in conformity with a true and rational plan; while the Inartistic Mind, on the other hand, is the state of mind which leads to production upon a false and irrational plan: each of them being in the sphere of *contingent* matter.

We must now treat of the Artistic Mind. Now things which are contingent, and which change with changes of circumstance, are either objects of production or of moral action. The objects of production are those which form the sphere of Art, and objects of action are those which form the sphere of Morals. But since production is distinct from action, the mental state which leads to *action* in conformity with reason will be distinct from the mental state which leads to *production* in conformity with reason. Yet they are not distinct in such a sense as to be included the one in the other as a whole and its parts, but as horse and ox are. Moral action cannot be brought under the notion of production, being distinct therefrom, nor for the same reason can production be brought under the notion of moral action. This truth is evident also from their respective definitions: the definition of moral action is one thing, the definition of production another. The Artistic Mind (or 'the intellectual condition of perfect production') is 'the mental faculty which leads to *production* in conformity with Reason,' as, for instance, the artistic attitude of the architect. The Moral Mind, on the other hand, or 'Practical Wisdom,' is 'the mental condition which leads to *action* in conformity with Reason' (as will be explained later on). The Artistic Mind is, therefore, distinct on the one hand from the Scientific Mind in being concerned with contingent matter, and on the other hand from 'Practical Wisdom,' in being occupied with production and not with moral action. Every Art is a mental faculty concerned with production after a sound standard of Reason, and whatever faculty is of that kind is an Art; the two ideas being convertible.

The object with which every Art is concerned is the creation of things which are possible to be created or not created; for example, the Art of housebuilding is concerned with the construction of a house, and the Art of shipbuilding with the construction of a ship—things which may as conceivably be not created as created. However, it is not concerned with *all* things that are contingent and possible, but only with those the cause of whose existence depends on the designer, not on the thing designed. For instance, Art is not concerned with physical phenomena: since the cause of the creation of things which depend upon a law of Nature is inherent in themselves, and though they conceivably might not be,

yet are they not subjects for Art: they have not the cause of their existence external to themselves, as a house has the builder or a ship the shipwright.

Art has almost the same sphere as Chance. Chance in fact is found only in circumstances the cause of whose existence is external to themselves. If the accidents of Fortune had the causes of their existence inherent in themselves, they would not have been thought wonderful. But in fact they are marvelled at for this very reason—that their cause is not only external, but derived from a source which no one would have anticipated. Digging has ofttimes been found to be the cause of being wealthy: in digging a trench for a foundation a man has often discovered a treasure. Such a discovery is contrary to expectation, because digging is not in itself a cause of being rich:—otherwise all those who dig would have been wealthy. Such a discovery is, therefore, by way of accident. Accidental causes are such that the things of which they are the causes were not expected to take place. A man only expects those things to occur in regard to any matter which are comprehended in the definition of that matter, whether potentially or actually; and things which happen in the way of accident are not of this character. Art and Chance are therefore in a certain sense concerned with the same circumstances: I say '*in a certain sense*,' because they are both concerned with contingent matter and things which are variable and changeful, and the cause which produces them is not an absolute cause, but arises in the way of accident, whereas Art is absolutely the cause of the things which are produced thereby.

The Artistic Mind is therefore, as has been explained, 'a mental faculty concerned with production in harmony with a *true* standard of Reason' in the sphere of contingent matter, and the cause whereof rests with the Artist. On the other hand, the Inartistic State of Mind is 'a mental habit concerned with production in accordance with a *false* standard of Reason' in the sphere of contingent matter.

iii.—The Wisdom of Practical Life.

(*a*) VIEW OF CONCRETE INSTANCES OF PRACTICAL WISDOM.

General conception of Practical Wisdom as a right estimate of the interests of life.

We shall best grasp the scope of 'practical wisdom' if we first enquire what is the character of those whom we commonly call 'practically wise.' It is undoubtedly thought to be a characteristic of such an one that he has the power of making a wise determination in matters that concern his own personal good, or that are expedient for him; and that not merely in special details, as for instance in what conduces to health and strength, but in matters of a nature to affect a good and happy life. This view of 'practical wisdom' (as a 'right estimate of the best interests of life') is further supported by the fact that we apply the term 'practically wise' in a limited sense whensoever men calculate wisely in regard to some good end, under circumstances which do not fall under a specific art: the inference being that the man who deliberates rightly in regard to the *whole* of life will be pre-eminently the man of practical wisdom.

We will now treat of 'Practical Wisdom;' and our view of it will be rendered clearer if we first consider what is the character of those whom we commonly

call 'practically wise.' It is assuredly considered that the man who is practically wise is one who is able to decide rightly in reference to what is good and expedient for him, having under review not merely isolated and special blessings, such as health and strength and such like, or of what tends thereto, but in the widest sense the happy life or whatever contributes to happiness as 'the end' and perfection of man. That this view is true is obvious. We apply the term 'practically wise,' to those who regulate their personal conduct by reference to some good end, and wisely decide matters which concern their own interests: and carry into effect such measures whereby they may be enabled to attain to a virtuous end. Consequently a man who deliberates in regard to life as a whole will be pre-eminently a man of practical wisdom.

(*b*) THE SPHERE OF PRACTICAL WISDOM DEFINED.

The scope of Practical Wisdom distinguished both from that of Science and of Art.

Yet no one deliberates upon matters which are incapable of being reversed, nor yet upon matters which, though conceivably possible *per se*, are not within *our own* compass to achieve. Since, therefore, Science involves demonstration, and demonstration is impossible in subjects where the first truths admit of variation (*i.e.* all the truths of science deduced therefrom could in that case be reversed), and since on the other hand deliberation is impossible, except in subjects which are contingent and variable, it follows that Practical Wisdom cannot be identical with Scientific Wisdom, the subject-matter of action being capable of being reversed; nor, again, can it be identical with Artistic Wisdom, because the whole conception of *art* is distinct from that of *action*.

The notion, therefore, left to us of Practical Wisdom is that it is 'a true and normal condition of mind tending to conduct in harmony with Reason, the sphere of its exercise being what is good or evil for man.' [(*It is thus distinct also from all forms of artistic production.*) For in all production the 'end' is distinct from the mental operation which produces it; but in action the 'end' is identical with the act, moral well-being or a 'good and happy life' being an end in itself.] The sphere of Practical Wisdom being thus what is good or evil for man, we consider that those who possess it are such men as Pericles and others of his stamp, since they have the power of understanding what is good for their own selves and for their fellows, and for the same reason we rank practical administrators and politicians in the same class.

But if the man of practical wisdom is one who deliberates rightly, the sphere in which he shows his wisdom is that of contingent matter: no one deliberates upon matters which have a fixed law of their own, and which are incapable of being reversed. Furthermore, even in the field of contingent matter, no one deliberates upon matters which, though possible, are not within our own power to effect: we never deliberate except upon matters which are capable of being effected by our own means. It is clear, therefore, from these considerations, that Practical Wisdom is distinct and separate not only from Art, as has been shown

but also from Science, Science having for its sphere necessary truths, Practical Wisdom such as are variable and contingent.

Practical Wisdom is, therefore, 'a true and normal condition of mind leading to action in harmony with Reason, in the sphere of what is good or evil for man.' [It differs from Art, as has been explained, because a moral action is a different thing from a production of Art: in the case of production there is an end distinct and separate from itself; *e.g.* the art of the shipwright is one thing, and the ship is distinct therefrom. But in the case of moral action there is no end distinct from the activity itself, under any circumstances: at times the action itself is the end of itself—when it be well and properly performed; the end of horsemanship, for instance, is to ride well and properly.] Practical Wisdom is, therefore, a state of mind which has reference to the good and evil of man; and hence it is that we regard Pericles and men of his stamp as 'practically wise,' because they were able to comprehend what was good for themselves and their fellows; and in the same class we rank practical administrators and statesmen.

(*c*) RELATION BETWEEN PRACTICAL WISDOM AND TEMPERANCE.

Practical Wisdom not merely intellectual, but involves certain *moral* characteristics, as is seen from its connection with Temperance.

Hence the origin of the word by which we speak of Temperance as 'the virtue which preserves that Moral Sense which Practical Wisdom implies:' that is to say, Temperance preserves a true instinct or perception about moral subjects. This is seen from the case of its opposite, Intemperance: the undue pursuit of pleasure and the undue avoidance of pain do not destroy nor corrupt every idea of the mind, but only such ideas as bear upon action and conduct; for instance, they do not destroy the idea of the mind upon such a question as whether the angles of a triangle are or are not equal to two right angles, but they do destroy the ideas of right and wrong. The principles which should regulate conduct are the truths which concern the 'final cause' or true perfection of man. But when the character is enervated through pleasure or pain, the perception of the Moral Law or Final Cause of life is instantly obscured: a man no longer sees that he is bound to conform his every choice, and regulate his every action, by reference to this higher law, vice being of a nature to destroy the sense of obligation and the intuitions of morality.

The definition of Practical Wisdom is, therefore, necessarily fixed as 'a true and normal condition of mind, permanently formed and in accord with Reason, manifesting itself in right action in the sphere of human interests.'

This view of Practical Wisdom may be illustrated by its connection with the word Temperance. The temperate man, in guarding his own proper good, is said to preserve his Moral Sense. In Greek we call Temperance σωφροσύνη, as being the virtue which *preserves* that Moral Sense which Practical Wisdom involves. The intemperate man does not by his dissolute pleasures destroy any other form of knowledge except only this knowledge of right and wrong. He does not ruin his scientific nor his artistic perceptions, nor any other of the forms

of Wisdom which have been enumerated. Pleasure does not prevent a man from knowing that a triangle has its angles equal to two right angles—which it is the part of the scientific faculty to demonstrate; nor from knowing how he ought to build his house or do anything else which falls within the province of art. But pleasure does pervert the character of the moral act which comes within the sphere of the Moral Sense. The first principles and causes of moral actions are 'the ends' for the sake of which those actions are done; and the end in every action is 'the good' of the man who acts consistently therewith; and if a man be in ignorance of this 'end,' the action which he performs is distorted; and such an ignorance is brought about whenever a man, corrupted by pleasure, or enervated by pain or by some other strong emotion, fancies that pleasure is the Summum Bonum, and considers that the end which is consistent therewith is his true end, and regulates all his actions in conformity therewith. In this way it is that a man vitiates his own proper good—the good that is his true end and the fitting principle of all his actions, vice being of a nature to destroy the true principle of conduct. For this reason it is that as the dissolute man loses the intuition of the moral law, the man who preserves that intuition is called temperate. Hence it necessarily follows that Practical Wisdom is a true and normal condition of mind, pemanently fixed and in harmony with Reason, leading to right action in the sphere of human interests.'

(*d*) FURTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF PRACTICAL WISDOM.

Practical Wisdom is an absolute state of moral excellence:—it is the perfection of the opinionative part of the soul, and it is inseparably associated with the consciousness of the agent.

Again, there are degrees of excellence in Art, but not in Practical Wisdom; and in art a man who blunders voluntarily is to be preferred to one whose mistakes are involuntary, whereas the reverse is true of Practical Wisdom, as indeed of all the moral virtues. It is clear then that Practical Wisdom is the excellence of the moral nature, and not an artistic faculty.

Now as there are two divisions of the soul which contain Reason, Practical Wisdom will be the excellence of one of them—the 'opinionative' division, Opinion and Practical Wisdom being both concerned with contingent matter. Furthermore it is not merely a mental state in harmony with Reason: it must be *incessantly* manifested in action; the proof being that forgetfulness is compatible with a purely mental state, but not with Practical Wisdom as the law of daily life.

It is clear, then, from these considerations that Practical Wisdom is a thing separate and distinct from Science and from Art and from the other forms of knowledge.

But, apart from these reasons, there is this: Art admits of degrees of goodness and of badness, it being possible for a man to be a good workman or a bad one; but in the case of Practical Wisdom, goodness or badness is inapplicable. It is impossible for a man of practical wisdom to be a bad man: Practical Wisdom is itself a virtue, and there cannot be degrees in virtue any more than there can be an 'ideal of an ideal.' Again, a man who errs voluntarily in the exercise of his art, is better than the man who errs involuntarily, so far, that is, as he is an artist. This is not the case with Practical Wisdom, but the very opposite: a man who voluntarily destroys his moral sense is worse than the man who loses that Moral Sense against his will.

It is evident, then, that Practical Wisdom is a virtue and not an art. It is the virtue of the opinionative part of the soul. There being two parts of the soul which contain reason, the intellectual, and the opinionative or deliberative, the second is concerned with contingent matter, which forms the sphere of Practical Wisdom.

Now Practical Wisdom is not merely 'a true and normal state of mind, in harmony with Reason' (which is the definition so far of Art also, when the artist is not executing objects of art: *i.e.* there is nothing to prevent a man being an artist though he execute no work of art, and his art being 'a true and normal state of mind in harmony with Reason'). But it is absolutely necessary for Practical Wisdom to be incessantly manifested in *action*. The subject-matter and the material are not always available to the artist; but the subject-matter of Practical Wisdom never fails the man who possesses that wisdom. The emotions of the soul, and the activities of the man, the various modes of intercourse between man and man, and the relations generally which form a sphere for every virtue and for Practical Wisdom, these, surely, it is impossible should be outside the frontier of human life. Hence it is that, though there may be a forgetfulness of Art, there cannot possibly be of Practical Wisdom.

For the present this account of Practical Wisdom may suffice.

iv.—The Intuitive State of Mind.

Before scientific demonstration can be made, certain universal truths must be known; and the faculty by which these ἀρχαί are known is νοῦς —the power of immediate intuition.

Now, since the Scientific Mind is one which has an apprehension of universals and things which exist by an unalterable law, and since, further, in all subjects which admit of demonstration and in all science there are 'first principles' involved (all science and all application of science involving the definition or cause of its own laws), of the first cause or principle upon which the matter of science itself depends there can be no science nor scientific demonstration;—nor, again, can there be any artistic or moral perception. The reason is this: on the one hand the subject-matter of science is capable of scientific demonstration, and on the other hand both art and practical wisdom are concerned with matter capable of being varied. Nor assuredly is Philosophy concerned with these first principles, since there are certain points upon which the philosopher can employ demonstration.

Consequently, if the faculties by means of which we attain to truth and are never deceived, as well in regard to matters that are irreversibly fixed as in regard to those which are contingent, are Science and Wisdom, Philosophy and Intuition, and the knowledge of first principles cannot possibly belong to the first three of these (*i.e.* Wisdom, Science and Philosophy), the only alternative left is that it belongs to Intuition.

At this point we must treat of Intuition, and examine with what class of the knowable it is concerned. Now since Science is a knowledge of universal truths which have a necessary existence, involving a definition of first truths and a

demonstration from them, and demonstration again involves first principles which must be assumed before the demonstration can be made by the man of science, we must examine to which of the forms of knowledge which have been mentioned it belongs to know these first principles—Science, or Art, or Wisdom, or Philosophy, or Intuition. It cannot possibly belong to Science, since Science is demonstrative while these first truths are undemonstrable. Nor can it belong either to Wisdom or to Art, both of which are concerned with the contingent while these first truths are concerned with the absolute. Nor, again, is it the business of Philosophy to know these first truths, since it is the business of philosophy to know certain things as demonstrated, whereas these first truths are immediate.

The remaining alternative is that it is Intuition which is the knowledge of these first truths, and Intuition is that by virtue of which we have knowledge of the first principles of Science.

v.—The Philosophic State of Mind.

(*a*) THE 'PHILOSOPHY' OF THE ARTS.

Now we assign the attribute 'finished,' or 'philosophic,' in a narrow sense, to artists who display in the various arts the greatest exactness of workmanship. For example, we call Pheidias an accomplished, or 'philosophic,' sculptor, and Polycleitus an accomplished, or 'philosophic,' statuary, implying, however, nothing more in such cases than that their accomplished, or philosophic, insight is the perfection of their art.

'Philosophy' sometimes used in a narrow sense as equivalent to 'the perfection of art.'

The term 'philosophy' is used in a double sense. There is one form of philosophy which is special, and another form which is universal. Philosophy of the narrower kind is the perfection of an art, in reference whereto we speak of an artist as being 'accomplished,' or 'philosophic,' in the execution of his art. For example, we call Pheidias an accomplished, or 'philosophic,' sculptor, because he is a finished workman in his craft; and for the same reason we call Polycleitus an accomplished, or 'philosophic,' statuary.

(*b*) THE PHILOSOPHIC MIND IS THE ABSOLUTE SENSE.

There are, however, those whom we consider 'philosophic' not merely in some special relation nor in a particular sense, but absolutely, as Homer says in the Margites :—

But the proper sense of Philosophy is 'the perfection of knowledge.'

> "Him the Gods neither miner nor ploughman made,
> Nor skilled merely in some one thing."

It is clear, then, that Philosophy will be the most finished and exact of all the forms of reason. The man, therefore, who would possess this philosophy in the absolute sense must not merely know what flows from the principles of Science, but must also have a true perception of the principles themselves.

Philosophy, therefore, in the absolute sense may be defin

'the union of the intuitive and scientific mind,' being, as it were, 'a scientific perception of the most important truths, holding to the particular sciences the relation which a head holds to a living body.'

Philosophy, in the universal sense, is that state of mind in virtue whereof we speak of men as philosophic absolutely, and not in a merely special sense, nor as possessing some particular accomplishment; as Homer says in his Margites:—

> "Him neither miner nor ploughman the Gods had made,
> Nor accomplished merely in some one thing."

Hence it is clear that Philosophy will be the most exact of all the forms of rational knowledge, whether one speak of it in the special or in the universal sense: on the one hand, special Philosophy is this very thing—an exact precision of mind whether scientific or artistic, and on the other hand, universal Philosophy, from the very fact of its being universal, is more exact than the other forms of knowledge, inasmuch as it is more definite and comprehensive.

Since therefore Philosophy is *per se* a thing absolute and universal, it is necessary that the man who is philosophic, in this absolute sense of Philosophy, should not merely know a part of things knowable and be ignorant of others: the true philosopher will know not merely the truths that can be demonstrated, but also the first principles from which those demonstrations start, and will render such an account of them as they admit of. Consequently Philosophy will be 'the union of the intuitive and scientific mind;' and thus it will be the most revered form of science, containing as it were the first principles of itself as the brain and life of the truths which flow therefrom. In the definition of the Scientific Mind are comprised both the truths of demonstrative science and the principles from which they are demonstrated. In the case of the subordinate sciences this is not the case: in the definition of the special sciences a knowledge of their own principles is not included, but simply a knowledge of truths demonstrated from principles assumed.

(*c*) THE PHILOSOPHIC MIND DISTINGUISHED FROM PRACTICAL WISDOM.

Pre-eminence of Philosophy as being concerned with the highest verities.

Philosophy, therefore, being concerned with the most important and transcendental truths, is quite a different attitude of mind from that of Practical Wisdom. It is obviously absurd to suppose that the grandest and most important exercise of reason is that which deals with *human* well-being—unless it be true that man is the highest of all existences in the universe.

The immutability of Philosophy contrasted with the shifting nature of human interests.

Here is another reason why Philosophy and Practical Wisdom cannot be identical. Assuming it to be true that what is healthful and good varies in the case of men and of fishes, whereas what is white and straight is so always and invariably, all men will admit that a truth of philosophy is always the same, whereas a truth of practical life varies with circumstances. In fact, one would say that it was a sign of practical wisdom to perceive accurately what concerns one's own self; and

one would entrust practical interests to a man who had that wisdom. [For this reason it is that certain *animals* are said to be 'practically wise'—such as are seen to possess a power of foresight in providing their own means of life.] It is clear, then, that Philosophy is not identical with the Science of human interests. If it were true to say that Philosophy is the science which is concerned with what is beneficial for one's self, there must be many forms of Philosophy: there is no one Science that treats of the good of all living creatures, but there are separate sciences bearing upon each class—unless one were to say that there is one form of medical treatment which is applicable to all existences.

If, again, the plea were urged that 'man is the noblest of all living creatures' (*and that, therefore, the philosophy of human life is the highest philosophy*), such a plea does not affect our argument. Though man is the noblest of creatures, there are other existences far more divine in their nature than man: as, of course, most obviously, the elements out of which the universe is composed.

Philosophy is as high above Practical Wisdom as the Universe is high above man.

From the arguments here adduced it must be evident that Philosophy is the 'union of the scientific and intuitive faculties,' and has for its province those existences which are most important in their nature.

[In illustration of this distinction between Philosophy and Practical Wisdom is the fact that men give the title of 'philosopher' to such men as Thales and Anaxagoras and others of the same class, but refuse to call them men of practical wisdom, since they are seen to ignore what is for their own practical interest: men say of them that they have a knowledge of things extraordinary, and wonderful, and abstruse, and transcendental, but that their knowledge is useless, since they do not seek for the knowledge of those good things that are proper to man.]

Contrast between Philosophers and men of the world.

But Philosophy is distinct from Practical Wisdom in that, while Practical Wisdom is concerned only with social well-being, Philosophy is the most important of all sciences whatsoever. The most important science is that which is found to be exercised on the most important subjects; and Practical Wisdom is not of that nature, being concerned with human interests only—but man and his interests are not the highest range of thought.

Again, it is a sign of practical wisdom in a creature to be capable of finding its own 'good.' But there is not the same 'good' to all alike: what is healthful and beneficial is not the same in all cases. Practical Wisdom is, therefore, not the same thing among all men; but the subject-matter of Philosophy is unalterably the same everywhere. It is what is demonstrable that is matter for Philosophy; *e.g.* that the angles of a triangle are together equal to two right

angles, is a matter which can be demonstrated, and the same truth can be demonstrated everywhere alike—just as the same thing is straight and the same thing white among all men. But it is the sign of practical wisdom, not only among men but among living creatures generally, that they examine and carry out each his own individual good; hence we call certain wild beasts specially wise and cunning—such as are seen to possess a power of foresight in reference to their own lives. It is clear, therefore, that Philosophy cannot be identical with Practical Wisdom. If one were to hold that Philosophy is concerned with achieving our own individual interests, there would be many forms of Philosophy, corresponding with the variety of interests; just as there is no one form of Medicine applicable to all creatures alike, since the conditions of health and disease differ with the different species.

If, again, one were to hold that the Science of human well-being, or Practical Wisdom, is, like Philosophy, the most serious and important in the world, inasmuch as man is the noblest and best of all living creatures, such a plea does not affect the argument: there are existences more divine by far than man in their nature, as, for instance, the elements which unmistakeably compose the universe —I mean the elements out of which the Cosmos was formed.

From the considerations above given it is clear that Philosophy is the union of Intuition and Science, and is concerned with those objects which are most revered in their nature—which are necessary existences admitting of neither change nor decay.

[Hence it is that we speak of Anaxagoras, and Thales, and men of that class, as 'philosophers,' but in no sense as men of practical wisdom, inasmuch as they were ignorant of what was beneficial for them, and of what was useful for the purposes of life, though they had knowledge of truths that were abstruse, marvellous, subtle, and strange:—and these latter truths form the field of thought with which Philosophy is concerned.]

III.—SPECIAL ANALYSIS OF PRACTICAL WISDOM.

(*a*) PRACTICAL WISDOM INVOLVES DELIBERATION.

Practical Wisdom involves all the elements of deliberation; but the 'end' which it seeks to realise is the end of perfect virtue.

Now the sphere of Practical Wisdom is the sphere of human interests and of whatever comes within the scope of deliberation. It is pre-eminently the business, we say, of the man of practical wisdom to deliberate wisely, yet no one deliberates upon matters which cannot possibly be altered, nor upon matters which do not involve a definite 'end,' and that end, moreover, 'a good' to be attained by action. The man who deliberates wisely, in the perfect sense of the term, is one who has the faculty of hitting the mark of what is best for man in actual life, so far as depends upon rational calculation.

But the sphere of Practical Wisdom is the sphere of human interests and of whatever comes within the scope of deliberation. It is pre-eminently the business, we say, of the man of practical wisdom to deliberate wisely; yet no one deliberates upon necessary truths, nor upon matters which are incapable of being altered: nor upon matters which have not for their 'end' the good of man to be realised in action. Philosophy on the other hand has for its 'end' truth

in the universal and absolute sense, and for its subject-matter that which can be absolutely demonstrated, and for its principles, the truths upon which all scientific reasoning depends.

(*b*) PRACTICAL WISDOM IN (1) PRINCIPLE AND (2) PRACTICE.

Practical Wisdom is not merely a knowledge of general principles: a man must know also the bearing of particular circumstances. Practical Wisdom is concerned with action, and the sphere of action is the actual conditions of the moment. Hence there are men who, without being versed in principles, are more competent in action than others who are versed in them: and such pre-eminently are those whom we call 'men of experience.' To take an illustration: if a man knows only the general principle that 'light food is easily digested and wholesome,' but is ignorant what particular food *is* light, he will not gain health, for all his knowledge; whereas the man who knows the particular fact that the flesh of birds is light and wholesome, will secure health more readily for his knowledge.

Practical Wisdom implies a knowledge of the universal as well as of the particular; but the particular is the more essential to it.

But Practical Wisdom is a faculty to be exercised in daily life, and in the details of conduct; so that we ought to have both its forms, or at any rate the form that will guide us to a right perception of details even more than the other. Yet in action too, there is a form of Wisdom that is sovereign and which gives the law to its special applications.

Further, Practical Wisdom is concerned with questions of detail. The man who is practically wise, not only knows as an abstract principle what are the things which are good for man, but he knows also of necessity the particular applications of that principle—*i.e.* what things they are which a particular man ought to do at a particular crisis. Practical Wisdom is concerned with action, and action is concerned with particular circumstances. It is for this reason that those who know only particular facts are more competent in action than those who know the universal principle. It is in fact generally the case that in all matters men of experience are better able to act than those who have knowledge of universal truths. For example, if a man were to know that 'light flesh is easily digested and healthful,' but were ignorant what flesh was light, he would not ensure health for all his knowledge. On the contrary the man who knows that the flesh of birds is light and healthful, will more easily secure health.

Since, then, Practical Wisdom is concerned with action, it is necessary to have both the absolute and the relative forms of it—more particularly the relative form, which is concerned with particular details. Wisdom cannot be 'practical' if it comprise simply general principles.

[What is the nature of Philosophy and in what respect it differs from Practical Wisdom has now been explained. We will now continue our discussion into the nature of Practical Wisdom.]

Practical Wisdom is, therefore, both universal and particular—a knowledge of general principles and a perception of specific truths. It is, as it were, a Sovereign or 'architectonic' Science, since the man who knows the general principles stands in the relation of master-builder to the man of experience.

(*c*) PRACTICAL WISDOM DIVIDED INTO SPECIFIC VARIETIES.

Practical Wisdom has different names according to the different kinds of circumstance with which it has to deal.

Now the mental conditions involved in Statesmanship are identical with those involved in Practical Wisdom, but the formal definition is different in the two cases.

A. Of the wisdom that bears on the city and city life there are two varieties :—

1. One kind is the faculty of wise legislation, and, as such, is sovereign, and defines the scope of the various applications of wisdom to common life.

2. The other kind is the perception of details, and takes the generic term 'statesmanship.' This latter kind of wisdom is concerned with action, and with deliberation about 'means' rather than about 'ends,' a 'decree' being a thing to be carried into action—the practical application of a general principle to a particular case. Hence they say that those who are concerned with details and practical questions are the only true politicians: they alone bring about practical results. Like artizans they carry out the designs of the master-builder.

B. But the wisdom which relates to a man's own self, and to individual interests, is thought to be 'practical wisdom' in the truest sense, and consequently it appropriates to itself that name, which is in reality of wider import.

A complete classification of the other varieties will be :

1. *Economics*, or the faculty of administering an estate.
2. [*Politics*, in the narrower sense, subdivided into :]
   - (*a*) *Legislation*, or the faculty of making wise laws.
   - (*β*) *Statesmanship*, which is either (i.) the faculty of making wise counsels, or (ii.) the faculty of administering justice.

At any rate one distinct form of Practical Wisdom will be for a man to know what concerns himself and his own interests; although this form presents many points of difference from the other forms of Practical Wisdom.

Of Practical Wisdom in the general sense of the term there is one form which is purely Moral, as when a man seeks simply what is good for his own self; and this form is called 'Practical Wisdom' without qualification. There is another form which has for its end the good of the whole city; and this form is called Statesmanship. Statesmanship, in this wider sense of the term, is identical with Practical Wisdom, but is different in its definition, inasmuch as it is concerned with a different kind of subject-matter.

Of Statesmanship, there is one kind which is Practical Wisdom as it were in the architectonic or sovereign sense; and this is called Legislative Wisdom. The other form is special and subordinate to this sovereign kind, and is called

Politics, or Statesmanship in a narrower sense. By the latter I mean that which is shown in action and council, which is occupied in passing decrees and executing measures. Public decrees are concerned with action, not in the sense of that supreme and sovereign Wisdom, but as the ultimate Wisdom of specific conduct which bears on action in the absolute sense. For this reason it is that we speak of men possessing such wisdom as though alone concerned with politics, and that which relates to them we call the public policy—because they alone of all who are practically wise are like craftsmen, and themselves practise their craft. They alone *act* in the full sense of the term. The master-builders of politics are called men of action simply from ordering the actions of others: they are not themselves men of action in the proper sense of the term.

But Practical Wisdom, in the true sense of the term, is when a man seeks simply what is good for his own self, and in this sense it holds the generic name and is called 'practical wisdom' in a characteristic sense. Of the other varieties one form has reference to the management of a house—Economics: and another form relates to the city, and is either Legislation or Politics, and Politics are either deliberative or judicial.

However, the Practical Wisdom which is so called in former and characteristic sense is a kind of knowledge, just as Statesmanship is, though not in every sense the same as Statesmanship.

(*d*) INTERDEPENDENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE WISDOM.

In common estimation the man of 'practical wisdom' is one who knows his own interests and occupies himself therein, whereas politicians are regarded as busybodies. Hence the sentiment which Euripides puts into the mouth of Philoctetes:

The popular antagonism between 'private' and 'public' good will not bear examination.

> "How can I be a man of sense, seeing that once I had the chance
> Without a trouble of my own, numbered only with the mass,
> To have a full fair share with all the host?
> Surely those who are officious and assay beyond their sphere—
> Zeus hateth such."

According to this common view, men of practical wisdom are those who seek what is good for their own selves, and who think that it is their duty so to do. From this opinion has in fact come the idea that none but such are practically wise.

Yet perhaps it is impossible for a man to manage his own affairs successfully without a faculty for administering his own estate, or without taking part in the social circumstances of the community around him. As for the mode in which he ought to regulate his own affairs, that is a matter of doubt, and he will have to consider it.

Hence it is that people consider the man of practical wisdom to be one who simply seeks what is good for his own self, and the politician to be a busybody. In accordance with this view are the lines in Euripides:

> "How can I be a man of sense, seeing that once I had the chance
> Without a trouble of my own, numbered only with the mass,
> To have a full fair share with all the host?
> Surely those who are officious and assay beyond their sphere—
> Zeus hateth such."

Therefore it was that the excellence of the moral nature was called 'Practical Wisdom' in the most characteristic sense: and appellation 'practically wise' was specially given to one who seeks simply his own good, and thinks it his duty to seek that good purely and simply and not to seek for anything beyond.

Yet surely it is impossible for moral wisdom to exist apart from the power of administering one's own household, nor can such a power of domestic administration be gained apart from the intercourse with society and experience of life. It is impossible for a man to manage successfully and well the matters which concern himself, if his own house or city are not in a prosperous state. It is hard for a man not to be ruined if he pass his time in company with a number of worthless people; and, on the other hand, if he pass his time in company with no one, but live a solitary life, how can he learn what is good for himself? His own good is uncertain, and there is need of information and consideration in view thereof. Yet such practical knowledge it is impossible for him to gain without experience; and experience belongs only to those who live together in communion, whether in the house or in the city, and apart from such associations it is impossible for a man to have either experience or practical wisdom.

(*e*) RELATION OF EXPERIENCE TO PRACTICAL WISDOM AND OTHER INTELLECTUAL STATES.

A man cannot be 'practically wise' unless he has had experience of life, and is something of a politician.

There is further proof of what has been said of the necessity of experience, in the fact that although young men prove themselves good geometricians and mathematicians, and clever in abstract reasoning, yet they do not seem capable of becoming 'practically wise.' The reason of this is, that practical wisdom involves a knowledge of particulars which only become known to a man by personal experience which the young man cannot have acquired: only length of time can create experience, and practical knowledge.

One might, however, raise this further question: what is the reason why a boy can become a mathematician, but neither a metaphysician nor a natural philosopher? Is it not that such subjects as Geometry proceed by a process of abstraction, whereas in the other sciences the truths from which we start are gained only by experience. Our youthful students of Metaphysics have no real conviction of the truths of which they talk; whereas in Geometry the definitions from which we start are obvious to any one.

Again, experience is essential in Morals, because, in deliberating about a course of action, error is possible either in regard to the general principle or to the particular fact: *e.g.* one may be ignorant either that '*all* brackish water is bad,' or that '*this* is brackish water.'

Hence it is that young men prove themselves good mathematicians, and clever in abstract reasoning, but are not thought to be 'practically wise.' The reason of this is that Practical Wisdom is concerned with particular facts, which are

only learnt from experience, and experience the young man cannot have, since it requires length of time to gain.

Akin to this question is the enquiry which has been made, how it is that young men show themselves to be good mathematicians, but in no sense metaphysicians or naturalists? Is not the reason this—that the first truths involved in Physics or in Metaphysics are derived from the induction of particular facts? In truth, Metaphysics—the Philosophy which deals with necessary and unchangeable existences, cannot possibly be established without experience. It is from truths known to our own selves, and to our own senses, that we are led up to truths which are super-sensuous and transcendental. Unless one has gained a knowledge of what properties belong to this or to that object in nature, it is impossible to draw a general inference, or frame a general definition of that object, or to make a scientific deduction. Again, without a scientific knowledge of Nature it is impossible to attain to a true Metaphysic: it is only after obtaining physical knowledge that we can learn the truths of Metaphysics. But to know these rudimentary facts of Nature is a matter for experience, and experience is a matter requiring length of days; and consequently it is impossible for young men to be either Natural Philosophers or Metaphysicians. On the other hand, the first truths of Mathematics are apprehended apart from concrete representations, and, therefore, they entail no necessity for having a knowledge of particular facts. Mathematicians do not investigate a circle or a quantity in the form of actual existence, in which it is found in manifold varieties and indefinitely, so to speak; but the Natural Philosopher must examine specific facts of nature. Mathematicians abstract these first truths from particular manifestations of them, and investigate them independently and *per se*: therefore, it is that there is nothing to prevent young men from being mathematicians. As for the principles of Physics and the truths of Physics generally, though young men talk about them, yet they do not understand accurately their nature, nor have they any conviction of their own thereon. But they have a real conviction of the principles of Mathematics, since they have knowledge of them through their definitions being precisely determined.

Since, therefore, it is evident that experience is the basis of that Practical Wisdom which regulates the personal life, and that experience cannot possibly be gained apart from social intercourse, while social intercourse cannot be maintained without the exercise of political wisdom, it is clear that Moral Wisdom cannot exist independently of Political Wisdom.

Again, since error arises in the regulation of conduct from ignorance either of the universal or of the particular, (*e.g.* the man who is ignorant of the universal that '*all* brackish water is bad,' as well as the man who, though he knows the universal, is ignorant of the particular, viz., that '*this* is brackish water,' will both alike fall into error, and both alike will use bad water), it is evident that in order not to err, it is necessary for a man to know not only the particular (that '*this* water is brackish'), but also the universal (that '*all* brackish water is bad'). The particular wisdom of experience in life has need, therefore, of the universal wisdom that is synonymous with statesmanship; and it is impossible for the wisdom of the personal life to be established apart from the wisdom of the State, just as it is impossible for the special knowledge of particulars to escape from error apart from a knowledge of general principles.

(*f*) RELATION OF PRACTICAL WISDOM TO THE INTUITIVE AND SCIENTIFIC MIND.

It is evident, then, that Practical Wisdom is not the same thing as the faculty of demonstration which the man of science possesses. As has been explained, Practical Wisdom is concerned with ultimate facts, whatever falls within the sphere of action being of this particular and final nature.

Practical Wisdom, as the science of human interests, involves a perception of the meaning of facts which nothing but the 'Moral Sense' can give.

Consequently Practical Wisdom stands in antithetical relation to Intuition, both of them involving *immediate* knowledge. Whilst on the one hand Intuition is concerned with first principles and axioms of which no proof is possible, on the other hand Practical Wisdom is concerned with ultimate facts of which no demonstration is possible, but of which there is an immediate sense—not of course one of the five senses, but an intuitive 'Moral Sense' corresponding after its kind to that sense by which we feel conscious, for instance, that the ultimate figure in Mathematics is a triangle. (For in Mathematics as in Morals the ultimate fact is the point at which the movement of the mind must stop.) But this mathematical perception is more of a *sense*, or sensuous imagination, than is the moral perception involved in Practical Wisdom: the perception of the Moral Sense belongs to a distinct species by itself (and is more intellectual than sensuous).

From these considerations it is evident that Practical Wisdom is not identical either with the Scientific or with the Intuitive Mind. It is not identical with the Scientific Mind, because it is concerned with particular facts, which are last in the order of Nature, whereas Science is concerned with universal truths, which are first in the order of Nature.

Nor is Practical Wisdom identical with Intuition. Intuition is concerned with primary truths which admit of no demonstration; while Practical Wisdom is concerned with ultimate facts with which not even Science is concerned, but which come within the province of sense. I am not of course referring to facts of which the five senses are cognisant in their isolated capacity—such as things which may be tasted or smelt or heard. Practical Wisdom does not distinguish between tastes and odours and sounds, but simply between individual *facts*: such facts as the sense alone can determine; and hence we say that Practical Wisdom is concerned with matters which come within the province of sense. For example, it is the province of the man of practical wisdom to know whether it is right for this city of the Athenians to go to war with this city of the Corinthians. Practical Wisdom is concerned with action, and action is concerned with particular circumstances. It is in this same way that Mathematicians recognize a triangle which comes under their senses—not in so far as it is in contrast with sight or touch, but absolutely in so far as it belongs to the class of particular individual facts which are recognized as ultimate and final: for in them, as ultimate, the investigator pauses, and carries his investigation no further. If we start from particular facts of sense the knowledge of the universal comes last of all; but if our knowledge proceeds from universal truth, objects of sense are recognized last of all. To recognize then particular facts so far as they are cognisable by the senses, and are not opposed either to tasting, hearing, touching or smelling, belongs to sense and not to Practical Wisdom. But to recognize particular facts, so far as they are advantageous or injurious to the good of man, that, I say, is the province of Practical Wisdom.

IV.—EXAMINATION OF VARIOUS MENTAL STATES AKIN TO PRACTICAL WISDOM.

i.—Analysis of Good Counsel.

(*a*) GOOD COUNSEL DISTINGUISHED FROM SIMILAR PROCESSES.

Now there is a difference between inquiring and deliberating, inquiring being the more comprehensive process, and deliberating only a species of it.

'Good Counsel' a form of deliberation

But we must first define the precise nature of Good Counsel, and determine whether it be 'a form of scientific reasoning,' or 'opinion,' or 'clever guessing,' or something distinct from either.

1. Scientific reasoning it certainly is not: men do not inquire about matters of which they have scientific knowledge, but Good Counsel is a form of deliberation, and one who deliberates is inquiring and calculating.

distinct from (1.) Science.

2. Nor again is it 'clever guessing.' Clever guessing is devoid of thought and is a thing of the moment, whereas men who deliberate spend a long time on the process, and the saying is that though we ought to carry out resolutions rapidly into effect when once they are formed, yet ought we to be slow in forming them.

(2.) Clever guessing.

3. Nor is 'acuteness' the same thing as 'Good Counsel,' acuteness being only another form of clever guessing.

(3.) Acuteness.

4. Nor surely is Good Counsel any form of 'opinion.'

(4.) Opinion.

Having now defined the nature of Philosophy, Practical Wisdom, Intuition, and the Scientific and Artistic faculties, and shown in what respects they differ from one another, we will proceed to treat of Good Counsel, Moral Insight, and Considerateness, and define their nature and show in what respects they differ from the five States of Mind described above as various attitudes towards Truth.

First, of Good Counsel; for it has a very close affinity to Practical Wisdom (the discussion of which we have just concluded), and therefore the account we gave of Practical Wisdom must be taken in close connection with the present inquiry into the nature of Good Counsel.

1. It is not, then, in the first place, identical with Inquiry, since Inquiry extends over a wider area than does Good Counsel. A man inquires not only when he counsels well, but also when he counsels ill. Again, not only matters of contingent existence, but also matters of necessary existence are matters of inquiry:—*i.e.* matters with which Science deals are matters of inquiry, as, for instance, whether the angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, or whether the moon has a spherical shape. Good Counsel is, therefore, not identical with Inquiry.

2. Nor, again, is Good Counsel a form of Science. The man of science does not

inquire into matters of which he has scientific knowledge, but the man of good counsel does inquire. Good Counsel is a form of deliberation, and deliberation is an inquiry into what one ought to do ; and the man who is deliberating is inquiring and calculating in regard to his actions how they can be done successfully and well. Hence Good Counsel is an inquiry, whereas Science has not that character : Good Counsel, therefore, is not Science.

3. Nor, again, is Good Counsel 'clever guessing.' Clever guessing takes place without loss of time, and without reflection and without practice. To understanding rightly the nature of a subject put before one instantaneously and without practice, that is clever guessing. Good Counsel is not of that character : deliberation takes place only after time spent on it, and slowly. Hence the saying which is in vogue, that 'one ought to be slow in deliberating, though one ought also to carry out one's resolutions quickly when once they are formed.'

4. Again, 'acuteness' is distinct and separate from Good Counsel. Acuteness is an off-hand statement of the middle term (*i.e.* the 'cause' of a subject proposed to it), whereas Good Counsel involves consideration. Acuteness is, in fact, a kind of clever guessing, and, therefore, is not the same as Good Counsel. 'Clever guessing' is speaking to the purpose, and hitting the point in reference to every question proposed ; and 'acuteness' is a prompt and quick assignment of the *cause* of any subject proposed for discussion (for instance. For what reason is it better to be ruled than to rule in oligarchies ?—'Because it is safer.') Hence Good Counsel is neither 'acuteness' nor 'clever guessing.'

5. Nor yet is Good Counsel 'opinion.' There are many forms of 'opinion,' but Good Counsel belongs to none of them. One class of opinions are the conclusions of the reason demonstrated as necessary ; if, for example, any one 'opines' after a process of demonstration that 'the angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles,' the opinion which he has is a *necessary* truth. Other opinions are drawn from the senses, and hence some of them are often false. But all opinions have for their end the truth, and truth is the correctness of opinion. On the other hand, Good Counsel has for its 'end' the interest either of the person who deliberates, or of the person to whom a man gives advice ; and this 'interest' men of 'good counsel' often succeed in attaining even by means of falsehood and deceit.

(*b*) GENERIC CONCEPTION OF GOOD COUNSEL.

Good counsel the rightness of the process of deliberation.

Now since the man who deliberates badly falls into error, while the man who deliberates well, judges aright, it is evident that Good Counsel is a kind of 'rightness,' but the rightness neither of science nor of opinion.

1. It is not the rightness of Science, because error is impossible in Science.

2. Nor is it the rightness of Opinion, which was shown above to be truth. Moreover any subject which falls under Opinion is defined and settled, (*not uncertain and future*).

Nevertheless, Good Counsel is not without a certain movement of the mind : it remains, then, that it must be a correctness of the process of practical reasoning : for this is prior to affirmation, whereas 'opinion' is not a mere process of search, but from the very nature of the case is a kind of affirmation. The man who deliberates, whether his deliberations be right or wrong, is inquiring for something and calculating.

Good Counsel is in fact 'a kind of correctness of deliberation.' Hence we must first inquire what deliberation is, and with what objects it is concerned.

There is no other correctness of Good Counsel beyond itself: it is in itself 'correctness of deliberation.' If the man who deliberates badly falls into error, certainly the man who deliberates rightly deliberates in accordance with Right Reason.

Moreover, Good Counsel is not the correctness either of 'opinion' or of 'science,' but of deliberation (as the very name indicates).

1. There is no 'correctness' of Science: Science is not even capable of a flaw so as to need correction.

2. The correctness, again, of Opinion is truth, as has been shown. Good Counsel is neither Opinion nor Science, nor is it correctness either of Opinion or of Science. Good Counsel is an inquiry in accordance with Right Reason. Opinion, on the other hand, is the discovery of some conclusion, and is concerned with some definite fact. Good Counsel is the seeking for something; Opinion is the result of having found something. In this respect, Good Counsel is inferior to thought. Thought is a reason absolutely settled and discovered in conjunction with its appropriate cause. Good Counsel has its whole essence in the process of inquiry. The man who deliberates, whether he deliberate well or ill, is searching and calculating. In searching, a process of reason is involved, and not a final conclusion. Opinion is not of this character: it is not a process of inquiry, but definite and absolute statement.

Good Counsel, therefore, is neither 'Science,' nor 'Clever-guessing,' nor 'Opinion.' But, seeing that it is 'correctness of deliberation,' we must inquire what is the nature of deliberation, and what the objects are with which the man who deliberates finds himself to be concerned. Of deliberation, and of the subject-matter of deliberation, we treated in the Third Book: we will now treat of *correctness* of deliberation.

(*c*) SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF 'GOOD COUNSEL.'

Now since correctness is predicated in many senses, it is evident that not every form of correctness is Good Counsel.

Further conditions limiting more exactly the nature of Good Counsel.

1. The weakly selfish man and the bad man will achieve the end which they have set before themselves, and will do so by a process of calculation. Hence such an one will have deliberated correctly, though he will have gained a great evil. But it is thought to be a kind of good to have deliberated rightly: it is this kind of correctness of deliberation which is 'good counsel,'—correctness, that is to say, which is productive of some good.

2. But it is possible to achieve a good end by a false method of reasoning—to succeed in that which one ought to do, yet through improper means:—in fact the middle term in the moral syllogism may be wrong. Consequently, not even does this state amount to Good Counsel—for though by it a man attains the proper end, yet he may do so by unlawful means.

3. Moreover, it is possible for a man to succeed in his quest

only after long deliberation, whereas another man will succeed speedily. Protracted deliberation does not amount to Good Counsel. Good Counsel is that correctness which has in view a real good, and which attains the proper object by the proper means within a proper time.

4. Again, deliberation may have been made either in regard to life as a whole, or in regard to some particular purpose. Good Counsel, therefore, in the absolute sense is that which leads a man right in regard to the end of life in its widest issues, Good Counsel in a particular sense is that which leads him right in regard to some special occasion.

If, therefore, it be the characteristic of men of practical wisdom that they form wise deliberations, Good Counsel will be 'a correctness which has regard to what is expedient in view of some end of which Practical Wisdom is a true apprehension.'

Correctness, therefore, is predicated in many senses. Men who propose to themselves a vicious end, yet seek the means which lead directly to the realization of that end, deliberate rightly; and deliberation of this kind is rightness. So also those who propose to themselves a virtuous end, and are impelled to its realization, yet do not seek the means which tend more than any others to its attainment, but other means less direct, (just like those who draw a true conclusion from premisses which are false or else not necessary.)—such men are deceived indeed, in what concerns the means to their end, yet deliberate rightly, inasmuch as the end to which they are impelled is a virtuous end; and deliberation of this kind also is rightness. But besides these forms there is a rightness which is called 'rightness of deliberation' in the emphatic sense, Good Counsel, in virtue of which we are impelled to a virtuous end, and seek for those means whereby we shall be able to attain that end most easily and most successfully. Neither of the other forms of correctness is '*good* counsel.' The first form is vicious counsel, whereas Good Counsel is a moral good—that being the very significance of the term 'virtuous counsel.' The second form of correctness, though it seeks what it ought to seek, yet does not seek it by the proper means, and in what conduces to the end, it deliberates badly,—*i.e.*, in those very matters in reference to which the deliberation is made (as has been already explained); hence, though its tendency is right, in that it is impelled to a virtuous end, yet, inasmuch as it is directed to means which are not suitable to that end, its result is injurious. This form of correctness, therefore, cannot be Good Counsel.

Nor, again, is the deliberation which takes place through a long interval and one that is more protracted than is right, Good Counsel. Good Counsel is that rightness of deliberation which is in the track of what is expedient when we deliberate upon rightful matters in a proper manner and *for a reasonable time.*

Again, since 'the end' is either universal and final, or special and particular,—the universal end being that towards which all human action is directed, and a particular end one to which only particular actions tend, Good Counsel presents a corresponding variety. Good Counsel in the universal sense is correct and virtuous deliberation in regard to what conduces to the ultimate end of man—a life in accordance with virtue: Good Counsel in the particular sense is that which tends to some special end, which is not in itself the ultimate end, though it is conducive thereto.

Since, further, it is the part of men of Practical Wisdom to deliberate well, we must add on to the definition of Good Counsel the idea of 'practical wisdom.' Consequently the definition of Good Counsel will run thus: 'Good Counsel is a

correctness in reference to what is expedient in view of some end of which practical wisdom is a true apprehension.' I say 'in reference to what is expedient,' because of the deliberation which, though directed to a virtuous end, is by no means carried out through fitting processes, by fitting actions, at a fitting time, and in a fitting manner. I say 'in view of some end of which Practical Wisdom is a true apprehension,' on account of vicious deliberation which seeks, indeed, what is fitting and consistent with its end, but is impelled to an end that is vicious; of which practical wisdom is *not* a true apprehension.

So much for Good Counsel.

ii.—Analysis of Moral Discrimination.

(*a*) MORAL DISCRIMINATION IS NEITHER SCIENCE NOR OPINION.

Moral Discrimination (and its opposite, dulness of the Moral Sense), in virtue of which we call men discriminating (or the reverse), are states of mind which are not generically the same as Science or Opinion:—otherwise, as all men form opinions, all men would have been men of discrimination.

The sphere of Moral Discrimination is the same as that of Practical Wisdom.

Nor, again, is Moral Discrimination one of the partial or particular sciences like Medicine, which is concerned with the conditions of health, or like Geometry, which is concerned with dimension.

For neither is it concerned with matters that are eternal and unalterable, nor with any of those phenomena which come into being.

Its province is that class of matters about which a man might feel a difficulty and take counsel.

We must now speak of Moral Discrimination. Moral Discrimination. and its opposite, dulness of the Moral Sense, are states of mind in virtue whereof we speak of men as discriminating or the reverse.

Moral Discrimination is not the same thing either as Science or as Opinion, or as Moral Sense or Practical Wisdom.

It is neither Science nor Opinion—otherwise all men of science, and all men who form opinions, would have been men of discrimination; but of course they are not.

Nor is it one of the special sciences, such as are Geometry and Medicine: otherwise it would have been concerned with the conditions of health or the laws of matter.

Nor is it concerned with matters which have a necessary existence, and which ever keep in the same state.

Nor is it specially concerned with any one of those particular things which admit of being altered.

But, in a general sense, it is concerned with matters about which one might raise a doubt and deliberate, matters which admit of investigation and deliberation and inquiry.

(*b*) MORAL DISCRIMINATION COMPARED WITH PRACTICAL WISDOM.

Consequently Moral Discrimination is concerned with the same class of questions as Practical Wisdom, though these virtues are in themselves distinct.

But Moral Discrimination and Practical Wisdom differ from one another, in the mode of their operation.

1. Practical Wisdom is imperative in its utterances: its scope and 'end' is to determine what it is a man's duty to do or not to do. Moral Discrimination is simply judicial or critical, the term 'discrimination' being identical with '*sound* discrimination,' and 'men who discriminate' being identical with those who discriminate soundly.

2. Moral Discrimination is not the possessing nor the acquiring of Practical Wisdom. But just as learning is called understanding when the student makes use of his knowledge, so also moral understanding consists in the use of opinion to determine questions that fall within the scope of the Moral Sense, and to determine them rightly, *when stated by another.* 'Well' and 'rightly' are in this sense synonymous: hence has come the term 'discrimination,' in virtue of which men are called men of right judgment from the discrimination which they show in comprehending moral facts. We often say in this sense that 'to learn' is 'to understand.'

Consequently, Moral Discrimination has the same sphere as Practical Wisdom, being concerned with 'contingent matter'—things which we have it within our own power to do or not to do.

Yet it is not the same thing in every respect as Practical Wisdom. Practical Wisdom is simply imperative, and prescribes the kind of end towards which we ought to tend and the measures which we ought to take so as to attain to that end—and this is its function, to prescribe what men ought to do. On the other hand, to estimate the commands laid upon men by Practical Wisdom, and to know that they are fitting and right, and that we ought to act accordingly—that is Moral Discrimination. [It is immaterial to say a man of 'discrimination' or a man of 'sound discrimination:' the term 'man of discrimination' involves this very thing—comprehending rightly and well, and judging accordingly of the commands laid down by the Moral Sense. So the virtue of discrimination is the same as that of sound discrimination.]

Moral Discrimination, however, is not Practical Wisdom, nor is it the possession of Practical Wisdom, nor is it the receiving nor the gaining of Practical Wisdom: to gain Practical Wisdom is to learn those things which the man of Practical Wisdom knows, whereas Moral Discrimination is to judge of them. Moral Discrimination is, therefore, not the same thing as gaining Practical Wisdom or possessing it. But just as a man who hears a scientific truth from some one else, and estimates it rightly, is said to comprehend, so also the man who understands the commands issued by Practical Wisdom and estimates them rightly is said to comprehend them, and is called a man of discrimination, or of sound discrimination, on account of his comprehending them rightly ('well' and 'rightly' being the same thing). From this the name has been derived, because for a man to understand rightly on hearing what another says to him, is said to be 'learning' or 'comprehending.'

iii.—Analysis of Charitableness and Consideration.

'Charitableness,' as it is called (in respect of which we say of men that they are kindly disposed and show consideration), is 'the right judgment of the fair-minded man.' As a proof of this we say that the fair-minded man is above all others charitable, and ready to make allowances, and that equity consists in showing forbearance and consideration under special circumstances.

Charitableness is the Right Reason of the equitable man.'

'Consideration,' again, is 'an appreciative charitableness which marks the standard of fairness truly, and which is just, as being the appreciation of a man true and honest.

Consideration is the critical judgment of the equitable man.

We must now treat of Charitableness, the province of which is matters within our own power, as is that of Practical Wisdom, Good Counsel, and Moral Discrimination.

Charitableness, then (in respect of which we speak of men as being kindly disposed and showing consideration) is 'the right judgment of the fair-minded man' (what this fair-mindedness is, and what is the character of the man who shows it, has been explained in a previous Book). That Charitableness is of this kind, is evident. We say that the fair-minded man is above all others charitable and ready to make allowances, and that fairness consists in making allowances in certain contingencies.

Consideration, again, is a rightful charity, that is critically appreciative of what is equitable: it is, in fact, 'a right judgment upon moral questions, and a reasonable charity.' By 'right judgment' is meant the judgment of one whose mind is true and honest. If, then, consideration is a judgment of the fair-minded man and a proper and correct charitableness, and men are called 'kindly disposed' in respect of their right-minded charitableness, Charitableness, therefore, in virtue whereof men are called 'kindly disposed,' is 'the judgment of the fair-minded man.'

iv.—Review of Practical Wisdom under all its aspects.

Now all these mental states tend, as we might expect, to the same result. We use the terms 'Charitableness,' 'Discrimination,' 'Practical Wisdom,' and 'Moral Sense,' in reference to the same persons, implying that all such possess charitableness, and of course a moral sense, whether as men of practical wisdom or of moral discernment.

The attitude of the wise man only varies with the variation of the phenomena with which it has to deal.

The sphere, indeed, of all these faculties alike is that of ultimate facts and of particular details. In showing discernment upon questions with which the man of practical wisdom is concerned, a man is called 'discriminating' or 'kindly-natured' or 'considerate,' since considerations of equity have weight with all good

men in their relations with their fellows. The whole world of action is, in truth, a world of particular details and of 'ultimate facts,' and assuredly the man of practical wisdom must know these facts; and moral intelligence and charitableness are also entirely concerned with specific actions, which are 'ultimate facts.'

It is the right estimate of moral truths,

But these 'ultimate facts' come within the cognizance of the Moral Sense in a double aspect—in their widest comprehension and in their narrowest extension: the Moral Sense is not a process of formal reasoning, but an intuitive perception as well of the primary axioms as of the simplest details. In one aspect, therefore, the Moral Sense is an immediate consciousness of eternal and immutable first truths, such as are applicable to demonstrations of Geometry. In the other aspect, it is the intuition of the meaning of the particular fact, and of what is within the power of man to compass, and of the minor premisses in the moral syllogism. These particular facts are indeed the starting points from which we mount up to the Final Cause, or 'Summum Bonum.' It is necessary, then, that we should have an immediate consciousness of these particular truths, and this immediate consciousness is the 'Moral Sense' or 'Intuition of Morality.'

whether those truths be universal axioms or particular facts.

Hence it is that the moral instincts are thought to be inherent or innate,—'the gifts of Nature'; and though no one is a metaphysician by Nature, yet it is thought to be in right of Nature that men possess charitableness and discrimination and a Moral Sense. In proof of this view is the fact that we consider the Moral Sense to be developed with the development of age and character, and that there is a particular time of life which evinces a Moral Sense and a spirit of Charity, as though Nature were the cause which produced them.

How far is this attitude dependent upon age and experience?

Wherefore the Moral Sense is the starting point of Moral Science, and also the ultimate principle in which all its truths end. The demonstrations of Moral Science all start from the truths apprehended by the Moral Sense, and are all concerned therewith. Consequently we ought to pay regard to the opinions and sayings, authoritative though undemonstrated, of men who have experience and age and practical wisdom, quite as much as to positive demonstrations: inasmuch as they gain from experience a moral insight, they detect the true principles and laws of life under the complexities of circumstance.

Now all these mental states which attain to truth, tend to the same result, and have the same objects for the subject-matter with which they are found to be concerned. Practical Wisdom, Moral Sense, Good Counsel, Moral Discrimination, and Charitableness are concerned with special facts and particular circumstances in which alone moral action can be displayed [I here refer to the Moral Sense as synonymous with the 'Practical Reason,' which has for its principles particular facts which come under the cognisance of the moral instinct]. The same man who is 'practically wise' when he performs what tends to the true end of virtue, is a 'wise counsellor' when he deliberates in a befitting manner upon the bearing of circumstances; and when again, he knows and judges that the measures which he has adopted and carried out for the attainment of the end of virtue have been rightly and befittingly carried out and adopted, then he is a man of moral discrimination; and, lastly, when, in judging aright of the actions performed by others, he thinks at times that those actions are deserving of commiseration, when they are really so, then he is a man of kindly nature and considerateness.

Now the subjects with which every judgment of the equitable man is concerned are the whole of the actions of virtue that are commonly performed by others. Equity, as it is called, or the moral corrective of strict legal justice (the nature of which was discussed in a previous Book), criticises the laws laid down by others; and Considerateness and Charity judge rightly concerning actions performed by others. All these form the province of the fair-minded man; and it follows that the actions which the fair-minded man criticises and judges cover the whole sphere of human activity, equity being concerned with the same sphere as positive law. Considerateness is concerned with actions only when they are performed by others.

The same subjects form the sphere also of the Moral Sense or 'Practical Reason.' Since the Moral Sense is a knowledge of fundamental truths, and these fundamental truths are in the case of actions particular facts, and in the case of abstract speculation and inquiries, where the end is truth *per se*, the definitions and immediate propositions and general conceptions, the Moral Sense will have two varieties:—as 'theoretical' or 'speculative' it is a knowledge of definitions and of primary and unalterable propositions; and as 'practical' it is a knowledge of ultimate facts and of contingent truths, *i.e.*, of specific and particular actions. Hence under its double aspect the Moral Sense, as 'practical' and 'speculative' Reason, is concerned with ultimate facts and with primary principles. Immediate propositions and definitions and particular circumstances are both primary principles and ultimate facts. Immediate propositions are 'primary' in respect of nature, and 'ultimate' in respect of human knowledge. Particular circumstances are 'primary' in respect of ourselves, and 'ultimate' as the last product of Nature. Those truths which are 'ultimate' in respect of nature are primary principles and causes of the end to be attained by human action. Being instructed by particular facts, which fall under the observation of the senses, how to do what is expedient for ourselves and for others, and by what means we may attain to the desired end; inferring in turn from these particular experiences certain universal and general truths, we thus grow to be 'practically wise' in regard to the course we should pursue in life. Wherefore the statesman ought to have a knowledge of particular facts; and when such a knowledge is gained without the help of a middle term (*i.e.*, when it is 'immediate'), it is an intuition of the Moral Sense—the Moral Sense being a knowledge of immediate truths and of first principles.

Hence it is that knowledge of this kind is thought to be a product of Nature; since it is not derived from any methods of instruction, nor from definite teaching, but grows with a man's growth. Nor is it the Moral Sense alone, but Practical Wisdom and Moral Discrimination and Charitableness are also thought to be gifts of Nature. It is from the innate knowledge derived from the Moral Sense that all these moral qualities are derived, and the sphere in which such knowledge is exercised is identical with that of the Moral Sense—*i.e.*, particular circumstances. Metaphysics on the contrary is not the product of Nature. No one is a philoso-

pher by right of Nature, inasmuch as there is need of scientific processes and systematic instruction in order to become a philosopher. On the other hand, we consider that Practical Wisdom and Charitableness and Moral Sense and Discrimination follow the course of growing years: we say of a particular time of life that it shows a Moral Sense, and Charitableness, and Practical Wisdom, as though Nature were the cause. But we do not attribute metaphysical insight to one age more than to another: it is possible even for a young man or a boy, and not merely for old men, to become metaphysical, but the reverse is the case with Practical Wisdom and the moral virtues generally. Experience is the special characteristic of old men, and without experience it is impossible for a man to become 'practically wise,' and to have a moral sense, or moral discrimination, or charitableness.

I am here using the term Moral Sense as equivalent to the 'Practical Reason.' As has been explained, the Moral Sense is both 'practical' and 'speculative':—it is a starting-point as well as the final goal. It is a starting-point in so far as it is a knowledge of primary principles, and is called 'speculative' or 'theoretical':—*i.e.*, it is the truth upon which demonstration is based. It is the final goal in so far as it is a knowledge of particular facts which depend upon personal experience, and is called 'practical': *i.e.*, all demonstrations are concerned with these ultimate facts, and all these ultimate facts are capable of demonstration, and the man who is demonstrating comes at last to these ultimate facts as he proceeds downwards from general truths.

Such a Moral Sense, as a result ensuing from experience, is found only in men of years. Hence one ought to trust the *dicta* and opinions, though undemonstrated, of men of experience and age and practical wisdom, no less than formal demonstrations. In consequence of their possessing a moral insight from experience, they discern the truths which govern action, and by means thereof they understand what is expedient, and supply to themselves and to the world a true rule of life.

Our account of the nature of Practical Wisdom and of Philosophy, and of the subjects with which they are concerned, is now complete; and it has been shown that they are, respectively, perfect states of separate divisions of the soul.

V.—UTILITY AND NECESSITY OF PRACTICAL WISDOM.

(*a*) OBJECTIONS RAISED AGAINST THE IMPORTANCE OF PHILOSOPHY OR OF PRACTICAL WISDOM.

But here a man may raise a difficulty, and ask in what respect are Practical Wisdom and Philosophy of any real utility. These are the arguments he may be supposed to use:—

1. 'Philosophy' investigates none of those subjects which might help a man to be happy: it is not concerned with any form of production or object of utility.

1. What is the use of Philosophy, if it does not help a man to be happy?

2. 'Practical Wisdom' has indeed a human interest; yet, still, what need is there of it? Granted that its scope is what is just and honourable and good for man, and that

the practice of justice and honour and virtue is essential to a good man's life; yet, still, men are not made more disposed to practise, nor capable of practising, the virtues by the mere fact of knowing what they are, since the virtues are not merely intellectual conceptions, but 'permanent dispositions of heart and will,' or 'fixed states of the moral nature.' These moral states are like physical states: the conditions of health and of physical well-being,—I do not mean external conditions, so called from their influence in producing health, but those conditions which result from an *internal* state,—these bodily conditions do not depend upon knowledge, since we are not altered in our own selves by the mere fact of knowing the art of Medicine or of Training.

2. What is the use of Practical Wisdom if men are virtuous without it?

3. But if knowledge be not the motive for which we are to assume that a man should be 'practically wise,' but the motive be rather that a man may thereby himself become virtuous: the possession of Practical Wisdom will not be useful either to those who are virtuous already, or to those who are destitute of virtue. The first case is obvious; the second may be argued as follows: It will make no difference whether we have practical wisdom ourselves, or whether we follow the guidance of others who do possess it; and it will be sufficient for our purpose if we take up the same attitude towards practical wisdom that we do towards medical science:—though we desire to be in sound health, still we do not study medicine.

3. Even if Practical Wisdom be useful for the conduct of life, cannot we gain it from others without troubling ourselves about it?

4. Over and above these objections, it would seem to be an incongruity that Practical Wisdom, though inferior to Philosophy, should have superior authority; yet so it has, since as producing results and originating action it is a sovereign science, and has authority over every department of life.

Practical Wisdom seems to be concerned with matter of less dignity than Philosophy, and yet to be of superior authority.

But an opponent might raise a difficulty in respect of the conclusions of this book, and ask in what respect Philosophy and Practical Wisdom are useful, and to what good end they contribute as regards mankind. Such difficulties may be stated as follows:—

1. Philosophy investigates none of those questions which lead to human happiness. Happiness is involved in action; but Philosophy is not the source of any kind of practical process, since it has not for its 'end' the good to be attained by action.

2. Practical Wisdom, indeed, is a source of action, and is directed to the good to be attained by action; yet it certainly does not seem to be nece[illegible] [illegible]the acquisition of moral virtue. The principles which regulate the l[illegible] men are gained by moral *habituation*, and are found to be perm[illegible]

as being formed states of the moral nature; and they are not rendered more capable of doing nor more disposed to do what is honourable and right by the mere fact of knowing what honour and right are. We are not made more healthy, nor brought into a better physical condition, by *knowing* ever so perfectly the conditions of health and well-being, but by possessing the bodily habit or condition from which health and well-being flow. The boxer is not made a better pugilist by the mere knowledge of what it is to box well and skilfully: he is a boxer, not from a knowledge of boxing, but in consequence of his possessing a bodily condition adapted for boxing. Similarly in the case of the wrestler and of the runner. A man who is an athlete, is so in consequence of his bodily condition, not in consequence of his knowledge merely of the principles of health or of training. In speaking of the 'conditions of health or of training,' I am not referring to external conditions productive of health and well-being, but to such as a man in health and well-being shows in consequence of his possessing a formed state of health and well-being.

3. Just, therefore, as in the case of the bodily states mentioned above, men will not be made physically better in consequence of their having knowledge, so neither will the good man be made more noble in respect of virtue in consequence of Practical Wisdom.

If, then, Practical Wisdom is no help to the good in respect of virtue, the remaining alternative is that it renders those who are not virtuous more noble. Yet in their case also it is not very necessary that they should be 'practically wise' in order to become virtuous. It is possible for them to learn the theory of virtue from others, and, following the directions given them, so to become virtuous. In precisely the same way, though we all desire to be in sound health, we do not ourselves study Medicine but inquire of our physicians, and there is nothing to prevent our being in good health thereby.

Such then are the difficulties which may be raised in reference to Practical Wisdom and Philosophy—in respect of the benefit which they confer on men and the way in which they are of real utility.

4. There is also a further question into which we ought to inquire—in regard to their relative position towards each other: which of them is the more important? It seems on the one hand that Philosophy is more important than Practical Wisdom, inasmuch as it is a knowledge of necessary truths. On the other hand Practical Wisdom seems to be more important than Philosophy inasmuch as it is the source of moral action, and for that reason is more authoritative than Philosophy, which is simply speculative. The mental attitude which is concerned with *action* has authority and exercises rule over every department of life.

(*b*) EXAMINATION OF THE FIRST TWO OBJECTIONS STATED ABOVE.

We must accordingly discuss these points, they being the only difficulties which have been so far raised.

We reply, then, in the first place, that Philosophy and Practical Wisdom must necessarily be objects of desire in and for themselves, though neither one nor the other produce any kind of result, since they are respectively the perfection of separate divisions of the soul.

General answer to the two first of these objections: Philosophy and Practical Wisdom are precious in and for themselves.

But as a matter of fact both of them do produce a result, not in the way in which a knowledge of medicine produces health; but a philosophic state of mind produces happiness precisely as a healthy state of body produces health. Philosophy

being a part of human excellence as a whole, renders a man happy by the fact of his being possessed of it, and working out a life in harmony with it.

Again, the work of man, and the proper function of his life, is only finished off and perfected after the model of Practical Wisdom and Moral Virtue. A good life makes the aim of life right; Practical Wisdom makes the means for realising that aim right.

[There is no moral excellence of the fourth division of the soul, the nutritive, because there is nothing depending upon it, to do or to forbear.]

Such are the difficulties which have been raised in regard to Philosophy and Practical Wisdom; and we must treat of them in order.

In the first place, then, even if the virtues of this kind were of no practical utility, yet they must necessarily be choiceworthy for their own sakes, since they are respectively the perfection of the several elements of the rational soul, as has been shown; and every excellence is a thing desirable *per se*.

But in fact they *are* useful in view of happiness, though not in the way in which medicine is conducive to health: Philosophy and Practical Wisdom are conducive to happiness in the same way that healthfulness is conducive to health. Happiness in its most comprehensive sense is complete and absolute virtue, while Philosophy and Practical Wisdom are elements of virtue as a whole; hence Philosophy and Practical Wisdom are elements in human happiness, and to have the intellectual states implied by Practical Wisdom and Philosophy, in conjunction with the other virtues, is to be happy with an absolute and perfect happiness.

Moreover, Practical Wisdom is useful in view of every single act of virtue; and by the help thereof it is that every function of virtue is perfectly performed. Moral Virtue directs aright the will or desire towards the end of virtue, and makes the moral aim right. Practical Wisdom, on the other hand, seeks the means which conduce to that virtuous end, and deliberates by what means it is possible most nobly and most easily and in the proper manner to attain to that end.

[Of the fourth division of the soul, which is the nutritive element, there is no excellence of the character to which we are here referring, having for its origination the property of impulse—I mean of course *moral* excellence. The nutritive element has influence in no kind of moral action; and that which is not a source originating moral action, is incapable of having moral excellence. The only excellence capable of being ascribed to the principle of nutrition is good nurture, and such things as are consequent thereon when the nutritive element is in sound condition, *i.e.*, beauty or size—though they are not excellences in the absolute sense of the term: they do not arise from an act of Will, nor are they desirable for their own sake, but are called 'excellences' by way of metaphor.]

It has, therefore, been shown that even if Practical Wisdom and Philosophy were unable to conduce to any other purpose, yet for their own sake they ought to be esteemed of vast importance.

(*c*) EXAMINATION OF THE THIRD OBJECTION STATED ABOVE.

In regard to the third objection, that 'men are no way better able through their practical wisdom to perform what is right and good,' we must recur to the

To answer the third objection we must

recur to the analysis of virtue, and distinguish the act from the intention of the agent.

simplest analysis of the moral faculties to find a starting point for our arguments in reply.

Now we all admit that there are men who while performing just acts are not in themselves just at heart; when, for instance, they do what is required of them by the laws either against their will, or in consequence of ignorance, or through some selfish motive, and not from conscious loyalty to Right, though notwithstanding they *do* perform their duty and what every good man should do. In precisely the same way the converse seems to be true: *i.e.*, it is necessary for a man to perform his every act in such a frame or disposition of mind as to be himself virtuous, as when for instance he does right of his own free will and simply for the sake of right.

Now the Will is made to desire freely what is right by Moral Virtue; but the doing of all that tends to the attainment of the purposes of the Will does not depend upon Moral Virtue, but upon another faculty.

Here we must pause to speak with greater explicitness upon the relation between the moral and intellectual faculties.

There is, we know, a certain faculty which we call 'cleverness' —of such a nature that it is able to do and to compass whatever tends to a mark set before it. Now if the mark aimed at be a right one, then cleverness is praiseworthy; whereas if the mark be a vicious one, then cleverness is mere cunning or astuteness. Hence we call cunning and astute men, as well as men of practical wisdom, clever. But practical wisdom is not identical with cleverness, though it cannot exist without this element of cleverness. Nor, again, is there any fixed character formed in the 'moral eye-sight' (as Practical Wisdom may be called) without the element of natural goodness, as has been explained before and as is obvious. In moral relations our modes of reasoning imply as their first principle: 'Since the end and what is best, is so and so . . . . . .' (whatever it may be: it is immaterial to our argument). But the true end is all unrecognised except by the good: sinfulness perverts the moral nature and causes a man to fall into error in regard to the true principles of action. It is accordingly evident that it is impossible for a man to have practical wisdom unless he has at the same time personal goodness.

The intellectual aptitude for moral action is mere astuteness unless combined with a virtuous disposition.

What personal goodness involves I will explain once more. There are two kinds of goodness, natural and confirmed, the relation between which corresponds

The dispositions of virtue are incom-

very nearly to that between cleverness and practical wisdom. I mean that the relation between goodness as an instinct of Nature, and goodness as a confirmed habit, is analogous to (though not identical with) the relation between cleverness and wisdom.

plete without Practical Wisdom.

Now it is universally admitted that the several characteristics of our moral nature do, somehow or other, attach to us by nature. We have, in truth, instincts of justice, of temperance, of courage, and other moral attributes from the very moment of our birth. Yet still the goodness which we seek to attain in life is distinct in kind from these unformed tendencies: our endeavour is that our moral qualities should belong to us in a new way by a higher right than that of nature. Children and animals have certain natural dispositions inherently attaching to them; but these natural instincts, being devoid of Reason, are found to be harmful. Thus much, however, seems to be matter of common observation. When a strong body moves without the power of sight, its fate is to meet with heavy falls, through not having sight. So it is with the moral nature, if it be devoid of reason; whereas if it gain reason, then taking the form and character of the reason it has received, the moral state will become confirmed or perfected virtue.

Accordingly, just as there are two forms in the opinionative part of the soul, cleverness and wisdom, so also in the moral part of the soul there are two corresponding forms, the one a natural tendency to virtue, the other a confirmed state of virtue; and of these two forms perfected virtue cannot be developed without practical wisdom.

Hence there are those who say that all the forms of moral excellence are forms of reason; and on this point Socrates was partly right and partly in error. He was wrong in thinking that all the virtues are intellectual states, but he was right in saying that the virtues involve an intellectual element. In confirmation of this view, when men of our day give a definition of a virtue, after limiting its sphere to definite circumstances, they make it to be 'a state of mind' with the proviso 'in accordance with Right Reason;' and Reason is 'right' in moral relations when it is in accordance with the Moral Sense involved in Practical Wisdom. Indeed all men seem to divine in a kind of way that a permanent state of mind of this kind, in harmony with the Moral Sense, is Virtue. But here we must digress for a moment to qualify what has been said about 'Right Reason.' Virtue is not merely a state of mind that

Unity of virtue as the harmony of the moral and intellectual life of the soul. [This view was partially misconceived by Socrates.]

accords objectively with Right Reason, but a state of mind which involves Right Reason in union with itself—and Right Reason upon moral subjects is identical with Practical Wisdom.

Socrates, however, said that the virtues were 'states of Reason' (he called them 'Sciences'); whereas I maintain that they only involve, or are associated with, Right Reason.

The theory of the diversity of virtue will only hold good of the natural instincts, not of virtue as a matured state.

From the various arguments used above it must be clear that it is impossible for a man to be good, in the true and permanent sense of goodness, without being 'practically wise,' nor again to be practically wise without personal goodness.

Under this aspect the difficulty which may be logically raised, that the virtues are distinct from and independent of one another, may be solved. It has been argued that the same man is not naturally disposed to all the virtues equally, and that, therefore, though he may have acquired one virtue he has others still to gain. Such a difficulty is quite conceivable in regard to natural tendencies, but is quite inconceivable in respect of those virtues in view of which a man is said to be 'good,' in the absolute and unqualified sense of the term. In 'Practical Wisdom,' though it be but a single virtue, all other forms of moral excellence will be found to be involved.

Yet even if 'Practical Wisdom' had not been necessary for the conduct of life, there would still have been need of it as the perfection of one part of the soul, and because the Will cannot make a right choice without Practical Wisdom and personal goodness. Personal goodness creates a perfect aim for a man, and Practical Wisdom enables him to take the proper measures for the attainment of that 'end,' or 'aim.'

We will now show with greater explicitness that Practical Wisdom *does* contribute towards making men more virtuous and more capable of carrying out what is noble and right. But we must take up the argument at a somewhat earlier stage, and take our starting point therefrom.

Now we say that it is possible that men should perform just acts without being personally just themselves, and exhibit the demeanour of temperate men without being personally temperate: such, for example, are they who perform what is enjoined upon them by the law, through fear and against their will; or they who have performed an act of justice through ignorance, as if a man had unwittingly punished the aggressor instead of the person aggrieved; or they who act uprightly from a selfish motive—money or pleasure—and not from love of right for its own sake. Precisely, then, as we say that such men are not themselves just, although they perform acts of justice, so in the case of virtue generally the same distinction holds good. The only man who is virtuous in the genuine sense of the term is the man who carries out what is right and follows after virtue as well for its own sake as also in view of what is good, and that because it is his own free choice

and according to his own wish. The man, on the other hand, who is constrained by another to carry out the good, does indeed what he does for the sake of 'the good,' if the man who constrains him does so in view of the good, nevertheless he is not a good man in himself, inasmuch as he does not pursue the good of his own free choice and according to his own wish.

Now the formed state of virtue regulates the impulsive part of the soul (*i.e.*, that which is the seat of impulse and of appetite), and so makes the attitude of the Will to be right:—the Will desires and makes deliberate choice of 'the good' in consequence of its own virtuous disposition. But it is necessary that the virtuous man should not simply rest at this point—the possession of a formed state of virtue, but he must also perform those things whereby the state within the soul may be strengthened—*i.e.*, virtuous actions. But as for the knowledge of what virtuous actions are, he cannot attain that knowledge from a mere disposition to virtue: the moral disposition engenders simply in the soul an impulse or striving after 'the good.' The knowledge what those particular acts are which it is the duty of the virtuous man to perform, belongs to another faculty.

We must speak of this faculty with more fulness and definiteness. There is of course a certain faculty which men call 'cleverness.' Now 'cleverness' is of such a nature as to be able to carry out and compass whatever tends towards a mark that is set before it. If, then, this 'mark' be a noble one, cleverness is praiseworthy; but if it be a vicious one, then it is 'cunning' or 'astuteness.' Hence we speak of men of practical wisdom as being 'clever' and 'astute.' But Practical Wisdom is not the same thing as this faculty of cleverness, though it cannot exist independently thereof, since in fact Practical Wisdom is the perfection of cleverness. On the one hand, therefore, the excellence of the moral nature cannot be perfected without Practical Wisdom, and on the other hand, it is impossible that Practical Wisdom should be formed in the Practical Reason without a general excellence of the moral nature. In practical relations the methods of reasoning, or the moral analysis which we go through before we act, have for their starting points 'the ends' of moral action: from those 'ends' we infer whether such and such conduct is virtuous or vicious. But these 'starting points,' or 'principles,' or 'ends of life,' we cannot recognize without having a formed state of moral virtue. Under the influence of a vicious state of mind we propose to ourselves a vicious 'end,' and we range our actions to the attainment of that end as though it were a virtuous one. It follows that the knowledge of such moral relations not being virtuous is not Practical Wisdom, since Practical Wisdom is concerned with what is good for men. It is consequently essential that the man of practical wisdom should place before himself 'the good' as his end; and hence it is impossible for Practical Wisdom to be formed apart from a general excellence of the moral nature:—*i.e.*, it is impossible for a man to be 'practically wise' unless he be personally good.

In this way, therefore, it is evident that Practical Wisdom is impossible unless the whole moral nature be virtuous.

It is evident also that Moral Excellence is impossible apart from Practical Wisdom. Now there are two aspects of Moral Excellence, as a confirmed state or as a natural instinct. Moral Virtue, in the perfect sense of the term, bears the same relation to Natural Virtue that Practical Wisdom does to Cleverness, the one not being identical but similar to the other (*i.e.*, natural cleverness is an aptitude of soul, and Practical Wisdom is the perfection of that aptitude).

It is admitted by all men that each one of our moral virtues is, in a certain sense, 'natural': we have the attributes of justice and of temperance, and other moral characteristics from the very moment of our birth. Still we seek for a goodness distinct from this type, because we consider that such excellences are not moral virtues in the perfect sense of the term. These natural excellences are found also in children and in animals, and are often found to be harmful, inasmuch as they attach to them apart from Reason. Precisely as when a strong body is moved, if it move without a power of sight, its fate is to fall heavily; so is it with the moral states: devoid of Reason they are found to be baneful, but com-

as being formed states of the moral nature; and they are not rendered more capable of doing nor more disposed to do what is honourable and right by the mere fact of knowing what honour and right are. We are not made more healthy, nor brought into a better physical condition, by *knowing* ever so perfectly the conditions of health and well-being, but by possessing the bodily habit or condition from which health and well-being flow. The boxer is not made a better pugilist by the mere knowledge of what it is to box well and skilfully: he is a boxer, not from a knowledge of boxing, but in consequence of his possessing a bodily condition adapted for boxing. Similarly in the case of the wrestler and of the runner. A man who is an athlete, is so in consequence of his bodily condition, not in consequence of his knowledge merely of the principles of health or of training. In speaking of the 'conditions of health or of training,' I am not referring to external conditions productive of health and well-being, but to such as a man in health and well-being shows in consequence of his possessing a formed state of health and well-being.

3. Just, therefore, as in the case of the bodily states mentioned above, men will not be made physically better in consequence of their having knowledge, so neither will the good man be made more noble in respect of virtue in consequence of Practical Wisdom.

If, then, Practical Wisdom is no help to the good in respect of virtue, the remaining alternative is that it renders those who are not virtuous more noble. Yet in their case also it is not very necessary that they should be 'practically wise' in order to become virtuous. It is possible for them to learn the theory of virtue from others, and, following the directions given them, so to become virtuous. In precisely the same way, though we all desire to be in sound health, we do not ourselves study Medicine but inquire of our physicians, and there is nothing to prevent our being in good health thereby.

Such then are the difficulties which may be raised in reference to Practical Wisdom and Philosophy—in respect of the benefit which they confer on men and the way in which they are of real utility.

4. There is also a further question into which we ought to inquire—in regard to their relative position towards each other: which of them is the more important? It seems on the one hand that Philosophy is more important than Practical Wisdom, inasmuch as it is a knowledge of necessary truths. On the other hand Practical Wisdom seems to be more important than Philosophy inasmuch as it is the source of moral action, and for that reason is more authoritative than Philosophy, which is simply speculative. The mental attitude which is concerned with *action* has authority and exercises rule over every department of life.

(*b*) EXAMINATION OF THE FIRST TWO OBJECTIONS STATED ABOVE.

We must accordingly discuss these points, they being the only difficulties which have been so far raised.

We reply, then, in the first place, that Philosophy and Practical Wisdom must necessarily be objects of desire in and for themselves, though neither one nor the other produce any kind of result, since they are respectively the perfection of separate divisions of the soul.

General answer to the two first of these objections: Philosophy and Practical Wisdom are precious in and for themselves.

But as a matter of fact both of them do produce a result, not in the way in which a knowledge of medicine produces health; but a philosophic state of mind produces happiness precisely as a healthy state of body produces health. Philosophy

being a part of human excellence as a whole, renders a man happy by the fact of his being possessed of it, and working out a life in harmony with it.

Again, the work of man, and the proper function of his life, is only finished off and perfected after the model of Practical Wisdom and Moral Virtue. A good life makes the aim of life right; Practical Wisdom makes the means for realising that aim right.

[There is no moral excellence of the fourth division of the soul, the nutritive, because there is nothing depending upon it, to do or to forbear.]

Such are the difficulties which have been raised in regard to Philosophy and Practical Wisdom; and we must treat of them in order.

In the first place, then, even if the virtues of this kind were of no practical utility, yet they must necessarily be choiceworthy for their own sakes, since they are respectively the perfection of the several elements of the rational soul, as has been shown; and every excellence is a thing desirable *per se*.

But in fact they *are* useful in view of happiness, though not in the way in which medicine is conducive to health: Philosophy and Practical Wisdom are conducive to happiness in the same way that healthfulness is conducive to health. Happiness in its most comprehensive sense is complete and absolute virtue, while Philosophy and Practical Wisdom are elements of virtue as a whole; hence Philosophy and Practical Wisdom are elements in human happiness, and to have the intellectual states implied by Practical Wisdom and Philosophy, in conjunction with the other virtues, is to be happy with an absolute and perfect happiness.

Moreover, Practical Wisdom is useful in view of every single act of virtue; and by the help thereof it is that every function of virtue is perfectly performed. Moral Virtue directs aright the will or desire towards the end of virtue, and makes the moral aim right. Practical Wisdom, on the other hand, seeks the means which conduce to that virtuous end, and deliberates by what means it is possible most nobly and most easily and in the proper manner to attain to that end.

[Of the fourth division of the soul, which is the nutritive element, there is no excellence of the character to which we are here referring, having for its origination the property of impulse—I mean of course *moral* excellence. The nutritive element has influence in no kind of moral action; and that which is not a source originating moral action, is incapable of having moral excellence. The only excellence capable of being ascribed to the principle of nutrition is good nurture, and such things as are consequent thereon when the nutritive element is in sound condition, *i.e.*, beauty or size—though they are not excellences in the absolute sense of the term: they do not arise from an act of Will, nor are they desirable for their own sake, but are called 'excellences' by way of metaphor.]

It has, therefore, been shown that even if Practical Wisdom and Philosophy were unable to conduce to any other purpose, yet for their own sake they ought to be esteemed of vast importance.

(*c*) EXAMINATION OF THE THIRD OBJECTION STATED ABOVE.

In regard to the third objection, that 'men are no way better able through their practical wisdom to perform what is right and good,' we must recur to the

To answer the third objection we mu

BOOK VII.—PART I. CONCERNING STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OF CHARACTER.

PART II. CONCERNING PLEASURE.

INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS.

Part I.—Concerning Strength or Weakness of Character.

HITHERTO we have been mainly occupied with ideals of character which are seldom realized. But in dealing with men as they actually are we find not only that the ideals both of excellence and of defect are seldom realized, but also that the deviations from the type assume various forms. We must, therefore, assuming all that has been already said, make a new beginning, and treat of men's characters as being not only ideally good or bad, but as being also actually strong or weak, and as exhibiting different forms both of strength and weakness.

The defective types of character which exist may be classified as wickedness, weakness or self-indulgence, and savagery; and corresponding to them are three forms of moral excellence, goodness, manliness, and that heroic temperament which is sometimes called divine.

It is with the second of each of these types that we shall be specially concerned. Our method will be, as in previous books, to take the facts as they appear, and to examine the difficulties which have arisen respecting the interpretation of them.

The prevalent opinions respecting moral weakness and its opposite may be stated as seven in number:

(1.) It is thought that moral weakness is to be ranked among things which are to be blamed, and moral strength among things which are praiseworthy.

(2.) It is thought that moral weakness consists in a want of power to adhere to conviction, and that strength of character is identical with tenacity of purpose.

(3.) It is thought that moral weakness consists in the want of power to resist passion, and that strength of character is the reverse.

(4.) It is thought by some that strength of character is identical with Temperance: by others this is denied.

(5.) It is thought by some that moral weakness is identical with dissoluteness: others regard it as distinct.

(6.) It is thought by some that moral weakness is incompatible with

Practical Wisdom: others think that a man may be intellectually strong and morally weak.

(7.) It is questioned whether moral weakness is an absolute characteristic, or whether each man is only morally weak in certain relations.

These various opinions present several difficulties, with which we must briefly deal before proceeding to a more philosophical analysis of the subject.

(*a.*) What is the true relation between moral weakness and mental conviction? In what sense can a man know what is right and do what is wrong?

Socrates answered this question in the negative: but his view fails adequately to explain the psychological phenomena involved in the fact that men do actually commit under the influence of passion acts which when out of the range of that influence they know to be wrong.

Others have answered the question by making a distinction between 'knowledge' and 'opinion.' But if a man were not *sure* of his moral ideas, if, that is to say, he could not oppose to the influence of passion the firm front of firm convictions, he would be pardoned for yielding to that influence: but as a fact of experience he is not pardoned, consequently this solution is at issue with experience.

Others have thought that the form of knowledge which struggles against passion is Conscience or Practical Wisdom: but if a man have Practical Wisdom in the sense in which we have described it in the previous book, he cannot have a weak will.

(*b.*) What is the relation between Moral Strength and Temperance?

They are not identical, as is sometimes supposed: for the man who is ideally temperate has already banished from his soul the strong and evil passions which the strong-minded man possesses and controls.

(*c.*) What is the relation between Moral Strength and tenacity of resolution?

These, again, cannot be identical: for some resolutions and opinions are bad: others are the result of a more or less conscious sophistry: in either case it is not weakness but strength which is shown in departing from them. Moreover, a wrong action which is the result of fixed, though mistaken, conviction, seems to be better than one which is the result of mere weak yielding to impulse.

Some of the questions which these difficulties raise cannot now be discussed: to the more precise solution of others we must now address ourselves. We propose (1) to determine the sense in which knowledge is compatible with moral evil, (2) to consider the special conditions which test strength or weakness of character.

(1.) The distinction which is drawn between 'knowledge' and 'opinion' will not hold in reference to the attitude of mind in which men stand to moral truths. Even if the distinction be metaphysically tenable, it will not account for the facts, inasmuch as what is called 'knowledge' and what is called 'opinion' do not differ in the action which they respectively exert upon the will. We shall assume that what a weak-minded man resists is 'knowledge:' but, assuming this, several distinctions may be drawn:—

(*a.*) A man may have knowledge and not use it; in committing a

wrong action a man may for the moment forget, though he really knows, how wrong it is.

(*b.*) There are two premisses in a moral syllogism: if a man does not see both at once, he will not act upon both, *i.e.* he will not act according to his full knowledge. He may say to himself 'This is a king' without realizing to himself at the moment the other premiss 'Kings are to be reverenced:' or he may be fully alive to the premiss 'Kings are to be reverenced,' but may not know that 'This is a king.' In either case his knowledge will not avail him.

(*c.*) A man may possess knowledge in another sense. He may be asleep or mad. For example, dreams are in a sense the result of knowledge: but a man has no control over that knowledge: what he knows is seen in a false light and with a distorted meaning. His state of mind under the influence of passion may be similar to this. The fact that he talks intelligently is no proof to the contrary. He may be talking only as children repeat words which they do not understand, or as actors upon the stage may go through their parts without realizing the poet's meaning.

(*d.*) The relative force of the influences of knowledge and passion or desire vary widely under different circumstances. A man who has dined may see food which is the property of his neighbour, and feel no desire to touch it. But the same man seeing food which is the property of his neighbour, and knowing it to be the property of his neighbour, when in a state of ravenous hunger, is constrained to take it. On the one hand is the syllogism 'My neighbour's property is not to be touched, and this is my neighbour's property:' on the other hand is the syllogism 'Food satisfies hunger, and this is food.' In such a case the weak-minded man, in yielding to temptation, yields in a sense to reason: albeit that his reason acts wrongly, desire having suggested the major premiss 'Food satisfies hunger,' instead of that which should have been the major premiss 'My neighbour's property is not to be touched.'

The general conclusion to be drawn is that although knowledge is compatible with a weak will, the form of knowledge which is so compatible is not intellectual but sensuous or emotional. It is the knowledge of particulars, *i.e.* of minor premisses, to which desire suggests wrong major premisses: it is not the knowledge of universals, *i.e.* of the true major premisses and principles of action.

(2.) Moral weakness is a generic term which includes several species. Its sphere is identical with that of pleasure, and its forms are not less numerous than the forms of pleasure.

(*a.*) Some forms of pleasure are produced by objects which are in themselves as innocent as they are desirable, such as victory, honour, and wealth. When a man pursues any one of these objects in excess, we do not call him weak-minded in an unqualified sense, but add a limiting description, for example, we speak of a man as being 'weak-minded in regard to military fame.' This description does not connote, as the unqualified epithet 'weak-minded' does, the idea of depravity.

(*b.*) Other forms of pleasure are produced by causes which, though natural and inevitable, admit of excess. Of this kind are the pleasures of the body, and it is in regard to these that a man is called, in an unqualified sense, strong or weak, when he pursues them in excess contrary to the dictates of conscience and sound judgment.

(*c.*) A third class of objects are pleasurable only as the consequence of physical defects or evil habits. The pleasures to which they give rise are neither innocent nor natural: they are censurable not in their excess, but in any form of their indulgence. They are savage and bestial. The term 'weak-minded' does not properly apply to those who give way to them: though at the same time it may be applied metaphorically and with the addition of the epithets 'bestial' or 'morbid,' according as the cause of the indulgence in them is nature or disease.

It will appear from this analysis that the sphere within which moral weakness is possible in the proper and unqualified sense of the term, is identical with the sphere of viciousness: it is exercised in relation to natural and inevitable desires: and the use of the term in relation to other desires is metaphorical and not absolute.

Having thus determined the several spheres within which the defective types of moral character are, properly speaking, displayed, we proceed to compare the various types with one another and to estimate their various degrees of blameworthiness.

(1.) In the first place, the moral weakness which yields to lust is more reprehensible than that which yields to anger: this is the case for several reasons:—

(*a.*) Anger is more rational than lust. The man who yields to the one listens in a sense to reason, though he may listen to it amiss: the other sets reason wholly aside.

(*b.*) Anger is a more purely natural impulse than lust. It is more deeply implanted in our constitution, not indeed than the desires from which lust springs, but than the excess of the indulgence of those desires, which constitute lust.

(*c.*) Anger is more impulsive than lust. It is less the result of deliberate intention.

(*d.*) Anger is sometimes painful to the man who indulges it: lust is always pleasurable.

(2.) Secondly, dissoluteness is worse than savagery, on the principle '*corruptio optimi pessima.*' It is the wreck of higher faculties and a nobler nature.

(3.) Thirdly, of the three varieties of character which are the special results of yielding to pleasure, the dissolute man is worse than the weak-minded man because he is farther from the chance of reformation, and the effeminate man is also worse than the weak-minded man because he yields to temptation with less struggle. On the other hand

(4.) Fourthly, moral weakness, in the strict sense of the term which has been described above, has itself two varieties. Some men yield through sudden impulse, others through feebleness of will: the former are impetuous, the latter nerveless.

Between moral weakness and dissoluteness there are several points of comparison.

(*a.*) The dissolute man acts from fixed, though depraved, purpose: the weak-minded man yields in opposition to his better judgment: the former is incurable, the latter may be influenced for good and admits of repentance.

(*b.*) The dissolute man has wrong principles or axioms of conduct: the weak-minded man right principles, upon which through the influence of passion and the want of strength of purpose, he fails to act. The former is utterly vicious, the latter is a mixture of good and evil.

In a similar way Strength of Character is predicated in two senses. In the strict sense of the term it is used only of a man who adheres to a right judgment: but accidentally it is used of a man who is firm to any kind of purpose. In the latter case it degenerates into obstinacy and self-will: and tends to become weakness rather than strength of character. For the case of Neoptolemus shows that men who depart from their resolution are not in every instance weak-minded: they may present the inconsistency of swerving from their purpose and yet achieving thereby a noble end.

In the strict sense of the term Strength of Character forms a mean between Asceticism and Moral Weakness: but since the former type of character is rare, it has popularly been considered to be opposed only to Moral Weakness. It is not identical with Temperance, except that the temperate man may be called strong-minded by analogy: but there is in reality this important difference between them that the strong-minded man has bad desires whereas the temperate man has not—having so perfected his moral nature as to be incapable of acting contrary to reason.

Part II.—Concerning Pleasure.

The question of pleasure is one which the political philosopher must necessarily take into consideration. For pleasure is conceivably the end, and certainly the sphere, of moral activity: if it be the end, then by reference to it, actions must be judged: if it be no more than the sphere, still activity cannot be dissociated from it: in either case the consideration of it is of essential importance to a student of human life.

What then, is pleasure, and what is its relation to human life?

We must answer this question, as we have answered other questions, by considering in the first place, the opinions which are current in reference to it. These opinions are mainly three, (1) that no pleasure is a good, (2) that some pleasures are good and the majority bad, (3) that pleasure is a good, but not the Chief Good.

I. The first of these opinions is held and advocated on several grounds:—

(1.) It is alleged that 'pleasure is a process of becoming, and therefore cannot be a good, which is not a process but an end.' We may urge in reference to this argument, (*a.*) that 'goods' are of two kinds, absolute and relative: there will be a corresponding distinction in moral states: some will be good or bad absolutely, some relatively to a particular individual, or to particular circumstances; and if this be the case with moral states, it will be the case also with the processes which produce those states: they cannot be all absolutely bad: some will be relatively good: hence even assuming that pleasure is a process, it may

be, if not absolutely, at least, relatively, good. (b.) It is not true that all pleasures are 'processes of coming into a natural state,' nor that all 'goods' are ends: some 'goods' are activities, and pleasure may be a concomitant of such activities and *per accidens* a good.

(2.) 'The temperate man shrinks from pleasure.' Not from all pleasures, but only from those which are attended with desire and pain.

(3.) 'What a wise man aims at is not pleasure, but the absence of pain.' This is not true: he aims indeed at avoiding the pain which accompanies false and imperfect pleasures: but there are positive pleasures which he pursues.

(4.) 'Pleasures hinder thought.' Nay: in certain cases they accompany and stimulate it.

(5.) 'There is no art of pleasure: but there is an art of good: consequently pleasure cannot be identified with good.' [In other words, every good is obtained in a systematic way: if a man wants health he applies to himself the rules of the physician, but there is no such set of rules for obtaining pleasure, nor any systematic teacher of it.] But in the first place the premisses are not true: there are kinds of pleasure of which there are arts: in the second place if the premisses were true, they would not prove the conclusion: for pleasure is an activity and not a faculty: but all arts are of faculties.

(6.) 'Pleasure is the aim of human beings before they have attained to the age of reason, and of animals, which are devoid of reason, and cannot therefore be the proper aim of man.' True: but a distinction must be drawn between pleasures: some are imperfect and objects of desire to those who are imperfect: some, on the other hand, are perfect, and a proper aim of the highest type of mind.

II. The second opinion is maintained on the ground that some pleasures are disgraceful, and some positively harmful.

It may be said in reply (1) that the argument is not conclusive: the badness may be not inherent but accidental: almost all good things admit of being accidentally bad: even knowledge itself may be put to a bad use. (2) That the fact of some pleasures being bad does not disprove the hypothesis that a certain form of pleasure may be the Chief Good. In the same way the fact that some kinds of knowledge are bad does not prove that a certain form of knowledge may not be the Chief Good. (3) Bodily pleasures, which are those in which the dissolute man indulges, and which are especially designated as 'bad,' are not in all cases bad. They are no doubt bad when pursued after a certain limit: but they may be good up to that limit.

III. The third opinion is maintained on one of the same grounds as the first opinion, viz., that pleasure is 'a process of becoming' and not an end, and that it consequently cannot be the Chief Good, which is of course the supreme end.

But it is not true that pleasures are 'processes of becoming.' Some of them no doubt are concomitant with such processes: but that is only accidental. They are in their own nature activities: they are experienced not so much when we are coming into a state of power as when we are using that power.

In addition to this criticism of current opinions, and in corroboration of it, we may remark—

(1.) That pleasure would seem to be a good because pain is an evil: it can hardly be said that pleasure is in its own nature evil: its effects may be, but not itself.

(2.) That the fact of the universal striving after pleasure cannot be lightly dismissed. It is true that different grades of beings and different types of character strive after different forms of pleasure: it is also true that since the bodily and lower forms of pleasure have a larger and sometimes an exclusive place in the aims of the mass of men, they have almost taken full possession of the name: but it is also the case that all men in their various degrees weave pleasure into happiness. And rightly so: for happiness is 'unimpeded activity:' and this is also the definition of pleasure.

(3.) That the causes of the confusion between bodily pleasures and pleasures *per se* are not far to seek. On the one hand bodily pleasures are an anodyne for the inevitable pains of life, on the other hand they are the only pleasures in which undisciplined and undeveloped minds —and such are the minds of the mass of men—can take delight.

(4.) That pleasures which are good in themselves are not bodily, nor do they admit of excess, nor are they, like bodily pleasures, in constant alternation with pain. The constant consciousness of such pleasures is impossible to us because our nature is complex and its lower elements do not admit of being absolutely repressed. But such pleasures exist even for us, and they are eternally present to the life of God.

TRANSLATION.

PART I.—CONCERNING STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OF CHARACTER.

I.—OPINIONS UPON THE CAUSES OF MORAL STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS.

i.—General view of the problems suggested by the subject.

(*a*) CLASSIFICATION OF TYPES OF MORAL CHARACTER.

HERE we may take a fresh starting-point for our inquiry and proceed to treat of those phases of character which ought under all circumstances alike to be avoided. Of these defects there are three distinct types—wickedness, self-indulgence, and savagery. What these defects are opposed to in the first two cases, is obvious: the opposite of wickedness is called goodness, and the opposite of self-indulgence is called manliness. Corresponding, again, to savagery, at the opposite pole, it would be most natural to place that form of goodness which is heroic and divine and grander than our common life—realising the description which Homer has represented Priam to give of his son Hector as of one who was supremely great:

Three defective phases of character:—
1. Wickedness.
2. Self-indulgence.
3. Savagery.

Three types of moral excellence:—
1. Goodness.
2. Manliness.
3. Heroism.

> "Nor seemed he
> To be the son of mortal man, but of a God."

If it be true, then, that out of men Gods are fashioned through pre-eminence of moral worth, it is evident that the state of mind which has these Godlike attributes will be one that is farthest removed from the state of the savage. As there is neither wickedness nor goodness predicable of a beast, so neither is there of a God: the condition of a God is more glorious than is implied in goodness, and the condition of a brute falls under a distinct category from that of wickedness.

However it is rare for a man to be 'divine,' and to realise the standard which the Spartans are wont to attribute to their heroes, calling a man Godlike when they strongly admire him. So also the savage type of character is rarely found: for the most part it is confined to barbarians, though it also arises in some cases through disease and mutilation; and we apply this character as a term of opprobrium to persons who are outrageous in their wickedness.

However we shall have to make some reference to the savage type of character later on, and an analysis of wickedness has been already made. We must now treat of moral weakness, effeminacy, and self-indulgence, and of their opposites—moral strength and manliness. We must not suppose on the one hand that these states are synonymous respectively with virtue or wickedness, nor yet that they are radically distinct therefrom.

After the analysis which has been given of the moral and intellectual virtues, it is necessary to treat of Manliness, and of that form of virtue which transcends our human capabilities and is in a way heroic and divine. Neither Manliness nor this superhuman virtue is of the same kind with the virtues which have been already described; we must, therefore, now that we have finished our account of the virtues generally, treat of these specially, taking a fresh starting point for our Treatise. It will be clear from the explanations which we are about to give, that neither Manliness nor Superhuman Virtue is on the same level with the virtues previously described.

Now of the types of character which are worthy of censure, and which ought to be shunned, there are three varieties—Wickedness, Weakness, and Savagery. The contraries of these states are, respectively,—of Wickedness Moral Virtue, which we have already examined; of Weakness Moral Strength or Manliness; of Savagery Superhuman Virtue, which is commonly called 'Heroic Virtue' on the strength of which men are said to become Godlike instead of human. It is in this Godlike character that Homer introduces Priam as speaking of his son Hector—

> "Nor seemed he
> To be the son of mortal man, but of a God,"

such was the pre-eminence of his moral worth.

It is this Godlike state that is opposed to Savagery. Savagery is not Wickedness in the sense in which Wickedness is opposed to the Moral Virtues: it is not wickedness natural to man—and in fact it is not wickedness at all, since a brute beast is incapable either of wickedness or of virtue, inasmuch as it acts neither with Reason nor in defiance of Reason. For similar reasons Godlike and Heroic Virtue will not be virtue in the strict sense, virtue being described as 'the perfection of *man*,' whereas Heroic Virtue is a thing divine. Moral Virtue does not attach to a God, but the perfection of a God is something grander and more precious than Moral Virtue. As the Godlike character is rare, so also is the savage character, which is its opposite, rare: it is for the most part confined to barbarians, though it may arise not only through utter depravity of temper, but also through disease or mutilation.

Of the savage type of character we shall have to give an account later on; and we have already treated of Wickedness in discussing the Moral Virtues.

For the present we must treat of Moral Weakness, and Self-indulgence, and Effeminacy, and the type of character opposed thereto—Strength of Character and Manliness. These are aspects of the moral life neither identical with

the Wickedness or Virtue which have been already described, nor yet again entirely different so as to belong to a different class. In so far as the man of moral strength chooses the good and follows the guidance of Reason, his character resembles that of the morally virtuous. But in so far as his passions are in opposition to his will, and he is consequently in a state of ceaseless struggle from not possessing a fixed and permanent disposition, to that degree his character is not that of virtue. For corresponding reasons neither is Moral Weakness identical with Wickedness in the sense in which Wickedness is the direct opposite of the Moral Virtues. A man who is vicious in respect of wickedness generally, having a fixed state of vice, performs vicious acts without any opposition on the part of Reason; whereas the man who is simply weak is overpowered by his desires, though his Reason is drawing him to the side of the 'good;' and on that account moral weakness is not of the same character as wickedness—though in so far as weakness, like wickedness, is in contravention of Reason, and agreeable to the agent, it participates in the nature of wickedness.

(*b*) METHOD OF THE INVESTIGATION.

Here, as in the previous analysis, our method of dealing with the subject must be to state the admitted facts of the case, and then, after reviewing the difficulties which those facts suggest, to explain, if possible, *all* the theories in vogue about them, or, if not *all*, the greater number and the most important. If the difficulties of the problem be solved and the current views are left unshaken, the subject will have been sufficiently elucidated.

Method of treatment proceeds from admitted facts.

We may treat of this subject according to the method in which we have dealt with the previous inquiries: we will put forward the views which are commonly held upon these problems, and after refuting such of those views as are not in accord with the truth, we will let remain such of them as are most probable, and strengthen them by further arguments. In this way the treatment of the whole subject will be clearly defined.

(*c*) STATEMENT OF CURRENT THEORIES RESPECTING MORAL FAILURE AND SUCCESS.

Now the theories commonly maintained in reference to the weakness or strength of the moral character may be stated as follows:

Seven current theories stated.

1. Strength of character and Manliness come within the category of things morally good and praiseworthy, whereas Weakness and Self-indulgence come within the category of things vicious and reprehensible.

2. The man of strong character is identical with the man who adheres resolutely to his convictions, whereas the man of weak character is one who is ever veering from his better judgment.

3. The weak man though he knows that certain actions are bad still commits them under the influence of feeling, whereas the

man of strong character through force of Reason does *not* follow his passions, knowing that they are depraved.

4. The temperate man has a strong character, and is manly; and whenever a man is of a strong and manly temper, some think that he is *ipso facto* temperate, but others deny that these two ideas are convertible.

5. The dissolute man is a weak man, and the weak man is dissolute:—so some would say, confusing the two characters together, while others would make them distinct.

6. The man of practical wisdom cannot conceivably, so men say at times, be a man of weak will; while at other times we hear of men who, though far-sighted and clever, have no strength of moral character.

7. Men are, again, said to be 'weak' in special connections, *e.g.* in respect of anger, or ambition, or gain.

I. Now it is universally admitted that Strength of will and Manliness fall under the idea which we have of what is virtuous and praiseworthy, while weakness of character is the reverse.

II. In regard to Strength of will men take the following views:—

1. The man of strong character is the same as a man who is resolute and immovable in carrying out his conviction, and Strength of character is adhering firmly to one's conviction; while weakness of will, and the man who shows it, are the very opposite of these.

2. The man of strong character, knowing that his passions are bad, refrains himself from them, and follows the guidance of Reason, whereas the man of weak character, though he knows that he is doing evil things yet fails to obey his Reason, owing to the influence of pleasure over him.

3. The temperate man is of a strong and manly character, and the dissolute man is the very reverse.

4. Everyone who is of a strong character is temperate. For similar reasons some think that everyone who is weak is dissolute, and that everyone who is dissolute is weak; while others think that the two characters are distinct the one from the other.

5. It is conceivable for a man to have practical wisdom and cleverness, and at the same time to have a weak will.

6. Men are called 'weak' when they are prone to passion, or grasp eagerly at honour or profit.

These are pretty nearly all the opinions commonly held in regard to Moral Strength and Weakness; and we may now proceed to examine them one by one.

ii.—Difficulties of a scientific explanation of Moral Weakness.

(*a*) IS MORAL WEAKNESS COMPATIBLE WITH RIGHT OPINIONS?

But a difficulty will be raised at starting:—In what sense can a man be said to have right conceptions of duty though he act weakly and selfishly?

Refutation of the Socratic view that a man cannot act against knowledge.

Now some writers deny the very possibility of a man acting wrongly, if he has real knowledge

of what his duty is. They think, as Socrates thought, that it is a wild fiction to imagine a man being overmastered by a strange principle, and dragged about like a slave in the very presence of the Science within him. Socrates of course combated this theory *à l'outrance*, maintaining that moral weakness was an impossible condition of mind. No one, he argued, acted in violation of what was best, if only he had a conception of what was best; but whenever a man violated right, his fault was caused by ignorance.

This theory, however, of Socrates and his followers is manifestly at issue with the admitted facts of experience. These writers are bound to explain what is the form which ignorance assumes in the case of these mental phenomena, if it be true that ignorance is in all cases the cause of sin. Clearly the man who falls into sin through weakness does not think that his act is lawful, before he finds himself in the toils of passion.

But there are others who admit the Socratic view in some aspects and disagree with it in other aspects. They acknowledge that there is nothing stronger than knowledge, but they do not admit that 'a man never acts contrary to what seems to him best,' and hence they qualify the theory to this extent that 'it is not *knowledge* which a man has when he is overmastered by his pleasures but only *opinion*' . . . . . Nay, but surely, if a man's moral ideas be not matters of *knowledge* but only of opinion, and if the impression which makes resistance to his passions be not a powerful one but faint and weak, as in the mental conflict of those who are in doubt and hesitation, in that case it would be pardonable for a man not to remain steadfast in his opinions in the presence of powerful passions; whereas in fact there is no forgiveness shown to Wickedness nor to any moral state whatever that is reprehensible.

Refutation of the view that a man acts not against 'knowledge' but against 'opinion.'

Here a difficulty arises:—How is it possible that a man, while having right conceptions in regard to the actions which he performs, nevertheless acts weakly and sinfully?

Some thinkers maintain that the man of weak will does not know that his conduct is wicked, and that he has no true knowledge of his duty: this is the view which Socrates held—that it is not possible, if knowledge be present in a man's mind, that some other power should overmaster him and drag him about like a slave.

This theory is, however, at variance with obvious facts: it is notorious that there is such a thing as a man of weak will, and the man of weak will is one who is impelled towards objects the very opposite of what he knows to be good.

We must therefore enquire whether everyone who practises the evil does so in consequence of ignorance, and, if so, what is the form which ignorance assumes in that case.

There are, however, others who think that though the man of weak will *knows* what he does, yet what he has is not real knowledge of his duty but only opinion, under the idea that it is not possible, if a man have real knowledge, that he should be overpowered by pleasures, nothing being more powerful than knowledge; and therefore they maintain that the knowledge which the man of weak will possesses, is only *opinion* . . . . . Nay but surely if his knowledge be only opinion and not real knowledge, and if there is in fact no strong intellectual belief in the mind of the weak man in regard to his conduct, but only a weak and indistinct belief, as is the case with those who are in doubt, then, in that case, there would be forgiveness shown to those whose wills were weak, for their not adhering to such indistinct beliefs when the violence of the passions dragged them another way. Under this aspect Moral Weakness is not a sign of wickedness, inasmuch as forgiveness is extended to nothing that is wicked or censurable or forbidden . . . . . But in fact Moral Weakness *is* wicked and censurable and forbidden.

(*b*) IS MORAL WEAKNESS COMPATIBLE WITH A GOOD CONSCIENCE?

Refutation of the view that a man cannot act against Conscience.

Imagine, then, that it were Conscience that made the resistance to the desires, Conscience being the strongest power within us. Such a theory would be monstrous: on that supposition a man might have a Good Conscience and yet be weakly selfish. But no one on earth would say that it was compatible with the idea of a man who had a Good Conscience that he should commit the basest actions, and take pleasure therein. Besides this inconsistency of idea, it has been already shown that the man who has a Good Conscience is pre-eminently a man who will show his goodness in action, being, as he is, conversant with every shade of moral distinction and possessing in himself every virtue.

But since the knowledge which the weak man possesses is neither opinion nor science, it may be thought to be the Knowledge which comes from the Conscience, that being the last alternative, and Conscience being indeed a strong form of Knowledge. Yet such a theory is monstrous: on that supposition, a man might have a Good Conscience and a Weak Will; but no one would say that it was consistent with the character of the man who had a Good Conscience to perform base actions and take pleasure therein. In fact it has been demonstrated in the last Book that the man who has a sound Moral Sense is a man who will show forth his goodness in action, and is specially concerned with the discrimination of particular actions, and is of necessity possessed of all the virtues which are consequent on a Good Conscience. It cannot, therefore, be in virtue of a Good Conscience that the man of weak will has the Knowledge that he has.

It has, therefore, been shown that it is impossible for the man of Weak Will to '*know*' in any of the foregoing applications of the term. We have, then, still to enquire what form Knowledge assumes in such cases—a question into which we will examine more minutely a little later on.

(*c*) IS MORAL STRENGTH IDENTICAL WITH TEMPERANCE?

Moreover, since the strong-minded man is so called in virtue of his having passions strong and evil (though under control),

his character will not be identical with that of the temperate man, nor will the temperate man be strong-minded. It is inconsistent with the idea of the temperate man to have violent passions or evil passions. Yet, surely, if he were strong-minded, his passions would be both violent and evil. Imagine the desires of the strong-minded man to be virtuous; why, then, the moral attitude which prevented his indulging them would be evil; and consequently strong-mindedness would not be in every case a good. Or, imagine that the desires of the strong-minded man were weak and not vicious, then there would be nothing grand in resisting them; or again if his desires were bad though weak, then there would be nothing great in overcoming them.

Moral strength not the same as temperance.

Now let us consider whether it be possible for the temperate man to be strong-minded, and whether in any sense the strong-minded man is temperate.

The answer will be evident if we fix the definition of the strong-minded man. The strong-minded man is surely one who shows resistance in face of strong and evil passions: he has then passions strong and evil. If, then, the temperate man will be strong-minded, he too must have passions strong and evil:—an idea opposed to the very conception of Temperance: Temperance does not consist in the desires following the guidance of Reason. Moreover the temperate man takes delight in the actions which he performs:—otherwise he would not be temperate. On the other hand the strong-minded character, being in a state of struggle and conflict with his passions, has no pleasure therein, pleasure depending upon moral calm. Again, if a man has a confirmed habit of courage, he is not terrified when dangers come upon him suddenly and before he has employed his reason against them. In the same way, surely, if a man have a confirmed habit of temperance, he will not be thrown into tumult by incentives to pleasure before he has had time to consider their character, and before his reason has withstood them. The strong-minded man is different from that: strong-mindedness is said to consist in employing Reason in regard to pleasure and withstanding the desires. Now if the desires of the strong-minded man were good, strong-mindedness which prevents his indulging those desires would be bad. If again his desires were weak yet not bad, strong-mindedness would be nothing grand, whereas in fact it is. If again his desires, though bad were weak, there would be nothing great in his overmastering them; and consequently strong-mindedness would be nothing great. The only alternative, surely, is that the passions of the strong-minded man are vicious and powerful; and consequently the temperate man will not be strong-minded nor will the strong-minded man be temperate.

(*d*) IS STRONG-MINDEDNESS OR WEAKNESS COMPATIBLE WITH INTELLECTUAL ERROR?

Again, if strong-mindedness makes a man resolute in adhering to any and every opinion, then in certain cases it is a bad state;—if, for example, it makes a man adhere to an opinion which is false. Conversely if moral weakness makes a man disposed to veer from any and every opinion, then there will be one form of weakness which is good, as in the character of

There is no Moral Virtue in adhering to *every* opinion: since some opinions are wrong,

Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes of Sophocles: his conduct is praiseworthy in that he did not persist in the course to which he had been persuaded by Ulysses, in consequence of the pain he felt in telling a lie.

and others are the result of Sophistry.

Again, if strong-mindedness be synonymous with adherence to any and every opinion, the reasoning of the Sophist, though leading to a false conclusion, is a puzzle. In consequence of the Sophists being anxious to prove conclusions specious yet startling, so as, if successful, to be thought clever, the method of reasoning which they frame becomes a moral puzzle, since the mind is bound with sophistical chains. While on the one hand the mind is reluctant to adhere to the conclusion, on the other hand it is unable to go beyond it, from having no means of unravelling the sophism. From one of their arguments, for instance, it follows that if folly be combined with weakness it becomes a virtue. In consequence of his weakness 'the weak fool' does the very reverse of what he conceives to be his duty; but inasmuch as in his folly he conceives that good is evil and that he ought not to do it, the whole result of his conduct will be good and not evil!

Moral error which results from wrong conviction is better than that which results from moral weakness.

Again, a man who acts on conviction in pursuing pleasure with a full purpose, would seem to be a better man than one who does so not from a rational motive but through moral weakness; the first case being more curable than the latter, since there is a chance of a man's changing his opinions when the question is one only of conviction. The man who is 'morally weak' on the other hand is liable to the taunt of the proverb:—'When water chokes what must a man drink then?' If he had *not* been convinced that his act was evil, he might have been brought round by argument and so have ceased from wrong-doing; but in fact he is convinced that his act is wrong though none the less he does the wrong.

Now if strong-mindedness means the adhering to any opinion which one may have formed, it will in certain cases be wrong—when, for example, a man adheres to a false opinion. But of course it is assumed that it is praiseworthy and a good. Consequently Strong-mindedness is not the adhering to the opinion present at the moment, without qualification.

For similar reasons, moral weakness would not be in every case wrong and avoidable but positively good, when for example a man did not adhere to a false opinion; an instance of this would be Neoptolemus persuaded by Ulysses to lie, yet not adhering to his intention, but speaking the truth; or a man deceived by one who was conversing with him, yet surmising that the arguments were false and so not adhering to what had been determined on. Such an one is not blamed; but the man of weak will is blamed. Consequently a man is not strong-minded simply for adhering to his purpose, nor is he weak-

minded for changing it. In fact weak-mindedness combined with folly turns out to be a virtue, if weak-mindedness means the changing from one's opinion and not adhering to what seems to be good. For example, if a man through his folly believes that dissoluteness is a good, yet does not adhere to the opinions he has formed, he will be a temperate man; and thus the weak man will be a good man —which is a fallacy, weakness being universally recognised as censurable.

Again, a man who is able to change his opinion is often better than one who is not so able. But the weak man is not better than the strong-minded man. Consequently the man who adheres to his opinion is not necessarily strong-minded, nor is the man who changes his opinion necessarily weak.

That the man who is able to change his opinion is better than one who is not able, is obvious. The man who pursues what is evil through having been deceived (*i.e.* because he thinks that it is good) is better than the man who knows that it is evil and still pursues it. The man who has been deceived, on being converted to a better view is capable of becoming good; whereas the man who pursues the evil through weakness and though he knows that it is evil, is incapable of turning from his evil courses. How could such an one possibly turn, since it is not possible for him to be persuaded? He knows what it was his duty to know, and yet acts weakly in spite of knowledge; and so is exposed to the taunt 'when water chokes, what must a man drink then?'

It is evident, then, that strong-mindedness is not the adhering to the opinion which a man has for the moment, nor is weakness the changing from that opinion.

(*e*) IS 'WEAKNESS' TO BE PREDICATED IN AN ABSOLUTE SENSE?

If weakness or strength of character may be displayed in all kinds of relations, who is weak or strong in the absolute sense of the term? No one, of course, has every form of weakness; and yet we say of some men that they are 'morally weak' without any qualification.

Some men are weak in a qualified, some in an unqualified sense.

Such, then, are the puzzles that arise on this subject: some of them we must refute as fallacies, and some of them we must leave, as containing a truth: for a difficulty is solved if the truth with which it is concerned is determined.

We must also enquire whether moral strength and weakness are displayed in special relations such as wealth or opinion, or absolutely in regard to whatever is object-matter of desire. If it be true that a man is 'weak' who shows a disposition prone to each one of these things separately, we must enquire who is weak in the absolute sense of the term. Of course it is not a man who is weak in *all* these relations, since no one has *every* form of weakness. We must therefore enquire who is weak in the unqualified sense.

Such then are the questions to be raised and the difficulties which arise in regard to Moral Strength. Some parts of these questions we must dismiss, and others we must leave as established, the unravelling of a difficulty being the discovery of the truth which was investigated.

II.—PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF MORAL EVIL.

i.—Determination of the sense in which knowledge is compatible with moral evil.

(*a*) PRECISE LIMITATION OF THE SUBJECT.

The questions which we must first discuss are these:

Three questions for discussion:—
1. Do weak-minded men act knowingly?
2. What is the precise object-matter of moral strength and weakness?

1. Do the weak-minded *know* that what they do is wrong? If so, in what sense is knowledge used in their case?

2. What is the precise class of objects in regard to which we may affirm moral strength and weakness to be exhibited? What I mean is this:—are the qualities of moral strength and weakness shown in regard to every kind of pleasure or only in regard to certain distinct and separate kinds?

3. Is the strong-minded man identical with or distinct from the manly and brave man?

3. Is strong-mindedness the same as courage?

We must examine also with equal explicitness whatever other questions are cognate to the present Inquiry.

The starting-point of our Inquiry will be the answer to the question whether the weak-minded and the strong-minded man owe their characteristics to a difference of object-matter, or to the manner in which they comport themselves in a common sphere. What I mean is this:—Is the weak man so called from bearing a relation to a certain subject-matter; or is it from the peculiar complexion which that relation assumes; or is it from both causes combined?

We must next examine whether these qualities of strength or weakness are shown in reference to all kinds of subject-matter or not. The man who is weak in the strict sense of the term does not display his weakness in every kind of subject, but only in the sphere in which dissoluteness is displayed; nor is his weakness owing to his having an unqualified relation thereto (otherwise weakness would be the same thing as dissoluteness), but rather to the special complexion which that relation assumes. The dissolute man is led along by his vices with his own free consent, thinking that it is right on every occasion to pursue the present joy; on the other hand the weak man follows after pleasure, though he knows that it is wrong.

We must examine in the first place whether men who are morally weak know their weakness when they yield to sin; and, if so, what is the nature of their

knowledge. In the next place, what are precisely the objects wherein moral strength or weakness are displayed? (I mean, are those objects every form of pleasure and pain, or only certain pleasures and pains in a defined sense?) Again, does the strong-minded character differ at all from the brave and manly character? And, generally, all questions cognate to these.

The starting-point for a solution of these questions will be to determine in what respect the strong-minded man differs from the weak-minded man: Is the difference between them owing to a difference of subject-matter with which they are respectively concerned; or is it owing to the different attitude they show in a common sphere, or is it in both respects combined?

We must then go on to determine whether moral weakness and strength are concerned with every form of the pleasurable or not. Their object-matter is surely not *every* form of the pleasurable but only those forms which give a sphere to the dissolute man. But the weak man does not comport himself therein in the same way as the dissolute man does, but shows a characteristic attitude of his own. The dissolute man, judging as he does on vicious principles, and thinking it an unquestioned good to follow after pleasure on all occasions, is consequently impelled to its pursuit. On the contrary, the weak man, though his Reason is in opposition to his passion, nevertheless indulges his passions of his own accord.

(*b*) UNSATISFACTORY SOLUTION WHICH MAKES 'OPINION' INSTEAD OF 'KNOWLEDGE' THE CONCOMITANT OF MORAL WEAKNESS.

The distinction between 'knowledge' and 'true opinion' is not pertinent to the question.

Now in regard to the view that it is only a true opinion, and not real knowledge, in defiance whereof men weakly yield to sin—such a distinction is immaterial to the argument. Some of those who have opinions are in no doubt thereon, but think that they know with a perfect knowledge. If, then, it be owing to their having but a slight assurance, rather than a settled belief, and those who have opinions are more likely than those who have knowledge to act contrary to their impressions, knowledge will not differ in that aspect from opinion—in regard, that is, to its influence on the will. Some men have a no less assured conviction of what they *think* than others have of what they scientifically *know*, as the case of Heraclitus shows.

As for the view that the knowledge which men who are morally weak possess, and which they violate in their conduct, is opinion and not real knowledge, the point is immaterial to our argument. The point which we have to examine into is whether the knowledge of the good which such an one has is firm or doubtful. It is frequently found that opinion is so firmly rooted in a man that it does not differ from knowledge, in respect of the opposition which it makes to the desires. Some men are as confident in the opinions which they hold as men of science are in the truths which they know through their Science; as for instance Heraclitus thought that he knew with exact scientific knowledge the fancies of his own opinion, such as that there is no movement possible, and the rest of his assumptions. At any rate a man who acts in opposition to an opinion about the good of this character differs in no respect from the man who has a scientific knowledge of the good and is yet impelled to the pursuit of what is pleasant. Both alike are wicked in so far as each of them wars against a strong conviction of Reason.

Hence the difficulty which was raised in the previous chapter—how it is possible for a man who knows the good to choose the evil—cannot possibly be solved in this way. We must therefore enquire how it can be solved in some other way.

(*c*) DIFFERENT SENSES OF THE TERM 'KNOWLEDGE' IN MORAL RELATIONS.

Knowledge in its relations to morals may be (1) latent and not active,

1. But seeing that we speak of 'knowing' in two senses, and that the man who has knowledge but does not exercise it, no less than the man who both has knowledge and also applies it, is said 'to know,' there will be a corresponding difference between the case of a man doing wrong when he has not his knowledge constantly present before him—though he is actually possessed of it, and the case of a man doing wrong when he is not only possessed of knowledge of right, but has that knowledge consciously realized at the moment. It seems a terrible sin for a man to know the right and deliberately do the wrong; but the case is altered if a man, in doing wrong, is not for the moment conscious how wrong it is.

Let us then assume that the terms 'to know' and 'to understand in the way of Science' have a double sense. A man is said 'to know' (1) when he possesses knowledge and exercises it (just as when a man is a geometrician, and exercises his knowledge, he is said to 'know' of geometry); and (2) when he possesses knowledge but without exercising it (just as when a geometrician makes speeches or otherwise occupies himself than in working geometrically.) Precisely then as in the case of a geometrician, it is a wonderful anomaly if, when exercising his knowledge, he draws false conclusions, though not so if, while making a speech, he fails to observe when a man is investigating the figures contrary to the principles of geometry, so it is with the weak-minded man. Marvellous is it indeed if the weak-minded man has real knowledge of right, and puts that knowledge into exercise, and contemplates his conduct in the light thereof, and yet, notwithstanding, is impelled in a direction the very opposite of what he knows to be right. But one ought not to wonder if he does wrong when he is not using his knowledge, though he actually possesses it.

or (2) a knowledge of one premiss only of the moral syllogism,

2. Again, in the moral syllogism into which action may be analysed, there are two premisses: the major and the minor. If a man possesses both premisses, yet makes application only of the Universal and not of the Particular, there is nothing to prevent his acting in despite of his knowledge. It is the particular or minor premiss which is all important, since conduct depends upon particular details.

There is, further, a distinction to be made in the Universal itself. One kind of Universal is subjective, and has reference to the person who uses it; another kind is objective, and has reference to an external fact. An instance of a subjective Universal would

be: 'Dry food is good for all men' (the corresponding minor being 'I am a man'). An instance of an objective Universal would be: 'Dry food has such and such qualities . . .' But whether 'this particular object has these qualities' (which would form the minor proposition), a man may not know or may not realize at the moment. Corresponding of course to these different kinds of premisses, there will be an incalculable difference in their moral bearings; so that, where a premiss depends upon experience, it would seem to be nothing strange that a man should not know; but in regard to subjective premisses it would be marvellous indeed.

Yet even when a man possesses knowledge and puts it into exercise, it is no marvel if he is still an evil-doer, unless he uses his knowledge in a perfect way. Since, I mean, there are two kinds of premisses, Universal and Particular, whereby a man who knows gains his knowledge in drawing a moral conclusion—if he uses only one of the premisses, if, I mean, he uses the universal and not the particular, there is no wonder if he is a wrong-doer. For example: a man knows that a particular thing is evil, and that he ought not to do what is evil, and consequently that he ought not to do this particular thing: now though both these premisses are in the soul at the moment when passion is stirring him to some evil course, it so befalls that he exercises the universal (that 'he ought not to do the evil'), and contemplates his conduct in relation to it at that moment, but does not also exercise the particular premiss (that 'this particular thing is evil'), nor consider it in its actual application, though he possesses that premiss within him; and consequently he proceeds to the commission of evil, just as though morally blinded. Such a case is in no way wonderful: though a man uses the universal premiss, yet is he not able to act upon his knowledge unless he also uses the particular premiss, which is paramount over moral action. If, for example, a man knows that he ought to use dry food but does not know that this particular food is dry, he will not any the more use dry food. The case is exactly the same in moral relations: if a man use the universal premiss and consciously realize it, yet does not at the same time use the particular, he gains no sort of advantage from his knowledge.

Particular premisses also differ in kind. There is one kind which it is quite inevitable for a man to know when the universal is known; and others which do not follow this law. When, for instance, the universal is of such a character as to comprise also the person who frames the syllogism or a subject of the same species, then the particular premiss is known in virtue of the universal; for instance, 'Hellebore is harmful to all men: he is himself a man: therefore hellebore is harmful to him.' In such a case the minor premiss is understood in virtue of the major: no one is able to be ignorant that 'he is a man;' similarly when the universal comprises others of the same species, it is not possible that a man should not know them. On the other hand, when the universal comprehends some external object, then there is no necessity that if the major premiss is known, the minor should be known also. For example, 'all hellebore is harmful: this particular thing is hellebore: therefore this particular thing is harmful.' In this case there is no necessity that the particular should be known although the universal be known. It is this latter kind of premiss which the weak-minded man either does not possess, or if he does possess, does not exercise. To use and not to use a premiss are so widely different from one another that we consider a man a monstrous fellow if he exercises his knowledge and still commits sin, and we marvel if there really be anyone in such a state; but we are by no means astonished at a man's sinning if he does not exercise his knowledge.

or (3) obscured by passion:

3. Again, there is another sense, different from the modes referred to above, in which 'knowledge' is found in men. The mental state implied in a man's having knowledge without using it, is, as we see, characteristic and peculiar; implying that in one sense he has and in another sense he has not knowledge, as when he is in a state of sleep, or madness or drunkenness. But assuredly this is the state to which men are reduced when under the influence of their passions. In fact fits of passion or sensual gratification or other forms of moral depravity unmistakeably change even the bodily appearance; and in some cases actually cause madness. It is evident then that the state of those who are weakly sinful is analogous to the case of those who are physically unnerved.

Again, men do not differ in this fact simply—that some have knowledge and also use it, while others have knowledge without using it, but they differ also in respect of the actual possession. Those who have knowledge do not all possess their knowledge in the same way. It is possible for a man while possessing knowledge, to possess it not, if, for example, he be asleep or mad or drunk. It is in this latter sense that men who are in the toils of passion possess knowledge. Men are drunk through indulging their desires, and they are mad through yielding to passion, and just as in the case of men who are mad or drunk, so also are the bodies of those who are weakly sinful changed and altered unmistakeably in consequence of the passions to which they yield: their colour and aspect is altered, and sometimes they become raving mad. It is evident, therefore, that the knowledge of those who are weakly sinful is of a similar character to that of men who are intoxicated or raving in madness.

or (4) superficial, and apparent only.

4. Again, for a man to use arguments derived from Science is no proof of his own knowledge. Men who are under the influence of their passions will often repeat learned demonstrations and the verses of Empedocles, just as boys when first taught will string together sentences of which they understand not a word. Knowledge, to be really knowledge, must be assimilated, and the process of assimilation is a work of time. Men who are weak and sinful must be understood to talk of moral truths only as actors recite them on the stage.

Even though the weakly sinful use the arguments of Science, they are not proved on that account to be different from those mentioned above. Men who are drunk will utter learned demonstrations and the verses of Empedocles; just in the same way that boys who are just beginning to learn, string together sentences but understand nothing before they have grown into a state of moral habituation, and as it were assimilated their knowledge—a result to be attained only through a long training. Men who weakly and sinfully indulge themselves must be supposed to talk upon questions of duty only as actors upon the stage talk when they are representing certain characters, and repeating the verses which occur in the poems but understand not a word that they say.

(*d*) PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF MORAL EVIL.

Operation of the Practical Syllogism.

Again, we may also regard the cause of Moral Evil from the point of view of the psychologist, in the following light. In the Moral Syllogism into which the mind shapes itself in forming practical judgments, there is first of all the Universal proposition, and secondly an opinion bearing upon the particular fact of which the senses are immediately cognisant. When out of these two propositions a third has resulted, it necessarily follows that while in the sphere of speculative Ethics the mind should simply assert this conclusion, so in the sphere of practical Ethics, the mind should forthwith carry its conclusion into effect. As an example of practical reasoning, suppose that there is in the mind the general proposition, *e.g.* 'One ought to taste whatever is sweet,' and also the particular proposition 'Such and such an object is sweet,' it inevitably results that a man who has the power, and is not hindered, should proceed to act upon the practical conclusion.

When however there is in the mind a conflict of beliefs—when, for instance, there is one Universal which forbids him to taste, and another Universal which says 'All that is sweet is pleasant' (with a minor premiss 'This particular thing is sweet' actively operating in the mind), and a sensual desire happens to be associated therewith, what takes place is this: though the first Universal says 'Avoid this,' yet desire leads and impels him to self-indulgence from the power which it has of setting in motion every bodily organ. The result of this mental conflict is that the weak man yields to temptation under the influence of Reason in a kind of way, and from a rational opinion,—an opinion which is not essentially, but only under these special circumstances, opposed to Reason: it is desire and not opinion which is opposed to Reason, in such a case. [Herein is the reason why brutes are not 'morally weak:' moral weakness implies the consciousness of a moral law, but brutes have no idea of law or conception of the Universal, but only sensuous impressions and a memory confined to particulars.]

Again, one might consider the cause on account of which men who are morally weak do not make choice of the good, though they know what it is, from the point of view of the psychologist, in the following light. In the Moral Syllogism into which we may analyse conduct, there is a Universal proposition, and there is also a particular judgment, which is of course concerned with particular objects of sense. Now when from this Universal and particular judgment we have inferred a third proposition, it necessarily follows that if that conclusion be a theoretical one, the understanding should affirm it and believe

that it is so in reality. On the other hand if the conclusion be a practical one, it necessarily follows that the man should forthwith carry it into effect, unless there be some one to hinder him. For example, it is a theoretical opinion that 'hellebore is harmful' or that 'honey is sweet;' and if we have drawn such a conclusion we simply *believe* it, we do not *act* it. An instance of a practical judgment would be 'we ought to taste whatever is sweet;' and if we have drawn such a conclusion, we immediately put it into effect and taste. When, therefore, there are opinions, as well general as particular, which urge a man to do something (*e.g.* 'it is right to taste this thing because it is sweet,' and 'whatever is sweet ought to be tasted') while at the same time there is Science and Universal Reason urging a man not to taste, yet withal a desire for the thing in question present in the mind, the conclusion drawn from these premisses finds actual expression, and the man puts the conclusion into practice—the Universal forbidding him to taste while desire associated with opinion is moving him to the thing to be tasted. Desire of course has power to influence each separate organ of sense (I mean the senses peculiar to the object of desire—if the pleasant object be visible, it draws to itself sight, and taste, if the object be one of taste. It consequently happens that moral weakness takes place under the influence of Reason and Opinion opposed to Reason. Opinion is not in itself opposed to Reason but on account of its association with Desire: Opinion does not by its own strength overmaster Reason, since it is impossible that Opinion should prevail against Right Reason, but it is owing to the strength of Desire, which even transforms and alters the very constitution of a man. Moral Weakness is therefore brought about by a process of Reason, and of Opinion expressed in opposition to Right Reason, by means of Desire. [It is for this reason that brutes cannot be termed morally weak—because they have no reason against which desire is in opposition but only a sensuous representation of particular objects and a sensuous memory.]

(*e*) THE PROCESS OF MORAL REFORMATION.

The recovery from moral, is analogous to the recovery from physical, weakness.

To explain how the ignorance of the weak man is dispelled and he comes again into possession of knowledge, no special solution is needed: the principle which explains this condition is not special, but the same as that which explains the recovery of a man from intoxication, or the waking of the sleeper; and for this we must refer to the psychologist.

To explain how the ignorance of the weak man is dispelled when his passion is quenched, and he comes again to his sound senses, and developes his life in conformity with true Science, that is the same question which arises in the case of one who is drunk or slumbering; and the matter is one for the psychologists to determine.

(*f*) CONCLUSION: IT IS SENSUOUS AND NOT INTELLECTUAL KNOWLEDGE WHICH IS COMPATIBLE WITH A WEAK WILL.

The Socratic solution is true: the weak-minded man has not knowledge in the strict sense.

To sum up: since the minor premiss of the Moral Syllogism is an opinion in regard to what falls within the range of the senses and has control over the conduct of daily life, this premiss is either not possessed by a man who is under the influence of

passion, or, if it be possessed, possession of knowledge is not equivalent to the realizing of knowledge, but is only the bare repetition of words, like the reciting of Empedocles by a drunken man. Furthermore, since the minor premiss is not universal, and has not the same scientific character as the Universal, the solution which Socrates tried to present seems to be the real one: it is not knowledge in the strict sense which is present in the mind when the conflict of weakness arises, nor is it real knowledge which is twirled about under the power of passion, but only sensuous or emotional knowledge.

The explanations above given must suffice to answer the question whether it be possible for a man to yield to evil with a full knowledge of his act, and to determine the sense which knowledge assumes under such circumstances.

When the man of weak will finds himself in the toils of passion, he either does not possess at all, and does not know, the minor premiss which controls particular actions (the premiss which would tell him that 'such and such a thing is evil,') or he possesses it after the manner in which men who are drunk or raving utter verses or demonstrations; more particularly for the reason that the minor premiss is not, in fact, scientific by itself in the sense in which the universal and major premiss is.

Hence it seems that the solution which Socrates tried to present is the real one. The moral temptation does not arise while knowledge (I mean knowledge in the real and recognized sense, *i.e.* the Universal), is present: Desire has no power over this kind of knowledge;—but it does arise in the presence of that kind of knowledge which is concerned with and has control over particular facts, *i.e.*, the minor premiss. It is this particular knowledge which is violated by the man who acts under passion—this particular knowledge being concerned with actual conduct; and it is this particular knowledge which is dragged about under temptation, and not the universal knowledge.

The explanations here advanced must suffice in regard to the knowledge which men of weak will possess, in reply to the question whether they have knowledge at all of 'the good,' and in what sense they have knowledge when they yield to temptation.

ii.—The special conditions which test the weakness or strength of the character.

(*a*) PLEASURES BEING (1) NATURAL OR (2) UNNATURAL OR (3) INDETERMINATE, THERE ARE CORRESPONDING DIVISIONS OF THE MORAL CHARACTER.

Is there any absolute form of moral weakness? and what is its sphere?

The question which comes next in order for us to discuss is this: Is there any absolute form of moral weakness, or are all cases of moral weakness referable to special failings? Or, if a man can be morally weak in an absolute sense, what precisely are the subjects relatively to which he displays his weakness?

Evidently the sphere in which strength and manliness, self-indulgence and effeminacy are shown, is that of pleasure and pain. But pleasures and pains have in them important points of distinction. Some of the objects which produce pleasure are inevitable; others again are desirable, though admitting of excess. (1) Inevitable pleasures are such as are natural to the body; such, I mean, as are associated with food and the satisfaction of the sensual instincts, in connection wherewith we placed sensuality and temperance. (2) Objects which are neither inevitable nor essential, though in themselves desirable and delectable, are, I mean, such objects as victory, honour, wealth, and similar things that are good and delightful.

Now when men are extravagant in reference to these innocent pleasures, though they violate the law of Right within themselves, we do not call them 'weak' in the absolute sense, but we add a qualifying term and speak of them as 'weakly yielding to the temptations of riches or gain or ambition or passion.' We do not speak of such men as being weak absolutely, since they form a distinct class, and are only called weak relatively and through similarity of relations. The limitation in this case is like that implied in the description 'The man *who was victorious at the Olympic Games*:' the general conception of man is not very different from the particular designation, though still a distinction is implied. In further proof of this distinction is this fact: moral weakness in the absolute sense of the term is blamed, not merely as an *error*, but actually as a kind of depravity, either in the full sense of sin or in some special relation; whereas none of these men (*i.e.* the men who are called 'weak' in one of these special senses) are blamed in that way.

The man who is called 'morally weak,' in the absolute sense of the term (and without any qualification confining his weakness to special objects such as anger), is a man who, in reference to those bodily and personal indulgences which constitute the sphere of temperance or dissoluteness, pursues the excess of what is pleasurable and shrinks from the excess of what is painful—hunger and thirst, heat and cold, and whatever sensations are associated with touch and taste; not in consequence of any choice that he has made, but contrary to the direction of his own will and judgment. Herein is a proof: men are called 'self-indulgent' or 'effeminate' in regard to sensual indulgences, but not in regard to ideal aims, such as wealth, or honour.

It is for this reason also that we place the weak and the vicious in the same category, and *vice versâ* the strong-minded man and the temperate man, while we keep the other characters distinct

from either, the reason being, I say, that the former are both in a sense concerned with the same class of pleasures and pains. But in saying that the weak-minded and the vicious display their characters upon similar objects, I do not mean that their attitude is the same thereto:—the dissolute yield to temptation of their own free choice, and the weak-minded contrary to their better judgment. Hence we should call a man more thoroughly dissolute when he pursues excessive pleasures and shirks even moderate inconveniences, not through the power of desire upon him (or with such desire acting but slightly upon him), than the man who gives himself up to pleasure through the fierce domination of the desires over him. What would such an one do, if there settled upon him the full passions of youth and a painful craving to satiate his bodily needs?

We must now go on to explain whether a man may be 'morally weak' in an absolute sense without any qualification, or whether all men are weak in some special connection, as for instance in regard to temper or reputation; or, if a man may be weak in an unqualified sense, what are the precise circumstances in which his weakness will be shown.

The general truth is evident that the objects with which men of resolute and manly character (both in the absolute and in the special sense), and men of weak and effeminate character, are concerned are pleasures and pains. But inasmuch as some objects which cause pleasure are essential, and others non-essential though pleasant in themselves and desirable (by 'essential pleasures' are meant those without which the human race collectively could not subsist, as, for example, marriage, or the individual, as food, rest, sleep, and such like; and by 'non-essential' pleasures those which are yet desirable and pleasurable by themselves and not from the constitution of man—wealth, honour, victory and such like), it happens that there are excesses in both these forms of pleasure, as well in those which are essential as in those which are desirable for their own sake—when, that is, one indulges in them to a degree beyond what is right and beyond what Right Reason prescribes for their indulgence.

Now a man who is extravagant in respect of pleasures which are not essential is not called 'weak' absolutely without qualification; but a man who weakly yields to the temptations of fame or wealth—the idea being that such an one is a distinct character from the man who is weak in the perfect and absolute sense—is only called weak on account of a certain similarity with the other. In the same way there is a distinction between 'the man *who gained the prize at the Olympic Games*' and 'man' generically: although the distinction between them is slight, still there is a distinction, and the former description is different from the latter on account of the special qualification.

It is further evident that the weakness which is shown in regard to non-essential pleasures is different from weakness in the absolute sense of the term, from the fact that weakness in the full sense is censured, and is thought to be not simply an error but also a vice, either completely or in some special relation; whereas weakness in connection with a special qualification is not censured as a vice. Those then who are extravagant in regard to non-essential pleasures are called 'weak' only with a special limitation.

On the other hand, those who are extravagant in reference to essential and bodily pleasures, when Reason does not decide in their favour or assent to their indulgence but sets itself in opposition to them, and who while pursuing in excess the pleasures wherein the temperate and the vicious man are tested, avoid pains more than is becoming—the pains, for instance, of hunger and thirst, of heat

and cold, and whatever is connected with touch and taste—such men are called 'weak' without any limitation, in the absolute sense of the term.

This distinction is evident also from the fact that those who indulge extravagantly in such pleasures are called 'dissolute,' but by no means are they so called who transgress in respect of indeterminate pleasures. Since in fact the temperate and the manly character, or the weak and dissolute character, are found to be displayed in reference to the same kind of bodily pleasures, we place the temperate man in the same category as the strong-minded man, and the dissolute man in the same category as the weak man. Nevertheless these characters do not respectively hold the same attitude in regard to these pleasures. The dissolute man is hurried on to the satisfying of his desires of his own wish and choice, whereas the weak man in indulging his desires is not acting in accordance with his own choice but with Right Reason raising a conflict in his mind. However we place the weak man in the same class as the dissolute man, and the strong-minded man in the same class as the temperate man, and we say that they are both concerned with the same objects; while on the contrary we place those who behave weakly in regard to pleasures that are not necessary in a class apart.

But although the weak man is concerned with the same objects as the dissolute man, yet the dissolute man is the more reprehensible as being the worse slave to his passions. The weak man is overmastered by very violent passions:—otherwise he could not be weak in face of the opposition which Reason makes. The dissolute man, on the other hand, is overmastered by trifling and weak passions inasmuch as Right Reason does nothing to counteract them; and he seeks the excess of pleasure and avoids even moderate pains: wherefore if under the influence of even moderate desires, he is thus overpowered, what kind of character would he prove to be if there came upon him the full force of youthful passion and a painful and violent craving for the satisfaction of physical needs?

(*b*) METAPHORICAL APPLICATION OF THE TERM 'WEAKNESS.'

The answer is to be found in the distinction between the proper and the metaphorical uses of the term 'moral weakness.'

But since there is a distinction in pleasures and desires, some of them belonging to the class of things honourable and excellent (some objects of desire being in fact by nature desirable), while others are the reverse and others again morally colourless (such as wealth and gain, victory and honour), according to the classification which we have already made, in reference to all such things whether good or evil or indeterminate, men are not blamed simply for being under the influence of such and such feelings, nor for having such and such desires and likings, but for yielding to a certain form of excess in their indulgence. Hence it is not a mark of depravity that men are overpowered by such influences contrary to Reason, or that they pursue any of those objects which are in their nature noble and good (I mean, for example, when men are more keen than is right in the pursuit of honour or affection for their children and parents). In truth these are among things which are good, and men are praised for the interest they show about them; notwithstanding that there is a possible excess even in the pursuit of these simple and natural aims, if, for example,

one contend, as Niobe did, even against the Gods, or as Satyrus, nicknamed 'father-doting,' did in regard to his father, since he was seen to be exceedingly foolish. However in all such cases there is no kind of moral depravity implied, for the reason which I have stated—that every one of these objects is in and by itself desirable; although the various forms of excess which these aims may take are censurable, and evil, and to be avoided. For similar reasons neither is there any 'moral weakness' implied in these relations, since moral weakness is not merely a thing to be avoided but one of those things which are positively censurable.

On account, however, of the similarity in the mental condition implied, for example, in a weak yielding to ambition with the condition implied in a weak yielding to pleasure, men speak of 'moral weakness' in connection with such things as honour or riches, adding however a term of qualification to limit the term to that extent. In the same way we speak of a man as being a 'bad doctor' or a 'bad actor' whom we could never call a bad man without such a qualification. The same limitation is therefore implied in this use of the term 'moral weakness': as the desires for riches, or honour, and such things are not vices in themselves, though they bear a certain resemblance thereto from the fact of their being analogous, so obviously we must understand that to be the only real strength or weakness of character which is displayed in the sphere in which their opposites, self-restraint or dissoluteness, are displayed. In describing any attitude towards anger as a moral weakness, we are only using a metaphor in virtue of a certain ideal correspondence. Hence it is that we use a term of limitation in such cases, and speak of a man as 'weakly yielding to anger,' just as he might yield to motives of ambition or of gain.

Again, of things which are pleasurable some are by nature good, some by nature evil and others indeterminate. Pleasures which are good by nature are such as we seek for their own sakes and not for ulterior objects; for example, reputation, victory, health. Pleasures which are evil by nature are for example cannibalism or the drinking of human blood or unnatural sensualism. Pleasures which are indeterminate are such as in themselves are neither good nor evil but only subservient to some good as food, clothing or wedlock.

Now when a man pursues pleasures which are good by nature or which are indeterminate, he is praised—if he does not transgress Right Reason but pursues his object in a proper manner. Excess of course is in all cases not praised, though in the case of things good by nature excess is not blamed, nor is it vicious, since the objects pursued are, as has been explained, by nature good and are sought for their own sake. Nevertheless, it is a thing to be avoided and evil. For instance though affection for children is by nature good, yet one ought to flee from the excess and not love them as Niobe did, who contended on

their behalf even with the Gods, or act as Satyrus who invoked his father as a God (since he was thought to be utterly senseless thereby).

Yet neither is this kind of excess 'moral weakness,' that being a thing not merely to be avoided but one of those things which are positively censurable. Still it is commonly called 'weakness' in virtue of a certain similarity which for example weakness in respect of gain or honour bears in relation to the qualified weakness which has been explained. Such an one is not weak in the absolute sense but weak only in respect of honour or philoprogenitiveness or some such thing; just as we speak of a 'bad doctor,' one who treats his patients contrary to the rules of art, or of a 'bad actor,' one who does not copy accurately the person whom he is representing but not as 'bad' in an unqualified sense. Failure of that kind is not a vice except by resemblance, in connection with a qualifying term.

Excess, therefore, in regard to things which are in their nature good and pleasant presents the character described above. But the forms of excess in regard to things by nature indeterminate are morally evil and censurable: such things have not their character one way or the other from themselves; but they are good or evil in virtue of the end towards which they are directed. Wherefore, if they are designed to compass a wicked end, they are themselves wicked; and they are designed to meet a wicked end when they are pursued in excess. A man who gives way to excess in the use of viands or clothing or other things in themselves necessary and indulges therein contrary to Right Reason, brings them to a level that may serve sensual pleasure. For this reason excess in all such things is a species of wickedness. In regard to certain objects there is weakness implied absolutely and without any qualification: such, for example, are the objects which form the sphere of temperance or dissoluteness.

(*c*) THE PLEASURES OF BESTIALITY, NATURAL OR ACQUIRED.

Abnormal and morbid states of the physical and moral nature.

Now while, on the other hand, some objects are by Nature pleasurable (either absolutely or else relatively to different races of animals and of men), other objects on the contrary are pleasurable only as the consequence of physical defects or evil habits or corruptions of nature. In reference, therefore, to these abnormal pleasures we may see states of the moral nature corresponding. The states to which I refer are bestial or savage conditions; such as that of the woman who devoured little unborn children tearing them from their mothers' wombs, or the foul pleasures in which some of the brutalized tribes around the Euxine indulge, delighting in raw meat or the flesh of human beings, whilst others lend their children to one another to serve as a feast; or such a story of cannibalism as that recorded of Phalaris.

Besides these cases of simple savagery, there are other similar cases caused by disease or, in certain cases, by madness—as was that of the man who sacrificed his mother and devoured her flesh, or of the man who feasted on the heart of his fellow-slave. Other instances of abnormal conditions caused by disease or by bad habits would be the tearing out of the hair, the biting of the nails or the chewing of ashes or of earth, or, worst of all, unnatural lust between man and man. Such practices are found in some

cases as a result of nature and in other cases as the result of habit, as when people are outraged from the time of childhood.

In the case of things which are evil by nature though they are also pleasurable, it is not simply the excesses which are wicked, but absolutely the moral inclination towards them at all,—*i.e.* states of bestiality, are in themselves wicked: nor in fact are such things *by nature* pleasurable. Some objects of course are naturally pleasurable to all living beings, as food, sleep and such like; while other things though naturally pleasurable are not so to all alike—for example, a particular kind of food (for instance, particular kinds of food, such as grass or flesh, are naturally pleasant to some, though not to all, creatures), while other things are not naturally pleasant in any sense, but are pleasant only through evil habituation or mutilation or depravity of disposition; and these latter objects are in their nature evil.

These unnatural conditions are those with which bestiality is concerned. Such is the case reported of a woman who devoured little unborn children, or that of the savage pleasure in which the brutalized inhabitants around the Euxine indulge who eat raw fish and uncooked flesh and lend their children to one another to serve for a banquet; or of the conduct of Phalaris in eating his own son. Such evil courses assuredly though they be pleasurable, are not pleasurable by nature but only *appear* to be pleasurable through a taint of nature. There are other things again in which men delight in consequence of mutilation, or derangement, or some other malady. Instances of madness are such as when the madman eats the heart of his fellow slave, or sacrifices and eats his mother, and instances of disease are when a man eats earth or ashes. A man becomes bestial through habit when he has been habituated to pleasures which violate nature, from the very dawn of life, and delights in food in which no mortal takes pleasure unless he has deviated from the limits of nature and is dissolute with a sensualism that is contrary to nature. Under this category comes also the man who takes pleasure in tearing out his hair or gnawing his nails. All such practices arise through depravity of nature.

(*d*) APPLICATION OF THE TERM 'WEAKNESS' TO PURELY MORBID CONDITIONS.

Moral weakness is sometimes habitual, and must sometimes be qualified as 'bestial' or 'morbid.'

Now where nature is the cause of depravity, no one would call its victims 'weak:' as little would one find fault with a woman for being female instead of male; and it is precisely the same with those whose morbid condition is the consequence of evil habit. The possession indeed of these abnormal tendencies is, in every case, beyond the pale of vice; and if a man possesses them, his subduing them or being subdued by them is only a sign of strength or weakness of character in an analogous or metaphorical and not an absolute sense—exactly as a man who is in an abnormal condition in regard to his angry passions may be called 'weak in respect of temper,' but not weak in an unqualified sense. All cases indeed of folly, or cowardice, or viciousness, or brutality, are either forms of bestiality or of disease. One man, for instance, is of a nature to be afraid of anything, even if a mouse rustle, having the cowardice characteristic of a brute; another man was afraid of a cat, through disease.

Some men, again, are void of reason through a defect of nature and live simply by sensation, and these are savages, like certain races of far-distant barbarians; others again are so through disease, as in cases of epilepsy, and of madness caused by illness.

Now some of these ailments one may have for a certain time or occasion without being overmastered by them permanently:—I mean, for instance, that Phalaris might have refrained himself when the desire came upon him to devour a little child, or that unnatural desire for animal gratification might be curbed. It is, however, possible not merely to have these unnatural lusts, but to be overpowered by them. Precisely, then, as wickedness, when it is consistent with human nature, is called wickedness without qualification, whereas special kinds of wickedness require limitation (as being 'bestial' or 'diseased'); so too it is clear that moral 'weakness' has two additional or qualified forms, the 'bestial' and the 'morbid,' and can only be spoken of absolutely when it induces that kind of sinfulness which is natural to man.

It is evident, then, that the field in which strength or weakness of character are displayed, is the same exactly as that of viciousness and self-control; and further in regard to the aims of life generally there is a distinct form of weakness which is called so by metaphorical analogy and not in an unqualified sense.

When, however, men delight in what is naturally evil, through their own depravity, they are not 'morally weak,' since there is no 'Right Reason' in their case which they withstand. Similarly neither are acts done in consequence of evil habituation, or disease, or madness; but the fact of a man's taking pleasure in such things places him altogether outside the limits of vice.

But if anyone is at one time master of his evil desires, and at another is mastered by them, he is not called 'weak' absolutely but with an addition, nor is he called strong simply, but strong with an addition; *e.g.* 'strong in curbing savage instincts' or weak therein. Savagery is not concerned with the same circumstances as viciousness, as simple manliness is. Viciousness is concerned with natural pleasures in the same way that simple manliness is; whereas savagery is concerned with pleasures that violate matter.

Indeed all cases of vice, or folly or cowardice, or sensualism or brutality that are indulged in to excess are either cases of savagery or of disease. One man, for instance, is of a character to fear everything, even if a mouse rustle, being a coward with the cowardice of a beast; another is diseased such as was the man who through disease feared a cat. In the case again of folly some men are by nature devoid of the power of calculation and live by sense alone—as are some tribes of remote barbarians, being irrational after the manner of beasts.

Now it is possible to have these mental characteristics without being overmastered by them; as for instance if Phalaris had restrained his lust at the time that he desired to devour his son. It is possible also to be overmastered thereby.

Weakness or strength, however, of this kind we must not call weakness or strength without qualification but must limit their meaning, as was explained above, as 'the weakness of the brute,' or 'the weakness of disease,' or 'strength in repressing savage instincts of vice or disease.' On the other hand, weakness in the absolute sense is simply that which is in the line of viciousness common to man.

It has now been shown that weakness or strength of character has simply reference to the subjects with which dissoluteness or temperance is concerned; and further that the weakness which has reference to other objects of pleasure is a distinct form of weakness so called by metaphor and not in the perfect sense of the term.

III.—COMPARISON OF THE VARIOUS FORMS OF MORAL EVIL.

i.—Yielding to lust is worse than yielding to anger.

We must now examine the position that 'a weak yielding to anger is less disgraceful than a weak yielding to the desires.'

1. Now anger seems in a kind of way to listen to Reason, though it listens amiss. It is like those over-eager servants who rush upon their errand before they understand what they are told and consequently miscarry their message; or like dogs who begin to bark if anything rustle before considering whether it be friend or foe. In this way it is that Anger, through the heat and excitement of its nature, though it listens to Reason yet catches not the word of command but hurries away to find its satisfaction. In such cases if Reason or Imagination only make it clear that an insult or a slight has been cast upon it, Anger drawing the inference as it were that 'it is right to fight against such things,' fires forth into instant rage. On the other hand Desire is incessant in its craving: if Reason or Sense only whisper that 'such a thing is pleasant' it rushes on to gratify its appetite.

Anger listens to Reason, but listens amiss.

Anger, therefore, is in a kind of way, faithful to Reason whereas Desire is quite irrational: hence to obey Desire is more disgraceful than to obey Anger. The man who yields to Anger is in a sense overmastered by Reason; whereas in the other case a man is simply overmastered by his appetites and Reason has no voice in the matter.

We must now enquire which form of weakness is the more disgraceful—the weakness which yields to appetite or that which yields to anger. It is commonly thought that that which yields to Desire is worse than that which yields to Anger.

1. For the man who gives vent to anger does not in every sense refuse to obey Reason, but in a kind of way listens to, yet mis-hears, the voice of Reason; just like over-hasty servants who rush out before they have heard what the command laid upon them is; and so fail to fulfil their errand; or like dogs who bark at the merest rustle before considering whether the arrival be that of friend or foe. It is thus that Anger, owing to the warmth and impetuosity of its nature, hearing the voice of Reason but not hearing what its command is, rushes out to vent its

resentment. In such cases there is a rational inference or impression indicating simply that 'such an one is insulting or despising or injuring a man;' and Anger drawing the inference as it were that one ought to fight against such things, forthwith fires into a rage. Anger does thus in a certain sense follow the guidance of Reason. On the other hand, Desire, if only sense or Reason vitiated by sense whisper that such a thing is pleasant, rushes instantly to find its gratification therein. Consequently, Anger follows the guidance of Reason in a certain sense, but Desire not at all; and for this reason a man who is weak on the side of appetite is morally worse than the man who is morally weak on the side of anger. The man who weakly yields to anger is in a kind of fashion controlled by Reason, whereas the man who weakly yields to Desire is controlled by appetite.

2. Anger is more natural than desire.

2. Moreover, it is more pardonable for a man to follow his physical impulses: in fact it is more pardonable for him to follow even his desires when those desires are of a nature to be common to all men, and in the degree in which they are common. But Anger and harshness are more constitutional and natural than the desires, when those desires are in excess and are not natural.

That there is excuse for a man who follows the bent of his nature may be illustrated by the story of the man who gave as his reason for beating his father the plea that his father had beaten his grandfather, and his grandfather his great grandfather; and pointing to his son he said, 'This little fellow will beat me when he has grown to be a man:—it is a constitutional weakness in our family.' Or one might take another instance of the same tendency in the case of the man who was being dragged about by his son, and begged of him to stop at the doors on the plea that he had never dragged his own father past the door.

2. Moreover it is a lighter evil to follow natural impulses than such as are less natural: natural impulses having a greater claim to consideration. But weak yielding to anger is more natural than weak yielding to appetites—I mean such desires as are not necessary and which are pursued in excess, such as money or honour. Hence the weakness of anger is a more tolerable evil than the weakness of the appetites; and it is evident that what is more natural is also more excusable. For instance, a man being rebuked for beating his father, made it his excuse that anger of this kind and the weakness which yielded thereto was constitutional in him: in fact that his own father was a beater of *his* father and his grandfather before him, and, he added 'my own son will be like us all and will beat me when he has grown to be a man.' There is another illustration of this tendency in the story of the man who when dragged along by his son begged him to stop at the door: 'I never dragged my own father,' he said 'further than that.' It is evident, then, that it affords some excuse for evil deeds that a man has a constitutional tendency towards them; and this makes the crime more endurable.

That it is more natural to yield to anger than to yield to appetite, is evident. To be enraged in the simple sense of the term is more natural than to desire what is not necessary. The feeling of anger was implanted in our nature for the preservation of our species—that we might shake off from ourselves what is harmful; and that is the aim towards which it tends. On the contrary, desire

for what is not necessary is not natural: it is possible to preserve our nature without either victory or honour. Hence the feeling of anger has a wider range than the desires for what is not necessary. Anger is inherent in all men, and in all sentient beings; whereas the desires are not universal even among men. Since then the feeling of anger is more natural than desires of this kind, and the excesses of anger are more natural than excess in the appetites, the weakness which yields to anger is more natural, and therefore less blameable, than the weakness which yields to the appetites.

3. Again, men are the more evil the more they are deliberate in their wrongdoings. Now neither the angry man nor anger itself are the results of deliberate intention but are open and undisguised. On the other hand Desire is crafty in its working; just as Aphrodité herself is said to be

3. Anger is less deliberate than desire.

"The Goddess Cyprus-born, the weaver of deceit."

In the same spirit Homer sings of her embroidered girdle, how upon it was

"The temptress-tongue that guiles the thought e'en of the prudent mind."

Consequently, since this form of moral evil is more wrongful, so also is it more disgraceful than weak yielding to anger; and indeed it is 'moral weakness' in the strict sense of the term and in a kind of way moral depravity.

3. Again, among evil men those are the more evil whose sin is the more meditated. But Desire is more deliberate than Anger; therefore it is more sinful. That it is more deliberate, is obvious. It steals over a man imperceptibly, and does not come on with a rush, as Anger does. Men who vent their anger display their feelings openly, whereas those who indulge their lusts are scarcely noticed at all because they enjoy themselves secretly as it were and steal their gratification by secret guile; and hence they are carried on of their own accord by a kind of guile and deceit to the objects of their lusts. Homer too says of Aphrodité that she is 'the weaver of deceit;' and for this reason they ascribe to Aphrodité the embroidered girdle, representing thereby the cunning craftiness of lust, and the phrase

"The temptress-tongue which guiles the thought e'en of the prudent mind,"

points in the same direction. Consequently, if lust of this kind is more wrongful, so the weakness which yields to it is more disgraceful than that which yields to anger; and this form of weakness and dissoluteness is the perfect form and vice in the unqualified sense.

4. Again, no one acts wantonly when wantonness gives him pain; but whenever a man acts under the influence of anger, his acts are painful to himself, and not, as in the case of wantonness attended with pleasure. If then the things against which we ought to be most enraged, are those which are more evil, the weakness which is caused by lust will be more evil than the weak-

4. Anger may be painful: the gratification of desire is never so.

ness which yields to anger, since there is no wantonness nor pleasure in anger.

It is clear, then, that moral weakness accompanying the desires is more disgraceful than that which attends anger; and further that the special field in which strength or feebleness of the moral nature is shown, are the gratifications and pleasures of the body.

4. Again, no one feels pain in following abnormal pleasures, but everyone is pained when giving vent to anger. Now a man is more censured who takes delight in doing evil, than is the man who feels pain in doing evil. The man who feels pain is thought to give some satisfaction for the error he commits, and for this reason is thought less guilty. Hence the man who follows unnatural pleasure is justly thought more guilty than the man who vents his anger. The weakness therefore which accompanies lust is a worse evil than the weakness which accompanies anger; since things are more evil in proportion as resentment is more justly felt against them.

It is clear then from what has been said that the weakness which yields to lust is more disgraceful than the weakness which yields to anger; and further that the sphere in which strength or weakness of the moral nature is displayed is the sphere defined by the lusts and pleasures of the body.

ii.—Contrast between Weakness, Dissoluteness, Savagery, and Effeminacy.

(*a*) DISSOLUTENESS WORSE THAN SAVAGERY.

Here we must take into account the differences between the different kinds of pleasure and desire.

Savagery is more terrible, but less evil, than viciousness.

Now it was shown at the beginning of this book that (1) some pleasures are proper to man and suited to his nature, in point both of character and extent while (2) others are brutish and others (3) again the result of mutilation and disease.

It is only in regard to the first of these pleasures that the virtue of self-control or the vice of dissoluteness is displayed: hence we do not speak of wild beasts as being either 'self-controlled' or 'vicious,' except relatively and by a figure of speech, in case there are any races of animals which, compared with others, are conspicuous for their wantonness and viciousness and utter voracity. Animals have not, of course, a moral purpose, nor power of calculation, but stand outside the pale of nature just as among men those who are in a state of madness do.

But though savagery is more terrible than viciousness, it is a lesser evil: there has been no corruption of the highest faculty in the case of beasts as in the case of vicious men—beasts simply do not possess that highest faculty, *i.e.* Reason. To compare beasts

with men is therefore to compare what is lifeless with what has a soul and ask which is the more evil. The badness of a thing when it has no 'power of origination' within itself, such as is Reason, is always less mischievous than it is where such a power exists. Beasts and men are things incommensurable: to compare them is almost like comparing 'wickedness' with 'a wicked man.' In a certan sense each is worse than the other: a bad man could, for instance, cause infinitely worse mischief than a beast.

Now let us examine what are the specific differences between Temperance, Manliness, and Endurance, and the vices opposed thereto—Dissoluteness, Weakness, and Effeminacy.

Now of the pleasures of the body some (1) are proper to man, others (2) are brutish and others (3) signs of disease. (1) Human pleasures are such as by their nature delight a man—whatever in fact they are in which a good man takes delight or even a bad man if his badness is but in the way of human failing; as for instance wealth, or reputation, or food or marriage. Whenever a man delights in such pleasures and pursues them, either rightly or in excess—violating thereby Reason but not his own nature, such an one feels the pleasure proper to man. (2) Brutish pleasures are such as are outside the pale of human nature as well in point of quantity as of quality. Excesses even of human pleasures when they outstrip their own selves and come to be outside the bounds of what is natural to man, are themselves also brutish. (3) Diseased pleasures are such as exceed human gratification through disease or madness, or which are contrary to nature. [In fine there are corresponding states of mind concerned with these different pleasures, as was shown above in the distinctions made in regard to brutish pleasure.]

But Temperance and Dissoluteness have for their sphere simply human pleasures: hence we do not call beasts temperate nor dissolute unless perhaps by way of metaphor and not in the strict sense. In such cases we only call beasts temperate or dissolute by way of making comparison between them: they do indeed present some points of distinction in reference to bodily pleasures—some of them take greater pleasure in such things and others less; but in the strict sense of the term they are not called either dissolute or temperate, because they do not in any way possess reason but are in every point outside the pale of rational creatures, just as also are those of ourselves who are insane.

On this account Savagery is a lesser evil than human wickedness, even though it be more terrible. Human wickedness corrupts the noblest element in human nature, *i.e.* the Reason; but that is by no means the effect of savagery, since beasts do not possess Reason at all. In the same way, a thing which is lifeless is a lesser evil than that which has a soul, since an evil which has within itself a power of origination which moves it, is more harmful than one which has no such principle. An evil which has no power of motion is more endurable than an evil which moves itself, inasmuch as its power of action is less. Just then as an evil which has life is a worse evil than one which is lifeless, because it has within it the soul as a principle of origination which sets it in motion, so also the rational element, because more than the irrational it has a principle of origination is more harmful and worse. A bad man can do infinitely more mischief than a brute. This examination may suffice for the present: we must now pursue the enquiry into the questions more immediately before us.

(*b*) VARIATIONS OF CHARACTER PRODUCED BY PLEASURE.

Turning now to the question of the pleasures and pains which come through touch and taste, and the desires and aversions

corresponding thereto (which were defined before as the special field in which dissoluteness or self-restraint are displayed), the attitude of a man's mind may be such in regard thereto as to yield to temptations to which men are generally superior, or on the other hand to be superior to influences to which men generally succumb.

Distinction between (1) the weak-minded and the strong-minded, (2) the effeminate and the manly.

These characters may be further subdivided into:

1. those who weakly yield to pleasures (commonly called 'the weak-minded') and those who overcome such pleasures (*i.e.* 'the strong-minded'),

2. those who weakly yield to pain (*i.e.* 'the effeminate') and those who overcome pain (or 'the manly' and 'much enduring').

The moral attitude, however, of the mass of men is not so pronounced as any of these distinct types, though they incline rather to the less noble side.

Now in reference to each class of emotions enumerated above there is a special type of character; and in reference to human pleasures and pains there is temperance, as has been already shown, and manliness and strong-mindedness, and the mental states opposed thereto. [By 'human' pleasures and pains forming the sphere of temperance I mean such as are associated with touch and taste.] Now there are some men who are more easily overcome by these pleasures than are the majority of men, and more easily impelled to their pursuit, as some few wicked men are: others again overcome pleasures to which the mass of men yield.

Since, then, there are pains and pleasures by which men are overcome or to which they are superior, (1) those who overcome pleasures are the strong-minded and those who are overcome thereby are the weak-minded; while (2) those who overmaster things which are painful so as not to be influenced by them are the patient and long-suffering and those who are overcome and are easily influenced thereby are the effeminate. But in most cases men are neither much-enduring nor effeminate but midway, though inclining rather to what is worse. The case is similar in regard to other habits. But we must hereafter draw more accurate distinctions in regard thereto.

(*c*) THE DISSOLUTE CONTRASTED WITH THE WEAK.

But since there are certain pleasures which are necessary, and others which are not necessary, or only up to a certain degree (to the exclusion of all cases of simple extravagance or defect), and these distinctions apply equally to desires and pains, the man who pursues the excesses of what is pleasant, or pursues even necessary pleasures to an extravagant point and pursues them from a definite conviction (*i.e.* for their own sake and with no ulterior aim beyond sensual gratification), such an one is a dissolute man: his will being abandoned to pleasure

Distinction between the dissolute, the ascetic, the temperate, and the effeminate.

he is necessarily past repentance and so incurable, since without repentance there can be no moral cure.

On the other hand, the man who is defective in his desire for pleasure, is the exact opposite of the dissolute man, and is an ascetic; while, again, the man who steers a mid course is the temperate man.

[The same distinction is applicable also to the case of the man who avoids bodily pains, not from being worsted by them but from settled principle.]

Of the characters, however, whose will does not co-operate in the badness of the life, one type is that of a man who is led astray by the motive of pleasure, and another comprises those who are led astray by their desire to avoid the pain which comes from unsatisfied desire. Hence they differ the one from the other. But a man would seem to be in every respect worse if he follows a disgraceful course when not under the influence of desire, or only so to a slight extent, than if he did so when the power of passion was strong upon him. He would, again, be thought worse if he struck his friend under strong provocation than if he did so in cold blood;—since to what lengths would he not go if he were in a state of strong emotion? Consequently the dissolute man is worse than the man whose sin is weakness only.

So then of the characters above described the one form has rather the characteristics of effeminacy; the other is simply dissolute and depraved. The moral opposite of the easy, selfish man is the strong-minded man, and of the effeminate man the patient and enduring man. Patient endurance depends upon the power of holding out against pain; whereas moral strength depends upon the power of conquering pain. It is one thing to hold out, another thing to overcome. Hence moral strength is a more desirable gain than is simple endurance.

Now since certain pleasures are necessary and others are not (and it has been explained already what pleasures are necessary and up to what point) while the excesses and defects therein are not necessary; and since desires and pains present the same character, the man who pursues the excesses of pleasure, or who is constantly seeking those pleasures which are in their nature great, or who seeks an extravagant gratification of pleasures which are in their nature moderate, without being drawn on by any kind of compulsion to such gratification but running after them with a free consent of his own will (and that too without any ulterior object, as let us say, reputation or gain)—such an one is a dissolute man. It is inevitable that such an one should have no regret after indulging himself and on that account should be incurable: a man who is incapable of remorse is past moral cure; and that is the character of the dissolute man.

The man, on the other hand, who pursues necessary pleasures less than is fitting is the man diametrically opposed to the dissolute man, *i.e.* the ascetic; while the man who steers the mid course is the temperate man.

But not only is he dissolute who pursues after bodily pleasures in the way

which has been described; but also the man who avoids bodily pains not from being overmastered by them but from the definite choice of his own will, is equally dissolute.

Of those, however, who are impelled to the pursuit of what is pleasurable without a settled choice of their own, one is influenced by pleasure and another man does so in order to avoid the craving, inasmuch as it is painful, of desire. Hence these two types differ from one another. The one who pursues what is pleasureable, through shrinking from pain, is effeminate, while the one whose whole motive is pleasure is weak and selfish. The weak man is the moral opposite of the strong-minded man; and the effeminate man of the patient or much-enduring man. Patient endurance consists in bearing up against pain: strong-mindedness in overcoming it. To hold out against a thing is different from overcoming it, just as not being defeated is different from conquering. Hence strong-mindedness is better than endurance, since it is better to conquer than to be beaten.

It is evident also that dissoluteness is worse than weakness. It is obvious to everyone that the man who pursues pleasure from deliberate conviction and without being under the excitement of passion or only slightly so, and who is not tyrannised over by an alien force, is a worse man than one who does so under the imperious force of very powerful passions. The first case is that of the dissolute man, the latter that of the weak man: consequently dissoluteness is worse than weakness.

Such then are the points in which the strong-minded and the patient differ from one another; and under this view strong-mindedness is more desirable than patient endurance, and weakness is more to be tolerated than dissoluteness.

(*d*) EFFEMINACY AND WEAKNESS IN CERTAIN CASES PARDONABLE.

Distinction between pardonable and unpardonable effeminacy.

When on the other hand a man fails in respect of temptations against which the mass of men struggle and struggle successfully, he is effeminate and luxurious (luxury being a kind of effeminacy); as, for instance, when a man trails his cloak to save himself the trouble of holding it up, or when he imitates the languor of the invalid yet does not consider himself a miserable man though he imitates the airs of one.

There is a similar distinction to be noted in regard to moral weakness and strength. When pleasures are violent and overwhelming, it is nothing wonderful for a man to be overmastered by them, or by pains in like degree; nay, it is excusable, provided that he struggle against them. Examples of this truth would be the picture which Theodectes draws of Philoctetes stung by a serpent, or the passage in which Carcinus describes the conduct of Cercyon at Alope; or, again, such cases as when men in endeavouring to restrain their laughter burst out into a roar, as was the fate which befell Xenophantus. On the contrary, if a man be confronted with pleasures and pains against which the mass of men are able to hold out, it is inexcusable that he should be defeated and unable to struggle against them—unless the fault be owing to some constitutional infirmity or disease, as is the effeminacy which is natural to their race among the Scythian

Kings, or as is the difference of strength between the female and the male.

The frivolous man is also effeminate, though he is generally counted as dissolute. Amusement is an unbending since it is a relaxation; and the frivolous man is one who goes beyond due limits in reference to amusement.

But we must make still further distinctions upon these points. Now the strong-minded man is one who is master of his desires, and the man of patient endurance is one who holds out against his desires and is not overmastered by them. On the other hand, the man who plumes himself on matters against which the mass of men struggle and temptations which the mass of men are able to bear, such an one is effeminate and luxurious (luxury being a form of effeminacy):—Such is the man who trails his cloak to save himself the trouble and pain of holding it up, or the man who imitates one prostrated by disease yet does not consider himself wretched though he has the air of one who is.

The case of strong-mindedness and weakness presents a similar character. There are pleasures and pains so great and violent that the man who is overcome by them deservedly claims some consideration: to be overmastered by such things is in no way wonderful. Such is the case of Philoctetes whom the poet Theodectes introduces in one of his poems as being stung by a serpent and overmastering his grief up to a certain point and then screaming out with pain; or the case of Cercyon, whom the poet Carcinus introduces bearing up at the outrage of his daughter up to a certain point, and then overmastered by his grief; or, again, the case of those who endeavouring to stifle their laughter burst out into a roar, as Xenophantus did. Such cases of men being overcome by very violent emotions are in no way wonderful.

But where men are overcome by pleasures and pains against which the mass of men hold out, and where men are powerless to make a struggle (and that not through any constitutional infirmity of race, such as that of the Scythian kings, who are effeminate by nature, or as the female is constitutionally more effeminate than the male, nor yet through disease), and where their failure is owing to a depraved and wicked disposition, such characters are without excuse.

The man who indulges extravagantly in amusements is effeminate, though he is commonly regarded as dissolute. The effeminate are those who seek extravagantly relaxation; and amusement is a kind of relaxation and recreation. The man who indulges extravagantly in amusements goes beyond the line in respect of relaxation and is called frivolous.

iii.—Specific varieties of Weakness compared with Dissoluteness.

(*a*) THE WEAKNESS OF THE NERVELESS AND OF THE HASTY NATURE.

Now there are two kinds of moral weakness: one form arises from hastiness of temper, and another form from feebleness of will.

Distinction between hastiness of temper and feebleness of will.

The latter case is that of those who, after having deliberated, do not adhere to the conclusions which they have formed, through the feeling of the moment.

The former case is that of those who are led away by the impulse of the moment through never having formed any determination at all:—in contrast, of course, to others who (like those

who are not tickled from having tickled themselves before) are not overcome by the momentary impulse whether that be pleasant or painful, because they have felt the sensations before, and anticipated them, and nerved their nature and their reason beforehand to meet them.

The persons most subject to this weakness of impetuosity are those of a hasty or bilious temperament. Hasty people through the rapidity of their movements and bilious people through overwrought nerves do not wait to hear the voice of Reason, being severally prone to follow the impression of the moment.

Now there are two kinds of moral weakness: one form is called impetuosity, the other feebleness of purpose.

Some men, though they have resolved beforehand not to succumb to impulse are after all overmastered by it; and their weakness is the weakness of the feeble will. Others are overmastered by the sudden onset of passion; and their weakness is the weakness of impetuosity. [Some men of course are not thus overcome by impulse because they have felt the sensation before and have foreseen it, and have roused themselves and their reason against it; just as parts of the body which have been rubbed before or tickled before are not liable to similar irritation again.] The persons most of all liable to this weakness of impetuosity are those of a quick or melancholic temper. The quick-tempered, through impetuosity, do not await the decision to be given by Reason; and the melancholic, through being intensely sensitive and following the impressions of the moment, and consequently are more powerfully stirred, since they do not attend to their Reason.

(*b*) RELATIVE SINFULNESS OF WEAKNESS AND OF DISSOLUTENESS.

Distinction between weakness and wickedness.

Now the dissolute man is, as has been shown, past repentance: he adheres to a settled purpose of the will, though that will is a depraved one. On the other hand those who are only weak are in all cases capable of repentance. Consequently the case does not really stand as it was tentatively assumed; but in fact the dissolute man is incurable and the weak man is curable. The wickedness of the dissolute man resembles such diseases as dropsy, or consumption; while that of the weak man resembles cases of epileptic seizure. The disease of the one is continuous, that of the other intermittent. In fact the whole character of weakness is distinct from that of viciousness. Vice deceives its own self, believing the evil to be good; while weakness is not unconscious that it is weakness.

[But of the two kinds of moral frailty, those who are carried away by precipitation are better than those who have the right before them yet do not keep firm to its bidding. These latter are overmastered by a less powerful impulse, and their weakness is not without an element of forethought, as that of the hasty is: in fact they resemble those who are quickly intoxicated

by a small quantity of wine—by a smaller quantity indeed than men generally are.]

It is clear then that weakness is not identical with viciousness —except, perhaps, up to a certain point. Weakness is contrary to the will: viciousness is in sympathy with the will:—nevertheless there is a certain correspondence or similarity between them, looking to their actual results, and their bearing upon conduct. The case of the weak reminds one of the saying of Demodocus in reference to the Milesians: 'Though the Milesians are not deficient in sense, they act precisely as though they were.' Just so the weak, though not vicious in heart and will, are yet guilty of wicked acts.

The characteristic differences between weakness and dissoluteness may be stated thus:

(1.) The weak man is of such a character that he follows after bodily pleasures that are in excess and in contravention of Right Reason, without having formed a conviction or being persuaded that it is right.

(2.) The dissolute man on the other hand has formed a belief that he ought to pursue such pleasures, a belief which arises from the fact of his character being such as to make the pursuit of such pleasures congenial and natural to him.

The weak man may therefore be easily influenced for good and the dissolute man cannot. There is an element of virtue in the weak man which preserves the moral principle or the sense of right; whereas the viciousness of the dissolute man utterly destroys his moral sense. But the maintenance of this principle is all important in practical life. This principle is the 'final cause' of human life upon which (like the axioms in Mathematics) all else depends. As in Mathematics, so in Morals, the first principles are immediate and intuitive: there is no method of ratiocination which can prove them. It is virtue, whether natural goodness of heart, or the good life resulting from virtuous habituation, which is the cause of a man's thinking aright in regard to the first principle in Morals. The man who has this self-contained principle of right within him and who acts upon it is the man of perfected temperance. The man who has lost this principle is dissolute and depraved. Intermediate between dissoluteness and temperance is the mixture of good and evil called weakness. That is to say, there is a character which, through the ascendancy of passion, is easily led astray contrary to Right Reason—a character which, though it be so overmastered by the feeling of the moment, is yet not so utterly overborne by evil as to alter its nature and form a conviction that it ought

without stint or curb to pursue bodily pleasures as a duty. Such is the phase which the character of the weak man presents—a phase preferable to that of dissoluteness and not evil to any irreclaimable degree; since in spite of all there is preserved unsullied in such a character what is highest and best—the moral principle and the sense of human perfection.

There is still another type of character, that of the strong-minded man, the exact opposite of the weak nature: he is one who keeps resolutely to the law of duty and is not liable to be led astray, at any rate by passion, though the conflict of his nature is not yet over. Hence it is clear that the moral frame of the strong-minded man is good while that of the weak character is bad.

But the weak man is in all cases open to a feeling of repentance, as has been explained. When the passion has been cooled and has spent itself the Reason of the man, being in a healthy state, surveys the incongruity of the passion; and a change of mind is the consequent result. The dissolute man, on the other hand, is not open to such feelings of repentance: Reason in his case is not sound, and consequently he is unable to discern the shamefulness of his conduct. Hence the weak man is curable and the dissolute man is incurable. Their relation is not in fact what we said it was when we first raised the question in regard thereto. Our previous account was put forward under the idea that a popular and plausible view helps to strip the question for discussion. The true view is as follows. Dissoluteness, in fact, resembles dropsy or consumption which incessantly gnaws at its victims; whereas weakness resembles attacks of epilepsy which distress men at intervals only and not continuously. Dissoluteness is continuous wickedness, the dissolute man thinking it ever right to indulge his passions. Weakness is not incessant but is only shown when a man encounters strong desires. In fact the whole character of dissoluteness is distinct from that of weakness. Dissoluteness is self-ignorance, and is all unconscious how shameful it is; whereas weakness knows how weak it is: the weak man knows that it is shameful to yield to passion. Dissoluteness is therefore worse than either of the two forms of weakness.

[But of the two kinds of weakness, the feeble will is worse than the hasty temper. Those who have the infirmity of a feeble will are overmastered by a trifling impulse, while those who have the weakness of impetuosity are overborne by one far stronger. It is evident that where men are able to take counsel, passion is not contending violently in their nature. But the impetuous, by reason that they are not able to reflect, are evidently overpowered by violent emotions. Besides it is more disgraceful for a man to be overmastered by impulse after he has previously resolved upon the opposite and as it were armed himself for the fray, than it is if he has not previously deliberated. Those who show the weakness of the feeble will resemble those who are quickly intoxicated and that by a little wine—by a smaller quantity, that is, than men generally are.]

It is evident, then, that weakness is vice, only not vice in the unqualified sense like dissoluteness, but in a qualified sense. In so far as the weak man does in a certain sense purpose what is evil while in the toils of passion, his weakness is a vice; but in so far as he does not entirely think that he ought to follow his passion, his weakness is not vice. His character resembles that of the Milesians, whom Demodocus spoke of in satire as being 'not devoid of sense, but ever acting as though they were.' In precisely the same way the weak are not dissolute and yet their actions are the actions of dissolute men.

Now since the weak-minded man pursues sensual indulgences contrary to Right Reason, without being persuaded that they are right and that he ought to pursue them, whereas on the other hand the dissolute man has formed a conviction that he ought to make pleasure his pursuit, the weak man is open to argument and the

dissolute man is not. The moral principle or standard of conduct—the Summum Bonum, the Final Cause of human activity, is preserved by virtue and destroyed by vice; by means of virtue we arrive at the Perfect Good or Human Perfection, and by the path of vice we withdraw farther and farther from it. An End of this nature is not apprehended by means of argument or of demonstration any more than the axioms of Mathematics are apprehended by demonstration; nay, rather, it is moral excellence, whether innate or acquired by virtuous practice, which enables us to have a right conception in regard to the true End. The knowledge of our true perfection is secured to us either as the heritage of nature or as the triumph of virtuous habit.

Now the man who knows 'the Good' which he ought to make the end of all his actions, and who performs whatever tends to that end, is a man of perfected temperance. On the contrary the man who places before him as his end what is evil, and directs his pleasures thereto, he is a dissolute man.

Again, the man who proposes to himself a virtuous end, and thinks it his duty to range his whole personal conduct in reference to that end, yet through passion revolts from Right Reason—not however to such an extent as to consider it his duty to pursue pleasures of this kind, but only so far as to do wrong in actual conduct, such an one will be neither temperate nor dissolute: he will be inferior to the temperate man owing to his conduct, yet superior to the dissolute man owing to the Reason within him. The weak man is only vicious up to a certain point, whereas the dissolute man is vicious absolutely.

There is, again, another character opposed to the weak man—the strong-minded man, who though he feels the power of passion is not thereby drawn away from the convictions of Reason.

From these considerations it is evident that strong-mindedness is a virtuous state of mind whereas weakness is an evil state.

iv.—Strong-mindedness contrasted with kindred states.

(*a*) TRUE STRONG-MINDEDNESS AND ACCIDENTAL STRONG-MINDEDNESS.

Distinction between real and accidental strength of character.

Is the strong-minded man, then, one who is firm to any kind of Reason, or to any kind of purpose? or must his purpose be a right one and his Reason sound? Conversely, is the weak-minded man one who fails to adhere to his Reason or purpose, whatever the character of that Reason or purpose may be?—or is he one who adheres to a false Reason and to a wrong purpose, as was suggested above?

May we not solve this difficulty by limiting the phrase 'whatever the character of the Reason may be' to accidental issues, and saying that in the exact sense of the term the strong character is one that remains firm to true Reason or a right purpose, and the weak character one who fails to adhere to true Reason and a right purpose? To take an instance: if a man pursues one thing for the sake of another, he may be said to choose and pursue one thing absolutely and the means thereto only accidentally. The term 'absolutely' we use as equivalent to 'for its own sake.' Hence it is true that in a certain sense the strong-minded man adheres to and the weak man wavers from any kind of

opinion, though absolutely and strictly that opinion must be a right one.

There is yet another point into which we must inquire, and which was raised on a previous occasion: Is a man strong-minded if he adheres to any kind of purpose, or must his purpose be a right one? and conversely of the weak-minded man. By accidental association at any rate a man is called 'strong-minded' who adheres firmly to any kind of purpose; but in strict truth a man is only strong-minded when he adheres to a right purpose and to a true Reason. Similarly the weak-minded man is through accidental associations one who fails to adhere to any kind of purpose, though in strict truth and absolutely he is one who fails to adhere to a right purpose. I mean that if a man seeks and makes choice of a thing not for its own sake but for an ulterior object, he seeks that thing only 'by accident' but the ulterior object he seeks absolutely and for its own sake. For example, a man who seeks money for the sake of glory, seeks money only 'by accident' and glory absolutely. In the same manner the case stands in regard to things generally that come under the choice. A man who continues firm to a virtuous opinion and to a right choice, chooses the good in itself because it is good; and hence he is strong-minded in the absolute sense. On the contrary a man who adheres to a wrong purpose and to a false opinion does so because he thinks that it is the good which he is choosing, and he thinks so because there is within him only a faint trace of the good; and in consequence thereof he embraces a wrong purpose and a false opinion as though they were right and true. Since therefore he does not choose the objects which he chooses for their own sakes but for the sake of the good, he is not strong-minded in the absolute sense of the term but only by accident. The case stands similarly in regard to the opposites. In a certain sense a man is weak-minded who does not adhere to any kind of opinion, but in the strict sense only he who does not adhere to a right opinion (the terms 'absolutely' and 'for its own sake' being identical).

(*b*) STRONG-MINDEDNESS CONTRASTED WITH OBSTINACY AND SELF-WILL.

Distinction between strong-mindedness and obstinacy.

But there are also men who adhere firmly to their opinions whom we call 'positive' and 'obstinate;' for example, those who are hard to convince and cannot be argued out of anything. They represent a type of character very similar to that of the strong-minded man (in the same way that the prodigal resembles the liberal man and the rash man resembles the brave man) yet still they are distinct in many points. The strong-minded man does not change under the influence of feeling or desire, and though he is easily convinced should occasion arise, he is strong-minded all the same. On the other hand obstinate men are not convinced by any appeal to Reason, though many of them are very susceptible to strong desires and are led astray by their own gratifications.

The class of obstinate men are represented by the self-opinionated, the uneducated, and the vulgar. The self-opinionated are so through the power of pleasure and pain: they rejoice as in a vic-

tory when they have shown themselves inaccessible to argument, and they are distressed if their dicta are unconfirmed like unwarranted decrees. In being thus swayed by pleasure, the self-opinionated resemble men of weak rather than of strong character.

Now those who are called 'obstinate' though they adhere to a form of opinion and though sometimes their purpose is true and right, are still not 'strong-minded,' but hold the same resemblance to the strong-minded that prodigals do to liberal men or reckless men to brave men: they are an impracticable class who are hard to be convinced. So far however as they adhere to their resolutions they resemble the strong-minded; yet the strong-minded are open to change of conviction under the influence of Reason and persuasion, whereas the obstinate are not changed by argument though many of them are led astray by passion or their own pleasures.

The obstinate include the self-opinionated, the uneducated, and the vulgar. The uneducated and vulgar are so through not knowing the principles of things from an appeal to which it might be possible for them to be persuaded. The self-opinionated cleave to their resolutions for the mere pleasure of keeping them, or for the pain of parting with them: they take delight in not being worsted by those who endeavour to convince them, and they are distressed if their views are unconfirmed like unwarranted decrees. Hence it is that the self-opinionated resemble rather the weak than the strong-minded: like the weak-minded, they do not follow Reason but their own feelings.

(*c*) A NOBLE INCONSISTENCY.

In some cases apparent weakness is real strength of character.

There are again cases where men are not firm to what they have determined upon from other motives than moral weakness. An instance of this kind is that of Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes of Sophocles. Neoptolemus failed to abide by his promise through the influence of pleasure—yet that pleasure was a noble one: in his eyes it was a glorious thing to speak the truth, and he had been persuaded by Ulysses to tell a lie. Not everyone, assuredly, who acts from motives of pleasure is either dissolute or bad or weak-minded, but only those whose motive is an evil pleasure.

There are again those who adhere to true resolutions or who do not adhere to false resolutions, from motives of pleasure, who still are not therefore evil inasmuch as the pleasure which influences them is a laudable pleasure. Such an instance is seen in the conduct of Neoptolemus. He did not adhere to the agreement which he had made with Ulysses, and did not deceive Philoctetes by telling a falsehood to him; but the motive which influenced him was a noble pleasure and not an evil one. A man is not evil simply because he acts from a motive of pleasure, nor dissolute nor weak; it is when he acts from a *disgraceful* pleasure that he is censured.

v.—General Summary of the Argument relating to Moral Strength or Weakness.

But since there is also a phase of character of such a temper as to be influenced by bodily pleasures to an extent less than is

right, and not to adhere to Reason in and for itself, the 'mean state' between that character and the weak-minded man, is the strong-minded man. The weak-minded man does not adhere to Reason, through a kind of excess of feeling, and the opposite or ascetic character, through deficiency of feeling; whereas on the contrary the strong-minded character is ever loyal to Reason, and for no motive but that of Reason does he change his purpose.

Strength of character is a 'mean' state, and allied to, though not identical with temperance.

Now if strength of character be right, it necessarily follows that the mental states opposed thereto are wrong, as in fact they are seen to be. Inasmuch, however, as one of these extremes, asceticism, is only found in rare cases and on rare occasions, strength of character seems to be the only state opposed to weakness of character just as temperance seems to be the only state opposed to dissoluteness.

Since, however, many terms are used metaphorically and by analogy, the term 'strong-mindedness of the temperate man' has followed the general law of metaphor. Under one aspect indeed the strong-minded man seems to be the same as the temperate man: they are both of them of such a character as to do nothing contrary to Reason under the influence of bodily pleasures. But there is this difference between them:—the strong-minded man has bad desires and the temperate man has not: the temperate man has so perfected his nature that he has no sensations of pleasure that are contrary to Reason, whereas the strong-minded man has those evil sensations though he is not led astray by them. In the same way the weak man and the dissolute man resemble one another under one aspect, though really distinct: both of them follow after sensual pleasures; but the dissolute man thinks that it is right and the weak man knows that it is wrong.

It is, again, inconceivable that the man of weak will should at the same time be a man of practical wisdom. It has been already demonstrated that the man of practical wisdom is also to the same extent virtuous in life and character: he is not what he is simply from knowing what his duty is but from having a disposition to perform it, whereas the man whose will is weak is not disposed to do his duty. As for being morally keen-sighted, there is nothing to prevent the weak man from being *that:* hence at times men are regarded as 'practically wise' though morally weak, inasmuch as clear-sightedness only differs from Practical Wisdom in the manner described in the Sixth Book, the man of moral clear-sightedness being very like the man of practical

Incompatibility of weakness with (1) practical wisdom,

wisdom in their intellectual conditions though they differ in the attitude of their wills.

Again, the weak man does not yield to temptation as one who *knows* and exercises his knowledge but as one who is in a state of drunkenness or sleep; and though he is a free agent since in a certain sense he knows what he is doing and the aim and tendency of his act, he is not wicked since his Will is right and good, and consequently he is only 'half wicked.' Such an one is not wholly unrighteous since he does not deliberately plan his wickedness beforehand. One type of weakness is that which does not adhere to the plan which it has resolved upon; and the other type that of the melancholic man is essentially devoid of the faculty of planning.

(2) perfect knowledge.

In conclusion: the weak man resembles closely a State which passes all resolutions that are fitting yet puts none of its decrees into effect, justifying the taunt of Anaxandrides:

> "A purpose hath a city framed that hath no heed for laws."

The wicked man on the other hand resembles a State which enforces its laws though the laws which it enforces are vicious laws.

The sphere, however, in which strength or weakness of character is shown, is a sphere which transcends the moral range of the mass of men. The strong-minded man is resolute under trials which go beyond the endurance of 'the many;' while the weak-minded man fails under temptations against which 'the many' would be proof.

The sphere of moral strength and weakness is not that in which 'the many' move.

But of the two varieties of moral weakness, the form which the melancholic show is more easily cured than is that of those who form right resolutions yet are disloyal to their own convictions. Again, men whose weakness is owing to evil habit are more readily cured than those who are constitutionally weak: it is easier to change the course of habit than the bent of nature; though indeed it is for this very reason—that habit resembles nature—that it is so hard to change even the former, justifying the saying of Evenus:

> "Long time cleaves habit to the soul, my friend:
> Indeed, 'tis man's whole nature in the end."

Here we must conclude our view of strength and weakness of character, and of manliness and effeminacy, and of the relations which these states hold respectively to one another.

Now since strong-mindedness is a praiseworthy state of mind, it will be an ideal mean between two faulty states by one of which it will be left behind while

itself will exceed the other. It is weakness of character which exceeds strength of character while the state which is defective has no distinctive name, though there is such a state in consequence whereof men take less delight than is fitting in bodily pleasures and who transgress the rule of Right Reason thereby. The weak-minded man does not adhere to Right Reason in consequence of his taking more delight than is fitting in his pleasures, while the man who is defective therein acts contrary to Right Reason in consequence of his seeking things which are pleasant to a less degree than is right. On the other hand the strong-minded man adheres to the rule of Right Reason, and does not deviate therefrom on account of pleasure whether great or small.

But since strong-mindedness belongs to things which are praiseworthy and excellent, it necessarily follows that the states which deviate from it in either direction are bad, and opposed to strong-mindedness. Since however the state of mind which is defective has no special name and very rarely occurs (the cases where men take less pleasure than is right in bodily enjoyment being rare), weak-mindedness seems to be the only state opposed to strong-mindedness, asceticism or insensibility to pleasure being so seldom found.

The strong-minded man is also termed temperate, and the weak-minded man dissolute, and vice versâ, by metaphor or analogy; just as many other terms are classed under a common name in virtue of a certain correspondence between them. Indeed the temperate man and the strong-minded man are both concerned with the same objects, and neither of them do anything in violation of Right Reason, though in the case of the temperate man his desires are not in conflict with his Reason as they are in the case of the strong-minded man. The temperate man has no sensation of pleasure contrary to Reason, whereas the strong-minded man has such sensations, though he is not led away by the pleasures which could satisfy them. Similarly the dissolute and the weak man are similar to one another in so far as they are overmastered by the self-same pleasures, but they differ in that the dissolute man thinks it right to pursue such pleasures, whereas the weak man does not.

In the same way we call some who are morally weak practically wise, in consequence of a certain resemblance to practical wisdom which their nature exhibits. In truth some of those who are morally weak are intellectually clear-sighted; and clear-sightedness has a resemblance to practical wisdom, since in regard to their knowledge of what is right the clear-sighted resemble the practically wise. But the clear-sighted simply know what is right, but do not make up their minds to do it, nor in fact do they carry it into practice; whereas the practically wise while knowing what is their duty also carry it out in their lives. Hence a man who is practically wise is a good man, whereas the weak man, however clever he may be is a bad man and visited with censure.

Indeed, though the weak man does know what is right, yet he does not know it in the way that the man of practical wisdom does, who surveys the matter in the full light of consciousness and puts his knowledge into practice; but as has been explained, the weak man knows only as one may do who is asleep or drunk. It is therefore in virtue of this similarity that the 'weak though clever' man is called 'practically wise,' and resembles such an one; since even a man who is weak in the absolute sense is not entirely wicked but only 'half wicked.' Nor, again is he unjust, since he is not vindictive, since he does what is evil voluntarily and knowing that what he does is evil and that he ought to do better, in one sense he is vicious; yet in another sense he is not. His conduct is wrong but his moral sense is right; whereas the conduct of a man who is vicious in regard to bodily pleasures (*i.e.* the dissolute man) and his moral sense as well are both vicious. The weak man on the contrary is wrong only on one point: he is weak, that is, either with the weakness of the feeble will or with the weakness of precipitation; and both of them err simply in regard to their personal practice. The precipitate man does not deliberate at all, and the man of feeble will resolves that he ought not to follow base desires. On the other hand the dissolute man is corrupted both in deliberation and in action. Consequently the weak man resembles a State which passes every decree that is necessary and has excellent laws and in that

particular is in sound condition, but notwithstanding puts none of its laws into execution; just as Anaxandrides scoffingly said:

"A purpose hath the city framed that hath no heed for laws;"

whereas the dissolute man resembles a State which puts its law into practice, but those laws vicious ones.

Now every form of strong-mindedness or weakness is displayed in reference to what is in excess of the state of the mass of men. The strong-minded man is superior to temptations by which 'the many' are overcome; and the weak-minded man is overcome by temptations to which the mass of men are superior.

The weakness of precipitancy with which melancholic men are afflicted, is more troublesome to be cured than the weakness of the feeble will in consequence of which men form resolutions and do not adhere to them. Similarly those who behave weakly from constitutional infirmity are more difficult to cure than those whose weakness is owing to habit. It is an easier task to change the direction of habit than to alter the bent of nature; indeed for this reason even habit is a hard thing to alter because of its resemblance to nature, just as Evenus says

"Long time cleaves habit to the soul, my friend;
Indeed 'tis man's whole nature in the end."

Here we must conclude our account of Strong-mindedness and Manliness, Weak-mindedness and Effeminacy, and of the various relations they bear towards one another.

PART II.—CONCERNING PLEASURE.

i.—Ethical importance of an investigation of Pleasure.

Part of the duty of the student of human life is to investigate the question of pleasure and pain. There are these reasons among others why he should do so:

Three chief reasons for investigating pleasure.

1. The student of human life is like the 'master builder' who fixes the 'end' and character of the whole work. We cannot call anything 'good' or 'bad' without qualification except in reference to this main 'end' or scope of life.

2. It is a matter of essential importance to estimate the character of pleasure and pain, since we have assumed throughout this Work that pleasure and pain constitute the sphere in which the goodness or badness of the moral nature is displayed.

3. Most men are unanimous that happiness is accompanied by pleasure: hence the derivation of the word 'blessed' which describes the happy life (*μακάριος* 'blessed' being derived from *χαίρειν* 'to feel pleasure').

We must now consider the subject of Pleasure and Pain, that being one of special importance to everyone who would be a student of human life.

1. The student of human life is 'the architect of the end,' as was shown in the previous discussions. This 'end' of life is the Summum Bonum, that which is highest and best for man, by means whereof as, by a standard, we distinguish

in conduct that which is good from that which is evil. Whatever tends to that final 'end' we regard as good, and whatever leads us away from that end as evil. Inasmuch, then, as pleasure is thought by some to be a good and by others an evil, and by others again the final end and Summum Bonum, it is consequently incumbent upon the student of social life to investigate its nature.

2. Such an inquiry is indeed essential in an inquiry concerning Morals. Pleasures and pains form the very sphere in which virtue and vice must be displayed, as was explained before; hence it is necessary that in investigating the theory of the virtues, we should also treat of the subject of Pleasure.

3. Happiness is, as some say, bound up with pleasure: hence the derivation of the term by which we describe the happy life, *μακάριος* 'blessed' being derived from *χαίρειν* 'to feel joy.'

ii.—Enumeration of current theories concerning Pleasure.

There are, however, various theories in vogue as to the nature of Pleasure:—

Three chief theories as to the place of pleasure in human life.

A. Some writers maintain that 'no kind of pleasure is a good,' either *per se*, in its own right, or *per accidens* through association with other things, 'pleasure' being, they say, in no sense convertible with 'good.'

B. Another view is that 'though some pleasures are good, the generality of them are evil.'

C. Thirdly and lastly, there is the view that 'though all pleasures be a form of "good," it is inconceivable that pleasure should be the Chief Good.'

A. In support of the first theory that 'Pleasure is not a good at all' the following are the arguments used:

1. Every pleasure is the consciousness of coming into a natural state. But no kind of 'process' is of the same nature as the 'ends' designed by that process; *e.g.* no process of housebuilding is of the same nature as a house.

2. The temperate man shrinks from pleasures.

3. The man of perfected human wisdom aims at a state of painlessness and not at the realization of pleasurable sensations.

4. Pleasures are a hindrance to the exercise of thought, and the hindrance is greater in proportion to the delight which a man takes therein, as for instance in the case of the pleasures of love: no one could possibly 'think' whilst in love.

5. There is no 'art of pleasure;' yet every good is the creation of art.

6. Children and animals pursue after pleasure.

B. In support of the second theory that 'not all pleasures are good' it is urged that some pleasures are positively disgraceful

and visited with censure and moreover harmful, certain forms of things pleasurable being attended with disease.

C. In support of the third view that 'Pleasure is not the Chief Good,' it is argued that pleasure is 'a process of becoming' and not 'an end' at all.

Such, then, are the prevalent views concerning Pleasure.

We must first of all state the views which other writers have held of Pleasure.

A. Some think that Pleasure is in no sense a good, either *per se*, in and by itself, or *per accidens*, by association with other things. They consider that it is quite impossible that 'Pleasure' should ever be convertible with 'Good.'

B. Another view is that the greater number of pleasures are evil, but that there are some that are good.

C. A third view which has been held is, that though all pleasure be a form of 'good,' yet it is in no wise conceivable that Pleasure should be 'the End' or Final Cause of man.

Such are the current views which are in vogue concerning Pleasure. We must now go on to state the grounds on which these theories are severally maintained.

A. The writers in favour of the view that 'no form of pleasure is a good' maintained their view on the following grounds:

1. Every pleasure is a conscious process of change to a natural state. (The process of growing into a natural state in the case of plants not being conscious or sensible is not a pleasure.) If, therefore, pleasure is a 'process of becoming,' and a process of becoming is incomplete, and what is incomplete is not a good, then pleasure is not a good. Good is something which has already taken place and does not consist in the process of taking place. A process of becoming is not of the same nature with the 'ends' in which it terminates. A process of erection is not of the same nature with a house.

2. The temperate man, as being a virtuous man, avoids such things as are not good and ought to be avoided: and he avoids pleasures: therefore pleasure is not a 'good.'

3. The man of perfected human wisdom pursues 'the good;' but pleasure he does not pursue: he pursues a state of exemption from pain, not the vivid consciousness of pleasure. Pleasure is not, therefore, a good.

4. Pleasure is an obstacle to thought, and the greater obstacle in proportion as the pleasure is greater. No one is able to meditate in the midst of the keenest pleasures.

5. Everything that is good is a creation of art. But pleasure is not the creation of any kind of art. Therefore pleasure is not a good.

6. Animals pursue pleasure, as also do children, being impelled thereto irrationally. But a thing is not a good that is the object of pursuit by things that are impelled irrationally. Therefore pleasure is not a good.

B. The reasons upon which it was held that 'not all pleasures are a good' are that certain pleasurable objects are harmful and attended with disease, and that certain pleasures are disgraceful and censurable.

C. The reasons upon which it was held that 'Pleasure is not the End' are that pleasure is a process of becoming and a kind of movement, whereas the 'end' is the limit at which the movement terminates.

Such are the current opinions held in regard to pleasure. The only view that is true of all these is that 'some pleasures are good and others bad.' The other views are false, as we must endeavour to prove; and first we will treat of the first view.

iii.—Examination of the theory that Pleasure is neither 'a Good' nor 'the Chief Good.'

It will be clear from the considerations which follow that it does not follow from the arguments given above that 'Pleasure is not either a Good nor the Summum Bonum.'

The arguments given above are not conclusive against Pleasure being the Summum Bonum: because

(1.) SOME GOODS ARE ABSOLUTE, SOME RELATIVE.

In the first place the term 'good' has a double import: it means either the 'absolute' or the 'relative' good. In accordance with this distinction different constitutions and states, both mental and moral, will be either relatively or absolutely good; and hence also the processes of change and transitions which produce those states will exhibit corresponding differences. Thus some of those processes which are accounted evil, may be evil only in the absolute sense whilst relatively they are not so but are even desirable for a particular individual. Other processes, again, cannot be called desirable even for a particular individual except on a particular occasion and for a brief time. Others, again, are not pleasures at all but only *seem* to be so; such, that is, as are attended by pain and have ultimate relief for their object, as is the case with the alleviations of the sick.

(1.) there are relative as well as absolute goods:

It is clear from the following considerations that the arguments which have been mentioned above do not prove either that pleasure is not a good, or that it is not the highest good. For since 'good' is predicated in two senses, the one absolute and *per se*, as, for instance, virtue, the other not absolutely but relatively to the individual, as, for instance, highway-robbery is a good to the highwayman, it follows that every natural or acquired state, and similarly every transition and process of becoming, is 'good' partly in an absolute, partly in a relative sense. The case is the same with what is evil. For some transitions and processes of becoming are bad absolutely, some relatively to an individual, being to that individual in the class of mischievous things: again, some are always bad relatively to a particular individual, others are so not always but with limitations of circumstance and time. Of things absolutely bad an example is afforded by every kind of vice: of things which are bad relatively to particular individuals, temperance is bad in the view of the dissolute man, at all times and under all circumstances: to act dissolutely is bad in the view of the weak-minded man, not always but under certain conditions—for when the heat of passion has been quenched, it seems bad, though it does not seem so at the actual moment of enjoyment. Since this division into absolute and relative is true of all transitions and processes of becoming, and since pleasure also is a transition, it is clear that not every pleasure is bad. For it is possible for a man to feel pleasure in proper objects, for example in virtue or wisdom: it is equally possible for a man to feel pleasure in wrong objects, and at a wrong time, and so forth—according to the other distinctions which we have made elsewhere.

(2.) SOME GOODS ARE ACTIVITIES, SOME PERMANENT STATES.

Again, there are other aspects of 'good:' it may be the mental activity of the moment, or a permanent state. Hence the play of the faculties which at any time restore a man to his normal state are pleasurable, not in themselves but by association of ideas. But there is, *per accidens*, a play of conscious and pleasurable life in the movements of desire in a state of mind that is deficient, or in a natural tendency which is unsatisfied—though of course there are pleasures which are pure pleasures absolute and accompanied neither by pain nor by desire; for example, there are the unimpaired activities of conscious thought, where nature has no claim unsatisfied.

(2.) there are goods which are activities as well as goods which are permanent states.

There is a proof of this difference between pure and absolute, and alloyed and accidental, pleasures in the fact that men do not delight in the same pleasure whilst their nature is in process of attaining satisfaction, as when it has been settled and permanent: *i.e.* when our nature is a fixed state, we delight in things which are pleasurable in their own right, whereas whilst it is only attaining to a state of satisfaction we delight in things the reverse of being ideally pleasurable—*e.g.* things pungent and bitter, not one of which is in its own nature nor in any unqualified sense pleasant. Hence neither are our pleasures under such circumstances absolutely pleasurable: since of course, answering to the objects which in their complex relations cause pleasure, are the pleasurable emotions derived from them.

Again, in the case of 'good,' one kind of good is a permanent state, as, for example, the state of mind of the man who has the formed habit of justice: another kind of good is an activity, as, for example, the activity of the man who performs an act of justice. The activity fills up and satisfies what is lacking in the mental or bodily state, and by its means in fact that state is preserved: as, for example, the bodily state called health may be inherent in a man, but it is preserved by means of the activity acting upon wholesome food. This activity, therefore, which preserves a given state, mental or bodily, is pleasant: not indeed absolutely and *per se*, but incidentally and *per accidens:* for it is not the actual filling up and satisfaction of what is lacking in the mental state that constitutes pleasure, but on such satisfaction pleasure ensues. If this were pleasure, all satisfaction of what is lacking in a permanent state, whether natural or acquired, would be pleasure. But this is not the case: so that pleasure cannot be defined as 'the consciousness of coming into a natural state'—which is synonymous with what has just been spoken of, the satisfaction of what is naturally lacking.

Such is our argument in reply to those who conclude that no pleasure is a good.

A further argument in proof of our denial that all pleasure is a satisfaction and filling up of what is lacking, is to be found in the fact that some pleasures are unattended by pain and desire: whereas satisfaction of what is lacking is impossible without a sense of lacking, *i.e.* without pain or desire. Such, for

example, are the pleasures incident to scientific investigation. For whenever knowledge which has not previously been known presents itself to the mind, it causes pleasure by its presentation of itself, but at the same time its absence does not produce pain, since in the absence of what is unknown there is no sense of want: at the moment when knowledge presented itself, the sense of want did not exist, and afterwards it was impossible.

Moreover there are some *bodily* pleasures which are unattended with pain and a sense of want. For not only do we find pleasure in taking food at the time when we have a sense of wanting food, but there are some kinds of food in which we feel pleasure even after the sense of want has been satisfied. Nor do we find pleasure in the same kinds of food before and after the satisfaction of the sense of want: but after such satisfaction we feel pleasure only in those things which properly and universally produce pleasure: whereas before such satisfaction we enjoy any chance food and often opposite kinds of food. From this it is evident that even of bodily pleasures some are absolute, and some relative: for the relation which exists between the objects of pleasure must exist also between the pleasures which arise from them.

It has thus been shown that not every pleasure is the natural satisfaction of a sense of want. Nor, conversely, is every satisfaction of a sense of want a pleasure: for example, the fulfilment of the needs of a state of health, which is a natural state produced by appropriate nourishment, is not in itself pleasurable. It is not true, therefore, to say of pleasure that it is the consciousness of coming into a natural state: and as a result of this, it does not follow from the arguments which have been adduced to support that thesis that pleasure is not a good.

(3.) PLEASURE IS A 'MODE OF ACTIVITY.'

(3.) Pleasure is not always a transition-state referring to an end outside itself.

Again, it does not follow that there is in every case a something better than the pleasure itself, as some maintain who say that the end is better than the process which leads to it. Of course all pleasures are not 'processes of becoming' nor yet the accompaniments of such transitions; but rather are they 'modes of human activity' and an 'end in themselves.' They do not ensue from our coming into our powers, but from our exercising our powers. Nor is the end in all cases distinct from the pleasure: that is only true of those persons who are being brought to the perfect realization of a natural state.

Hence it is not right to speak of pleasure as a 'transition realized by the senses:' we should rather describe it as 'the mode of activity of a mental state that is in harmony with nature;' and instead of saying 'realized by the senses' we should define it as "*unimpeded.*"

[But pleasure has been supposed to be a kind of transition because it is 'a good' in the full sense of the term. They fancy that every play of the faculties is a transition; though of course they are distinct.]

Further, those who say that pleasure is not the End or Chief Good do not base their assertion upon irrefragable arguments. For assuming that pleasure cannot be an end, they argue that there must be in every case something better than

pleasure, in other words its end: for the 'end' or final cause of any process is better than the process itself: and the ultimate 'end' or Chief Good is the absolute and perfect 'best.' But this argument is not conclusive: for pleasure is not a process of becoming, in such a sense that the 'end' of the process is necessarily better than the process itself: nor is it in every case viewed as a process of becoming, but it is a mode of activity and an 'end:' nor, again, is it viewed as an accompaniment of the formation of a settled state (for example, when any one is doing just acts, and is forming a settled state of justice in his mind, without being as yet just), but rather as an accompaniment of the settled state itself, when, for example, any one having become just afterwards brings that settled state of justice into play. Consequently, it is not true to say that there is an 'end' of every pleasure, some pleasures being an 'end' in themselves. For although it is true of those modes of activity which bring us to the full realization of a natural state that they are not themselves an 'end' (in the same way as the activity which ensues upon the possession by a man of the art of healing has its end not in itself but in the production of a natural state, viz. health), yet in the case of those modes of activity which do not lead to the full realization of a natural state, but are themselves such a realization, it is evident that their 'end' is not external to themselves, but that on the contrary they are themselves ends to other modes of activity. This, for example, is the case when a man's activity is in pursuance of a fixed mental state of perfect virtue. For such an activity is the end of other activities, and is not itself aimed at the realization of any external end. This shows that pleasure, which is a mode of activity, has not in all cases an end outside itself: for it is the mode of activity of a mental state that is in harmony with nature.

Hence it is not right to define pleasure as a 'transition realized by the senses;' we should rather describe it as 'the activity of a mental state that is in harmony with nature:' and instead of saying 'realized by the senses,' we should rather say 'unimpeded.' Pleasure will consequently be defined as 'an unimpeded activity of a mental state that is in harmony with nature.' It is neither a transition nor realized by the senses. That it is not in all cases a 'transition' has been shown in a previous section: so that the above-mentioned definition is defective in this point. That it is not in all cases 'realized by the senses' is shown by the fact that the pleasure which consists in philosophical investigation is not connected with the senses. But, if we take our own definition, in the first place the definition of it as an 'activity' will include 'transition realized by the senses:' in the second place there is no pleasure which is not an 'unimpeded' activity: in the third place, the expression 'in harmony with nature' includes both kinds of permanent states, those which are acquired by habit as well as those which are formed by nature. For the former as well as the latter class of habits are in harmony with nature: since nature gives us the capacity for them and thereby enables us to acquire them. He, therefore, who is the subject of an unimpeded activity is the subject of pleasure: and in fact this is pleasure.

[The reason why pleasure has been thought by some persons to be a 'transition' or process of becoming is because they have thought it to be a 'good' in the full sense of the term and in fact the highest good: but that which is 'good' in the full sense of the term is a mode of activity: and there is no difference between 'activity' and 'process of becoming.' But this is not true: the two terms are not, as they think, identical. For a 'transition' is a passing from non-being into being: whereas an 'activity,' at least that activity which is identical with the highest good, is an activity which comes into play after a settled state has been formed, and which moves in harmony with that settled state in its most developed form.]

(4.) PLEASURES ARE NOT NECESSARILY EVIL *PER SE*.

As for pleasures being bad on the ground that there are certain pleasant things which are unhealthy—that is as absurd as to say

that healthful things are bad . . . for money-making. From a particular point of view of course they are both bad; but for all that incidental badness they are not bad *per se*. Of course under certain circumstances even thinking is injurious to health.

(4.) The fact that some pleasures are not good does not prove that all pleasures are not good.

Nor does it necessarily follow that pleasure is bad because some pleasant things are unhealthy: for on the same principle healthy things will be bad, since some of them stand in the way of a man's being rich, by necessitating the expenditure of large sums of money. Of course this does not prove healthy things to be bad; the mere fact that something is in some way opposed to a particular good does not prove that thing to be bad: for even philosophical investigation is sometimes injurious to health, but it is not on that account bad. It does not follow, then, that because some pleasant things are unhealthy, pleasure is therefore bad.

(5.) PLEASURE IS NOT ALWAYS A HINDRANCE TO ACTIVITY.

The pleasure which flows from our several pursuits is no hindrance either to thought or to the tension of the mind in any other direction—though the reverse is the case with foreign pleasures; nay, natural pleasures such as of thinking and learning will enable us to think and learn all the more.

(5.) Pleasure does not hinder, but sometimes stimulates, activity.

Nor, again, does it follow that because some pleasures stand in the way of practical wisdom and philosophical investigation, pleasure is therefore bad. For the pleasure which attends the exercise of practical wisdom or artistic production is no hindrance to practical wisdom or artistic production: on the contrary, it augments it. The pleasures which stand in the way of the activity of any settled state are foreign to that state, and disturb its activity from the fact of their not being appropriate to it. But the fact of their being foreign to a given state and so impeding its activity is not a sign of their being bad: for, as has been stated already, philosophical investigation sometimes stands in the way of health, not being a mode of activity appropriate to health: but it does not follow that philosophical investigation is a bad thing.

(6.) THE RELATION OF PLEASURE TO ART.

But as for the objection that 'no pleasure is the creation of art' (and therefore not a good), that is a result which might have been expected: there is no art in the case of any other mental activity but only of (mental) faculties. [Though one might deny the statement: the art of the cook and the art of the perfumer are both thought to be 'arts of pleasure.']

(6.) The argument from pleasure not being the creation of art proves too much.

Nor, again, does it follow that pleasure is bad because it is not the creation of any form of art: if that were so, every mode of activity would be bad: for no mode of activity is a product of art, but art produces the capacity, and the capacity leads to the activity. For example, it is the art of steering which produces in a man the capacity of steering, and it is the capacity of steering which leads to

the activity or actual exercise of the steersman's art. It may be added that in some cases pleasure *is* the result of art: for example, the arts of perfumery and cookery are productive of pleasure.

(7.) THE RELATION OF THE TEMPERATE MAN TO PLEASURE.

Again, as to the objection that 'the temperate man shrinks from pleasure and the perfect man compasses the life that is free from pain' and that 'children and animals pursue pleasure,' all such difficulties are solved in the same manner. It has been explained how that in a way there are pleasures which are good absolutely, and how that not all pleasures are good. The pleasures, then, which animals and children pursue are pleasures of an imperfect kind; and it is from the pain of these false pleasures that the perfect man shrinks; pleasures, I mean, which are attended by desire and pain (as truly they are), and the excesses of pleasure which bring a man to utter dissoluteness. Hence the temperate man flees from such pleasures as these, though there are pleasures in which even the temperate man may indulge.

(7.) It is not true that a temperate man avoids *all* pleasure.

The difficulty which may arise from the fact that temperate men and men of practical wisdom avoid pleasure, and aim not so much at a life of pleasure as at a life that is free from pain, and from the fact that children and animals pursue pleasure, is solved by what has been said in a previous chapter. The solution is briefly this. Some pleasures being good absolutely, and others not absolutely, the latter class are pursued by animals and children, and avoided by temperate men, who in regard to them wish merely to be free from pain. So also with men of practical wisdom and all good men. I refer to the pleasures which are attended with desire and pain, the bodily pleasures, that is to say (for all bodily pleasures are of this kind), and the excesses of such pleasures, which form the sphere of the dissolute man and which are consequently avoided by the temperate man. The other class of pleasures, those which are such absolutely, are pursued by both the temperate man and the man of practical wisdom: they are temperate pleasures and are the activities of praiseworthy states of mind: the pleasures I mean of temperance, justice, and philosophical investigation.

iv.—Refutation of the theory that no form of pleasure can be the chief good.

(1.) PLEASURE SHOWN TO BE A GOOD BECAUSE PAIN IS AN EVIL.

Nay, further, it is admitted that pain is an evil and a thing to be avoided: in one aspect it is an unqualified evil, in another aspect it is a relative evil as impeding the action of the individual in some way or another. But the opposite of what is to be avoided—in the degree in which it *is* an evil and a thing to be avoided, is a good. It necessarily follows then that pleasure is under certain aspects a good.

Pleasure is opposed to pain as a good to an evil,

[The explanation whereby Speusippus tried to evade this dilemma, does not turn out to be true. He argued that the greater was opposed to the equal as well as to the less: and that, similarly, pleasure and pain were both opposed to the good. But no one could say that pleasure could be defined as any form of evil.]

and not as one evil to another.

Further, since pain is partly a good, and partly an evil and to be avoided; and since that kind of pain which is to be avoided is to be subdivided as being so partly in an absolute sense, as for example the pain which sometimes ensues upon the performance of a virtuous action, and partly in a relative sense, as for example the pain which ensues upon the infliction of a penalty, which falls under this class, as being an obstacle to philosophical investigation: it follows that the opposite of pain, I mean pleasure, must also be of two kinds, absolute and relative. To pain in its absolute sense must be opposed pleasure in an absolute sense: to pain in its relative sense must be opposed pleasure in a relative sense. Speusippus is not successful in his attempt to break the validity of this argument by a counter-argument; he says that just as in mathematics the greater and the less are opposed to the equal, and as in the case of the virtues there are two extremes opposed to the mean: so pleasure and pain are both opposed to the mean state of painlessness, the former standing to it in the relation of excess, the latter in that of defect. In other words painlessness is a good, pleasure and pain are each of them evil. But this argument is in every respect improbable: for no one thinks pleasure to be an evil, nor would anyone assert that pleasure in itself, *quâ* pleasure, is an evil.

(2.) THE EVIL OF PLEASURES DOES NOT AFFECT THE PLEASURE OF HAPPINESS.

Nor is there any reason to prevent pleasure of a certain kind being the chief good, though certain pleasures are evil; precisely as knowledge of a certain kind *might* be the chief good, even though there are certain forms of knowledge which are worthless and evil.

Certain forms of pleasure may be evil, and yet pleasure may be an element in happiness.

Surely, then, it is a necessary consequence that, if in the case of every mental state there are certain modes where its development is unimpeded (whether happiness be the activity which arises from all these states, or whether it be the activity which arises from some special form of them), if the activity be unimpeded, it is a thing most desirable; but this unimpeded activity is *pleasure*.

Consequently, the chief good *may be* a certain mode of pleasure, even though the majority of pleasures be, possibly, evil *per se*.

For this reason all men think that the happy life is a pleasurable life, and with good grounds entwine pleasure into the very conception of happiness, no mode of human activity being perfect if it be fettered and impeded, and happiness belonging to what is perfect.

Hence also the happy man needs for his happiness the good things which depend upon the body and external advantages and prosperity, so that he may not be impeded in such relations. As for those who say that a man who is being racked on a wheel, or who is plunged in dire calamities, is happy provided he be virtuous, they only talk nonsense whether intentionally or not.

Another mistake is this. In consequence of the need of fortune to supplement the inner dispositions, happiness is thought by some people to be identical with prosperity. That is not the case: in fact if good fortune be excessive, it is a hindrance to happiness, in which case it is no longer right to call it 'good fortune,' since good fortune has sole reference to happiness as its standard and measure.

Nor does the fact that some pleasures are bad prove that pleasure cannot be the chief good and the Absolutely Best: for in the same way the fact that many forms of knowledge are bad does not prove that knowledge is not the Chief Good. Indeed it is not only a possible but actually a necessary conclusion that pleasure is the Chief Good and the ultimate object of choice. For if every mental state has its corresponding mode of activity, and if Happiness and the Chief Good is an unimpeded activity of a perfect mental state, whether that perfect state be one or many, it necessarily follows that Happiness and the Chief Good is pleasure. Nor is this conclusion invalidated by the fact that some forms of pleasure are evil.

Moreover it is manifest that happiness must be an unimpeded activity: for no activity that is impeded can be perfect (which by the nature of the case happiness must be). Consequently, as was stated in an earlier book of this treatise, a happy man has need of external goods, that his activity may not be impeded. Those who say that a man whose life is marked by great inequalities of fortune and who meets with great calamities is happy, only talk nonsense, whether intentionally or not. For the happy man requires certain external advantages, for example health, and long life, and the indispensable conditions of a sound body, and start in life which comes of good fortune. It is on this account that some persons have gone so far as to think that the fortunate man and the happy man are identical: because without the favour of fortune no one can be genuinely happy. But they are not in reality identical: for the happy man must be a good man, but not every fortunate man is good. Indeed good fortune sometimes stands in the way of moral excellence, and spoils a good man, if it be excessive: in which case it would not properly deserve even the name of good fortune, for it is of the essence of good fortune that it should contribute to happiness: it is in accordance with this fact that its definition also is given to it, and consequently its name. Hence it would not properly be called good fortune if it did not contribute to happiness. All this makes it clear that the attribute 'unimpeded' should be added to the word 'activity' when applied to the happy man. But an unimpeded activity is in fact pleasure. Happiness is therefore a certain form of pleasure.

(3.) PLEASURE IS INSEPARABLE FROM THE CHIEF GOOD.

Further, the fact that all creatures both beasts and men pursue pleasure is a proof that in some sense pleasure is the Chief Good.

"Mankind's universal voice falleth not wholly vain."

But since there is no one state of nature which either is or is recognised to be the best for all, so neither do men all pursue the same pleasure, though pleasure they all pursue. Nay, perhaps unconsciously they are not pursuing the pleasure they think they are and say they are, but, in reality, all alike the same. There is a kind of instinct which all creatures alike possess by right of nature—a divine instinct (which justifies an appeal to universal nature).

The striving of all creatures after pleasure shows that some form of it is the ultimate object of striving, viz., the chief good.

Yet inasmuch as bodily pleasures are those to which men most frequently resort and in which all men share, they have usurped full possession of the name of pleasure: because they are the only pleasures men know of, they think that they are the only pleasures which exist.

In conclusion, it is evident that, if pleasure and the play of the faculties be not a good, it will be impossible that the happy man should live a pleasurable existence. With what object would a happy man need pleasure, if pleasure be not a good and if it be possible to live happily in the midst of pain? In fact, if pleasure be neither a good nor an evil, neither will pain be good nor evil: why, then, should a man shrink from pain? Moreover, if the activities of the good man are not more pleasurable than that of the bad, neither will the *life* of the good man be more pleasurable than that of the bad.

Further, the fact that animals and men and all beings possessed of sensation pursue pleasure makes it clear that pleasure is the Chief Good. For all agree in shouting out that pleasure is a good and the highest good, and all press on in the pursuit of it. And

"Mankind's universal voice falleth not wholly vain."

It is true that they do not all pursue the highest form of pleasure; for, in the same way, they do not all have the same mental state or the same nature: but pleasure they do all pursue, though the form of it be only in some cases good, and in others bad. Nay perhaps none of them even pursue or seek for a bad form of pleasure or aim at anything that is bad: the actual object of their pursuit and seeking is not that which they intend to seek, or would admit that they pursue: what all of them really pursue is the highest form of pleasure, for all things naturally aim at what is really good, since in all things there is a divine element, and the impulse of all things is towards a form of pleasure which is good, and which is pleasurable in the proper sense of the term: though it may be admitted that the bodily pleasures seem to men to be pleasures in the proper sense of the term, on account of their constant exposure to them and also on account of all men participating in them. They are, in fact, not cognizant of any others, and consequently think these to be the only forms of pleasure which exist. And since these forms of pleasure are not good nor are pleasures in the proper sense of the term, men (knowing no others) have denied that any form of pleasure is a 'good.' But it is incontrovertible that (some form of) pleasure is a good.

For if pleasure, and the play of the faculties which is in harmony with pleasure, be not a good, it is not possible for the happy man to live pleasurably. But

surely there is no doubt that a happy man's life must be accompanied with pleasure. Consequently it is impossible that pleasure should not be a good. A further argument to prove the same point from the same premisses is that nothing which is evil, or in fact which is not in the proper sense good, can be an element in happiness. Why, then, if pleasure be not a good, does the happy man pursue it? And again, if pleasure be not either a good or an evil, pain will not be either a good or an evil: consequently it will not be a thing to be avoided. Why then does the happy man avoid it? He would not avoid it unless it were an evil: but as a matter of fact he cannot help avoiding it. It is necessary, in short, that the happy life should be the pleasantest life: but this is impossible unless the modes in which the activities of the happy man manifest themselves are pleasant: for if otherwise how will the pleasantness of his life be realized?

If, then, pleasure be not either positively evil or negatively not good, it follows that it is good.

v.—Refutation of the argument from bodily pleasures.

(1.) BODILY PLEASURES ARE, IN CERTAIN CONNECTIONS, GOOD.

Bodily pleasures are only evil in their abuse and excess.

Now the subject of bodily pleasures is one especially incumbent on those thinkers to examine who maintain that though certain pleasures, *i.e.* noble pleasures, are emphatically desirable in a high degree, yet bodily pleasures and such as those in which the dissolute man indulges, are evil.

If this view of theirs be true, why are the pains which are the opposite of pleasures grievous and evil? Good and evil are, of course, opposites.

May the solution be this: are not necessary pleasures good in the sense that whatever is not an evil is a good? or, are these bodily pleasures good up to a certain point? In the case of mental habits and processes where there is no excess possible as they increase from more to more, there is no excess possible either, in the pleasure resulting therefrom. On the contrary, where excess is possible from the increase and enhancement of those processes, there also there is excess possible in the pleasure which ensues. Consequently excess is possible in the pleasures of the body; and the bad man is bad in that he seeks that excess instead of seeking such pleasures as are necessary. All men find pleasure of a certain kind in dainties and wines and love; though not all observe the proper standard therein. The converse is true in the case of pain. Men shrink not merely from the excess of pain but from pain in general: pain is not opposed to the mere excess of pleasure—except in the case of the [very sensitive and self-indulgent] man who pursues the excess [and makes every defection from his own extravagant standard a pain].

It is possible for anyone to raise the question why it is that if some pleasures are good and choiceworthy, and some on the other hand evil—as for example the

bodily pleasures with which the dissolute man is concerned—every form of pain is vicious and to be avoided. For it would be reasonable to suppose that although the pain which is opposed to good pleasures is evil, the pain which is opposed to evil pleasures should be good—evil and good being in the relation of opposites. If on the contrary this form of pain is evil, it would seem as though the bodily pleasures were good. Our answer to this question is as follows: Bodily pleasures are good in the sense of not being bad: for whatever is not bad is good. This is true up to a certain point. For if they do not exceed a certain limit they are in this sense good: consequently the pains that are opposed to them are not good. For, since some states of mind and body exceed the due limit and what is best, whereas other states of mind and body do not so exceed, the necessary states of body, such as the state of requiring nourishment, are capable of excess, since they can be exercised to a greater extent than they should properly be exercised: on the other hand those which when subjected to tension do not go beyond the due limit are not capable of excess, but are always good, as for example the states of mind which are engaged in philosophical investigation. But since pleasures follow upon states of mind, it necessarily follows that some pleasures exceed the due limit, and some do not. All those which exceed the limit are bad, and it is with them that the dissolute and the weak-minded man are concerned. In the case of pains which are opposed to pleasures, it is not with *excessive* pains that the dissolute man concerns himself: he pursues no doubt excessive pleasures but avoids even small pains. From this it is manifest that the pains which in the case of the dissolute man are opposed to his excessive pleasures are not excessive but moderate pains—such as no good man would avoid, because they do not in fact deserve the name of pains.

This is the solution of the question which was raised: the pains which are opposed to moderate pleasures are not good: for moderate bodily pleasures are good, inasmuch as they are not evil: the pains which are opposed to excessive pleasures are moderate pains, in fact not pains at all, and consequently not to be avoided. Every form of good is contrary to that which is to be avoided: and bad pleasures are opposed to good pains, just as good pleasures are to pains which should be avoided.

(2.) CAUSES OF THE UNIVERSAL PURSUIT OF PLEASURE.

Why do bodily pleasures seem to most men to be especially desirable.

However, we must not only give a true account: we must also explain the cause of the error; a thorough exposition being highly conducive to winning conviction. When a probable reason has been shown why a theory has an appearance of truth without being true, such an explanation makes us have a greater confidence in the truth itself.

Hence we must explain why it is that bodily pleasures have the appearance of being more choiceworthy than others.

(1.) Because they act as the remedies of pain.

(1.) In the first place, of course, bodily pleasure drives out pain. In face of excessive pain, as though it were a remedy for it, men strive after a pleasure correspondingly excessive—in fact, after bodily pleasure. Now these remedies are found to be powerful, and hence they are adopted because they are regarded in contrast to their opposites.

[It is on account of these two causes that pleasure is thought not to be a good: (*a*) *i.e.* some pleasures, as we have explained, are the actions of a depraved nature, whether congenital as in the case of beasts, or the result of habit as in the case of vicious characters; (*β*) other pleasures, again, are remedies, because they are the actions of an imperfect nature. But, as for remedial pleasures, it is better to have a normal condition than to be arriving at one: yet these remedial pleasures only take place whilst we are arriving at a state of completeness: hence they are only 'pleasures' in an indirect and secondary sense.]

(2.) Because of the want of capacity in most men for mental pleasures.

(2.) Again, these bodily pleasures are sought on account of their powerful effect only by those who have lost the capacity for taking pleasure in simpler and purer tastes. At any rate men have to create artificial excitements so as to satisfy their abnormal tastes. Of course, if these indulgences do not hurt their health their conduct is not censurable; but if they are injurious, then their conduct is morally evil. Men only indulge them in fact because they have nothing else in which they can take pleasure, and 'a state of impassivity' is to many men painful by the constitution of their nature. 'The whole creation struggleth even until now,' as the writings of natural philosophers tell us . . . . adding in fact that even the act of seeing or of hearing is painful; only in time we become habituated to the pain, which is second nature to us (so they say).

The same truth is conspicuous in time of youth: owing to the processes of growth, boys are in a physical state resembling that of the intoxicated, and boyhood is sweet and pleasant.

Again, people of a nervous temperament are ever in need of an anodyne: their bodies are in a state of constant irritation, owing to their temperament, and they are incessantly in a state of vehement desire. Now pleasure, be it the opposite of a given pain, or be it what it may, provided it be strong enough, drives away the irritation; and hence it is that nervous people become dissolute and depraved.

However, we must not only give a true account: we must also explain the cause of the error; a thorough exposition being highly conducive to winning conviction of the truth. For when the reason has been shown why it is that what is in reality false has an appearance of truth, and the cause of the error has been exposed, the explanation makes us have a greater confidence in the truth itself. Hence we must explain why it is that bodily pleasures have the appearance of being more choiceworthy than those which are really good.

(1.) In the first place bodily pleasures are of the nature of remedies for bodily pains. The pains may be great, but the strength of the pleasures exceeds the strength of the pain, and drives it out. Consequently, at the time when bodily

pain presses upon a man, pleasures are sought after, because they seem to be strong and powerful remedies, and easily rid a man of the pain which comes from defect of pleasure. The second reason is that bodily pleasures are sought after by those who are incapable of taking delight in other forms of pleasure. And these persons form a numerous class: and consequently that which they seek after is thought to be good and choiceworthy. They are not content with the satisfaction of natural desires, but they go on to devise artificial excitements, creating for themselves, for example an artificial thirst, in order that they may be always capable of delighting themselves with drink. No doubt if this practice does not go beyond the limits of reason and moderation, it is not injurious, for bodily pleasures in moderation do not injure the body, and to that extent the practice of which I have spoken is not to be censured. But if the pleasures which are to be pursued do go beyond the limit, and the pursuit of them injures the body, the pursuit of them is morally evil. I assert that the use of bodily pleasures in moderation is not to be censured, because it is absolutely necessary for a man to find some things pleasant in life, because his nature is in process of struggle, and requires some kind of pleasure which will serve, so to speak, as a repose. For the whole creation is always in process of struggle, as in fact natural philosophers tell us: for they say that even the act of seeing or of hearing is in reality painful, though through habituation it does not seem so. Men, therefore, need some kind of pleasure, and if a man is insensible to intellectual pleasures, he is compelled to enjoy himself with the pleasures of the body. It follows, that those who use them in moderation, and in such a way as not to injure their body are not morally censured.

The same truth is conspicuous in time of youth: the pleasures which accompany the nutritive part of our nature, just as they are by the dissolute man, under an impulse of nature struggling after growth. Youths are, in fact, in an analogous position to men who are under the influence of wine; for eating, drinking, and sleeping continually, as they do, they have the desire which is stimulated by these operations in a constant state of extreme vigour, just as those with whom I have compared them are under the constant influence of thirst. It is for this reason that the period of youth is pleasant because its realization of the necessary conditions of existence is always accompanied with desire.

In just the same way persons of a nervous temperament are always in a state of vehement desire, and are always in need of an anodyne: for their bodies are always in a state of irritation on account of their temperament.

These, therefore, are persons who seek after bodily pleasures, and these are the reasons why they seek them. Speaking generally, every bodily pleasure is sought for in order that it may expel a bodily pain: for pleasure drives out pain, nor is it necessary that the particular form of pleasure should be the exact opposite of the particular form of pain; for example, a pain which arises in the nutritive part of us, is driven out not only by a pleasure which has its seat in the nutritive part of us, but by any other form of pleasure as well, if only it be strong enough. It is for this reason that bodily pleasures are pursued, and it is hence that men become dissolute or bad.

(3.) THE PLEASURES OF THE MIND, HOWEVER, ARE PREFERABLE TO THOSE OF THE BODY.

Mental pleasures do not admit of excess.

On the other hand, pleasures unaccompanied by pain do not admit of excess: they are the satisfaction and realization of things which are pleasurable in their own nature and not through adventitious circumstances. By 'pleasures of association' I mean such things as are of the nature of a remedy. Since it

happens that we are relieved, owing to some operation of that part in us which continues sound, the object [which causes this result] seems to us to be itself pleasant. On the contrary things are *naturally* pleasant when they produce the activity of a nature corresponding to their own.

But the same object is never continuously pleasant to us, because our nature is not simple, but there are in it other and diverse elements (in virtue of our corruptible nature). Hence when one element is in action, it thwarts the tendency of the second element; and when the two elements are balanced, the result of their action appears to be neither painful nor pleasant. However, if there be any being whose nature is uncompounded, the same mode of action will be continuously and in the highest degree pleasurable to him.

Hence it is, through the simplicity of His essence, God enjoys everlastingly one pure pleasure. There is an activity assuredly not only in change but in changelessness; and pleasure is keener in a state of calm than in a state of motion. It is only, as the poet says, 'through the frailty of our mortal nature that change is the sweetest of all things.' It is the frail and faulty character which is fond of change; and the nature which needs change bears the same stamp of imperfection, being neither sincere nor true.

We must here conclude our account of moral strength and weakness, and of pleasure and pain, having defined the nature of each respectively and the sense in which they are right or wrong, good or evil. It now remains for us to proceed with our examination of Friendship.

On the other hand, intellectual pleasures are not preceded by pain (for it is not necessary for us, as in the case of bodily pleasures, to feel pain before feeling the delight which they bring), and do not admit of excess. It is not possible for us to give play to the intellect beyond what is fitting: the pleasures which flow from the play of the intellect are always praiseworthy, for the objects which cause those pleasures are pleasant not accidentally, but always and absolutely. By things which are accidentally pleasurable I mean those which satisfy and heal bodily wants and pains; for example, articles of food. For food is, as it were, a remedy to the nature of a hungry man, which is, so to speak, in an abnormal and morbid state, and it supplies what is lacking: when, that is to say, the man's nature is not defective or morbid in respect of its capacity of receiving nutriment, but possesses that capacity, and is sound in respect of it, and gives it play, that is to say, feels a desire for food. Things of this kind are pleasurable, not in themselves, but through adventitious circumstances, that is, because they happen to serve as remedies. On the other hand, things are naturally pleasurable which instead of filling up a deficiency in a man's nature, stimulate that nature into activity. Of this kind are the objects upon which the intellect employs itself, for they allow a perfect play to the activity of the mind.

But since our nature is not simple but complex, and since we do not live with

our minds only apart from our bodies, the same objects are not always pleasurable to us; since even in the case of those things which are accidentally pleasurable, the same things are not always objects of pursuit, but we seek at one time one class of objects, at another time another. For when our bent is in the direction of our body, we feel pleasure in those things which are connected with our body, but when, on the other hand, we look beyond our body, we seek things which are not accidentally, but naturally pleasurable, for there is a conflict between the pleasures of the mind and the pleasures of the body: and the objects in which the mind feels delight seem to the body to be contrary to nature. At the same time, when the exercise of virtue has brought the mind and body into unison, then, although it is still true that the body does not feel delight in the objects round which the mind delights to play—for they are not objects of sense, still, it is not objects of pain.

Hence it is that to those beings whose nature is absolutely simple, the same course of action is always absolutely pleasant. For God enjoys everlastingly one pure pleasure. It is true that he is changeless, and that he has been thought on this account to be incapable of pleasure, for pleasure is a mode of activity, and activity is thought to be only a mode of change. But it is not so: there is an activity not only in change, but in changelessness, and pleasure is keener in a state of calm than in a state of changeful motion. Change is the sweetest of all things, as the poet says, not to an absolutely good and perfect nature, but to a composite nature, owing to its frailty and its wickedness: for just as a wicked man is constantly changing, so also a wicked nature is in constant need of change, it is neither simple nor sincere.

We must here conclude our account of moral strength and weakness, and of pleasure and pain, having defined the nature of each respectively, and the sense in which they are right or wrong, good or evil. It remains for us to speak of friendship.

BOOK VIII.—CONCERNING FRIENDSHIP.

INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS.

I.—GENERAL CONCEPTION OF FRIENDSHIP.

THE general subject of these two books (VIII. and IX.) is Friendship. The subject has many claims on the moralist for his attention. It deserves consideration (1) on account of its intimate connection with virtue. Friendship in all its higher forms is impossible without virtue, and is in its turn of the greatest assistance towards leading a virtuous and so a happy life.

(2.) It befits every condition and every age of life. Rich and poor, old young and middle-aged are all on different grounds indebted to friendship.

(3.) Friendship is a principle deeply rooted in human nature; not to speak of the natural affection subsisting between parent and child and even among animals towards those of their own kind, man has a natural attraction to man as man. We may see this in the way in which men casually thrown together make friends with one another, and even strangers are made welcome.

(4.) As 'social philosophers' we are especially bound to consider it; it is the chief tie that binds civil society together and is even more absolutely indispensable to its well-being than justice is, while

(5.) The possession of friends is 'a crown of glory' to a man, a distinctive addition to virtue itself.

Yet as to the nature and origin of the sentiment there are a variety of differing, and even diametrically opposed, opinions.

1. Some Philosophers take the view that 'like is attracted by like.'

2. Others maintain that it is dissimilar natures that have affinities. Both alike trace the prevalence of one or other of these principles through the whole of nature.

3. Into these wider questions it is beyond our present purpose to enter. As *moralists*, we approach the question only from the moral side, and would confine our attention to such questions as these. What is the relation of friendship to virtue and to happiness? Are there different *kinds* of friendship, friendships which the vicious man may share as well as the virtuous, or is friendship the privilege of the virtuous alone?

II.—ARE THERE DIFFERENT KINDS OF FRIENDSHIP?

Let us attempt to answer this last question first and consider—

'Are there different kinds of friendship, and if so how many they are.' In order to answer it, it will be necessary to analyse the grounds on which affection, and with it friendship, may rest. What are the objects of affection? Now that which excites affection is always either the good, or the agreeable or the useful. We love persons, or things, because they are good, or pleasant or useful to us. But the useful, if we consider what it really means, is that which conduces to our good, or conduces to our pleasure. Consequently goodness and pleasantness are the only *ultimate* grounds of affection, and, therefore, of friendship. (We may notice further that, though ideally it may be the truly good and the really pleasant which excite and command our affection, yet practically the feeling will be evoked in each individual by that which impresses him as good or as pleasant.)

Yet mere affection for a person or an object, prompted by one or other of these motives does not, taken by itself alone, constitute friendship. If it did, we might be said to be friends with our wine, or with any other inanimate object which gives us gratification or amusement. Three other conditions have to be complied with before the idea of friendship can be regarded as complete.

1. The affection felt must be *unselfish;* it must be a genuine wish for the good of the person, or the object, loved.
2. The feeling must be reciprocated by the object towards which it is felt, and
3. Their mutual affection must not be unknown to the two parties concerned.

We are now in a position to answer the question with which we started, whether there are different *kinds* of friendship, and to answer it in the affirmative. Since the three objects of affection above enumerated are distinct in kind, and since an unselfish feeling of affection, reciprocated by, and not unknown to, the object of it, may arise on any one of these grounds, it follows that there are three distinct *kinds* of friendship, corresponding to these three different objects of affection; friendships, that is, based upon goodness, friendships based upon pleasure, and friendships based upon interest.

III.—THE THREE KINDS OF FRIENDSHIP CONTRASTED AND COMPARED.

Of these three forms of friendship, the two which originate severally in interest and in pleasure, depend not so much on the intrinsic character of the contracting parties as upon circumstances which are more or less accidental, and consequently the friendships have themselves something of an accidental character.

This same fact renders them also liable to speedy dissolution, as interest and pleasure quickly change.

These different kinds of friendship do not prevail equally among all classes. The old and the more mercenary of the young and the middle-aged form friendships of interest, while the young form friendships

chiefly from delight in one another's society; but the changeableness of youth, and the uncertainty of pleasure, make such friendships often only of short duration.

The only perfect form of friendship is the friendship of the good, and it can alone be regarded as true and real friendship. (1) It is unselfish, and this gives it a true element of friendliness in which the other forms are wanting. (2) Being based on a mutual respect between the friends for each other's character, it is not affected by any external or accidental considerations. (3) It contains in itself the advantages of both the other kinds, as the good are both pleasant and profitable to one another. (4) It is lasting, for it has its roots in virtue and virtue wears well; while (5) we have here that similarity of disposition which is essential to friendship.

Of course such friendships are rare. Perfectly good men are scarce, and time and intimacy are requisite to bring friendship, in this its highest and completest form, to perfection.

The two other forms are enduring, and approach the ideal form in varying degrees.

1. Of the imperfect forms that is most lasting, in which each of the friends is agreeable to the other and on the same grounds. Two wits, for instance, may often strike up a lasting friendship. But

2. Where, as in the case of lovers, the advantage sought is not of the same kind, but one seeks gratification, the other profit, the connexion is apt to be transitory, ceasing as the bloom of youth dies away and attentions cease to be paid as of old; though of course cases occur in which love ripens into lasting friendship, if the lovers come mutually to esteem each other's characters.

3. Those friendships are least real, and least lasting, which are dictated by merely mercenary motives.

4. One other point in which all such friendships fall short of the ideal of true friendship is their liability to be destroyed by the breath of slander; true friends, who have really proved one another, are superior to all its assaults.

In all these respects, then, does true friendship transcend these its imperfect copies; yet since popular usage extends the name of friendship also to them, we will follow it in this particular and speak of three *kinds* of friendship, one that true and ideal friendship which is confined to the good, the other two kinds shared by bad and good alike, being called friendships at all only by a kind of analogy or metaphor.

If we turn next to consider the conditions which give vitality or reality to friendship, they seem to be summed up in these three.

(1.) Constant intercourse and delight on the part of the friends in one another's society.

(2.) A certain pleasantness and pliability of temper which makes such constant intercourse possible and delightful.

(3.) A certain fixity of character and determination to do good to one's friend, which distinguishes true friendship from any passing affection.

Lastly, if we ask

IV.—WHAT ARE THE LIMITS OF FRIENDSHIP?

We shall observe

1. That the morose and the elderly, from hardness of character, seldom can make friends.

2. That ideal friendship being, like love, a highly-exalted state of feeling can be entertained only towards few at a time, all the more because it requires time and intimacy to mature it.

3. That friendships of interest and pleasure may be formed with a wide circle of friends.

4. That the powerful require many friends and friends of different kinds, but cannot often command the friendship of the good except in those rare instances, where by reason of their superior excellence the good can repay their favours in honour without loss of self-respect.

Thus, then, the results we have arrived at are the following: (1) that all forms of friendship imply equality, either an actual return of like for like, honour for honour, pleasure for pleasure, profit for profit; or, if not that (still) an equivalent amount in some other kind, and (2) that the friendship of the good is the only ideal type, and that the two other forms are regarded as friendships only in virtue of their resemblance to this: but (3) friendships are formed as a matter of fact, not merely between equals but between men differing widely in position, virtue, wealth, &c. With respect to these friendships of relative superiority and inferiority the following principles applicable to all their different cases may be laid down.

1. What each of the friends will, and should, look for in the other, is not an exact repayment of his own services but a different kind of service.

2. The payment should be based on principles of proportion rather than of strict equality, the greater service being repaid by more honour.

3. Such friendships cannot extend beyond a certain limit; when one of the two parties is altogether in a different position from the other, friendship is no longer possible. Friendship herein differs from justice. In justice it does not matter how widely removed in station the two parties involved are; justice can still be done between them; all that we have to look to is their respective merits; but in friendship a certain equality between the two parties is necessary. The very idea of friendship between those very widely removed in position is preposterous. Man does not claim to be the friend of God, nor a common man to be friends with princes.

This fact furnishes a limit to the good wishes we can entertain for our friends. We cannot be absolutely unselfish in our good wishes; we cannot wish them such advancement as will make them cease to be our friends, nor can we desire that their happiness should interfere with our own.

V.—WHAT ARE THE MOTIVES IN WHICH FRIENDSHIP ORIGINATES?

1. Though the majority are more anxious to receive than to give affection, such a desire, like that of honour though in a less degree, has

always a certain element of selfishness and self-seeking about it. In its nobler forms friendship consists more in loving than in being loved, as we see preeminently in the case of a mother's love for her offspring, when any requital of the affection is often not even asked for. Consequently the outpouring of love must be regarded as more proper to, more characteristic of, true friendship than the being loved.

2. Friendships most frequently originate in a similarity of tastes and character. This is seen most conspicuously in the case of the good who are drawn together by sympathy and a respect for one another's character.

3. Where there is not this similarity of character, the friendship is generally prompted by interest, a desire on the part of each to make good some deficiency in himself. In these cases it may well be that the opposite does not really desire its opposite, but desires that balanced condition which is, as we have already seen, the true nature of 'the good.'

VI.—THE RELATION OF FRIENDSHIP AND JUSTICE.

Justice and friendship have much in common; they prevail for the most part between the same individuals, and find a place in the same transactions. Wherever two people are associated for any purpose, they will be found, as a rule, united by ties both of justice and of friendship, and the closer the tie uniting them, the more intimate will be the friendship, the more imperative the claims of justice.

Furthermore, inasmuch as every form of association is entered into with a view to secure some particular advantage, while the political union was originally formed, and still continues to exist, with a view of promoting the well-being of man as a whole, consequently every special association may be regarded as subordinate to, and forming a part of 'that political union' whose end thus comprises and includes the ends of them all. This is true even of those associations which are formed merely for purposes of pleasure and enjoyment. Pleasure and enjoyment and relaxation from toil are constituents of well-being, and so cannot be regarded as lying outside the scope of the all-embracing political union.

But the political union may itself take many forms of which the chief are these, kingly government, aristocracy, and timocracy. Each of these has its corresponding 'perversion' or distorted form, tyranny being the perversion of kingly rule, oligarchy of aristocracy, democracy of timocracy. The perverted forms differ from the legitimate forms, in that in the former the governors aim at their own selfish ends, in the latter at the public good. Of the legitimate forms kingly rule—where the king looks solely to the interests of his subjects—is the best, timocracy the least good; while in the perverted forms tyranny is the worst, democracy the least evil. It should further be noticed, that each of the three forms of government is apt to degenerate into its own allied perverted form. Human selfishness is for ever creeping in and perverting governments from their true ideal.

Relations corresponding to these different forms of government are to be met with in the household as well. Kingly rule is, or should be represented by a father's 'paternal rule.' Tyranny finds its counterpart in the harsh authority of 'Persian' fathers, and, more legitimately, in the authority exercised by a master over his slaves.

Husband and wife—where the husband rules in virtue of his superior merits, and assigns to the wife her proper sphere and duties—are on the footing of an aristocracy and its subjects. If the husband interferes beyond his proper sphere, or where the wife, as having possession of the purse-strings, gets the upper hand, their relation degenerates into oligarchy.

Brothers again are on that footing of equality, which is the characteristic note of 'timocracy;' while in masterless houses, or when the father is weak, we see rampant the evils of democracy, in which each does that which is right in his own eyes.

Now in state and household alike friendship is only possible, where the rights of all concerned are duly respected. Friendship between ruler and subject, between father and child, will be found, only where the rights and interests of each are properly respected by the other. Unselfish care on the one side must be answered by due deference on the other.

In an aristocracy and in the case of husband and wife friendship will rest on a due recognition, on the part of the governed and of the wife, of superior merit in the ruling class and the husband respectively.

The members of a 'timocracy,' like brothers in a household, are equals; and their friendship will depend, accordingly, on the recognition by each of the others' equal right.

On the other hand between a tyrant and his oppressed subjects, between a master and his slaves there is no real community of interest and consequently no friendship, or scarcely any friendship. If a master feels friendship at all for his slave, it is, not as a slave, but, as a man that he loves him, and because he recognises in him the rights of a common humanity.

The members of a democracy have many interests in common, and friendship is, therefore, of frequent occurrence between them.

VII.—FAMILY AFFECTION.

Family affection may be regarded as something distinct from all other forms of friendship. In all its different forms, it rests not on community of interests, but has its roots in a *natural* instinct or feeling. (1.) The love of parent for child is natural, for the child is almost a part of the parent's self, and the parent cannot fail to recognise the share it had in giving its child being.

(2.) Brotherly love is a natural instinct, derived from the community of blood acting as an element common to both, uniting brothers together by a chord of sympathy. This natural feeling is further enhanced by common bringing up, similarity of age and common education. Cousins and more distant relatives are drawn together in the same way, but to a more limited extent, till the relationship fades away into nothing.

(3.) The love of children for their parents rests on a sense of benefits received, while brothers are bound to one another, not merely by that community of blood, which we have above described, but also, by similar dispositions, close intimacy and a common education; so that the 'love of brothers' transcends every other form of friendship.

(4.) Lastly nature also dictates the love of husband and wife; it is

more natural to man to live in pairs, even than in civil society. This is an instinct indeed that he shares with the animals; but, while with them, the union continues only so long as is necessary for the rearing of offspring, man and wife find in it a means of enhancing the value of life by the supply of their mutual needs. This love, which has thus its roots in nature, is further increased by the possession of common children.

VIII.—THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF FRIENDS.

Having now settled what friendship is, what its different species are, what are the conditions necessary to give it reality and what is its relation to justice, our next enquiry will be what are the rights and the duties of friends. Now the golden rule in friendship of whatever kind is that 'Equals should make one another equal returns, Unequals returns proportionate to the superiority of the one side.'

Practically, however, the question of the rights and duties of friends as well as the heartburnings to which such questions give rise, occur in respect of one only of the three species of friendship above distinguished, in that, namely, which originates in interest. Such questions can never arise between those who are bent on virtue, since each will exhibit a noble rivalry to do his friend every good that lies in his power. And those who seek one another's society on grounds of pleasure can always withdraw, if they cease to find their friend's society any longer attractive.

(a). But in friendships, which rest on interest, such questions do very often occur, as in this case each is sure to get less than he wants, and less, consequently, than he considers he has a right to have. For in matters of interest, men are apt to make their wants the measure of their rights.

Of these interested friendships, if we may so style them, there are two different kinds:

(1.) Those in which the whole transaction is purely business-like and commercial where a stipulated service is rendered for a stipulated price or reward. But in respect of this we must again distinguish two different cases, (a) that in which the return is made on the spot, as in transactions in the market; (b) the second that, where delay is allowed in the repayment, the article being given on trust, the amount of the repayment to be made being still stipulated. This latter case has more the character of friendliness, and is less purely business-like than the former.

(2.) The second kind admits certain moral considerations. For in this no precise stipulation is made as to the amount to be repaid, but the gift is given, or the service whatever it may be, is rendered, as to a friend. Still even here the benefactor will expect to get back as much as he has given, and will grumble, if he does not do so. Men wish indeed to realise a noble ideal, and so to give without hope of recompense or return, but when it comes to the point, they cannot help choosing to get back an equivalent for what they have given and to have their services repaid.

And so the rules, which will regulate our conduct in these cases, will be these:

1. Presume as little as possible on the friendly intentions of those who confer a favour.

2. Make repayment in full, wherever this is possible; if it is impossible, your benefactor himself will not require it of you.

3. Make enquiries at the outset as to the terms on which the favour is bestowed, and so settle whether to receive it or no.

There still arises the question, what are we to take as the measure of the repayment which should be made? Is it to be estimated by the good done to the recipient or by the benefit intended by the benefactor? On the one hand the recipient is always inclined to make light of the cost of the service rendered him, on the other, the author of the favour inclines to magnify it. *In friendships of interest* the return to be made should clearly be measured by the amount of the benefit received, since the author of it confers the benefit in the hopes of getting back as much as he actually gives. *In an ideal friendship* no disputes of the kind occur, but there the amount to be returned will rather be measured by the benefactor's intention than by the amount actually received; since it is the benefactor's intention which gives its value and character to his act.

(b.) Besides these friendships of interest, a second case in which disputes occur is where the two friends are in positions of relative superiority and inferiority. In these both claim, though on different grounds, to reap the larger harvest from the transaction. The superior thinks that his superior merits entitle him to a larger return, the inferior that his greater needs entitle him to greater consideration.

Both in a way are right; the superior is entitled to a greater share of honour, the inferior is entitled to a greater share, a greater amount, of help.

(That honour is the proper return for services gratuitously rendered may be seen from the instance of public men. They get honour only in those cases where they give their services to their country gratuitously.)

Of course here again the repayment which will have to be made will have to be limited by the power of the recipient to make it.

So a father has always a claim on his son for his services, since the son can never adequately and completely repay the services and the benefits he has received; but the son has no corresponding claim on the father, since he remains always in his father's debt.

A father has, therefore, a right to repudiate his son, but not the son his father. Still the father is scarcely likely, unless the son is very bad indeed, to exercise his right, as, independently of natural affection, he would be discarding thereby his best hope of assistance and protection for his old age.

TRANSLATION.

I.—GENERAL CONCEPTION OF FRIENDSHIP.

1.—Connection of Friendship with the theory of Morals.

THE subject which follows next in order for us to discuss is Friendship, for friendship is either a special virtue, or, at any rate, implies virtue as a constitutive element in itself.

1. Friendship is either a virtue or implies it.

Friendship is besides most essential to a complete career. Without friends no one would care to live, even though he had all other goods except them; to the rich, and to such as are in positions of authority and high place, friends are in a special way indispensable. For what profit is there in external advantages of this sort, if one has not the opportunity of doing good with them? and it is to friends that the doing of good is at once most natural and most excellent. Again how could such external prosperity be maintained, or kept secure in the absence of friends? In proportion to its greatness the more liable is it to accidents. In poverty, moreover, and all other misfortunes men think that their friends are their only sure refuge.

2. Friends are indispensable alike in prosperity and in adversity,

To the young friends are a help to keep them free from errors; to the old for the tendance they give and for supplying the lack of power to act which comes of weakness; to those in their prime to promote noble deeds.

in youth, in age and, in the prime of life.

"And two going together (are better)."

Two together are more capable of seeing what should be done, and of doing it.

And nature too seems to implant affection in the parent to its offspring, not in men only, but in birds and in most other animals as well, and in those of the same species one towards another, and most of

3. Nature implants friendly feelings in animals, even, to

those of their own kind, most of all in man to man.

all in men to men, so that we use the term 'philanthropic,' or lovers of men, as a term of praise. One can see too on one's travels how every man is akin to and a friend with every other man.

Moreover, friendship between the citizens is, it would seem, the bond that holds states together; and legislators are more anxious to promote such friendliness even than to promote justice. For unanimity is very much akin to friendship, and thus it is that legislators are most anxious to secure and to expel civil discord, which is a form of enmity. When men are friends justice may be dispensed with, but men may be just and still require friendship in addition. And justice in its highest and most perfect form wears a character of friendliness.

4. Friendship is the great bond that holds states together.

Friendship is not only indispensable, it is honourable also; we speak with approbation of those who have many friends; and a 'wide circle of friends' is thought to be a title of honour to a man. Some too there are who hold that it is the same individuals that make good men that make good friends.

And 5. It is honourable and confers distinction.

It will devolve on us to discuss next in order the question of friendship. For friendship is either a special virtue or a consequence of virtue. The virtue which falls intermediate between offensiveness and obsequiousness if combined with affection, is friendship, as has been already stated in the Sixth Chapter of the Fourth Book. Friendship is also a consequent of complete virtue. For true friendship, as will be shown hereafter, will be found only between the good.

Hence in our treatise on the virtues it will be quite relevant to discuss friendship also; all the more because it is besides most indispensable to a complete career. Without friends no one would care to live, though he had all other possible blessings, since even the wealthy, endowed with office and high place, seem in a special manner to have need of friends. For what profit is there in all this worldly prosperity if they are not able to do good offices? And they cannot do good offices, if they have no friends. For the good offices, which are highest and most praised, are done to friends. Again how can a prosperous man continue and be kept safe in his prosperity without friends? And in proportion as his prosperity is greater, the more is it exposed to risks.

Not only have the prosperous need of friends but the unfortunate and poor as well, for all think that friends are their only haven of refuge.

Again not only is friendship profitable to every variety of fortune but in every variety of age also. The young, friends lead into the paths of right reason, that they may not go astray through their inexperience of the good; the old they tend, and make good their lack of power to act which comes of the weakness that age brings; for those in the prime of life they add to their noble deeds, and make their works more excellent; they are

"Two going in company;"

for by the help of friends we become more capable of framing plans and carrying them out.

And it is by nature too that friendship comes to us. It is nature that makes the parent to feel friendly to its offspring, and that not among men alone, but among birds as well, and most animals; moreover, not only does this hold

between parent and offspring, but also between those of the same kind one to another, and most of all between man and man: on these grounds we praise also those who are 'philanthropic,' as doing that which is natural to man. And one can see too on one's travels how akin man is to man and friendly to boot; those who stay at home entertain and tend with pleasure the traveller; and the traveller, if only he falls in with his fellowmen, has his heart gladdened within him.

Political communities also in the first instance grew out of friendship, and are still held together by it. Legislators, who form such communities, take more thought to secure friendship even than justice: it is for the sake of unanimity that justice is desired, and unanimity is something like friendship, while party faction is like enmity, and it is this that legislators are ever anxious to banish from their states. Besides this, if the citizens are friends with one another there is no need for justice, but though they are just, the state still requires friendship. By its help they will be made more unanimous than by the help of justice. Further, justice carried to its highest pitch seems to merge in friendship; for, when a man observes all the claims of justice to his neighbour, even to the extent of punishing him, if it be necessary for him to be punished, he is accounted his friend. Hence friendship is even more sought after than justice by legislators, while it is necessary also to any genuine unanimity.

Further, not only is friendship *necessary*, and conducive to other good besides itself, but it is itself also in itself noble and praiseworthy; we praise those who are attached to their friends, and 'a wide circle of friends' is thought to be also a distinction. Some besides maintain that there is no distinction between a good man and a good friend, but that they are absolutely identical.

ii.—Review of conflicting opinions as to the origin and nature of Friendship.

But not a few diametrically opposite opinions are held about it. Some make it consist in likeness, and maintain that the like are friends. This fact they say has given rise to such proverbs as 'Like loves like,' 'Birds of a feather flock together' and so on. Others from an opposite point of view assert that all similar characters are like 'two of a trade' to one another. And they push their researches on these points still further back and with a more philosophical analysis (Φυσικώτερον), Euripides for instance saying

Conflicting views.
1. Like is friend to like.
2. It is the unlike who are friends.
3. Views extended to all nature.

> "The parched earth yearns to the shower,"

and

> "The stately heaven charged with rain
> Yearns to fall upon the earth,"

and Heracleitus 'the opposing conduces,' and 'from things that differ is the fairest harmony,' and 'all things come to the birth through strife.'

At an opposite standpoint to these are such writers as Empedocles; 'like yearns to like,' he says.

Such then is friendship, but not a few questions are raised concerning it. It is asked whether likeness is friendship and it is the like who are friends, or

whether it is unlikeness and it is the unlike who make friends. Some make it consist in likeness and make the like friends, and this, they say, is the origin of such proverbs as 'Like to like,' 'Birds of a feather' and so on, while others maintain that it is opposite characters that make friends, and carry up their argument into a wider and more philosophical region, Euripides maintaining that

> "The parched earth loves the shower;
> The stately heaven charged with rain
> Loves to fall upon the earth,"

and Heracleitus too saying that 'the opposed conduces,' 'from things that differ is the fairest harmony' and that 'all things come to the birth through strife.' From an opposite standpoint to these Empedocles, and many others with him, maintain respecting friendship that it is like that yearns to like.

iii.—Limitation of these enquiries to 'moral' subjects.

Our inquiries must be restricted to the moral aspects of friendships — to such questions as (1.) Is friendship confined to the good? (2.) Are there different kinds of friendship?

However the naturalistic aspects of these discussions may be dismissed as being alien to the scope of the inquiry we have before us. Let us rather investigate the *human* aspect of these questions and such as reach up into character and human emotion—such questions, I mean, as whether friendship originates in all minds or whether it is impossible for men, while they are evil, to be friends, and again whether there is but one kind of friendship or more than one. (Those who restrict friendship to a single *kind*, because it admits of degrees of more and less, have rested their belief on an insufficient proof. Things which are even different in kind still admit of degrees of more and less. But we have already stated our views on this subject.)

But to carry up our discussion into such general and physical considerations and to enquire generally, how contraries yearn for their contraries and like things for their likes, is not germane to our present investigation.

Rather let us restrict our enquiries to those points which touch on the nature of man, that relate to character and emotions; these are the proper subject-matter for our present treatise. We must ask then whether friendship originates in all men or is confined to the good, while it can find no place between the evil; and whether there are many *kinds* of friendship or one only. It does not follow, that because friendship admits of degrees of more and less, that, therefore, there is but one kind of it: for things which even differ in kind admit of degrees of more and less; substance for instance and accident, though they differ in kind, admit of degrees of more and less, the one is more existent than the other; so that those who, because it admits of degrees of more and less, think that there is but one kind of friendship, have grounded their belief on an insufficient proof. But on these points we have stated our views in earlier Books.

II.—THE GROUND OF FRIENDSHIP.

i.—De amabili (τὸ φιλητόν): The object of affection.

Perhaps, light will be thrown on this point, if we discover the object of affection. It is held that not everything is the object of affection, but that there is a specific quality in objects which inspires affection, and this is the good, the pleasant or the useful. A thing would seem to be useful when by means of it some good or pleasure is called into existence; consequently the only objects of affection regarded as ends, are the good or the pleasant.

The object of affection is the good, the pleasant, or the useful.

This last is desired as a means not as an end.

Do, then, men love the good or that which is good for them? Sometimes these two are at variance. The same question applies to the pleasant also. Now each is thought to love what is good for his own self and, though in an ideal sense, it is the good which is the object of affection, yet for each individual that is the object of affection which is good to him. And each loves, not that which is good for him, but, that which impresses him as such. Still this will make no difference, as the object of his affection will be also an apparent not a real object.

It is the apparent rather than the real good and pleasant which in individual cases is the object of affection.

Such, then, are the questions raised, but they will be cleared up if the conception of the object of affection be made plain. It is not all things that we love but only such as are fitted by nature to be loved, being such as are loveable. Now the three objects which excite affection are the good, the pleasant, and the useful. Of these the good and the pleasant are loved for their own sake, while the useful is loved for the sake either of goodness or of pleasure.

That is useful by means of which either goodness is brought about or pleasure, the consequence of which is that while the good and pleasure are loved as *ends*, the useful is only loved as conducing to ends.

Next let us investigate in what way the good is the object of affection: is it the absolute good that is loved or that which is good for him who feels the affection? These sometimes differ from one another, and that which is truly and properly a man's good may be quite one thing, what he may hold to be his good quite another: similarly the ideally pleasant may differ from that which seems pleasant to this or that individual. Which of the two then is the object of affection? Is it not clearly that which they *think* good and *think* pleasant? Similarly useful things, that excite affection, are those that conduce to what *seems* pleasant and *seems* good. Moreover it is not all things that seem pleasant and that seem good that excite their affection, but those that seem pleasant and seem good to the people concerned.

ii.—Other conditions besides affection necessary to friendship.

There being thus these three grounds of affection, the term friendship is not applied to the affection felt for inanimate

objects, as there is in this case no requital of affection nor wish for the good of such objects: it would be ridiculous for instance to wish all happiness to wine; if we have any wish at all, it is merely a wish that the wine may be kept safe that we may ourselves have the enjoyment of it: but in the case of a friend men say we ought to wish him all happiness for his own sake. Those who wish good in this spirit we call well disposed, where the feeling is not reciprocated by the object of it—where the feeling is reciprocated, the kindly disposition becomes at length friendship. Perhaps we should further add that it must not be unknown to the object of it, for many have a kindly feeling for those whom they have never seen, that is to say if they believe them to be good or serviceable, and this same feeling might be entertained in turn towards them by the objects of it, and thus the two would be kindly disposed to one another. But how could they be called friends if they severally did not know of their feelings towards one another?

The affection based on one of these grounds must be further (1) reciprocated, (2) unselfish,

(3) not unknown to the object.

For men, then, to be friends it is needful that they entertain kindly feelings to one another, that they wish for each other's good and be known to do so, and that on one or other of the grounds above enumerated.

Summary.

There being thus three grounds of liking on account of one or other of which affection is felt, it does not follow in the case of all things that are liked that friendship is felt towards them: for we like even inanimate objects on one of these three grounds; but such a feeling does not amount to friendship. Friendship exists when the affection is reciprocated, and a man wishes all happiness to the object of his love, while that object in turn wishes it to him; but he who loves, let us suppose, wine is neither loved in return by the wine, nor wishes all happiness to it, as it would be ridiculous to do so: if he has any wish with respect to it, he wishes it to be kept safe, but that not for the sake of the wine but for his own that he may have the enjoyment of it; to a friend on the other hand we wish all happiness for his sake. Consequently the affection felt for inanimate objects is not friendship.

Again, though a man love another man and wish him good, such a feeling may still not amount to friendship; his love must be returned in an equal degree; if not, he is not a friend, but is spoken of as well disposed to the other.

It may moreover happen that some from a mutual belief in one another's goodness, or serviceableness, or excellence, may even wish all happiness to one another and not know they do so. In this case we should not call them *friends* in the proper sense, because they don't know that they are loved, nor how they are disposed to one another; we should rather call them well affected to one another. Thus, then, neither is the affection for inanimate objects friendship nor the affection of men for one another, when it lacks any of the above conditions. But friendship does exist when men feel kindly to one another on the score of goodness, pleasure or profit, and wish for each other's good, and each knows of the other's love.

III.—THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF FRIENDSHIP AND THEIR COMPARATIVE VALUE.

i.—Friendships differ in kind according to the grounds of the Affection.

These grounds differ from one another in kind, consequently must the affections to which they give rise, and the friendships as well. Hence the kinds of friendship are three, equal in number to the objects of affection: for on each ground there may be affection, and a requital of it, not unknown to those concerned.

There are three distinct kinds of friendship corresponding to the three grounds of affection.

What then friendship is has been now explained. It is clear also from what we have stated that there are three *kinds* of friendship. For since there are three grounds on which friendship originates, the pleasant, the good, and the useful, and these differ from one another in kind, the friendships must be equal in number to the objects of affection. For in virtue of each one of these separate grounds a friendship may originate, that is to say, an affection known to the object of it and a requital of that affection. Further also an unselfish wish for each other's good; for in so far as we love anything we wish good to that thing. There are, therefore, three kinds of friendship, corresponding to the good, the pleasant, and the serviceable.

ii.—Imperfection of Friendships of Pleasure and Interest.

Those who love one another wish good to one another in the way that corresponds to the character of their affection. Those who love one another on grounds of profit, do not love one another in and for what they are, but only in so far as each gets some advantage from the other. The same is the case with those who love each other on the ground of pleasure. The witty are loved, not for their intrinsic character, but, because they are pleasant to their audience. So, then, both those who love on grounds of profit, feel affection on grounds of their own selfish good, and those who love on grounds of pleasure, on grounds of their own selfish pleasure, and they value their friend, not for what he is, but for his serviceableness or agreeableness; consequently also these friendships are accidental in character, for the person loved is not loved according to what he is in himself, but according as those who profess to love him get in the one case good from him, in the other pleasure.

Friendships for profit and pleasure are (1) selfish, (2) accidental in character, (3) easily broken off.

Another consequence is that friendships of this sort are easily broken off if the position of the parties alters; for if such friends are no longer pleasant or profitable to their friends, they cease to

care for them. Interest is never permanent, but alters with altering circumstances. When the object, then, of their friendship disappears, the friendship vanishes along with it, such friendship being strictly relative to the object.

We must next enquire into each kind. Those, then, who love one another on grounds of interest, love each other not for what they are in themselves but for the sake of the good or the pleasure which they are the instruments of providing, and they love each other only so long as they severally get some advantage from the other; similarly those who love one another on grounds of pleasure do not love each other for their intrinsic worth. They love one another, not because they are respectively pleasant in the abstract, but because each finds the other pleasant to himself, for it would advance the friendship nothing if it was to others they were pleasant. Consequently both those who love for profit's sake, and those who love for pleasure's sake, feel affection not on account of goodness or pleasure absolutely, nor do they love the object of their friendship, for and in what he is in himself, but only because he is pleasant or profitable to them.

It is clear, therefore, that friendships such as these are accidental in character: the person loved is not loved, because he is what he is, but because he furnishes in the one case profit, in the other entertainment. And such friendships are easily broken off: the agreeable, and the profitable, do not continue agreeable and profitable for ever; we take pleasure at one time in one set of persons, at another in another, and our interest varies at varying times.

Since, then, the cause of the friendship is not permanent, the friendship proceeding from it is not permanent either, but is broken off, as being strictly relative to these objects and having them for its ends.

iii.—The sphere of the two inferior forms of Friendship determined.

Friendships of interest prevail most among the old and the mercenary.

It is amongst the elderly that friendships of interest are observed most frequently to prevail, since the old make not pleasure but profit the object of their pursuit, and among those in the prime of life, and the young who have an eye to the main chance. Men of this stamp do not in all cases even care to live in one another's society. Sometimes they are not agreeable to one another, and, consequently, do not feel the need for this sort of intercourse, unless there is profit to be got out of it: for they are agreeable to one another only just so far as they entertain hopes of gain from the other.

Hereditary friendships are probably to be classed under this head.

Friendships of pleasure among the young.

The friendship of the young on the contrary is ordinarily based upon pleasure. The young live under the rule of their passions, and for the most part take for the object of their pursuit what is pleasant to them and is close at hand. But as their age advances the character of their pleasures alters, so they make friends quickly and quickly cease to be friends: their friendship alters along with

their pleasure, and pleasure of this kind is liable to rapid changes. The young are moreover prone to fall in love, love being largely the result of passion and the desire of pleasure. On this account they speedily make friends and speedily cease to be such, changing often in the course of a single day. But these (unlike the last) do wish to spend their time together and to live in one another's company, the object of their friendship being in this way realised by them.

Friendship of this transient sort is observed to prevail most among elderly men, since men of this stamp do not make pleasure strenuously, or continually, the object of pursuit. Consequently they abandon pleasurable friendship, and, devoting themselves to profit, form their friendships on grounds of self-interest. And not the elderly only, but also those of the young who have an eye to interest more than to pleasure. Men of this stamp do not in all cases pass their lives together, for at times they take no delight in one another. They take delight in one another only so long as they are severally profitable to one another, or furnish hopes of advantage to one another. At other times they no longer find pleasure in one another, and, not finding pleasure, they don't care to live in the same house.

Of this character it is maintained that hereditary friendships also are. These are contracted on grounds of self-interest.

But the friendship of the young is, in the great majority of instances, based upon pleasure. The young spend their lives under the sway of passion, and for the most part make pleasure the object of their pursuit, and present pleasure rather than future advantage. Living as a rule by sense they delight in what is actually present and what tickles the senses. But as their age advances so do their pleasures also change, for which reason they quickly make friends and quickly cease to be friends, for as their pleasure drops through, their friendship drops through along with it. But pleasure of this kind drops through quickly, and so does the friendship which depends upon it.

And the young are also ready to fall in love, as they live by the rule of passion and pleasure, for the sentiment of love is largely made up of passion and pleasure. Consequently they are quick to make friends, quick to cease to be friends, changing often in the course of a single day. Their friendships are formed not at the dictates of reason and judgment but under the influence of passion.

But these do wish to pass their time together and to live in one another's society. This is, indeed, the very source and origin of their friendship, and pleasure requires company for its realization. Such then is the friendship based on enjoyment and on self interest, imperfect and accidental in its character.

iv.—Of ideal or perfect Friendship.

But the friendship of the good, who are alike in the character of their virtue, is perfect: such in virtue of their goodness agree in wishing each other all good, and their goodness is a goodness of character. But they who in an unselfish spirit wish their friends all good, are friends in the highest sense; for they are friends not on any accidental grounds, but in virtue of their own inherent character, and their friendship continues as long as their goodness lasts,—and virtue lasts well. Besides each

The friendship of the good is perfect, for (1) it is unselfish, (2) based upon character,

of them is good absolutely and good too to his friend, for the good are profitable to one another as well as absolutely good, and they are in the same way pleasant also, for the good are pleasant absolutely and pleasant to one another. Every man finds pleasure in his own peculiar acts, and those that resemble them, and the acts of all good men are either identical or at any rate similar in character.

Friendship of this kind we consider, with good reason, to be lasting, since it combines in itself all the characteristics which friends should have. Every friendship is based on goodness or on pleasure (goodness and pleasure which are really such, or are viewed as such by the person feeling the friendship) and implies a certain resemblance. Now in this perfect form all these requisites are present, and present too in virtue of the character of those concerned; in it we get resemblance between the friends and the remaining conditions, to wit absolute goodness and absolute pleasantness: these are the highest objects of affection; consequently, where these are, there will be love and friendship in their highest and best forms.

(3) lasting,

(4) combines in itself all necessary conditions.

But it is likely that such friendships will be rare. Men of the character required are few, and the friendship needs time and intimacy to bring it to perfection; for, as the proverb says, men cannot know one another till they have eaten, as the saying goes, salt together; nor can they even be sure that they are friends till they have had time, each of them, to become manifestly loved by the other and to be trusted by him.

Perfect friendships are rare, (1) because good men are scarce,

But those who hastily strike up friendships with one another have a wish to be friends but are not such, unless they are loved as well and know themselves to be so: a wish for friendship may arise speedily, but not friendship itself.

(2) because time is required to bring them to perfection.

We conclude, then, that friendship of this kind is perfect in respect of time and in all its other particulars, and that in all things each gets from the other an identical, or similar, advantage; and this is the relation which should subsist between friends.

Summary.

But the friendship of good men, who are alike in virtue, based as it is on goodness, is perfect and intrinsic friendship. For such, because they are good themselves, wish each other the enjoyment of all good, having no ulterior object in view, but quite unselfishly. And those, who wish their friends the enjoyment of all good, on no personal grounds but quite unselfishly, are friends in the highest sense of the term: they love their friends for their own sake and wish them all good with no arrière pensée and on no accidental grounds. Such friendship moreover is both stedfast and lasting. It lasts as long as the friends are good

and excellent, and take pleasure in what is good, and virtue is lasting. And each of the two is both absolutely good in himself and good also to his friend. For the good are both good in themselves and good to one another. In a similar way they are pleasant and profitable as well; since those who are good in themselves, and absolutely, are also pleasant to one another. Each takes delight in his own peculiar acts and is also delighted with those of the rest of the world, when they are like to, or the same as, his own acts. But the acts of all good and excellent men are either the same or at any rate alike: and so it is plain that the good are pleasant both to themselves and to one another. Consequently such friendship as this is lasting. For those characteristics which the other two forms of friendship exhibit specially, and which are needful in friends, all these this friendship, and this friendship alone, comprises in itself. It contains at once goodness, and pleasantness, and profitableness; pleasantness and profitableness resulting from goodness; and goodness of this sort is not merely good in itself but is also good to him who feels the affection. Moreover their very likeness to one another is productive of pleasure to friends of this kind. So this friendship has both pleasantness and profitableness in the highest degree. And in virtue of their likeness to this the two other kinds of friendship get their names. This is the best form of friendship; and the causes which produce it are most properly and in the highest sense, objects of affection.

It is likely enough that such friendships should be rare. Those who are good, in the sense we have described, are few and far between. And friendship of this kind requires not only virtue and good dispositions but time and intimacy as well to mature it. As the proverb says, you cannot know one another, till you have consumed together the proverbial salt. Nor is it possible heartily to receive and to love one another, till each has had time to become clearly loved by the other, and to be believed to love that other. Those, who strike up friendly relations with one another in a hurry have a wish to be friends, but are not really such, unless they grow into each other's affections by length of time and intimacy and come to believe themselves to be loved. Consequently a wish for friendship may originate quickly, but not friendship itself. As a result of this the friendship of the good is complete in point of time as well as in all those other particulars which have been enumerated, and rests on all the different grounds of affection.

Once more, each of the two friends gets from the other to an equal extent all those good offices, which should subsist between friends: both of these are alike in being good, alike in being pleasant to the other, and alike in being loved by that other.

v.—Ideal Friendship compared with the two inferior kinds.

(*a*) THEIR INFERIORITY FURTHER DEMONSTRATED.

Still friendship, which has pleasure for its object, has a certain likeness to true friendship, since the good are agreeable to one another as well as to the rest of the world; so too has friendship for profit's sake, since the good are also profitable to one another. In these two cases, friendships are more likely to be permanent where each of the two friends derives a similar kind of gratification from the other, pleasure say, and not only so but where this pleasure is drawn in both cases from the same source. This is so with the witty, but not so with the lover and his darling. These latter both

1. Friendships, where the objects sought by the two parties are identical, are more real and more lasting than where they are different.

indeed feel pleasure, but not pleasure in the same objects. What the lover delights in is the sight of his darling, what the latter delights in is being courted by his lover. So when the bloom passes off, the friendship often drops; the lover is no longer charmed by the sight of his darling, and so the latter no longer receives the same attentions as of old. Still in many cases such friendships are lasting, if the two from similarity of disposition come to love each other's characters.

2. Friendships of pleasure more lasting than those of profit,

Those who, in their love affairs, interchange, not pleasure but profit, are not such real or such lasting friends. Those whom profit makes friends break off their friendships as soon as the profit vanishes. It is not one another they are friends of, but their own selfish interests.

3. but fall short of true friendship (1) in unselfishness, (2) in superiority to slander.

Now on grounds of pleasure or of profit the bad may be friends with one another, and the good with the bad, and those who are neither one nor the other with any of the three; but to be friends for their friend's own sake is clearly restricted to the good alone, since the bad have no pleasure in one another, unless some advantage is to be gained.

Furthermore, it is the friendship of the good that is alone unruffled by slander; it is not easy to believe anyone's stories about a friend who has been proved over a long period of time. Between such friends perfect trust prevails and an assurance that their friend never could have injured them, and those other requisites which we look for in real friendship. But in the two other kinds there is nothing to prevent slander having its way.

But the friendship which is based on pleasure and that which is based on profit has a certain likeness to this kind. Goodness is that which is *strictly* pleasant and profitable, and the good are in the highest sense pleasant and profitable to one another. And in the case of these 'friends by analogy,' as they may be called, their friendships are lasting when they give one another the same sort of gratification, for instance when each is pleasant to the other or profitable; they are not lasting where the one is pleasant the other profitable. But not only should they afford the same kind of gratification to one another, but also one derived from the same source, that is to say if they are to keep up their friendship permanently: for instance if they are to give each other pleasure, they must give it by the same kind of dispositions, the witty, for example, gratifying one another by their wit and not being like the lover and the object of his affection. In this case both give one another pleasure, yet not after the same manner. The lover delights in the sight of his darling, the latter in the attentions he receives from his lover. As the bloom dies off, the friendship often fades away, since the pleasure which gave rise to the friendship ceases; neither is the lover pleased any longer by the sight of his darling, nor does the latter get his attentions. Still many under these circumstances do form lasting friendships, that is to say if being of similar dispositions, they come as a result of their intimacy to love each other's characters.

But those who give one another not the same kind of gratification do not form lasting friendships and, when they are friends, love each other less. As a general rule, those who are friends for profit's sake, when the profit ceases, cease to be friends and separate; it was not one another that they cared for but their own interests. Such friendships, then, as these which rest on pleasure or profit, the bad even may experience; and the bad man may be a friend in this sense as well as the good: on such grounds as these the bad man may love a bad man and may also love a good man, and a good man a bad, and an indifferent man either of them, for a good man may often have occasion to use a bad one. A man may well be an excellent admiral, or a first-rate general, without being very excellent morally; and there is nothing to prevent a good man requiring the services of such.

Moreover it is not impossible for the good to be pleased by the bad. Some there are who, though of a wholly alien character, by their skill in discussion and philosophy, and in hitting on truth and the good, make themselves agreeable to the good; those, then, who are loved in this way are loved not on their own account but for their pleasantness or profitableness.

But it is the good alone who are loved by the good for their own sakes; and such friendship is indissoluble because it is tested and tried by length of time and perfect intimacy. About those who have been so tested it is not possible for one who has tested them to believe anything to their disadvantage. In such friendship there prevails perfect trust in one another and confidence on the all-important points, assurance that they never could do one another wrong and all those other things which we look for in those who desire to be friends in truth. But in all besides there is nothing to prevent the friends from being slandered to one another and injuring one another, by not maintaining equality, and from suffering other things as well.

(*b*) TRUE FRIENDSHIP BELONGS TO THE GOOD ALONE.

Since, however, men give the name of friends to those who love one another on grounds of interest, which is the case with states (for the alliance which states form are held to be formed for the sake of mutual advantage), and again to those who love one another on the score of pleasure, which is the case with children—perhaps we too ought to call such *friends*, and to admit more kinds of friendship than one—the friendship of the good *qud* good, being friendship in the primary and strict sense of the term, the others friendships only by analogy. So far as there is some good in these latter or likeness to the good, so far are they friends, since the pleasant is good to those who are fond of pleasure. Such friendships do not often coalesce, nor is it the same men that become friends on grounds of pleasure that become friends on the score of interest, such accidental qualifications being not often coupled together.

Though general usage dignifies such connexions by the name of friendships,

yet they are friendships only by analogy, and in virtue of their likeness to true friendship.

But since friendship may be divided into these different species, the bad will be friends either for pleasure or for profit, when they happen to agree in affording one another pleasure or profit. But the good are friends for one another's own sakes: and friends because they are

This is confined to the good.

good. Such, then, are friends in an absolute sense, the others only accidentally, and in virtue of the resemblance they bear to them.

For which reason men of this stamp are not friends at all in the proper sense of the term. But since men are wont to name *those* friends, who are held together by mutual need—as states for instance call their allies friends—or those who are held together by pleasure—as children who are intimate call one another friends—accordingly we too must name them friends, only not friends in the same way as the good; we do not regard them as of the same species, but call them 'friends by analogy.' For this same reason we speak also of several kinds of friendship. The friendship of the good, in virtue of their goodness, is friendship in the primary and proper sense of the term: the other two are friendships only by analogy; for the pleasant also, in so far as it is a kind of good, by its pleasantness holds men together: the pleasant is a sort of good to the lovers of pleasure, and it is like good just because it seems good to them; the profitable also seems good to him who is in the enjoyment of it. Hence it comes to pass that friendships which are prompted by these motives get called friendships from their likeness to true friendship.

But a friendship which grows out of a mixture of pleasure and profit, in such a way that on the one side the affection arises from pleasure on the other from profit, is of rare occurrence; that which binds friends together is only accidentally present in this case, for that which binds friends together is the delighting in the same things, the loving the same things. Socrates' love for Plato, for instance, is based on their common love to (the elder) Socrates and their common delight in his prosperity or, it may be, on their both loving pleasure, or both profit. But in the case of this compound friendship they don't both take delight in the same thing, but one delights in the pleasant, the other in the profitable: it is only a matter of accident that they love the same thing, so far as each rejoices in the other's good and prays for his prosperity: still they don't do this for their friend's own sake, but because of pleasure or profit.

For this reason, then, friendship of this kind does not often occur, because it is a pure accident that what is common to the two is united in one thing. But what is a single thing only by accident will not often hold men together.

If, then, friendship be divided into these three species, the bad will be friends to get pleasure or profit, this being the point of resemblance between them, while the good alone will be friends unselfishly. Because they are both good, therefore do they love each other. Such men then are friends absolutely properly and essentially, the others only accidentally, having the name of friendship applied to them from their resemblance to the good.

IV.—THE CONDITIONS FAVOURABLE TO FRIENDSHIP.

i.—Constant intercourse is necessary to give reality to Friendship.

Friendship, like virtue, may exist as a potential disposition, or as an actual fact. Intercourse is required to make friendships actual.

Now, just as in respect of the virtues, some men are called good for their dispositions others for their acts, so too is it in respect of friendship—that is, some are called friends for their friendly dispositions, others for their friendly acts. Those who live together delight in one another and supply one another with blessings, while those who are asleep or separated by distance do not live in the performance of acts of actual friendship, though they may be dis-

posed to do so: distance destroys, not friendship in itself but, the actual exhibition of it; and if the absence be protracted, even the friendship itself gets forgotten, a fact which has given rise to the sentiment,

"Many are the friendships dissolved for want of intercourse."

And, as in respect of the virtues, some men are called good for their disposition, others for their actual conduct—some, for instance, have a disposition of justice, but do not put it in practice, as they are prevented by external circumstances, while others do put their justice in practice, acting in accordance with that disposition of justice which they have received—so too is it with friendship. Some there are, who live together, delight in one another's prosperity, and furnish each to the other all the good in their power, while others sleep, are separated by distance, and do not practise acts of friendship to one another, and yet are so disposed as to do so—since distance does not put an end to friendship in itself, only to the active exercise of it.

But if the absence be long continued, then even the friendship itself grows forgotten, which has caused it to be said,

"Many are the friendships dissolved for want of intercourse."

ii.—A certain pliability and easiness of temper required.

But the elderly and the austere don't appear to be good subjects for friendship; there is little that is pleasing in them, and no one can pass his days with what gives him pain or even with what gives him no pleasure, since nature seems to shun beyond all else what is painful and to yearn for what is pleasant.

The elderly and austere do not often make friends since they have no pleasure in one another's company,

Those who entertain esteem for one another but yet don't live together should be regarded rather as well disposed than as friends proper, there being nothing so distinctive of friends as their living together; since the needy require assistance, the fortunate company, they least of all can afford to be solitary. But men cannot pass their time with one another if they are not agreeable to one another and don't take pleasure in the same pursuits, these conditions being the bases on which companionship rests.

though mutual esteem may render them well disposed.

The elderly and the austere do not furnish promising material for friendship, as there is so little that is pleasant in them. But where there is no pleasure felt, men do not care to live together or pass their time in company, since no one would choose to pass his days with what is painful or even with what fails to please him. A man we cannot live with cannot become our friend, for it is intercourse and companionship that make friends.

Those who esteem one another without living together are to be accounted well-disposed rather than friends.

There is nothing so distinctive of friends as living together. Not even those whom interest makes friends can do without living together; if they are in want, they require each other's services, and these they cannot have without living

together. Nor can those who are friends for pleasure's sake get on much better, nor those either who are properly friends, I mean the blessed themselves: for though they may not stand in need of one another, they still are agreeable to one another. For this further reason it is impossible for them not to wish to live together, because there are none whom it so little becomes to be solitary as the blessed. They are bound to be in one another's company, taking pleasure in the same pursuits. But this taking pleasure in the same pursuits constitutes the boon companionship of the young, when they are keenly interested in the same objects.

iii.—Friendship implies a virtuous disposition and a settled determination of the will.

But the good have in themselves the conditions most essential to friendship,

It follows again from this that the friendship of the good is friendship in the highest sense, as has been already frequently stated. For it is absolute goodness and absolute pleasantness which are held to be most properly the objects of affection and desire (though for each individual these will be shaped by his own peculiar temperament), and in the good man both these desiderata are found combined.

which is no mere passing phase of the affections, but implies a formed character and determination of the will.

Moreover while affection may be regarded as a feeling, friendship bears more the character of a settled disposition. Affection may be felt towards inanimate objects; but men can *requite* affection only by a determinate act of the will, and this itself is the result of a settled character; and to have an unselfish wish for the good of the objects of our love is the result not of feeling but of character. Besides in loving their friend, men love what is good for themselves, since the good man, in becoming a friend, becomes a good to him whose friend he is. Accordingly in this case each at once loves what is good for himself and gives the other back an equivalent both in good will and in the kind of good; and as friendship is said to consist in equality, therefore this essential is most completely realised in the friendship of the good.

But since friendship is a virtue, and since in every virtue we can detect an element of feeling as well as a disposition, we must inquire what the feeling in friendship is and what the disposition. Now affection resembles a feeling, friendship a disposition. A feeling is that which rises in us without any choice of the will, but a disposition implies a determination of the will and is that in virtue of which we exhibit such determination of the will; affection comprises both the love we entertain for inanimate objects and generally for objects from which no requital of our affection is possible; and this is a feeling. We love in these cases not from any judgment or consideration or deliberate choice but simply because we are moved in respect of it, and this is feeling pure and simple. But friendship is love for those who love us, and this is a feeling implying an act of the will; for we judge that we *ought* to love one who loves us; and so we are moved not only from without but also from within ourselves and by considera-

tion; but an emotion which implies consideration and an act of the will is the result of character. We conclude then that affection is a feeling, friendship a disposition.

Once more, friends have an unselfish wish for the good of those they love. They do this not without consideration but on consideration of the grounds: but to wish good to those we love for their sake forms part of the idea of friendship. On this ground therefore also friendship implies a certain fixity of character.

Once again, each man loves the good friend, in that he is a good to himself; for the good man, by becoming a friend, becomes good to his friend: each, consequently, loves the other as his own proper good, and they wish one another well and are pleasant to one another in the same way.

And in every way each makes the other an *equal* return, friendship being called equality; but to make such an equal return implies deliberate choice, and deliberate choice grows out of a settled character; friendship, consequently, is a settled disposition, while affection, implying no deliberate choice, is simply a feeling.

V.—LIMITATIONS OF FRIENDSHIP STATED.

i.—The austere and the elderly seldom make friends.

Between the austere and the elderly friendship is of less frequent occurrence, because they suffer more from infirmities of temper and take less pleasure in society, but good temper and the love of society are held to be in the highest degree elements of friendship and productive of it. For this reason the young make friends quickly, not the old; since these cannot make friends with those in whom they take no delight. The same is the case with the austere. Such characters may very well be well wishers to one another: they wish each other good and come to the relief of one another's necessities—yet they are not friends proper, as they do not spend their days together or take delight in one another, things which are the very making of friendship.

The austere and the elderly are debarred from friendship by want of geniality and sympathy.

All the elements conducive to friendship and proper to friends occur in the case of the friendship of the good alone. Between the elderly and the austere friendship is of less frequent occurrence, inasmuch as they are more liable to infirmities of temper and have less taste for Society: society and company are held to be most productive of friendship. Consequently the young make friends quickly, the elderly do not: for it is not possible to become friends with a man whom you take no delight in and in whose society you feel no pleasure. To feel such pleasure occurs but seldom in the case of the elderly, they know so little what pleasure is. On these same grounds the austere also but seldom become friends, though such are often well wishers to one another; they wish one another good as far as their needs go, and they get from one another the help they each of them need: but they are not friends, as they don't spend their days together or take delight in each other, and it is this that most constitutes friendship and promotes it.

ii.—The number and character of the friends we should make.

Next it is not possible to be on a footing of perfect friendship with many at the same time, any more than it is possible to be in love with many people at once; such friendship is a highly exalted state of feeling, and naturally can be entertained towards but one at a time. Nor is it easy for many to be giving at once exquisite pleasure to the same individual. Nor perhaps does it often happen that you come across at the same time many who are good. You require further to have experience of them and to become intimate with them, a task of no slight difficulty. But on grounds of interest and pleasure it is possible to please many at once; there are many who will be pleased on these grounds, and to render such services requires no great length of time. Of these imperfect friendships, that which is based on pleasure has more of the character of real friendship, at least in those cases where there is reciprocity of mutual favours and the two friends take delight in one another and in the same pursuits. This is the character of the friendships of the young. In them there is a larger element of generosity, while it is mercenary characters that form friendships on grounds of profit. Moreover the fortunate, though they don't require serviceable, do want pleasant friends. They require some one to live with, and can submit to what is painful only for a little while, since no one can put up with it as a permanence. A man could not stand even the good itself for long if absolutely distasteful to him. Thus the friends they look for are agreeable friends. Yet they ought, I think, while looking for such to see that they are good as well and good too for them; in this way they will secure what should be implied in friends.

We can be friends in the highest sense only with very few at one time.

But for profit or pleasure we may be friends with a wider circle. Friendships of pleasure are more real than friendships of profit, (1) there is something more generous about them,

and (2) it is such friends that the prosperous (who are able to choose their own friends) mostly look for,

yet they ought to require them to be good as well.

It is not possible for the good man to be on terms of perfect friendship with many at once, just as it is not possible either to be in love with many at once. Perfect friendship is a kind of intensity of friendship, and such a feeling can be entertained towards only one at a time. To take great delight in the same objects is hardly possible among many, nor is it easy to meet with many who are good and estimable. Besides this, to perfect such ideal friendship requires long time, great intimacy, and a thorough proof of one another. To get these is difficult.

In respect of the two other forms of friendship one may be friends with many. On the score of interest a man may delight many, and attract many by the

charm of his society. Many there are who take delight in such objects and who are moved to love by such motives; and these do not require a long time either in order to make full trial of their friends, but profess at once affection on grounds of interest or pleasure. Perfect friendship, then, is that which is based on goodness, while the other two forms are friendships only by analogy, being respectively based on interest and on pleasure.

But of these 'analogical' friendships, that form of friendship for pleasure's sake, in which each gets the same sort of return from the other and both take delight in one another or in the same people, is more like true friendship. In the first place there is more generosity in friendships of pleasure than in friendships of profit. It is the mercenary and illiberal who form friendships on this latter ground. Besides, true friendship needs pleasure, but needs not profit in any wise. The blessed while they have no need of what is profitable do need elements of pleasure. They want some one to live with, and cannot live with those who are disagreeable to them. They can bear with the disagreeable only for a little time; indeed no one can endure to be pained perpetually, and no one would be able to put up with even the good itself for long, if it were distasteful to him. For this reason the excellent look for their friends being pleasant, while they are at the same time good, and good too to them; in this way they will have the qualities friends should have. On these grounds we may assume that friendship for pleasure has more the character of true friendship than friendship for profit.

iii.—The Friends of the powerful.

Those who are in high position seem to need a number of different kinds of friends; one set of men to be serviceable to them, another pleasant, while the same men are rarely, if ever, both; for the powerful don't look for friends who are at once agreeable and have virtue also, nor for such as are profitable for good works. They seek out the witty, when they wish for pleasure, the clever to carry out their orders; these qualities are not often combined in the same man. We have indeed pointed out that the good man is pleasant and profitable at one and the same time, but such an one does not make friends with his superior in position, unless he feels himself surpassed in virtue also; unless this is so a balance is not struck by his being porportionately surpassed (in which case he would be able to repay the advantage he receives by the honour he would give); but such characters (preeminent at once in station and in virtue) are of rare occurrence.

The powerful choose as friends (1) the witty to amuse them, (2) the clever to serve them.

But the good will not become their friends, where they forfeit self-respect.

Those in high position do not employ the same friends as profitable and as agreeable. One set of men are profitable to them, another agreeable; but the same individuals are never, or scarcely ever, both. The reason of this is that profit and pleasure are combined only in perfect friendship, which is the friendship of the good. Those in authority do not, however, seek the good for their friends. They do not seek those whom virtue makes pleasant nor such as are profitable for good works. But they employ the witty to give them pleasure, the clever as useful tools to carry out their orders. These qualities are not often found together in the same individual. For, though the good man is at once

pleasant and profitable, as has been already said, still he does not become friends with his superiors in station, unless that superior recognise his superiority in point of virtue and submit himself to the good man, and acknowledge him for his better. In this way the good man will feel himself on a footing of equality with his superior in station, by being superior and surpassed proportionately: and feeling himself on an equality he will be his friend; but unless he do so feel himself, he will not be. Since those in high position are not often of such a character, consequently neither are the good often friends with them.

iv.- Summary of the general character of the friendships based on equality.

All the friendships we have described are based on an equality: for either the friends get the same advantages one from another and wish the same advantages one to another, or they make an exchange of one thing for another, pleasure for instance for profit. But that these latter are less real and less lasting friendships we have already pointed out. They are held to be or not to be friendships at all according as men have looked at their similarity or dissimilarity to one and the same thing: from their likeness to friendship based on virtue they look like friendship—the one promoting pleasure the other profit, and these both belonging to ideal friendship. Yet because true friendship is superior to slander and is lasting, while these quickly fall through and differ from it in many other particulars, they appear not to be friendships at all, from their *unlikeness* to the true.

All these friendships imply an equality, an equality of gains given and received.

But the two inferior kinds of friendship will be regarded as friendships or not, according as we consider their likeness or unlikeness to the ideal type.

All the friendships above described are based on equality. In these the friends reap the same advantages from one another and wish the same good to one another or else exchange one thing for another, equal for equal, pleasure for instance for profit. That these last are less properly friendships than the rest, and are shorter lived, we have already said. But friendships which are based on pleasure or on profit, from one point of view may be regarded as friendships, from another not. In so far as they are like perfect friendship, they are friendships; in so far as they are unlike it, they are not friendships. They are like it because perfect friendship has both goodness and profitableness; they are unlike it, because while perfect friendship is enduring and superior to slander, *they* quickly fall through, and differ from it in many other respects besides.

All these, then, are friendships by analogy and are based on equality.

VI.—FRIENDSHIPS OF CONDESCENSION.

i.—Such Friendships admit a large number of varieties.

There is, however, another form of friendship, involving a superiority on one side, for instance the friendship of a father for his son, and generally of the elder for the younger, of a man for a

woman and of the ruler in every instance for his subjects. And these also, as well as the former, differ from one another; the friendship of parents for their children is not the same as that of rulers for their subjects, nor again is that of father to son, the same as that of son to father, nor even that of husband to wife the same as that of wife to husband. Each of these has a different form of excellence and a different function, and the grounds of their affection are different also; consequently the affection they severally feel is different and their friendships as well.

'Friendships of condescension' are formed among a variety of different people,

result from different motives, and may be regarded as different kinds of friendship.

But there is also another kind of friendship, which is based, not on equality, but on superiority on one side: for instance, that of father for son, and generally between old and young, husband and wife, ruler and subject.

Moreover, these differ from one another; for the friendship of parent and children is not the same as that of ruler and subject, nor even is that of father for son the same as that of son for father, nor of husband to wife the same as that of wife to husband,—so that, not only do the friendships differ in these cases, but the affection given, and that by which it is requited, are also different. The excellence of each of the friends is different, consequently their functions also, and the grounds on which they love one another. Therefore, also, are the affections and the friendships different too. In the friendships described above their permanence was produced by each of the friends getting precisely the same advantage from the other: but here this is not the case. A father will not ask back from the son exactly what the son will expect from his father.

ii.—But in all the return of affection should be proportionate, not equal.

Accordingly neither does each get exactly the same kind of return from the other, nor ought they to look for it; but when children pay their parents all that is due to those who have begotten them, and parents their children all that children have a right to, the friendship under these circumstances is lasting and excellent. But in all friendships involving superiority, the affection given should be proportionate; I mean the better should receive more affection than he gives, as also the more profitable and in the same way with the rest; for, where there is accorded an affection proportionate to merit, then in a way equality is secured, and this is rightly held to be distinctive of friendship.

In these the return made will be (1) different on the two sides;

(2) proportionate to the merits of the two, rather than exactly equal.

In the above described forms of friendship, what, as we showed, produces permanence in them is, that each of the two gets the same advantage from the other, but in these cases it is not so: the father will not ask back from the son the same services that the son looks for from the father.

Men ought not in such respects to attempt to secure an absolute equality; but,

when one receives from the other what he ought to give and the other to receive, their friendship is lasting and equitable.

Furthermore, the affection also ought to be proportionate in friendships implying superiority; the better of the two, and the more profitable, and so too the other cases, ought to receive more affection than he gives; for a certain kind of equality requires to be realised in these cases too, as it is this which cements friendship.

iii.—Limits within which such Friendships are possible.

A certain absolute equality between the two friends is essential to friendship,

Equality does not seem to hold exactly the same position in respect of friendship that it holds in respect of justice; in justice what we look for first is an equality which has regard to the *proportionate* merits of the two parties, while absolute or numerical equality is only secondary, but in friendship this *absolute* equality is primary, and equality which is proportionate to merit is secondary. This is at once apparent if the discrepancy in virtue, wickedness, wealth or anything else be great: the two no longer make friends, nor think it right they should. This is best seen in case of the Gods, as they surpass all others most in every kind of good; yet it is clear even in the case of kings. With them also those who are far their inferiors in station do not even think of making friends; nor again with the very wise or the very good do men of no consideration. One can lay down no accurate definition in such cases up to what point two men can be friends. Though many advantages be removed, the friendship may still continue, but where the gap is very wide (as for instance between man and God) it is no longer possible.

as is seen by the fact, that friendships are never formed, or even thought of, between those who are very widely removed from one another in position, or in goodness.

But equality after a sort is attained when affection is proportioned to superior merit, and by this equality the principle of justice is preserved. Yet equality does not stand in the same relation to friendship that it stands in to justice; in justice the first requisite is an equality based on desert, and proportionate to those that receive, while equality in amount is only a secondary requisite; for if the distribution be made according to merit and in proportion, it is just; and even though the amounts differ very much there is nothing to prevent the standard of justice being maintained—indeed if the distribution made was equal in amount and not proportionate, it would not be just; but with friendship just the reverse is the case; the equality which is required in it is in the first place an equality in amount, and only in the second place an equality in proportion.

For if two parties differ very much, and the interval between them is not small, but one is very much superior to the other in virtue, in wealth, or in anything else, they will not be friends; they neither can be nor wish to be. It becomes quite obvious in the case of ourselves and God: He surpasses us infinitely in every kind of good and, in consequence, in this instance friendship has no place; it is clear too even in the case of kings; those who are far their inferiors in rank don't even think of claiming friendship with them either; nor do those of no account

with such as are very excellent and very wise. We conclude, then, that those who are very widely distant cannot be friends, but where the superiority is moderate in amount it is possible.

How wide the interval may be it is impossible to say precisely or to give an accurate definition. For though many advantages are taken away from one of the two friends, and the other is put thereby in a position of great superiority, it may be that the friendship will still continue; or it may be that it will be broken off, when the interval between the two becomes very wide—as wide, for instance, as that between ourselves and God.

iv.—Difficulty stated and solved.

Hereupon a question is raised whether it *can* be that friends wish their friends the very greatest of goods, that is that they should be Gods, since in that case they would cease to be their friends? But if they don't wish them this, they don't wish them good; and yet, as friends, they should wish them all good.

There is a limit, then, to the good which a friend can wish his friend.

Now if we were right in saying that friends wish their friends good for those friends' own sake, it is a necessary condition of their wish that the friend should remain in the state he is in; but a friend will wish his friend the greatest of goods, compatible with his being a man, and yet not perhaps after all *all* good, since each must wish good to himself above all others.

He cannot wish him to be other in the grade of being than he is; nor can he wish him such an amount of good as will interfere with his own happiness.

On these grounds a question is also raised, whether, after all, friends can wish their friends the very chiefest goods: did their wishes extend to this length, they would join in their prayer, that they might become Gods: but this would put an end to the friendship; so that if they wish them the very chiefest goods they wish in effect that they should no longer be their friends; but to do this is opposed to the very idea of friendship, while besides they will be no longer good to them, if they are no longer their friends; they don't, therefore, join in their prayers for goods of this kind.

But we may say in reply to this that the friend joins in his friend's prayer for good for that friend's sake; consequently it is needful that his friend continue to be, that so goods may accrue to *him;* but he will continue to be, if he be still a man and does not become a God in place of a man; if he continue to be but a man, his friend will wish that the very greatest of all goods befal him; and yet not perhaps all after all, at least in the actual case of the majority of friends, since it is for himself that each wishes for good the most.

VII.—THE ESSENCE OF FRIENDSHIP.

i.—Friendship consists more in loving than in being loved.

The majority are led by ambition to wish to receive rather than to bestow affection, (consequently the majority are lovers of flatterers, as the flatterer is a friend who acknowledges his inferiority,

or pretends to do so,) and to love more than he is loved. To be loved is like being honoured, and on this most men set their hearts.

There is a touch of selfishness in the desire to be loved, which the majority have,

Yet they seem not to covet honour for its own sake, but only by the way. The mass of men delight in honour from those in high station on account of the hopes such honour inspires, thinking they will get from them what they may chance to want; accordingly they rejoice in the honour they receive as a sign of benefits to be obtained.

yet it is more unselfish than the desire for honour, which is valued either (a) as a sign of influence, (b) as enhancing a man's own self-esteem.

Next, those who thirst for honour for the good and from their intimates have a wish to have their own good opinion of themselves confirmed; they revel in the feeling that they really are good, trusting to the judgment of such as these when they affirm that it is so.

But men do delight in being loved for its own sake; and so, it would seem, to be loved is better than to be honoured; and friendship we should hold to be itself desirable.

Friendship too would seem to consist more in loving than in being loved, a proof of which is furnished by the delight that mothers take in pouring out their love. Some mothers even give their children to be brought up by others, and, recognising them as their own, love them accordingly, and do not even look for a requital of their love, if this cannot be combined with their children's continued prosperity, but are content, if only they see *them* prospering. And they continue to love them all the same, even though their children are prevented by their ignorance of them from performing to them any of those duties to which a mother has a right. But since friendship consists more in loving than in being loved, and it is those who love their friends that we single out for praise, therefore loving is thought to be the special virtue of friends; consequently those who exhibit this in a proper degree are lasting friends, and their friendship is lasting friendship.

But in its nobler forms (e. g. in a mother's love), friendship consists more in loving than in being loved, and is so unselfish.

But the majority would seem to be led by ambitious motives to wish to be loved rather than to love; consequently the majority are fond of flatterers, and take pleasure in the company of such, because they feel their superiority to them while they seem to be their friends; but this superiority to their friends is pleasant to the ambitious, while flatterers pretend to profess their inferiority in all respects to those in whose company they are, and for this reason to love more than they are loved; but to be loved is very near being honoured, and this it is that most men yearn for.

Yet those who seek to be honoured seek it, not for its own sake, but, only acci-

dentally as indicating something more. Honour would seem to be regarded by them as a good on account of something other than itself. The majority desire to be honoured by their superiors for the hope such honour inspires. They think that they will get what they want at the hands of those who honour them, and take pleasure in the honour as an indication of future benefits. But the better sort, who have a craving to be honoured by the good, have as their reason for seeking honour that they wish to have sure grounds for entertaining a good opinion of themselves. And they have their good opinion of themselves confirmed by the suffrages of such men. Consequently they take pleasure in honour while it proceeds from such a source, and feel confidence in their own goodness. We conclude, then, that to be honoured is sought for for something other than itself, but to be loved for its own sake.

This is indeed pleasant and desirable in itself, consequently it would seem to be a better thing than to be honoured, and friendship would seem to be in itself desirable. For, since it consists both in being loved and in loving, and each of these is in itself desirable, it is clear that friendship too is in itself desirable; accordingly not only is being loved in itself desirable but loving also, and even more so as being the more excellent.

Whence it follows that friendship consists also more in loving than in being loved; as is proved by the pleasure that mothers take in pouring out affection, without even seeking a return of it at the hands of their children. Some of them even make their own children the supposititious offspring of others, or, at any rate, give them to others to be brought up by them, and so, not being known to their children, are not even loved by them: of course they themselves do know their children and love them, but don't even seek to be loved by them in return, if this is incompatible with their children's prosperity, but are content if only they can see them well off. But if friendship consists more in loving than being loved, and if it is those who are fond of their friends that are praised, loving is a sort of virtue in friends.

Accordingly where love is given in due proportion, the two are lasting friends and their friendship is sure. And in this way even the unequal may become friends if they love one another in proper amounts, since by these means they will be made equal to one another, and friendliness means equality.

ii.—In what sense likeness is essential to friendship.

In this way those who are unequal in station may most readily be made friends, as they will be put thereby on a footing of equality. Equality and likeness constitute friendship, most of all the likeness of those who observe the law of virtue; being stedfast in themselves, they are stedfast to one another and neither ask for what is evil nor abet one another in evil; but, if one may say so, even throw obstacles in the way of it. Good men neither sin themselves nor permit their friends to do so. But the evil have no stedfastness, they are not at one with themselves for long together, and are friends but for a brief space from taking pleasure in iniquity. The serviceable and the pleasant are more lasting friends. They at least continue friends, as long as they give one another either pleasure or profit.

A proportionate return of love

and likeness in virtue preserve friendships,

but to be alike in wickedness is no abiding guarantee for it.

But likeness of this kind is found most perfectly and in the proper sense among the good. Among the bad it is scarcely to be found at all, more among those whose aim is pleasure or profit. The good are at one with themselves: they do not easily change nor take pleasure now in one thing now in another, but only in good deeds. Virtue is lasting because it is a formed character, and consequently the good are ever like one another and abide in each other's friendship. And they neither ask for what is evil nor abet one another in it, but, so to speak, ever throw obstacles in the way. The good neither fall into sin themselves nor permit their friends to do evil. But the evil are evil too in this, that they don't take pleasure always in the same objects. For which reason they are not always like themselves nor like their friends, and hence they abide but a little while in their friendship, only so long as they take pleasure in one another's wickedness. But the serviceable and the agreeable continue longer in their likeness to one another, as the search for the profitable and the pleasant is more lasting. Consequently they continue longer like themselves and each other, since both seek the profitable or the pleasant; namely, so long as they furnish one another with pleasure or with profit. Such, then, are the friendships which arise from likeness.

iii.—Cases where unlikeness produces friendship.

It is friendships for profit's sake that are formed most often between dissimilar characters, with which we may, perhaps, class lovers' friendships.

But it is friendship based on profit which seems most often to be formed from opposites, for instance, the friendship between rich and poor, ignorant and wise. When a man is in need of something, his desire for it impels him to give something in return. Under this class may be brought lover and loved, beautiful and ugly. For this reason lovers sometimes appear ridiculous when they expect to be loved as much as they love. They would have, indeed, a right to ask it, if they were as deserving of affection; but, when they are nothing of the kind, it is ridiculous in them to do so.

But that form of friendship which is based on profit would seem to consist in contrariety. Take for instance the case of a poor man making friends with a rich, an ignorant with a learned man. Where a man feels in want of something, in his desire to get this he is prepared to give something else in exchange. Under this species may be classed the friendship between a lover and his darling, and the friendship of the beautiful and the ugly. For this reason lovers often appear ridiculous, when they claim to have their affection equally requited by the objects of it, being themselves ugly while those are beautiful. If they are *as* loveable, their claim is reasonable, and they have a right to be loved as much, but, if they are not, they make themselves ridiculous.

iv.—The true ground of attraction in these cases.

But what dissimilars yearn for is not really one another, but that 'balanced condi-

After all, perhaps, even in these cases it is not that opposite yearns for opposite pure and simple, their doing so being merely accidental. What they really yearn for is 'a state of balance' (for this is the good). The moist, for instance, desires not to

become dry but to reach the intermediate state, the same being the case with that which is warm and with all the rest. However, let this pass, for such speculations are somewhat alien to our inquiry.

tion' which is intermediate between them.

In these cases friendships are thought to be formed between men of opposite parts because the ugly love the fair—the rich the poor—the ignorant the learned. In nature also the dry yearns for the moist. Yet such friendships between opposites arise, not from their essential character, but only incidentally. It is not as loving one another that they are opposite, but it is an accident that they are such. The poor man loves a rich man, because he is profitable or serviceable to him. But a useful or serviceable tool is not essentially and in itself opposite to him who uses it. In that case every serviceable agent would be opposed to him who avails himself of it. But the soldier is not opposed to his general nor the disciple to his teacher. The lover also loves his darling because he is pleasant to him. But he who is pleasant is not opposed to him who is pleased. It is an accident only that they are in a relation of opposition. And in nature that which is dry yearns properly not for its opposite moisture but for 'a mean state.' Their desire is for what is good, and it is this 'mean state' which is good.

Such subjects may, however, be dismissed; they are not very germane to our present inquiry.

VIII.—THE RELATION OF FRIENDSHIP AND JUSTICE.

i.—Every association for whatever purpose implies at once friendship and justice.

Now, as we said at starting, friendship and justice seem to have the same sphere and to subsist among the same individuals. In every association there seems to be justice of a sort and friendship as well, at least men dub as friends fellow-voyagers and fellow-soldiers, and in the same way any who take part in any joint enterprises. And so far as the association goes, so far does the friendship extend, and the justice also. And the proverb 'friends' goods are common property' is right, inasmuch as friendship is based on community.

Men cannot associate themselves for any purpose without forming friendships and observing justice to one another.

Now it would seem, as we said before, that both friendship and justice have the same sphere. We look for justice in the associations which men form with one another, and it is in these also that friendship originates. Fellow-voyagers, fellow-soldiers, and generally all those who join with one another in any actions or pursuits, seek to observe justice as towards one another and are also friends with one another; and as far as their association extends, so far do they love one another and do what is just to one another. Whence also the proverb has it, 'common are the goods of friends,' and rightly too, for friendship is based on community.

ii.—Friendship and justice vary alike with the closeness of the tie.

The claims of justice and friendship are more imperative the closer is the tie, and the greater is the injustice, if injustice be committed.

Brothers and comrades have all things in common, all the rest only certain definite things, some more, others less. And the claims of justice differ also. The claims parents have on their children are not the same as those that brothers have on one another, nor have fellow-citizens the same claims as comrades. The same is the case with all the other forms of friendship. So too do acts of injustice differ according as they are done to this man or to that, and grow in magnitude, the closer the friends are to whom they are done. For instance, to rob one's comrade of money is more atrocious than to rob a fellow-citizen, and to fail to help a brother is worse than to fail to help a stranger, and to strike one's father is worse than to strike anyone else. So justice and friendship grow side by side, holding good between the same persons, and within the same limits.

But these associations differ. Brothers and comrades have all things in common, the rest of mankind not all things, but only certain definite things, some more, some less. With these different forms of association the friendships also correspond, some are more, others less, intimate, following the different forms of association. Similarly the claims of justice also are proportionate to the friendships. Brothers have not the same claims on one another that a father has on his son—nor have citizens and comrades the same claims on one another but different, and the claims vary in degree, being more or less stringent as the friendships are more or less intimate. It is not equally unjust to rob a citizen and one's comrade of money, or to fail to help a stranger and a brother, or to strike one's father and any one else. The claims of justice grow with the friendship, holding good in the same cases and within the same limits. It is more grievous to injure a man who is dearer to us, who is associated more closely with us, who loves us more, than it is to injure one with whom the association is less close, the friendship less intimate.

iii.—All forms of association are but parts of the political union.

The political union seeks to promote the interests of life as a whole, all particular associations some partial interests.

But all subordinate associations are like parts of the political association. In them men band together with a view to some special advantage to get some one of the elements of well-being, while the political community also seems originally to have been formed, and to have been subsequently perpetuated for the sake of advantage as a whole. It is this which lawgivers also take for their aim; and one definition of justice is 'the common advantage.'

Now all other forms of association aim only at some special part of our interest; fellow-voyagers, for instance, are associated

to promote the interests of the voyage with a view to the making of money or some similar object. Fellow-soldiers are associated with a view to success in war, from a desire for wealth, or victory, or the good of the state. The same is the case with fellow-tribesmen and 'fellow-parishioners.' But some associations would seem to be formed to get pleasure; those, for instance, who club together to offer a sacrifice or to get a dinner have the sacrifice or the dinner for their object. Still all alike would seem to be contained under the political association (for the political association aims not at present interest but at interest which looks to life as a whole). Under it men make sacrifices, contribute money for these purposes, giving at one and the same time to the gods their proper honours, and furnishing themselves with the means of relaxation and enjoyment. For the ancient sacrifices and gatherings seem especially to have been held after the ingathering of the harvest as a kind of first fruits, because it was at such seasons that men were most at leisure.

Even those which are formed for pleasure still rank as parts of the political union, as pleasure is an ingredient in social well-being.

Accordingly all forms of association seem but parts of the political union, and what is true about the associations will hold equally about the corresponding friendships.

As the associations are related, so too are the friendships connected with them.

But all associations, in which friendship and justice have their sphere, are like parts of the political union. The political union exists to promote the general interest, for the sake of which society was formed at first and still continues to exist. But every association exists to promote some special interest or other, one to promote this, another that; it is by means of associations that we each secure our own interests, and this is the ground of our associating with one another that we may get some of the essentials of well-being. And this, *i.e.* the common interest, lawgivers also make their aim, and say that that is just which is to the common interest. All the other forms of association then, both as wholes, and the several parts of them, seek after some interest; for example fellow-voyagers seek after success in their voyage, whether their object be money or something else; fellow-soldiers aim at success in war, whether their object be money, victory, or their state. The same is the case with fellow-tribesmen and fellow-parishioners. Further some associations also have some form of pleasure for their aim and seem to have originated for the sake of *pleasure*, which is the case with those who join to make a sacrifice or a feast. The first are engaged in promoting a sacrifice, the second in promoting a common meal, and both sacrifice and meal are chiefly forms of enjoyment. Yet these are themselves also parts of the political association; for these too, as promoting the common weal, are ranged under the domain of 'social science.' For this seeks not merely that which is expedient at the moment but also aims at that which, though not expedient at the moment, still ultimately will be so. It aims not only at present interest but at the interest of life as a whole, for which reason it takes into account sacrifices and social gatherings and pleasant convivial meetings and means of relaxation. For it was after the ingathering of the crops that social gatherings used to be made and sacrifices offered, being a sort of first fruits; as men were most at leisure at these seasons. By such joint acts heaven was made propitious to

them, and this they counted a gain, while they were themselves refreshed, and so undertook with new vigour their labours for the common weal. From this it appears that every form of association—that which is formed for pleasure's sake no less than that which is formed directly for profit—has well-being for its ultimate object and aim, and consequently all alike are parts of the political union.

With these associations the friendships based on them accord; the divisions which are to be found in the associations will be found in the friendships as well, and such as are the associations, such too in character will the corresponding friendships be.

iv.—The different forms which the political union can assume.

The three forms of political union are (1) kingly government, (2) aristocracy, (3) 'timocracy,' and there is a distorted form of each.

Now there are three forms of political constitution and three distorted forms which are, as it were, corruptions of them. The three legitimate forms of political constitutions are kingship, aristocracy, and the third which, as being based upon a money assessment (*τίμη*), would have for its proper name 'timocracy,' but which the majority have ordinarily styled 'a constitution' (*πολιτεία*) (*par excellence*).

We must accordingly discuss political society. Of this there are three forms, kingly government, aristocracy, 'timocracy' called usually by most writers 'a constitution' *par excellence*, which has as its characteristic that it is based on an assessment of property; men give money and get power, and so a timocracy is its appropriate name.

v.—These different constitutions compared.

Kingly government is best, as a true king can pursue most unselfishly the public good, and the opposite of it, which is tyranny, is obviously the worst form of government.

Of these kingly government is the best, the worst is 'timocracy.' The distorted form of kingly rule is tyranny. Both of them are the rule of one man, yet there is the widest possible difference between them. The tyrant has an eye to his own interests, the king, to the interests of his subjects. He is no true king who is not 'self-contained' and abundantly supplied with all goods; but he who is in this position wants nothing more; consequently he will be on the look-out not for his own interests but those of his subjects; he who is not such is a mere 'pinchbeck' king. Tyranny is in just the reverse position, for the tyrant pursues his own selfish good. Tyranny is clearly recognised as the worst form of government, and the worst is the opposite of the best.

Of these constitutions the best is kingly government, the worst 'timocracy.' Such then are the different constitutions. The distorted forms, which are, so to speak, their corruptions, are—of kingly government, tyranny; for they are both instances of personal rule, but there is the widest possible difference between

them. The tyrant looks after his own interests, the king the interests of his subjects; he is no king who is not self-contained and abundantly supplied with all good things. Such an one will not want to absorb the goods of his subjects. Consequently he does not in his political measures, and in his public acts, look out for his own interests but only those of his subjects, as he will provide for his own interests not out of the public funds but from his own resources. And he who is not in this position may be a haphazard ruler but no true king. Tyranny, therefore, is the opposite of kingly rule; for the tyrant pursues his own interests, and much more so even than the 'haphazard' ruler. And the difference between him and a king is even more obvious as he is worse than the chance-chosen ruler. For this reason tyranny is the opposite of kingly rule, because the one is best the other worst, and the worst is *opposite* to the best.

vi.—Order of the changes in the constitution.

Kingly rule degenerates into tyranny, aristocracy into oligarchy, 'timocracy' into democracy.

Constitutions change as follows. One change is from kingly rule to tyranny; for tyranny is a bad form of single rule; accordingly it is the bad king who becomes tyrant. Next, aristocracy changes into oligarchy through the badness of the rulers, who distribute the goods of the State contrary to merit, reserving all, or the great majority of good things, to themselves, keeping offices always in the same hands, valuing the amassing of wealth above all things. The result is that but few get office, and they the baser sort instead of the very best. From 'timocracy' the change is to democracy, the two bordering close on one another; for 'timocracy' too means the rule of the multitude, and all are equal who are assessed at the necessary amount. Democracy is the least evil of the distorted forms, as it is but a slight departure from the legitimate form of constitution. The above is the most ordinary way in which constitutions change, as the transition is in this way the smallest, and most easily made.

Now the ordinary change in the forms of government is from kingly government to tyranny: for tyranny is the corruption of personal rule, and the bad king passes into the tyrant. Of kingly government, then, tyranny is the perversion, but of aristocracy oligarchy: this comes about, when those who administer this form of government, assign themselves all the goods of the state in the teeth of desert; if not all the goods of the state then the giant's share; their policy also is to entrust the same individuals perpetually with the management of the offices of the state, that they may bind them to themselves by ties of intimacy, and so be enabled by these means to batten on the public revenues. The result of this is that but few are entrusted with the management of affairs, and they the baser sort in place of the very best. Next of a 'timocracy' the perversion is democracy: these border closely on one another, for a 'timocracy' too means the rule of a multitude, and all who are assessed at the same amount, count as equal. Of all the perverted forms democracy is the least evil; it departs but slightly from the ideal of a 'timocracy': it has more points in common with it than points of difference from it; it differs from it in dispensing with any property qualification, but it is at one with it in the equality it establishes (as in a 'timocracy' all who have the same property qualification are on an equality) and in involving the rule of the multitude.

vii.—The counterparts of these different forms of government in the family.

Similitudes and patterns of these different constitutions are to be found also in the family. The relation of a father to his sons is the counterpart of kingly rule, as a father cares for his children. For this reason Homer calls Zeus 'father,' for kingly rule is a kind of paternal government. But in Persia the father's rule is tyrannical, for he treats his sons like slaves. Tyrannical also is a master's rule over his slaves, for it is the interest of the master that is made the object in it. This would seem all right and fair, but the Persian custom a wrong one, since those who differ should be ruled differently.

1. Kingly rule is represented by the rule of a father over his children.

In Persia this degenerates into tyranny, which, however, is the natural relation of master and slave.

The relations of husband and wife are aristocratical in character, for the man has in virtue of his superior merit a right to rule, at least in those points that become a man, while he gives over to his wife those departments which suit a woman. But when a man lords it over everything, he changes his rule into an oligarchy. He does this in the teeth of merit, and not in virtue of his superiority.

2. Husband and wife live under an aristocracy, which degenerates into an oligarchy, if (a) the husband takes all authority into his own hands,

But sometimes women have rule, if they are heiresses; in this case again rule is not based on merit, but on wealth and power, as is the case in oligarchies.

or (b) the woman has the upper hand.

Thirdly, the relations of brothers are like a 'timocracy;' they are equals, except so far as there may be a difference in age. Consequently if there be a very great discrepancy in age, their friendship is no longer the friendship of brothers.

3. Brothers make a 'timocracy,'

But democracies are mostly to be found in masterless houses—here all are on an equality—and in those homes where the ruler is weak, and every one has licence to do as he pleases.

which degenerates into a democracy in masterless houses.

It is to such changes as these that the different kinds of constitution are most liable. Each constitution is least liable to pass into the one opposed to it, but easily degenerates into its own perverted form. But there are also in the sphere of the household similitudes and, if one may say so, patterns of these constitutions. In households are to be seen kingly government, aristocracy, and so on. The relation of a father to his son exhibits the form of kingly rule, since the father cares for his children: and, on this ground Homer also calls Zeus '*father*.' Kingly rule has a tendency to become 'paternal' government; but this the Persians pervert into a tyranny, for they rule their sons like slaves. But the

rule over slaves is 'tyranny;' it is the master's interest that the slaves are always expected to promote, so that a rule of this sort over children is wrong, while that which resembles kingly rule. has right on its side; for as a son differs from a slave, the rule exercised over them should be different also. So, then, the relation of a father to his sons resembles kingly rule, while that of husband to wife is like aristocracy. The man rules by merit and as being the superior; there will be an aristocracy then, when the husband reserves to himself what is suitable to a man and resigns to his wife the duties that befit a woman. But this relationship will step beyond the limits of aristocracy and degenerate into oligarchy, when the husband attempts to be master in all things; this would be to go in the teeth of merit, and to rule no longer in virtue of his superiority. And sometimes women bear sway, when they are heiresses, and so surpass their husbands in wealth and power. Such a rule is not based on merit, but, as in oligarchy, on wealth and power.

Such then are oligarchy and aristocracy in the household.

The relation between brothers answers to 'timocracy;' they are equals, except so far as they differ in age; for which reason, if they are very different indeed in age, their friendship is no longer of the fraternal sort, but resembles that of a father for his children. Democracy is mostly found in masterless households: here all are on an equal footing. It is found also in those in which the ruler is weak, and each member is, therefore, his own master.

viii.—In all these cases friendship and justice go hand in hand.

Now in respect of each one of these different constitutions friendship seems to prevail just so far as justice does. There is friendship between a king and his subjects, resting on an overplus of benefits conferred by him; for he is a benefactor of his subjects, if he is good, and takes care for their welfare, like a shepherd for his sheep; for which reason Homer has styled Agamemnon 'shepherd of his people.'

There is a friendship 'of condescension' between a king and his subjects,

Such also is the position of a father, but he differs from the king in the greatness of the benefits conferred. He is the author of his children's being, which is held to be the greatest of benefits, and of their nurture and education as well; ancestors also are treated with the same respect, for it is *natural* for a father to rule his children, ancestors their descendants, and a king his subjects. But these friendships all imply superiority on one side, for which reason parents are also honoured; and the claims of justice between the two parties are not identical but proportioned to merit; so it is on these terms also that the friendship is formed.

and between a father and his children, a friendship resting on benefits conferred and acknowledged.

And between a man and his wife there is the same friendship as subsists in an aristocracy. It is based on virtue, the better getting the greater good, and each what befits him; and this also is the character of the justice involved.

In an aristocracy, and between husband and wife, the friendship implies superiority on the

one side, deference on the other. Brothers, and the members of a 'timocracy,' are equals; and on this footing their friendship is concluded.

But the intercourse of brothers is like that of comrades; brothers are equals, and of the same age, and such are, as a rule, alike in feeling, alike in character. Like this is the regard which prevails in a 'timocracy;' the citizens should be equals and kindly to one another, they take it in turns to rule, and all rule alike; such also is the character of the friendship.

In a 'tyranny,' and between master and slave, there is no justice and no friendship; there is no community of interests; subjects and slaves alike are regarded as mere tools.

But in the perverted forms, as there is but little justice, so there is but little friendship either, least of all in the worst form; in a tyranny there is no friendship at all, or but very little. For where there is nothing in common between ruler and subject there can be no friendship, as there is no justice; the relation is analogous to that between a workman and his tool, soul and body, a master and his slave. All these are well treated by those who use them, but there is no room for friendship or justice to inanimate objects; no, nor even to horse or ox, nor towards a slave as a slave; for the slave is a living tool, the tool a lifeless slave.

But still the slave has, as a human being, claims on his master's recognition and regard.

Thus the master can feel no friendship to his slave as a slave, yet he may feel it towards him as a man. Every man is bound to recognise the claims of justice towards every one who can take part with him in law and contract; consequently he must accord him friendship too so far as he is a man.

In a democracy friendship is more possible than in any other perverted form of government.

The result of all this is that in tyrannies justice and friendship both alike find place to a very small extent; but in democracies there is more scope for them, as equals have many things in common.

Such then are the different forms of association, whether in the body political or in the household. All these different forms of association may be accompanied by friendship, and are so accompanied, just so far as they rest on justice.

Thus in the connexion of a king and his subjects the friendship rests on acknowledged superiority, the king having preeminence in respect of benefits conferred, since, if he is good, he benefits his subjects, and cares for their welfare, like a shepherd cares for his sheep. It is for this reason that Homer styles Agamemnon shepherd of his people. This too is the character of a father's friendship for his children; it rests on recognized superiority. Yet it differs in the greatness of the benefits conferred, a father being the greater benefactor. He is the author of his child's being, and this is held to be the greatest of all benefits; while, besides, he provides for its nurture and education. And similar claims are accorded to ancestors as well; it is held *natural* for a father to rule his sons, ancestors their descendants, a king his subjects. So, then, all these friendships rest on a recognition of superiority, for which reason parents are also

held in honour. And the justice is such as the friendship is, involving not the same rights on either side, but superiority on the one side. A father's claims on his son are more urgent than a son's claims on his father, since each ought to give in proportion to the other's merits. It is on this footing that the friendship between them stands.

But it is not merely the relation between a king and his subjects that is accompanied by friendship, resting on recognised superiority, but aristocratical rule is so too. The better of the two parties receives the greater affection; and this is the character also of the friendship of husband and wife. The relation between them is aristocracy in the household. It is in virtue of his superior excellence that the man rules, and because the better has a right to expect the greater affection. Consequently justice in this case also rests on recognised superiority.

Thirdly, the relation of citizens in a 'timocracy,' like the relations of brothers to one another, is accompanied by a friendship like that of comrades, resting as it does on equality. Comrades are equals and of the same age, and such are, as a rule, alike in feeling, alike in character; and these are also characteristics of those who live under a 'timocracy.' Its citizens should be equals and kindly to one another; they each take their share in ruling, and are ruled in turn. Friendship also in their case, and justice as well, are based on equality. Healthy constitutions then, and healthy relationships in the family, are attended alike by friendship and by justice.

But in the perverted forms of government, as there is but little justice, so too there is but little friendship. And since of all the perverted forms of government tyranny is the worst, consequently friendship is not found at all under it or very little of it. For, where there is nothing in common between ruler and subject, there can be no friendship. There is no justice (or mutual respect for each other's rights); the relation between tyrant and subject, between master and slave is simply that between a workman and his tools, between soul and body. The tool is looked after by the workman, the body by the soul, but no friendship is felt in the one case or the other. There can be no friendship for inanimate things. Nor are any claims of justice recognized by those who make use of these things, since no such claims are recognized even towards ox or dog. In the same way a master can feel no friendship for his slave, a tyrant none for his subjects, inasmuch as they are slaves; masters and slaves have nothing in common; the slave is a living tool, the tool a lifeless slave. So far then as the slave is a slave, no friendship can be felt for him, yet so far as he is a man friendship may be felt towards him. Every man must recognise certain claims of justice towards every other man, who can participate jointly with him in certain laws and ordinances. For the participation in laws as regards one another, is what constitutes justice, and participation in justice brings in its train friendship as well. A tyrant, therefore, may feel friendship for his subjects so far as they are men, and so in this sense there can subsist a kind of dim justice and friendship.

In democracy these are to be found more largely than in any other of the perverted forms of government: for equals have many things in common.

IX.—THE FRIENDSHIP WHICH RESTS ON TIES OF BLOOD.

i.—Distinction between this and other kinds of friendship.

Though all friendship thus involves 'common interests,' as we have said, yet the friendships of blood relations and comrades form a class apart. For the friendships of fellow-citizens, fellow-clansmen, fellow-

The friendships of relations spring less out of com-

munity of interests than other friendships.

voyagers, and all of that kind, are more like regular partnerships, resting, as they appear to do, on a kind of stipulation. With them may be classed also hereditary friendships.

All friendship then rests on community of interests, as has been already said. But the friendship of relations and comrades alone does not rest on this basis. For the friendships which are concluded on certain set terms and on a regular agreement, like those of fellow-citizens, fellow-tribesmen, fellow-voyagers, and all similar ones, have the character of a partnership; and with them may be classed hereditary friendships.

ii.—Origin and character of parental affection.

Parents love their children (1) as a part of themselves,

But the affection of relatives, in all its different forms, seems ultimately to be derived from the love of parent and child; parents love their children as a part of themselves, children their parents as deriving their existence from them. Parents, however, know better the offspring they have given birth to, than their offspring know the source from which they are sprung: and this source of their being is more wrapped up in its offspring, than the offspring in that which created it. That which derives its origin from something else, is naturally dear to that which has produced it, a tooth for instance, or a hair, or anything else to the owner of it, while the source of its being is not dear to the thing produced, or at any rate much less dear. The same result is brought about by the length of time over which the knowledge extends. Parents love their offspring directly they are born, but children their parents only after a lapse of time, when they have attained to understanding or perception. From this it is plain also why it is that mothers have the greater love.

(2) as knowing that they are the authors of their being.

But the friendship of blood relations and of comrades is not based on any stipulation or agreement, but in the one case nature binds them together, in the other the accident of similarity of age and of interest in the same pursuits.

We must now speak about the friendship of relations. This assumes many forms but is all to be traced back to parental affection—for by reason of their affection for a common parent, or ancestor, brothers and other relations generally, are led to love one another. Parents love their children as being a part of themselves, children their parents as deriving their origin from them, brothers brothers, as being sprung from the same parents. But parents know better that their children are sprung from them, than their offspring know, that they derive from them their origin; and the cause, and the producer, is more wrapped up in that to which it has given birth, or which it has produced, than the creature is in its creator, or the offspring in that which has given it birth: that which has sprung from anything is dear to that from which it has sprung, as a tooth, or a hair, is dear to its possessor, while its possessor is not dear to a tooth or a hair; either, then, the cause is not dear at all to its effect, and the source of its being to that

which springs from it, and has no special connection with it, or if it has, has at any rate a less intimate connection than the effect has with its cause; accordingly children love their parents less than they are loved by them.

This is further evident from the time through which the connection lasts: parents love their offspring directly they are born, but children their parents only after an interval, when they have attained to understanding or perception. For this reason mothers love their children more than fathers do, because they love them earlier. Parents therefore love their children as themselves; that which is sprung from them becomes to them, as it were, a kind of second self, differing only in having a separate existence,—while children love their parents because they are born of them.

iii.—Origin and nature of brotherly love.

Parents, therefore, love their children as themselves (that which is born of them becomes, so to speak, themselves repeated, in virtue of its separate existence), while children love their parents because they derive their being from them. But brothers love one another because of their origin from the same sources—their identity in respect of their parents identifies them with one another. Whence such expressions as 'same blood,' 'same stock' and so on, since there is a common element in their separate existences. Moreover their being brought up together, and being of an age, contribute greatly to their friendship; those of an age seek out each other; and it is those who are similar in character that make bosom friends: this is the reason why the love of brothers is like that of bosom friends.

The love of brothers arises from their common blood, which draws them together.

But is increased by companionship in youth, and similarity of tastes.

But cousins, and all other relatives, derive their intimacy from this same source; being sprung from the same stock their intimacy is more or less close, according as the original source is nearer or further removed.

The same holds good, though in a less degree, of cousins and other relations.

Brothers love one another because they are sprung from the same parents. Their identity in relation to their parents creates an identity for them with one another, just as the identity of the root binds the branches one to another; whence such expressions as 'same blood' 'same stock' and so on. There is the same element running through each of them though many and diverse.

The fact also of being brought up together and being of an age greatly enhances their friendship; those of an age love one another and 'tis those of like disposition that are comrades. Cousins, moreover, and all other relatives, derive their intimacy from the brotherly relationship; for, being derived from the same ancestors, they are in a way identified with one another. And relations are more or less closely bound together as the common ancestor of the race is nearer or more remote. Where the common ancestor is very remote, the connection becomes enfeebled, being diminished at each stage of removal.

iv.—The love of children to parents.

The love of children to parents rests on a sense of favours received.

The love felt by children for their parents, as that of men to God, is based on goodness and a recognition of superiority. Our parents have conferred the greatest benefits upon us. They are the authors of our being, and of our being nurtured; and we owe to them our education too after we are born.

The love of children towards their parents and of men to God rests on goodness and a sense of superior merit; parents are benefactors who have conferred the greatest benefits, being, nurture, education; but the affection of other relations to one another rests on equality.

v.—Superiority of family affection to all other kinds.

Family affection possesses every requisite for friendship in an enhanced degree.

Family affection has moreover pleasantness and profit in a greater degree than the friendship of aliens can ever have, just because life in the family is lived more in common. Brotherly love has all those characteristics which are to be found in comradeship, and has them in a greater degree, where the brothers are good and alike in disposition, just because they are more intimate and start with having natural affection for one another from birth upwards, and also because those who are sprung of the same parents, and are brought up together and educated alike, have more tastes in common; while further, that proof of each other which time furnishes is in their case most complete and reliable. These elements of friendship are to be found proportionately in the case of other relations.

And family affection has pleasantness and profitableness in a greater degree than that of those who are aliens in race, as family life is lived more in common, and the members of a family are more bound up with one another. Most of all is this true of brotherly love: it has all the characteristics which comradeship has, and has them even in a higher degree: and for this reason where brothers are good, and similar in character, they will love one another even more than comrades: they are more closely allied to one another, are more alike, have a natural affection for one another from their birth onwards, and have more kindred dispositions, as being born of the same parents, and as having been educated alike. And the proof of each other which time gives is in their case greater and more sure. First, then, among family affections stands the love of brothers; all the rest are proportionate to their nearness in blood.

vi.—The love of husband and wife.

Affection between husband and wife is a natural instinct, for man lives by nature in pairs even more than in civil society. A

household is prior to, and even more absolutely indispensable than, a state, and the production of children is a function which man shares with the animals. In the case of the other animals the connexion lasts only so long as is needful for this particular purpose, but men and women live together, not merely with a view to the production of children, but also to supply their wants in life; their functions from the first are separate, and different tasks are assigned to man and woman: consequently they help one another by bringing their several products into a common fund.

Love between husband and wife is a natural instinct, but is increased by the sense of mutual helpfulness, by goodness, by the possession of children.

On these grounds there would seem to be both pleasure and profit in this form of friendship and on grounds of virtue also, where husband and wife are good. They have their own specific excellence and each can therefore take pleasure in the other's goodness. Children too would seem to be a bond of union between the parents, as is proved by the fact that the childless more readily separate; children are a good common to both of them, and that which is common binds men together.

Between man and woman love seems a natural instinct. For man is even more disposed by nature to the production of children, than he is to living in a civil community, inasmuch as a household is even more indispensable than a civil government; the production of offspring is also more widely shared by the beasts than is civil government. The former belongs to all animals, the latter to human beings alone: in other animals the connexion between the pair lasts only so long as is necessary for the rearing of offspring, but in the case of human beings the connexion is not formed merely to rear children, but extends to the supply of the other wants of life; their functions are divided from the first, and the duties of a husband are different from those of a wife; consequently they help one another by bringing their several contributions into a common store. For this reason there seems to be profit and pleasure as well in this form of friendship; and there will be goodness and virtue also, if the two happen to be well-disposed: they have each their own special excellence; and if each be good in the line of their own special excellence, this will lead them to take pleasure in one another. Children, too, seem to be a bond in maintaining affection of this sort, which is the reason why childless couples more readily separate: children are a good common to both parents, and that which is common holds together those who participate in it.

vii.—The claims of friendship vary in these different cases.

But the question of how a man should live with his wife, and generally a friend with a friend, is the same question as how they may live justly with one another; a friend has different claims from a stranger, a comrade from one who is merely a fellow pupil.

The claims of friendship vary with the closeness of the connecting tie.

But the question how a man should live with his wife, a brother with a brother, and generally a friend with a friend, is the same question as how they may do so

justly. Each kind of association is accompanied by its own special kind of justice analogous to the friendship, which prevails in it, as we have several times stated. The claims which a friend has on his friend are not identical with those that a stranger has, or which a brother has, or a comrade, or a fellow pupil.

X.—THE RIGHTS AND THE DUTIES OF FRIENDS.

i.—General principle for their regulation enunciated.

The general principle is that equals should return equal, unequals proportionate amounts in each kind of friendship.

Now as there are three kinds of friendship, as was stated above, and as in respect of each of them the friends may be on a footing of equality, or may be in a position of relative superiority and inferiority—for two men who are equally good may become friends, or a better man may become friends with one less good; and this same holds good with respect to those who are friends because they are agreeable to one another and with those who are friends for profit's sake—they may be equals in the benefits conferred, or the one may confer more the other less—equals should make each other an equal return in affection and in all else, unequals should make a return proportionate to the superior position of the one party.

But as there are three kinds of friendship, based respectively on goodness, pleasantness, and profitableness, and as in respect of each of these three kinds some friends may be on a footing of equality, others on a footing of superiority and inferiority (for men who are the equals of one another in goodness in pleasantness in profitableness in some cases become friends, while in other cases the better become friends with the less good), the general rule should be that equals should love one another equally, and make equal returns in all other respects, but that unequals should give and receive affection in amounts proportionate to their relative superiority and inferiority.

ii.—Limitation of the enquiry to friendships of interest.

Disputes do not occur between the good, as they are anxious only to do good to one another.

It is in friendship based on profit that recrimination and upbraidings occur either exclusively or at any rate most frequently; and naturally so. For those who are friends on grounds of excellence, are only eager to do one another good, as this is the course dictated alike by friendship and by virtue, and between those who rival one another in this there is no room for recriminations and contentions. No one gets vexed with a man who loves him and does him good, only if the recipient be a man of honour he repays the benefits he receives. And even supposing one of the two to be the greater benefactor, if he gets what he desires, he will find no fault with his friend, as each of them is set on the good. Nor do quarrels often occur either

between those whose friendship rests on pleasure. Both get at once what they desire, if they take delight in each other's society. A man would be regarded as ridiculous for grumbling at another for not pleasing him, when he might withdraw from his society.

Nor among pleasure-seekers, as they can withdraw from one another's society.

But friendship based on profit does give room for recriminations. As both parties make use of one another with a view to advantage, they always desire more than they get, think that they get less than their due, and find fault because they do not get, though they deserve it, as much as they want; benefactors can never give as much help as the recipients of their favours want.

But only among the interested, as they always want more than they get.

But it is only in friendship, the motive of which is interest or in this principally, that dissensions and fault-findings between the friends occur, and naturally so. For those who are friends on grounds of virtue are anxious to do one another good; this is the course dictated alike by virtue and friendship; but where the friends vie with one another in this there is no room for charges and contentions. No one can get vexed with one who loves him and seeks his good: but if the recipient be a man of honour he returns the good he receives; and even one who surpasses the other in his kindnesses, if he gets what he wants, will not find fault with his friend; each wishes for the good and to do good.

Nor can those who are drawn together by pleasure often grumble at one another. Both get at once what they desire, if they take pleasure in passing their days together: a man would be thought ridiculous for finding fault with his friend for not pleasing him, when he might please himself by going and passing his time with some one else. Accordingly neither does the friendship which rests upon goodness, nor does that which rests on pleasure, admit of grumblings and fault-findings.

But that which is based on interest is alone in being full of recriminations. For as the friends make use of one another with an eye to advantage, they always want more and think they get less than their due, and find fault because they don't get as much as they want, though they deserve to get it; those who do them services can never help them as much as they want; for those who are the recipients of favours always want more than their benefactors can do for them.

(*a*) DIVISIONS OF INTERESTED FRIENDSHIPS.

Now just in the same way as justice is twofold, one form of it unwritten the other embodied in written law, so there would seem to be two kinds of friendship of interest, one moral (*i.e.* resting to some extent on character), the other resting simply on contract. Now the most frequent cases of recrimination occur where men enter into a friendship on one footing, break it off on another. By 'stipulated' friendship we must understand one which rests on stated terms—one form of it purely commercial involving a transference of goods on

Friendships of interest may be divided into (1) moral, (2) covenanted; but 'covenanted' friendships are subdivided into (a) those that require immediate repayment, (b) those that allow a time of grace.

the spot—the other more liberal in allowing time, but still implying an agreement for a definite return for a definite service. In this even the debt is recognised and is not questioned, still the delay it allows of has a friendly character. Consequently among some peoples no legal recovery is allowed in these cases, as they consider that those who have concluded a bargain on trust should abide by the result. But in 'moral' friendship there are no stipulated terms—the gift or whatever other service is rendered, is made as to a friend, still the donor expects to get back an equivalent, or even a greater amount, supposing himself not to have made a gift, but only lent a loan: and if he comes out of the transaction on less good terms than he entered it, he will grumble. But this comes about because, while all, or at any rate most men, *wish* to realise what is honourable, at the moment of choice, they *choose* what is profitable. Now, while it is honourable to do good without any hope of reward, it is profitable to be recompensed again.

In 'moral' friendship an equal return, though not stipulated for, is still expected, and disappointment will be felt, if it is not made.

Now it seems that, just as justice is twofold, one form of it unwritten, another embodied in law, so too is it with friendships of interest—there is a moral and there is a 'covenanted' kind. We have an instance of covenanted interests whenever one man gives anything to another on condition of receiving a stipulated and definite return: but a moral relation where one man makes a gift to another as to a friend, but still claims to get back an equal amount or even more, though not a stipulated or definite return; but in respect of both forms of interest recriminations and reproaches are apt to break out in the friendships based on them. Most frequently of all do they occur when one of the friends introduces into the transaction covenanted interests, the other moral considerations. Such friends are sure speedily to fall out. For, if the one confers an obligation in money and expects to be accommodated in the same way, and to get back just as large a sum as he has given, while the other confers a service of some other kind on him by way of repayment, they cannot continue in their friendship.

But, again, of 'covenanted' friendship one form is purely commercial, another more liberal. For to refuse to give if one does not receive an equivalent on the spot, the goods passing there and then, is purely business-like; but while giving, to allow delay in the repayment is more liberal. In this case, too, there may be an express agreement as to the terms of the exchange; the one is a debtor, the debt being definite and not matter for dispute. Yet the delay allowed in the repayment makes the transaction at once more liberal and more friendly; and so among some people no legal redress is allowed in these cases, nor can they sue one another for debts, but it is considered that those who have made a bargain on trust ought to abide by the result.

But he who does a service to another on moral grounds, does the service on no stipulated terms, but gives the gift, or does any other service as to a friend; still he expects to get back an equivalent amount or even more, considering himself not to have given a gift but made a loan, and if he does not get this back, he will grumble, yet not because it was a loan, but because the recipient was a friend. And this comes about because while all, or most men, at any rate, wish to do what is honourable, they yet choose what is profitable. Now to do good without any hope of return is honourable; but it is profitable to be well done by; consequently men seek what profits them, but if they fail to get it, wish to be thought honourable.

(*b*) GENERAL RULES FOR REGULATING THESE DIFFERENT CASES.

Consequently he who can, should repay the full worth of what he has received (and must do so voluntarily); one has no right to treat a man as a friend against his will. He should consider, then, that he made a mistake to start with and received a favour from one from whom he had no right to receive it—he received it not from a friend nor was friendship the other's motive in conferring it—he must conclude the transaction, accordingly, as if he had been served for a stipulated return; and he should acknowledge that he would repay if he could; if he cannot, even the donor will not require it of him; so that, if he is able he must repay.

1. Repay in full, where it is possible.

2. Assume as little friendly intention as possible.

But he should ask, to start with, in what capacity and on what terms the donor confers the favour, that he may settle whether or no to enter on the transaction on these terms.

3. Make inquiries at the outset.

But such friends and all who do good to receive as much again, those who can should do good to with all their might, and should repay them the full worth of their services. For one ought not to drag by force into a true friendship those who do not wish it, but we should rather feel pain at having unwittingly received a service from one we ought not, that is from one who is not a friend and should seek how we may voluntarily wipe off disgraceful favours which we received involuntarily, through not knowing the character of our benefactor. In these cases good men will wipe them off, if they can, repaying them of their own accord, and concluding the business at once as if conditions had been stipulated; but if they cannot do this, then they must acknowledge that they would have repaid at once, if they had been able; but if they are absolutely unable to repay, not even the donors will ask back anything from them; so that if they can, they must repay at once. But before receiving a benefit each should look, by whom the benefit is conferred and on what terms, that so he may best know whether to receive it or no.

(*c*) HOW THE RETURN TO BE MADE IS TO BE ESTIMATED.

But it is open to question whether the favour is to be measured by the benefit of the recipient and whether one should make one's return in accordance with this, or by the sacrifice made by the benefactor. On the one hand the recipients declare, that what they have received from their benefactors is what it cost these little to give, and what they might have got from any one else, thus making light of the favour; on the other hand, the donors assert that they have given the best they have to give, and what the recipients could never have got from any one else,

Is the return to be made to be estimated by the good received or by the benefit intended?

and that it was given at a moment of danger or other urgent need. Must we not in answer to such questions conclude that, since the friendship is one of interest, the advantage to the recipient is the standard of measurement? It is he who makes the request, and the other will help him with a view to get an equal amount of help in return. The assistance given has been in amount just what he has profited by it; consequently he must repay as much benefit as he has derived from it, or rather more, since this is the more honourable course.

In interested friendships by the good received.

But in friendships founded on virtue, though there are no disputes, the intention of the benefactors is taken as a measure. The determining element in virtue and character is to be found in the intention.

In ideal friendship by the intention of the benefactor.

In this interchange of good offices between friends a difficulty meets us. Seeing that from great sacrifices on the part of the benefactor little advantage often accrues to the recipients of his favours, and from small sacrifices great advantage—for it may well be that though one has done much and spent much, one has done little good to one's friend—or the reverse may be the case—are we in returning the service to regard the advantage received, or the measure of the benefit conferred? Another ground for asking the question is that the recipients contend that they have got from their benefactors what it was a very small matter for them to give and what they might have got from any one else, thus minimising the favours conferred: while the benefactors maintain just the opposite. They say they have rendered the recipients the greatest services they could, services which they could never have got from others, and at moments of danger or other similar need. Accordingly the question is raised by which of the two we should measure the return to be made, by the advantage to the recipient or by the sacrifice of the benefactor.

The case is not quite the same in every form of friendship; in the case of friendship entered into for profit, the return will be proportionate to the benefit to the recipient or will even transcend it, as this is the more honourable course. It is the recipient who makes the request and the other helps him with a view of getting back an equal return; the assistance, therefore, has been just as great as the amount of benefit which he has received from it, or rather more; so in a general way it is right that he should measure the return by the benefit to himself for it is for the sake of this that he formed the friendship.

But in the case of friendship which rests on virtue there are no dissensions as there are in the kind where each wishes to turn the services rendered to his own profit, nor are the returns to be made measured by the profit to the recipients of the favours but by the intentions of the benefactors; for the characteristic feature in virtue and in character is the intention. Since, then, the two love each other for their virtue and they will measure the returns to be made by the intention; consequently friendship of this kind will be free from all dissensions, but the other two kinds are subject to them.

iii.—Why disputes occur in 'Friendships of condescension.'

Disputes also occur in 'friendships of condescension.' Each of the friends claim to have the largest share, and, where this occurs, the friendship is broken off. The better of the two thinks that

the larger share is his due, as his goodness entitles him to more; the more profitable in the same way thinks this too; they maintain that the other party, being useless, ought not to get an equal amount, the connexion (they urge) ceases to be friendship and becomes gratuitous service unless the results of the friendship are distributed in proportion to the services done: they consider that just as in a money partnership those who contribute more get more, so ought it to be in friendship. But the poor man and the inferior in virtue hold just the opposite view. They hold that it is the part of a good friend to help his friends who are in need. What advantage (they ask) is it to be a friend of a good man or a powerful man, if one is to get nothing from it?

The superior party considers that he should get the larger share of profit, as contributing more.

The inferior, that he should do so, because his needs are the greater.

This is the case in friendships of condecension when a greater man is the friend of the less, or a more profitable friend is friends with a less profitable; the superior party expects to get more in the one case on the grounds of his superior merit, in the other on account of his superior usefulness. For if, the one urges, each of the friends contributes to the extent of his powers, and gets no proportionate return, the connexion is a gratuitous service rather than a friendship; consequently they say they ought to get not similar results out of the friendship but greater. They claim that, as in trade they who contribute more to the common stock get a larger share of the profits, so should it be in friendship. This is the case of the superiors, but the inferiors maintain that this is not what is due from friends in a superior position, but just the opposite. A good friend's part is to help his friends when in want. For what use is it, they say, to be friends with a good man, or a powerful, if you are to get nothing out of your friendship? And thus finding fault with one another and each claiming to get the larger share, they very easily break off the friendship.

(*a*) PRINCIPLES ON WHICH SUCH DISPUTES SHOULD BE SETTLED.

After all, each of them seems to have reason in his claim, and each has a right to get 'more' out of the friendship, only not 'more' of the same kind, but the superior 'more' honour, the inferior 'more' profit. For honour is the natural meed of virtue and of benefits conferred, while gain serves to alleviate distress. This same principle seems to hold good in public affairs; he is not honoured who brings no good to the commonwealth, for public property is exclusively given to the man who has *benefited* the common weal, and honour is public property. It is not possible at one and the same time to make money out of the commonwealth and to be honoured as well. No one can stand coming the worse off at all points. Accordingly to a public man, who suffers

1. The greater benefactor should receive more honour, he who is more in need of help, more assistance.

(This principle that honour must be given for services rendered holds good in public affairs.)

from a money point of view, the citizens give honour, while one who is open to bribes gets money. It is the proportioning the return to merit that equalises and keeps up friendships, as we have already said. These, then, are the principles on which the unequal should conduct their intercourse; he who is benefited in point of money or in point of virtue must make repayment in honour, repaying the best he has to give. Friendship exacts the best a man can do, not exact proportion. An exactly proportionate return is not indeed possible in all cases, for instance in the honour we pay to the Gods or our parents. Here no one can make a return which is really proportionate to the favour received, but he who serves them to the best of his powers is accounted good. For this reason it would seem not to be allowable for a son to disown his father, though a father may his son; a debtor is bound to repay; and nothing that the son can do can wipe off what he has received, so that he remains for ever a debtor. But those to whom a debt is owed are at liberty to remit it, consequently a father is at liberty to do so. Yet at the same time, we may presume, no father would part with his son unless that son were desperately bad: for, independently of natural affection, it is human nature not to discard assistance. But it may well be that the son, if he is bad, will shun giving assistance, or will not be anxious to give it. For the majority wish to receive favours and shun conferring them as being unprofitable.

But (2) the return made will have to be limited by the power of the recipient to pay.

The relation of parent and child considered in the light of this principle, a father has the right to repudiate the son, not the son the father.

Let thus much suffice on these points.

Each seems to have justice in his claim; each has a right to get 'more' out of the friendship, but not 'more' of the same sort. The superior should have more honour given him, the inferior more of what he needs. Of virtue and of well-doing honour is the reward, while money profit or whatever else the man may need is the alleviation of poverty.

The same seems to be the case also in public affairs; it is to benefactors that honour is always awarded: he is not honoured who brings no good to the common weal; public property is given to him who benefits the public and honour is public property. It is not possible at once to make money out of the public and to be honoured as well: the poor man receives money from the public purse, but is by no means honoured; for no one can brook to come worse off at both points, both in respect of honour and in respect of money, but if he is to give the one he must receive the other. Consequently he who suffers loss from a money point of view in behalf of the public interest has honour given him, while he who is willing to receive bribes gets money. Proportionate returns equalise and keep up friendships, as has been said. On these principles unequal friends should conduct their intercourse; the man who is benefited in point of money or virtue must repay in honour and repay to the extent of his ability.

It is the best a man can do that friendship looks for, not an exact proportion. For all cannot repay the full extent of the debt they owe. They cannot indeed

find a proportional equivalent in all cases. For instance, in the honours given to God or our parents, no one can repay the amount in full, but he who serves them to the best of his powers and as far as he has opportunity is accounted a good man. For this reason it seems not lawful for a son to repudiate his father or to refuse to listen to any of his requests; for he is for ever his debtor and therefore ever bound to repay; he has done for his father nothing equivalent to the benefits he has received from him. But a father *may* repudiate his son, as benefactors may dismiss their debtors. Yet we may assume no father would ever part from his son, unless that son were superlatively bad; natural affection constrains him not to do so, while at the same time it is human nature not to reject assistance. But if the son *is* very bad, he will hate, or at any rate will not be anxious, to assist his father. Most people are willing to receive favours, but shun the doing them, as being unprofitable.

Let thus much suffice on these subjects.

BOOK IX.—CONCERNING FRIENDSHIP

(*Continued*).

INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS.

THE break between Books VIII. and IX. is purely arbitrary. There is no break in the connection at the point at which in our existing editions the Books are divided. No new subject is entered upon with the commencement of Book IX., scarcely a fresh division of a subject already begun.

Book IX. opens with a continuation of the subject which was engaging our attention at the close of Book VIII., the question, namely, of the mutual rights and duties of friends and the circumstances under which disputes between them are apt to occur.

The two cases, which have been already considered, are (1) Friendships of interest, in which it is difficult to get the claims of each fully satisfied, and (2) those friendships involving superiority on the one side, inferiority on the other, where the difference in the claims to be considered renders them hard to adjust.

C. The third class of friendships in which disputes are apt to occur is that of those in which the friendship is prompted by different motives on the two sides—

(1.) It is hard in these cases to assess the exact amount of the equivalent which should be repaid, since the benefits conferred cannot very well be expressed in terms of money-value.

(2.) Such friendships being based, not on affection and admiration for one another's character, but on circumstances which are more or less accidental, if these circumstances alter, the friendships themselves are apt to fade away since neither of the friends any longer derives that advantage from the connexion for which he looks.

(3.) Dissatisfaction is felt most of all, if a friend's services are repaid in some other form than that on which he had set his heart. To take an extreme case. Imagine the harp-player's disappointment, when the tyrant, having promised him a reward for the pleasure he had given him, repaid him nothing at all: telling him by way of consolation that he had repaid him by the pleasures of hope for the pleasure of enjoyment which he had himself received.

Here once more comes in the question with whom, then, does it rest to determine the amount of the repayment to be made? Should it be the original receiver or the original giver? The question can hardly be

answered in all cases in the same way. The answer must to some extent depend upon circumstances.

(*a.*) In some cases, for instance, the giver agrees to leave it in the hands of the recipient. This was what Protagoras did with his pupils. He gave them instruction first and then told them to pay him what they thought the knowledge they had acquired was worth.

(*b.*) The opposite course to this is followed by the majority of the 'Sophists.' They require payment in advance, and then egregiously fail to fulfil the promises they have made. It may be that this is the only course that it is open to them to adopt. The knowledge they have to impart is for the most part so worthless that no one would give them anything for it, if it were not paid for in advance.

(*c.*) By the good and by true students of philosophy the repayment to be made will be measured, not so much by the advantage received, as according to the intentions of the benefactor. 'The price of wisdom being above rubies' the pupil will feel that, in giving his instructor the best he has to give, he is still making him too small a return.

(*d.*) As a general rule it must be left to the receiver to settle the amount he will repay. The giver of the favour has trusted to his honour and should abide by the consequences. Indeed in some countries no legal redress can be obtained at all, where the contract has been a purely voluntary one. The law holds, that a man who has trusted another, should end as he began.

The principle which should guide the receiver in making repayment should be this. He should consider what he was prepared to give for the service he has received, *before* it was actually rendered him. He has no right to value it at what he is prepared to give for it now—for a gift already received loses value in our eyes.

D. In the last place we are encountered by a number of *questions of Casuistry* when we are attempting to determine the respective rights and duties of friends. Duties seem to conflict, and it is hard sometimes to determine their comparative obligatoriness.

It may be asked, for instance, are a father's claims upon us paramount? And again, are we bound to recompense a benefactor in preference to fulfilling any other obligation?

Of course such questions as these, like all other questions of moral casuistry, admit of no precise and accurate determination. All we can say is that, as a rule, the two following principles will be found to hold good. 1. Do not heap all your favours on the same individual. 2. Be just before you are generous.

Yet the second rule has its exceptions. People may press their claims ungenerously upon us. Such we have a right to resist. Further, our duty to our parents takes precedence of all others.

In this and in all other cases we should try to ascertain the exact line of conduct which the nature of the relationship prescribes and to act accordingly. Parents, for instance, have from the nature of the case a claim upon us for support and for honour; elders are entitled to marks of respect, brothers and comrades to frankness of speech and a readiness to impart to them, our relatives for interest in all family matters.

When the conflicting claims are of the same kind, the decision between them is not very difficult. The difficulty occurs where we have to decide between competing claims of wholly different kinds.

Another question of casuistry, which demands an answer, is under what circumstances are we justified in breaking off a friendship once formed? The answer will be dictated by the following considerations.

(1.) When a friendship springs merely from interest or pleasure, it naturally comes to an end when the interest or pleasure is found no longer to exist.

(2.) When one of the friends pretends to have an unselfish admiration for the other's character, but is really led into the friendship by motives of interest or pleasure, the discovery of such a fraud is a sufficient reason for breaking off the connexion.

(3.) If one man makes friends with another believing him to be a good man, and this other turns out evil, the first is no longer bound, after such a discovery, to continue the friendship, that is supposing the second to prove irreclaimable. Yet he is bound, before renouncing the friendship, to make every effort to reclaim his friend.

(4.) Where the one remains stationary, the other makes great strides in virtue, the friendship will, when a certain point is reached, naturally drop. The two will cease to have any community of tastes or interests. Still each is bound to retain a kindly recollection of their earlier intimacy.

X.—STATES AKIN TO OR SUBORDINATE TO FRIENDSHIP.

I.—SELF-LOVE.

It would seem as if our very idea of friendship and of our duties to our friends were derived from the relations in which a man stands and the duties which he owes, to himself.

For friendship is ordinarily defined as consisting either (1) In an unselfish wish for, and effort to promote, the good of our neighbours; or (2) In the desire for our friend's preservation and continued life; or (3) In the taking pleasure in a man's company, or society; or (4) In feeling sympathy with him in his sorrows and his joys.

Now the good man, who must be taken, as so often observed, as the type or standard of human nature, exhibits each one of these dispositions in his own person, and in relation to himself.

(1.) He wishes what is good for himself and desires it too with his whole nature. His wishes do not point one way, his desires another, but the two, and his whole nature, are absolutely at one.

(2.) He desires his own preservation and continued existence. Above all he is anxious for the health and preservation of his intellectual nature, which is properly to be regarded as a man's true self.

(3.) He is in perfect sympathy with himself, as his whole life is a consistent and harmonious whole; while

(4.) He takes pleasure in his own society, as he has nothing but pleasant memories and joyful hopes to occupy his thoughts.

A life of virtue is, however, absolutely indispensable for the realisation of such true self-love, such friendly relations to oneself. The wholly depraved, far from being in this condition, don't even bear the semblance of being at one with themselves. They come at last, as a result of their vices, to loathe even their own existence. They cannot endure their

own society. The bad of all sorts have little pleasure in their own company. They find little in themselves to draw out their affection, and consequently are little loved, even by themselves.

II.—GOODWILL.

This again has intimate relations to friendship. It differs from friendship, in that it is a feeling which may be felt towards strangers, and which need not be known to the objects of it. It differs from affection in being destitute of warmth or strong feeling and in springing up sometimes quite suddenly, as, for instance, towards the combatants in the arena.

Goodwill is thus a kind of passive, or inert, friendship, but developes into friendship, when matured by time and intimacy, and into friendship also of the true, or genuine, type. It is itself elicited neither by interest nor by pleasure but by some nobleness, or goodness.

III.—UNANIMITY.

This feeling is distinct from mere coincidence of opinion, being restricted in its sphere to those practical matters, where important public, or private, interests are at stake. Thus states are said to be unanimous, when they are agreed upon a course, or line, of policy, and are prepared to carry it out in common. The citizens, again, of a state are unanimous when they entertain the same views for the conduct of their own public affairs.

Unanimity may, therefore, be defined as a kind of 'political friendship,' and this is the accepted meaning of the term in ordinary parlance.

It is a privilege, like friendship itself, confined, or almost confined, to the good. The bad, being bent on their own selfish interests, grow suspicious of one another and exacting in their requirements from one another, and this puts an end to all true harmony of feeling between them.

IV.—THE RELATION OF BENEFACTOR AND BENEFITED.

People often puzzle themselves why it should be that the benefactor loves the recipient of his favours more than that recipient loves him.

The popular explanation is that the two are in the position of creditor and debtor. Just as the creditor is more anxious for the debtor's safety and long life than the debtor is for the creditor's, so, they argue, the benefactor wishes for the safety and continued life of his client, that he may receive back his own with usury.

Such an explanation is, indeed, founded on a dark view of human nature, yet it receives a certain confirmation from the conduct of the majority, who are apt to be but little mindful of the favours they have received.

This explanation is, however, really inadequate to account for the fact —it does not account for the *affection* felt. The true causes must be sought deeper down.

1. Probably a truer explanation is to be found in the analogy of the affection felt by an artist for his work, most notably by a poet for his own poems. This affection originates in the fact that a man's work is the proof, symbol, actualisation of his own existence. Our work makes us realise better, that we are alive and active; and since existence is in itself a good, that which gives reality to, and enhances our consciousness of, existence, must be good likewise. But a work done—a thing made—does this. Consequently the contemplation of such a work must afford pleasure and gratification. Now the recipient of our favours is in a way our 'work.' He is a monument of the activity of the benefactor; and so the benefactor can scarcely fail to take pleasure in that, which he has thus, in a way, created.

2. The doing of favours gratifies that 'sense of nobility' which furnishes us men with the noblest of all our pleasures. It must, therefore, be pleasant to a benefactor to have constantly before his eyes a monument of the favours he has conferred, that is the living, actual presence of the person he has benefited. To be reminded, on the other hand, of the favours one has received is by no means an equal pleasure. Thus the recipient has not the same pleasure in the presence of his benefactor.

3. The feeling of having done a kindness carries with it a sense of superiority, which is in itself a pleasure. So all that tends to keep this feeling alive is in itself pleasant.

4. Whatever is attended with effort and difficulty gives pleasure by the attainment of it. The conferring of favours involves trouble and effort, and so is viewed, when accomplished, with pleasure by those who have conferred the favours.

V.—THE RELATION OF SELF-LOVE AND THE LOVE OF OTHERS.

In examining the relation of self-love to the love of others, we are at once met by a difficulty.

On the one hand self-love is denounced as a vice. It is the bad, it is urged, who are most actuated by self-regarding motives, and the worse a man is, the more selfish he is, the more entirely does he seek his own interests to the neglect of the interests of others.

On the other hand, we have already pointed out how, in a certain sense, we are bound to be self-regarding, to be on terms of friendship with oneself, and how all the requirements of true friendship are best fulfilled in a man's relations to himself; so that in a certain sense it would seem that a man, both ought to be, and must be, self-regarding.

The difficulty, however, and apparent contradiction—as is so often the case—will be got over by a more exact definition of the terms employed.

When the many speak of a man as 'self-regarding,' what they mean by it is one who seeks to get for himself as large a share as possible of those things which, like money, honours, external advantages, are most prized by the vulgar. And since the lion's share for one of such advantages means loss to all the rest, the term, as thus employed, becomes properly a term of reproach.

This is the popular use of the term, corresponding with the popular view of what is desirable. Yet it is not the real, nor the proper, mean-

ing of the term 'self-loving,' 'self-regarding.' For what is a man's true self?' 'A man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesses.' It is his *reason*, as we have already pointed out, which constitutes his true self. And so he who is truly 'self-regarding' is the man who provides, not for his material, but for his spiritual needs. Reason, not the passions, not his lower nature, is a man's real self; and he who consults the interests of his reason, who gratifies his reason's dictates, that man must be pronounced truly 'self-regarding.' Now he who consults the dictates of his reason is the good man. He, consequently, deserves the title of 'self-regarding' far more than the other. Only we must remember that, when we apply the term to him, we are using it in a widely different sense from that in which it is ordinarily applied, a sense as different as is the life of reason from the life of passion, as is the effort after true nobility from the gratification of our lower desires.

And since, by being 'self-regarding' in this higher sense, a man will be at the same time promoting the happiness of others and the good of his country, it will follow that a good man *ought* to be 'self-regarding,' a bad man ought not, since this latter, by being self-regarding in his way, not only does harm to others but even to himself as well.

And, though the good man gives up for his friends and his country honour, wealth, even life itself, he cannot for all that be counted a loser thereby. Rather he is gaining for himself the best of all rewards, the reward of having acted nobly, a reward worth more to him than all besides. Yes; even when he surrenders in his friend's favour the very chance of doing noble deeds he is not without his reward. He is a gainer of a still deeper sense of inward satisfaction. In this way the most absolute self-surrender becomes identified with the most absolute 'self-regard.'

To be 'self-regarding' in such a sense as this, securing, as it does, at once our own highest good and the good of others, is fitting and right. Only it must be remembered that it is a spirit as widely removed as possible from that selfishness, which by the vulgar is so often confounded with true self-love.

XI.—THE RELATION OF FRIENDSHIP TO HAPPINESS.

This last subject connects Books VIII. and IX. with the main current of the Treatise. If it can be shown, as Aristotle attempts to show, that friends are a necessary element in true well-being, then the discussion of friendship clearly becomes germane to the definition of happiness and its constituent elements, which forms the main subject of the treatise.

The discussion opens at once with the question whether the presence of friends is, or is not, indispensable for the completion of the ideal of perfect happiness.

The question is first approached from a dialectical point of view.

On the one hand many maintain that friends are *not* required, on the ground that a man who is perfectly happy having, ex hypothesi, all goods at his command can have no possible call for, or need of, friends. Friends it is urged, are absolutely superfluous for him.

On the other hand, these arguments are met by the following considerations:

(1.) Friends are admittedly among the greatest of all goods. What right have we, it is asked, to leave this feature out of our picture of ideal, or perfect, happiness?

(2.) A happy man requires to do acts of benevolence, as in them, at least in part, his happiness must consist. There are no so appropriate objects for our benevolence as friends. Thus, from this point of view, friends will be requisite.

(3.) Nature does not *intend* man to live alone; he is naturally social. So his natural longing for society will be unsatisfied, if we do not accord him the society of friends, and his nature would be so far maimed and incomplete.

(4.) It is not difficult to see how the mistake arose of supposing the happy not to require friends. It grows out of the unworthy conception which the world has formed of friendship. The only form of friendship which the world recognises is that which is based on interest. Since the happy do not require friends who will do them good turns, it has been hastily assumed that they do not require friends at all.

That this is not really the case, that good friends *are* essential to perfect happiness, is more than plain from the following arguments.

(1.) The sight of the good acts of our friends excites in us a pleasureable excitement, being indeed almost equivalent to the performance of good acts ourselves. And since in this—as we saw at the outset of this treatise—our happiness, or well-being, consists, the sight of friends doing well, which is almost equivalent to it, must also be a good.

(2.) The performance of good acts is rendered easier, more pleasant, and consequently more continuous, by their being done in company. Since, then, the presence of friends has this effect, and to pass his time in well-doing constitutes man's true felicity, on this ground also friends will be necessary.

(3.) Good friends further encourage one another in acquiring habits of virtue and so promote one another's happiness.

We may, however, discover arguments reaching deeper into the nature of things, and approach the question from a more metaphysical point of view.

Whatever is *naturally* good in itself is good and pleasant to the good man. Life is naturally good, so life is good and pleasant to a good man. But, since life is defined as a *power* of sensation, and thought and powers are only apprehended by the exercise of them, therefore sensation and thought, as constituting life, must be good to a good man. Further, each act of sensation and thought is accompanied by a consciousness of it. Therefore this consciousness of sensation and thought must be good to a good man. This consciousness of sensation and thought we enjoy in the presence of friends. Therefore this presence must be a good. And so it is indispensable to the happy man, as he would otherwise be wanting in an element of happiness which he might enjoy, and so fall short of perfect bliss.

XII.—THE NUMBER AND THE USES OF FRIENDS.

But, if friends *are* thus essential to complete happiness, are we, therefore, to conclude that we should make as many friends as we possibly can, or should their number be limited? Their number should clearly be limited, for

1. In the case of interested friendships, it is inconvenient to have to return a great number of good offices; and life is not long enough to enable us to do so.

2. A limited number of *pleasant* acquaintances are enough to give a spice to our lives.

3. Even of the *good* we may have more than enough. We may make our friends so numerous as to mar that roundness or completeness which the perfect life should exhibit. The exact number of friends permissible it is indeed impossible to fix, as impossible as it would be to settle the exact number of citizens who should go to make up a state. All we can do in either case is to determine certain limits. In the case of friends the limit will be found in the largest number that it is possible to live with comfortably.

There are other considerations which tend also to limit the number of possible friends.

(1.) Friends, as we have already seen, should live together and live in harmony. Where the circle is made unduly wide, this condition becomes very difficult to fulfil; they are sure not all of them to share in one another's tastes and interests.

(2.) Besides, if our friends are very numerous, their claims on our sympathies in their joys and their sorrows will be found to clash.

(3.) Friendship, being an *intense* feeling, is necessarily very restricted in its range.

(4.) These arguments receive confirmation from the facts of actual life. Men break themselves up into little bands of comrades, and the most celebrated friendships, such as those of Damon and Pythias, of Pylades and Orestes, have been restricted only to two. You may be, and ought to be 'civil' to the whole world, but to be content with a few real friends.

Lastly, since friends are thus indispensable under all circumstances, a question has been raised in what circumstances they are most indispensable. Do we require them more in prosperity or in adversity?

It would seem as if in prosperity they were more honourable, in adversity more needful.

In adversity they are a comfort to us; they share our load of grief and, by sharing it, make it lighter to bear, and their very presence, being a delight to us, drives away part of the pain. And yet a good man in adversity will view their presence with mixed feelings. Though he is pleased to see them, he is grieved that the sight of his sufferings should cause them pain, and will be careful to inflict as little pain upon them as possible. Above all he will eschew encouraging them to make lamentation with him, for he is not fond of making lamentations himself.

In prosperity the society of friends adds to our pleasure, and their delight in our good fortune adds zest to our own.

These considerations will furnish us with a code of rules for the uses to which we may put our friends.

We shall summon them eagerly to share our good fortune, reluctantly to witness our misfortunes. When they are in adversity we shall voluntarily proffer our services, but shall be shy of intruding ourselves on their prosperity, lest we seem to be seeking for favours. Still, if good offices are offered us, we shall not decline them, lest we seem, as sometimes happens, discourteous. In the ordinary course of life—as distinct from either prosperity or adversity—what friends chiefly desiderate is constant intercourse. Above all, men seek the participation of their friends in those interests and those pursuits, which they deem the most important and to which they chiefly devote their lives.

And thus it comes about that, while the intercourse of the evil ends only in confirming them in evil, the friendship of the good carries with it increased encouragement and greater strength in the performance of virtue.

TRANSLATION.

X.—THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF FRIENDS

(Continued).

iv.—Disputes in Friendships of dissimilar aims.

In all friendships, prompted on the two sides by dissimilar motives, it is the principle of proportion that places the two friends on an equality and maintains the friendship, as has been already stated; just so, in the sphere of civil intercourse, the shoemaker gets for his shoes a proportionate return according to their worth, and so does the weaver, and so do all other artificers. In these cases, however, there has been provided a common measure in the shape of coined money, to which all these different products are compared and by which they all are measured. But in love affairs it sometimes happens that the lover will complain because, though he loves to distraction, his love is not requited; and yet it may well be, that he has nothing loveable about him. On the other hand the object of his affection will often grumble because, though formerly the lover made all kinds of promises, he now performs nothing. Now such cases come about, when the one loves the object of his affection for the pleasure he gives him, and this latter loves his lover from interested motives, and neither the one nor the other gets what he desires. For since the friendship was prompted simply by these motives it drops through when these objects are not gained; it was not their friends themselves that the two severally loved, but certain attributes they possessed, which attributes are not enduring; consequently the friendships are not enduring either. But the friendship that is based on character, which is essential, is, as we have already said, lasting and permanent.

1. Quarrels occur where one or both fail to get a proportionate return.

2. When they fail to get the return they severally wish for,

Another cause of quarrel occurs when friends get by way of recompense something different from that on which they have set their heart; it is almost as bad as getting nothing at all, when

one does not get what one desires; we see this by the case of the tyrant and the harp-player, the tyrant promising to reward him, and the better he played, the more he promised him; but when in the morning he came to ask for the fulfilment of his promises, the tyrant answered he had repaid him pleasure for pleasure (the pleasure of hope for the pleasure of enjoyment). Now if each of them had wished for pleasure, this would have been all very well; but if, as was actually the case, the one wanted pleasure and the other gain, and the one got what he wanted and the other did not, the result of the transaction could not be satisfactory. What a man happens to want he sets his heart upon; and it is to get this and nothing else that he is ready to give what he has to give.

3. Or get some different return from that on which they have set their hearts.

Let us continue to speak about friendship, and state what we have to say in addition to our previous remarks. In friendships based on equality friends should repay one another equal amounts, but in friendships where the friends are unlike one another, proportionate amounts, as has been already stated. It is proportion that sets friends on an equality in all civil transactions. The cobbler gets for his shoes not shoes, but their worth, that is a proportionate amount of some other commodity, as has been explained at length in the 5th Book; the same is the case with the weaver and all similar artificers; for this is what maintains civil relations, the giving and receiving of proportionate amounts, according as one is in need and another has a superfluity. In civil transactions money serves for a common measure, to which all commodities are referred, and by which we estimate the amounts to be given and the amounts to be received. But in moral and friendly relations there is no common measure by which dissimilar services may be estimated. For this reason such connexions are always liable to disputes, as is the case with love affairs.

Sometimes the lover will find fault with his darling, because, though he loves to distraction his love is not requited, he being, very likely, not deserving to be loved; accordingly the darling on his side will often find fault with his lover, because he formerly promised him everything, and now accomplishes nothing. Now such cases occur when the one is prompted to love by pleasure, the other by interest, and then the one does not turn out agreeable, the other does not turn out profitable; for as the friendship was prompted by these considerations it is broken off, when they are not realised. The two did not love each other, but each other's attributes, which, being in their nature transitory, destroy the friendship also along with them when they fail. But those who love one another, and one another's characters, as is the case with the good, are steadfast in their friendship. They love each other for their own sakes and for nothing else; and remaining true to themselves they preserve the friendship at the same time.

And friends of unlike character also quarrel when they get from their friends something else than what they desire. It is as bad as getting nothing when one does not get what one wishes for; this was seen in the case of the tyrant, who promised the minstrel that the better he sang the more he would give him, and when the minstrel asked the next morning for what he had promised him, said he had given him pleasure for pleasure. If then each of them had wished for pleasure, the transaction would have been perfectly satisfactory; but if, as was the case, the one wanted enjoyment, the other gain, and if the one got what he wanted and the other did not, the result of the transaction could not be satisfactory. For it is to get what he wants that every man is ready to give what he happens to possess.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR FIXING THE AMOUNT OF THE REPAYMENT IN THESE CASES.

But whose business is it to settle the amount to be repaid—the original giver's or the original receiver's? It would seem as if the original giver entrusted it to the other, and this is what they say Protagoras actually did. For when he gave any instruction, he used to bid his pupil determine the value of the knowledge he had acquired, and used to accept that amount in payment. But in such cases some like the principle

1. Sometimes the giver leaves it to the receiver to settle the value of the service *after* he has received it.

"Let the labourer get his stipulated hire."

But those who take their money beforehand and then fail to do what they said they would, on account of the extravagance of their promises, are justly liable to reproach, as they don't perform what they had agreed to do. But this is what the Sophists are, perhaps, compelled to do, as no one would give them money for the knowledge they have actually acquired. Such, then, as they fail to do what they received their payment for, are justly held in reproach.

2. Sometimes (as is done by the Sophists) a fixed payment is insisted on in advance.

Again, in those cases where there is no agreement as to the service to be performed, those who perform services for their friends' own sakes are, as we have already stated, not likely to find fault, this being the character of the friendship which rests on virtue. But the return must be made in accordance with the intention of the donor, as befits a friend and virtue. And the same, it would seem, should be done to those who impart philosophy; the value of this cannot be measured in money, and no adequate price can be given for it. We should repay them, I presume (and this is sufficient), all we can give, just as we do to the gods or our parents.

3. Sometimes the repayment will be confessedly inadequate, but the best the receiver has to give.

But, if the gift is not of this character, but is made for a stipulated return, the return made should be, if possible, such in amount as seems fair to both sides; and, if this cannot be secured, then it would seem not only necessary that the original receiver should settle the amount, but just as well; for if the other gets from him an amount equivalent to the benefit received, or the amount which he would have been prepared to give for the pleasure he has received, he will get from him what is

4. As a general rule the original receiver will have to fix the amount to be repaid, and it is fairest he should do so.

fair. This is what also seems to occur in purchases. In some countries there are laws forbidding suits for the enforcement of voluntary contracts, on the ground that, where one man has trusted another, he should settle with him on the same terms on which he entered into the transaction. The law further considers that it is more fair that the man in whom trust has been reposed, should settle the terms of repayment, than that the man who trusted him should do so. For in most cases those who have a thing do not value it at the same as those who wish to get it; each is inclined to think his own goods and what he has to give very valuable. Any way the return made will be that which the original receivers fix. But they ought, perhaps, not to value it at what it appears to them to be worth, when they have got it, but at what they would have valued it before getting it.

Only he should fix it at the amount he would have given before he received the service.

Thus, then, in these friendships of diverse motives it is proportion and a recognition of merit that is looked for. Still it is a question whose business it is to settle the proper requital, the original giver's or the original receiver's. It is urged the original giver seems to entrust the receiver with settling the proper return as was Protagoras' custom. He used to take payment from those who went to him for instruction, not fixing the amount himself, but bidding them estimate what they thought the knowledge they had acquired, was worth, and then accepting that amount. But in such transactions some are contented with the words of Hesiod—

"Let the man get his fitting reward."

But mercenary folk, who enter into such arrangements on business principles, ask for more than this, and sometimes also when they have got their money, and have promised that they will repay it in kind at once, they fail to repay it and perform none of the things they undertook: and they are justly found fault with, because their promises outrun their performances. For this reason the Sophists, also, do not give lessons until they have received the fee for their instruction, because no one would in any other case have given them money for the things they have learnt from them, as they are worthless; having promised to teach great things, they thus get their pay, and end by teaching most worthless stuff. These, then, since they fail to do that for which they have been paid are justly liable to reproach.

In those transactions in which there is no agreement as to the return to be made, or the service to be rendered, those who benefit their friends unselfishly and sacrifice their own property for the sake of their friends, which is the case with the good, we have already said, are uncomplaining. This is the character of the friendship which rests on virtue; and the return must be made in accordance with the *intention* of the benefactor; for this is the distinguishing feature alike of friendship and of virtue, as has been explained above. Such too is the character of the intercourse based on philosophy; the teacher of philosophy does not ask from his pupil either money or honour to a definite amount, nor can there be any adequate requital for philosophy either in money or in honour; but he looks to the will of his pupil; he considers the service and the return adequate, if the disciple does the best he can: and this is also the nature of the claim that the Gods and our parents have upon us. Those, then, who gratify their friends unselfishly measure in this way the amount of the requital to be made.

But those who perform a service for a stipulated reward, whether they do so for

interest or for pleasure, will give such an amount and will receive such a return, as may seem fair to both of them. In this way it will be brought about that their intercourse shall be free from all reproaches. But if this cannot be effected and they cannot both agree on the proper return to be made, but one or other or both of them object, the returns must necessarily be regulated in accordance with the decision of him who receives the benefits. For, if the one says that he is willing to give so much for such and such a service, and the other renders that service on these terms, the one will give what he agreed that he would give, and will repay the service by giving pleasure or some other advantage, while the other is precluded from grumbling since he has got what he judged it fair that he should get. This is not only necessary and relieves the transaction from all trouble, it is also fair as well. For if a man gets what he wishes, no injustice is done him; and this seems to be the way in which matters are regulated in buying and selling; the purchaser fixes the price and measures it by the profit, or the pleasure the article will bring to him, and says the thing he wishes to buy is worth so much to him. In some countries moreover there is a law, that no suits shall lie for the enforcement of voluntary contracts, and that the parties shall not have recourse to any other judge in such covenants, or any other law, than the terms of the contract; but as a man has trusted his neighbour and has given him his goods on trust, he must finish the transaction on the terms of his original agreement. Such nations consider it more just that he who has been trusted in the first instance should settle the amount of the return than the man who has trusted him. Otherwise, he who trusted his companion, will decide for the receiver, but no one is a trustworthy judge in his own cause. For as a general rule, each thinks that what is his own, and what he has to give, is worth a great deal. But he who in the first instance was trusted to settle the return for the benefits he received, even though subsequently the man who parted with his goods to him, give him trouble on the ground of being inadequately recompensed, can still judge aright if he carry out the original conditions which the other assented to and he agreed upon: for he will not do what he now thinks right after having received the service, but what he valued it at when he had not yet got it.

v.—Questions of casuistry stated and solved.

(*a*) QUESTIONS STATED.

There are a number of cases in which it is doubtful who has the prior claim upon us.

The following kind of questions are also attended with difficulty. Ought a man to give up all to his father and obey him in all things, or, when he is sick, obey his doctor, and when voting for one to serve the office of general, vote for the man most skilled in war? Similarly, should a man do a service to a friend in preference to a good man, and repay his benefactor a kindness in preference to giving money to a comrade, if it be impossible to do both?

Thus much on these points. But we must look also into the following questions. Must we give all things and obey in all things our most honoured and our dearest ones, or are there some things which we shall give to those less honoured and less loved in preference to those who are more honoured and more loved? For instance, shall we obey our father in all things, whatsoever and whenever he command us, or not always? but, when we are sick, obey our physician, when we are at war, obey one fitted to command? And ought we to vote for as general not our friend nor our father, but one who is skilled in war?

In the same way to which of the two ought we to do a service, our friend or a good man? And should we do a favour to our comrade or repay our benefactor and one to whom we may owe a debt if it is not possible to do them both a good turn?

(*b*) EXACT ANSWERS ARE IMPOSSIBLE.

Such cases of casuistry are too numerous and intricate to be *exactly* solved.

Is it not the case that to determine this class of cases *exactly* is by no means easy! They are subject to all kinds and varieties of difference in magnitude and pettiness, in point of honourableness and imperativeness.

Now to settle all such cases individually and exactly is not easy. They are subject to all kinds and varieties of difference and they differ from one another variously in magnitude and insignificance, in honourableness and necessity. They are not all of them equally small or great, honourable, or necessary. Sometimes to tend a friend seems more imperative than to tend a good man, sometimes it is more honourable to do a service to a benefactor than a friend, sometimes the reverse; hence it is not possible to lay down an exact rule on each one of these points.

(*c*) TWO GENERAL RULES STATED.

1. Don't give everything to the same individual.
2. Repay your debts before you give away.

But that we ought not to heap all things on the same individual is clear enough. Also we should as a rule repay benefits rather than confer favours on our comrades. For instance we should repay a debt to the man to whom it is due rather than make a present to a comrade.

This is plain at any rate, that we should not give all things to the same individual, but *as a rule* it is more just to repay our benefactors the benefits they have conferred upon us than to gratify our comrade, for instance we should repay a debt to one who has lent us money, rather than make a present to a comrade.

(*d*) EXCEPTIONS STATED AND CONSIDERED.

1. A father may have superior claims even to a debtor.

But, perhaps, not even this always, for instance if a man has been ransomed from robbers should he ransom his ransomer, whoever he may be, or should he repay him, if he has not indeed been captured but asks for repayment, or should he not ransom his father in preference? (Surely this latter) for it would seem as if one should ransom one's father even before oneself. As has been already said, then, though generally speaking we should repay a debt rather than bestow a favour, yet if the gift surpass the repayment of the debt in honourableness or obligatoriness, we must incline rather to it: for sometimes it is not even fair to requite a favour, as in the instance where one man does a

favour to another knowing him to be good, while he to whom the return is to be made is, as he believes, a bad man. Sometimes we are not even bound to repay a loan by another loan. A bad man knows very well that if he has lent his money to a good man he will get it back again, but the other has no expectation of getting his back from a bad man (and is not, therefore, bound to lend it). If this is in truth the case, the claim is no longer an equal one; if it is not the case, but the one holds it to be the case, still we shall not consider his conduct strange.

2. Cases in which the repayment of favours is not obligatory.

But I say as a *general rule*, because it may happen that the opposite course of conduct is the more just. For instance, supposing a man to have been ransomed from robbers, is he bound to ransom his ransomer whoever he may be, in return, or to repay him, if he has not been captured but asks for the money back again, or to ransom his father? Surely the latter, as it would seem that he should ransom his father even before himself. Therefore it is that we said that as a *general principle* and *as a rule* we should pay a debt rather than gratify one whom we love. But if the gratifying our friends is so necessary or so honourable as to outweigh justice to our benefactors, we must incline rather to that side, since it is not always just even to recompense our benefactor if that benefactor be a bad man: for instance if a bad man has lent money to a good man, the good man will not be bound to lend money to the bad, for the one lent his money with the full knowledge that he would get it repaid, but the good man having no expectation of getting it back again does not act unjustly in not lending it. Whether then the good man is right in thinking about the bad man that he will be evil also in this, and so refuses to return his favour, he acts reasonably in refusing to advance the loan; or if this is not the case, but he still thinks that it is, and consequently does not requite him by an equal service, in this case also he does not miss justice by much. For it is not fair that whatever a bad man gives a good, this he should also get from him. The gift of the bad man is not equal to that of the good, even though each does the same service to the other. The good man's gift becomes the greater by the reputation of the giver. Therefore it is that we have said, we must not always repay our benefactor in preference to conferring favours on our friends.

(*c*) THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE IS 'RENDER TO ALL THEIR DUE.'

As we have often already said, discussions about feeling and actions admit of precise definition only to the degree to which the subject matter of which they treat, admits it. That, then, we must not give the same service to all alike, and that we must not give everything to a father, any more than we must sacrifice everything to Zeus, is obvious enough. But since parents and mothers, comrades and benefactors have different claims upon us, we must render to each their due. And this is what men seem actually to do. To marriage feasts they invite their relations; since they are bound by the tie of a common race they naturally take

Rules on this, as on all other moral subjects, cannot be laid down with precise accuracy.

Generally speaking, different classes have different claims upon us. Relatives are called in on occasions of family interest.

their part in all acts connected with it; for the same reason men hold that relatives above others should attend funerals.

Parents are entitled to support and to honour;

Parents would seem, thus, to have a special claim upon us for maintenance since we owe to them our own; and those who are the authors of our being it is more honourable to provide for in this way even than to provide for ourselves. And honour too should be paid to parents as to the Gods, only not all honour. Father and mother for instance have not a right to the same honour, nor to that which we pay a philosopher or our general, but to that which befits a father and to that similarly which befits a mother. To every elder we should pay the respect to which their age entitles them, by rising up in their presence, making way for them at table and in other similar matters. Comrades on the other hand and brothers have a right to plainness of speech and to share our goods with us. To relations, to fellow-tribesmen, to fellow-citizens, to all others we must ever try to give their due, and seek to determine what properly belongs to each in respect of relationship, virtue or usefulness. When the claims are of the same sort, the decision is comparatively easy, where they are different in kind, it becomes more difficult, still we must not on this ground shrink from making it, but decide to the best of our powers.

Elders to respect;

Comrades to frankness and openhandedness. Every class has its own special claims,

and these are sometimes found to conflict.

As we have often remarked in our previous discussions, statements about feelings and actions must correspond to the feelings and actions, varying from time to time as they do. And it is not possible to give a precise and exact answer on every point.

That we must not give the same things to all, nor everything to a father, as we must not sacrifice everything even to Zeus, is obvious. But since we owe one kind of duties to parents, a different kind to brothers, and a different set to benefactors and to comrades, we must render to each their due and what properly belongs to them. And this is what almost all men seem actually to do: to weddings they invite not their benefactors nor their intimates but their relations; for, as their race is what they share with them, they call on them to participate in acts which have reference to it; and they consider that relatives are especially bound to attend the funerals of relations for the same reason.

It would further seem that we are bound to provide support for our parents, for them even before ourselves. Children are bound to maintain their parents in existence, as they themselves derive their own existence from them. And we ought also to pay them honour as we do to the Gods—yet not all honour nor honour of every kind. Father and mother are not entitled to the same honour, and to neither of them should we pay the honour due to the philosopher or the general—that I mean which we naturally pay to these two; but to a father we should pay the honour due to a father, and to a mother the honour due to a mother. And we should further render to every elderly person the respect due to their age; a young man for instance should show his respect for an old one by rising up in his presence, making way for him, and in many such

ways. To comrades and brothers we should manifest frankness and readiness to impart, and so to relations, fellow-tribesmen, fellow-citizens, and all the rest. And we must try to give to each his due, taking into account the relationship in which each stands to oneself, or his usefulness, or his virtue, and measuring by these the honours and the intimacy to which we should severally admit them.

Where the claims are the same in kind the decision is comparatively easy. What we ought to give to different relatives, or fellow-tribesmen, or fellow-citizens, or any others who are similarly related to us, we shall easily discover. But when the claims are various and diverse, to settle what we should render to each is a task of more difficulty. Still we are not entitled for all that to abandon the claims of equity, but we must decide in each case as best we can, and in respect of all we must observe the conduct which propriety dictates.

vi.—Questions relating to the dissolution of Friendships.

(*a*) CASES WHICH JUSTIFY A DISSOLUTION OF FRIENDSHIPS.

Difficulties too surround the question whether we should or should not break off our friendship with those who no longer continue to be what they were. Where men are friends on grounds of interest or of pleasure, it seems perfectly natural that they should part company when these motives no longer exist. It was by their interests or their pleasure that they were bound, and where these fail, it is natural that their affection should come to an end. But a man would have a right to find fault if a friend while really loving him for profit or for pleasure should profess that he loved him on the score of character. For as we said at the commencement of the discussion, the most fruitful source of dissension is when men imagine they are friends on different grounds from what they really are. When, then, a man has deceived himself and considers that he is loved on the score of his character, while his friend did nothing of the kind, he has himself to blame for it; but when he is led astray by his friend's profession he has a right to find fault with him who has deceived him, even more than with the issuers of counterfeit coin, inasmuch as the ill deed touches a point of more vital interest.

1. In friendships of pleasure or interest the friendship comes naturally to an end, when pleasure or interest is no longer promoted by them.

2. Friendships fall through where a man has been deceived as to the motive which prompted the friendship.

We have still the following point to investigate—should we or should we not break off friendships? For it is matter of discussion whether in certain cases, where our friend still continues to feel affection for us and to love us, we should by our own act bring the friendship to an end.

Now our sentence is that when men are friends on grounds of interest or pleasure, it is not unreasonable for them to separate, when they no longer afford each other the one or the other: if the pleasure or the profit come to an end, which was what they really cared for, it is quite natural that they should no longer feel affection.

But when those who really love from motives of interest or pleasure pretend that they love on the score of character and goodness, and are convicted of dissolving the friendship on such unworthy grounds, they are guilty of a wrong and are justly subject to reproach. For as we said at the commencement of the discussion, those friendships are sure to be full of complaints, where the two are not loved and do not feel affection on the same grounds and in a similar way, and do not think that they are loved in the way in which they actually are loved, but are deceived. For then when the deception is laid bare, they find fault with one another. When, then, a man is deceived and thinks that he is loved on the score of character, though his friend does nothing of the kind, nor says anything which befits one who feels affection on that ground, he should by good right blame himself for the mistake he has made; but when he has been led astray by his friend's pretence, he has a right to find fault with him for having led him astray, even more than with those who issue false coin, inasmuch as the ill deed touches more precious interests. Such then are the grounds which justify those, whom pleasure or profit makes friends, in breaking off their friendships.

(*b*) CASES WHERE CHANGES OF CHARACTER LEAD TO A DISSOLUTION OF FRIENDSHIP.

3. If a friend turn out a bad man, that is sufficient cause for breaking off the friendship,

But if one man admit another to his friendship supposing him to be good, and that other turn out evil and show himself to be such, is the first bound any longer to love him? Is it not impossible for him to do so, since it is not everything that commands affection, but only the good? The evil neither commands love nor ought to do so; for we ought not to be lovers of evil nor to make ourselves like the evil. But we have already said that like is friend to like.

but every effort should first be made to reclaim him.

Should we then at once cast off the friendship? Surely not, except with those who are incurable in their wickedness. If they can still be reclaimed, we are bound to help them to recover their character even more than their property, inasmuch as to do so is more excellent and more properly a work of friendship. Still he who does break off his friendship cannot be regarded as acting unreasonably, as he was never a friend with the man in the character which he actually bears. Since, then, he is unable to reclaim him now he has altered, he parts company with him.

4. If again one greatly advances in virtue the other remains stationary, their friendship naturally comes to an end.

To take next the other case of the one continuing as he was and the other greatly improving, so that there comes a wide interval between them in virtue, is the second bound to treat the first as a friend, or is it impossible for him to do so? The question will be best answered by looking at an extreme case; such for instance as where the friendship was contracted in childhood. If in this case the one were to remain a child in intellect, the other were to develope into a man

of the noblest kind, how could they continue to be friends, when they neither take delight in the same pursuits, nor are pleased or pained by the same circumstances. Indeed they will no longer find any pleasure in one another, but without this it is impossible, as we shewed, for them to be friends, for they cannot live together. But this point we have already discussed.

Ought the one, then, to treat the other exactly as if he had never been his friend? Should he not rather keep in mind their former intimacy? And just as we think that we ought to do favours to friends rather than to strangers, on this same principle we should give something to those who *have* been our friends on the score of previous friendship, that is to say where the friendship has not been broken off on account of extreme wickedness.

Still the one is bound to retain a kindly recollection of their past intimacy.

But if one man love another for his character and admit him to his friendship supposing him to be good, but that other should turn out evil, or should appear to his friend to do so, is the first bound to continue to love him or may he break off the connexion? We conclude that it is not possible for one to be loved who does not seem good. It is goodness that commands love, badness has not even a right to do so; for no one has a right to be a lover of evil, nor to assimilate himself to the bad; but if he loves it, he is bound to grow like it, for we have already said that it is like that is friends with like.

Should we then break off the friendship at once? Ought we not rather not to break it off at once with all, but only with those who are incurably bad? With those who may still be cured of their disease and set right we must not break off our friendship, but must use all diligence to help them to regain their character and to preserve their virtue for them even more than their property. Virtue is more excellent than property, and to help one's friends in respect of this is more truly an act of friendship than to guard their wealth for them. If, then, he who has the power is bound to ward off poverty from a friend's substance, much more is he bound to join in the recovery of his virtue, all the more as it is especially appropriate in him to do so, since it is with a view to virtue that they are friends. The better course then is to continue to love one's friend even when he has grown evil and to seek to restore him. Still if a man should break off the friendship at once, he is not thought to act unreasonably. He made friends in the first instance not with a bad man but with a good, and in ceasing to love one who is no longer good, he does wrong to no one; if then he is unable to recover the good man who has altered, he gives up his friendship with him. Supposing then our friend who was good to become evil, this is how we must act in breaking off our friendship.

But if of two friends one should grow very much better than he was, and should greatly alter in point of virtue, the other should remain as he was—should the good man treat the other who is not such, as a friend? or is it not possible for him to do so, but must he break off the friendship? The matter becomes plainest where the interval is very great. For suppose two children to be friends, drawn together by similarity of age, by living together and by sharing one another's amusements, and when they come to men's estate the one should turn out good and be a man in all things, and the other should remain with a child's character to the end, how can they be friends, if they neither take pleasure in the same objects, nor are pained or pleased at the same things? No; one will not even find pleasure in the other, as neither has anything by the doing of which he can conciliate and give pleasure to his friend. And further they will not even be able

to live together; yet without these things friendship cannot be maintained, as we have already said.

Should the good man then be disposed to the other exactly in the way he would have been, if he had never been his friend, or should he not rather bear in mind their former intimacy? And as we think that we are bound to oblige our friends in preference to strangers, on the same principle are we not also bound to do more for those who *have been* our friends than for those who have never been so? We ought, therefore, it would seem, to recognise some obligation on the ground of previous friendship, unless that friendship has been broken off for flagrant wickedness.

XI.—EXAMINATION OF DISPOSITIONS ALLIED TO FRIENDSHIP.

i.—Of Self-love.

(*a*) CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF FRIENDSHIP.

Friendship is defined—
(1) as wishing well and doing well to one's friend,
(2) as wishing for one's friend's life and health,
(3) as living together and following the same pursuits,
(4) as sympathising in one's friend's joys and griefs.

Now our different friendly relations to others, and the various characteristics by which friendships are defined, seem to have been derived from a man's feelings to himself. Men define a friend as one who wishes and does good, or what appears to him good, to his neighbour unselfishly; or as one that wishes for his friend's own sake his friend's continued existence and life—(this is the feeling that mothers entertain for their children, or friends that have had a quarrel for one another); others again represent him as one who passes his time with his neighbour, and follows the same pursuits; or as one who sympathises with his neighbour's sorrows and joys. This is a feature again which is most frequently to be seen in mothers. It is by one or other of these attributes that friendship is defined.

Such, then, are the grounds on which friendships may be properly broken off. But we have still some points we may discuss about friendship itself. The relations of friendship and the attributes by which friendship is constituted would seem to have a kind of measure and starting-point in the duties which a man owes to himself. Friends expect from one another what a man does for himself.

Consequently they define a friend as one who wishes and does good to his friend for that friend's own sake, or as one who wishes for its own sake for his friend's continued life and preservation, which is the feeling that mothers have for their children; for they wish for their children's own sake that they should live and prosper, since often, even though they may not be loved by their children or even known by them, they still pray for their happiness and prosperity: this too is the feeling of friends, who have had a quarrel or who have been slighted, but who yet, as far as they are concerned, continue to cherish their previous affection; they wish their friends all good, without hoping to participate in this good themselves, just for their friend's own sake. Others again define a friend

as one who sympathises with his friend in sorrow and in joy, which thing again is what mothers beyond all others do in the case of their children. From one or other of these things the definition of friendship is derived, being drawn from the definition of those who exhibit the characteristics in the same way as the definition of the temperate man furnishes us with the definition of temperance. Such then are the definitions of friendship and of friends. But they are taken from the duties owed by a man to himself, as has been already said.

(*b*) A GOOD MAN IS HIS OWN TRUE FRIEND.

Now each of these characteristics is to be found in a good man's relations to himself, while in all others they are to be found just so far as they consider themselves to be good. Virtue and the good man seem, as we have often said, a kind of measure of what each should be.

These characteristics are all realised in a good man's relation to himself.

First, the good man is at unison with himself and desires the same ends with every part of his soul; so too he wishes for himself what is good and what impresses him as such, and does good to himself; it is the special trait of the good to labour for that which is good and on his own account: for he does this for the sake of his intellectual nature, and this is held to be most properly himself. He wishes too for his own continued life and preservation, and most of all for that of his thinking part; for existence is good to a good man. Yet it is for himself that each wishes good, and no one chooses to become something other than he is and that that new self should have everything, (he cannot, therefore, wish even to become God), for though God has even now the good, still it is by being that which He is. But 'thought' would seem to constitute a man's personality, or to constitute it more than anything besides. Such an one wishes, moreover, to pass his time in his own company; he does this with pleasure, as the memories of his past deeds are delightful to him and his hopes for the future are good, and such memories and such hopes are pleasant. He has besides plenty of objects of contemplation for his intelligence. And he sympathises with himself in sorrow and in joy; the same things are ever pleasant, ever painful to him, not one thing now, another then, for he has, as we may say, nothing to repent of. Seeing, then, that each of these characteristics is to be found in the good man in his relations to himself, and seeing that he is affected to his friend as to himself—a friend being a kind of second self, friendship is, therefore, thought to consist in one or

(1) He is at one with himself, and wishes and does good to himself,

(2) he wishes for life and preservation for himself,

(3) he takes delight in his own society,

(4) he sympathises with himself in sorrow and in joy.

other of these things, and a friend to be one in whom these dispositions are to be found.

What a true friend is to his friend, that in all respects is a good man to himself; and the good man and he who thinks himself good is in the truest sense a friend to himself. The fact that this cannot be said of all, but the bad are no true friends to themselves, does not bear upon our present argument. What the good and the excellent do is what is properly distinctive of man and of our common nature. It is virtue and the good man that are the measures of what feelings and what acts are proper to our human nature; the objects which the evil seek are not regarded as proceeding from our human nature. For a decision on such points we go not to those who are sick but to those who are whole. But that a good man does perform all the offices of friendship to himself is plain. In the first place he is at unity with himself and desires the same objects in respect of both his rational and his irrational nature and does not, like the man, lacking in self-restraint, seek conflicting objects, while his feelings are at war with his reason. Secondly the good man wishes what is good for himself, both those things which are really good and promote virtue, and also those things which appear good as being aids to virtue. Moreover he wishes what is good for himself for that self's own sake, while the bad man, if he wishes it at all, wishes it not for his true self's sake. It is his intellectual nature that makes man man, and it is for the sake of this that the good man does all things and seeks all good things, but the bad man does nothing for its sake. The bad man takes as the end of his acts, not pure contemplation but evil pleasure, and so he does not wish good for himself for that self's own sake. Thirdly the good man wishes also for life and preservation for himself, and most of all for the continued existence and preservation of his intellectual nature, and he does everything which he thinks good for himself and which contributes to his existence and preservation. But of the rest those that are not wholly perverted from the right, but are so circumstanced as to be able to imagine themselves good, seek also themselves what seems good and wish for life and preservation for themselves. But they are enabled to do this, because they are to some extent like the good. But they who are thoroughly bad and workers of unhallowed deeds are not in this condition. They do not follow after what seems good, but their wishes lead them in one way their desires in another. This is the condition even of the self-controlled, but much more is it the state of those who are prevented by cowardice or sloth from doing what they think to be best for themselves. They, therefore, neither pursue what seems to them good, nor wish for themselves life and preservation. Some there are who from the many evil deeds that they have done have become objects of detestation on account of their exceeding wickedness, and they fly from life and make away with themselves. But the good man does wish for himself to live on, as existence is a good to the good man; for he pursues the life of contemplation, as the personality of each consists in thought, or in this more than in anything besides. But he who wishes existence and preservation for his irrational nature and wishes good for a self which has deviated from its proper nature, cannot be said to wish good for himself, but for that into which he has been perverted. Moreover each wishes good for himself, expecting to remain what he is at present; but if he were to be conscious that he had passed into something other than he was, he would not choose that that altered self should be possessed of all good things; one might just as well wish good to some one else, as to one self when entirely altered. But no one is content that some one else should have everything that is good, for granted that all good things are even now the lot of God, still He too is that which He is, whatever that may be. Consequently we are not content, but we go on praying that goods may be granted to ourselves or to our friends, to our friends because they are in a way our second selves. Once more, the good man also wishes to pass his life in his own company, as he is self-sufficing and pleasant withal to himself; he takes delight in remembering by himself what he has done and in hoping that he will still do good things and that good will befall him, and he has besides an abundance of noble objects

for his thoughts to contemplate. All these things make him most agreeable to himself, and he takes pleasure in his leisure moments in being alone with himself and in his own society.

(*c*) BUT A BAD MAN IS HIS OWN WORST ENEMY.

The question however whether a man can or cannot have friendship for himself may be dismissed for the present. It would seem as if he could have it so far as two or more of the above conditions are fulfilled. This is also confirmed by the fact that friendship, when pushed to its greatest length, becomes like the feeling a man entertains for himself.

Thus a good man may be said provisionally to be friends with himself.

But the traits we have mentioned look as if they were to be found in the majority, bad though they be. Is it not the case, though, that they are to be found only so far as the majority are pleasing in their own eyes and consider themselves to be good? In the case of the wholly bad at any rate and workers of unhallowed deeds they are not to be found at all, and don't even appear to be so. They are scarcely to be found at all, even in the bad. Such are at variance with themselves, their wishes pointing in one direction, their desires pulling in another, as is the case with men of imperfect self-control; such choose, in place of what they themselves recognize to be good for them, what is pleasant indeed but harmful, while others of them are induced by cowardice and by sloth to abstain from doing what they really consider to be the best for themselves. Those once more by whom many dreadful deeds have been done and whose wickedness has made them objects of detestation, come to hate life itself and make away with themselves. And bad men seek companions to pass their time with and shun their own company. Disagreeable memories crowd in upon them when they are by themselves, and they have only what is disagreeable to look forward to, while when they are with others they forget their troubles; having nothing to draw forth affection in them they are conscious of no affection for themselves. Thus also they do not rejoice in their own joys nor grieve over their own sorrows: their soul is at strife with itself; part of it is made by its evil nature to grieve over the enjoyments which it is denied while the other part of it rejoices, part of it pulls in this way the other part in that, dragging the man, as it were, asunder. And if it so be, that it is not possible to be pained and pleased at one

Yet this is true only so far as men either are, or think themselves, good.

The hopelessly depraved don't even seem to be on friendly terms with themselves, but rather to loathe themselves.

While all the bad alike shun as far as may be their own company.

and the same moment, then we must say that after a very little while the man is pained that he was pleased, and would not wish, if he could help it, to have found such things pleasant to him; for the bad are full of regrets.

We conclude, then, that the bad man does not seem to be friendly disposed even to himself, because he has nothing in him to call forth affection.

But the evil want companions with whom to pass their time and shun their own company; when they are by themselves, unpleasant memories crowd in upon them, unpleasant expectations haunt them; and they forget them when they are with others. Once more the good man more than others rejoices and grieves in sympathy with himself, because his wishes and his desires are at one and his rational nature is not at variance with his emotional. For this reason the same thing is ever painful to him, the same thing ever pleasant, for he is unchangeable as far as may be. The evil are not thus. They have nothing in them to call forth affection and so feel no affection for themselves. Consequently they do not sympathise with themselves in joy or in sorrow. Their soul is at strife with itself, and the irrational nature wars against the rational; the irrational nature is grieved at having to desist from what is evil, but the rational nature does not then share in its grief but is pleased. So is it also in the opposite case. And generally speaking the one part pulls in one direction, the other in the other, dragging the soul asunder. And if we have to admit that it is not possible to be pained and pleased at one and the same time, then we shall say that after a little the soul is pained because just now it was pleased, for it did not wish that such a pleasure should have been felt by it. The evil are full of regrets. It appears, then, that the bad man is not friendlily disposed towards himself, as he has nothing in him to call forth affection.

(*d*) PRACTICAL EXHORTATION.

But if to be in such a condition as this is very miserable, we must earnestly shun vice, earnestly try to be good. In this way a man will be at once placed on a friendly footing with himself and be made a friend with his neighbour.

Goodness will make a man friends with himself and with all the world.

If to be in such a case is the height of misery we must shun wickedness with all diligence and strive each one of us to be good and excellent, for by these means we shall be placed on a footing of friendship alike with ourselves and with our neighbours. Seeing, then, that what a man does to himself he should do for his friend likewise—for one ought to love one's friend as oneself—the friend being a second self—it is plain that what the good man wishes and does for himself, these are the obligations of friendship and in them friendship consists.

But the question whether the love a man has for himself is, or is not, friendship, may be dismissed for the present. Friendship implies two or three, as is clear from what we have already said. If a man chooses to call a man's relation to himself friendship, it may be regarded as friendship so far as there are different parts in man and the feelings are at peace with the reason. Moreover, because friendship in its most perfect form approaches the love a man has for himself, this latter also may be called friendship.

ii.—Goodwill.

(*a*) DIFFERENCE OF GOODWILL FROM FRIENDSHIP AND FROM AFFECTION.

Goodwill is a kind of friendly disposition and yet it is not friendship. It can be felt towards strangers and without being recognised, friendship can not be. This indeed has already been insisted on. Yet it is not affection either. It has no impetuosity or emotion, but these are the concomitants of affection. And affection implies intimacy, whereas goodwill may be conceived on a sudden, which is what happens in the case of combatants in the arena. The spectators grow well-disposed towards them and wish them success, though not prepared to help them. For, as we have said, men become well-disposed on a sudden and feel a liking in a superficial way.

Goodwill differs from friendship in being felt towards strangers, and without being recognised;

from affection in having no intensity and not implying intimacy.

Goodwill is like friendship, and yet is not friendship. We feel goodwill for those with whom we are not friends, and goodwill may spring up towards a stranger and without the knowledge of the object of it. But this is not possible in the case of friendship, as we have explained above at greater length.

Thus goodwill is not friendship; it does not even seem to be affection. Affection implies a certain impulse and movement towards the object of it. But goodwill is not of this character. The well-disposed wish good to those to whom they are well-disposed, and yet do not seek their company. And again, affection implies intimacy, as it is brought about only by time and intercourse, whereas goodwill may come all on a heap (if one may use the expression,) on those who experience it; which is the way with spectators and the combatants in the arena. The spectators grow well-disposed towards the combatants as soon as they see them winning and give them their good wishes, but they are not prepared to help their efforts, as they have no affection for them from having loved them long and intimately, but were pleased with them the moment they saw them, and so their love is only superficial, and this is the character of goodwill.

(*b*) RELATION OF GOODWILL TO FRIENDSHIP.

Now goodwill seems to be the originating cause of friendship in the same way as pleasure in the sight of a person is the originating cause of love. No one feels love who is not first pleased with his darling's outward form; and yet he who does take pleasure in another's beauty does not for all that fall in love unless he comes besides to regret his darling's absence and to feel a desire for his presence. In the same way it is not possible for men to be friends without becoming first well-disposed to one another, and yet the well-disposed are not for all that friends. They only get

Goodwill is the germ of friendship,

as far as wishing good to those to whom they are well-disposed, but are not prepared to help them in their efforts or to give themselves trouble on their account.

Hence we might speak of it by a metaphor as inert friendship; yet when it has gone on for a good time and has passed into an intimacy it developes into friendship, friendship of the true kind, not friendship prompted by either pleasure or interest, since goodwill itself does not rest on these. He who has been benefited returns goodwill for the benefits he has received and is right in doing so, but he who wishes to do another a kindness, only in the hope of being enriched by his neighbour, would seem to be well-disposed not so much to his neighbour as to himself; just as a man would scarcely be reckoned a friend, if he serves his neighbour with a view to his own profit.

but requires time and intimacy to mature it into friendship, after which it becomes true friendship,

So as a rule goodwill is felt on account of virtue and kindliness in cases where one man impresses another as noble or brave or something of the kind, as we illustrated by the case of combatants in the arena.

as it is itself called forth by the sight of nobility and excellence.

Thus then goodwill seems to be the beginning of friendship in the same way as pleasure in the sight of a person is the beginning of love. And just as it is not possible to fall in love without first being charmed by the fair form of the loved object—though you may be charmed without falling in love, for you can only be said to be in love when you miss your darling, if absent, and eagerly desire his presence—in the same way it is not possible for two to become friends without being first well-disposed to one another, but they may be well-disposed without being friends. For the well-disposed wish good to those to whom they are well-disposed, but are not prepared to actively help them or to put themselves to trouble about them. Consequently one might speak of goodwill in metaphorical language as inert friendship, for when time has passed over it and it has grown into intimacy it developes into friendship.

And friendship not for interest nor for pleasure's sake, but friendship which rests on goodness. One man becomes well-disposed to another on account of virtue or excellence, when the one appears noble or brave in the other's eyes, or something of the kind. Whereas he who wishes to do another a good turn for the sake of pleasure or profit is not really well-disposed to that man but to himself, just as he is not a real friend either. In the same way he who wishes good to his benefactor because he has received benefits from him, will be properly speaking well-disposed, but as he is only doing what is just and repaying gratitude for benefits he has received, he seems to be rejoicing not in his friend's excellence but in his own goodness.

We conclude then that goodwill is neither friendship nor affection but a beginning of friendship; but that when coupled with time, intimacy, and the other requisites for friendship, it grows into friendship, friendship too of the kind which rests on goodness and virtue.

iii.—Unanimity.

(*a*) ITS PROVINCE DETERMINED.

Unanimity also has a friendly character, and this is what distinguishes it from mere coincidence of opinion. This latter might be found among those who are complete strangers to one another. Nor is it customary to speak of those who are of one mind on some special subject, as for instance about the movements of the heavens, as unanimous, for to be unanimous on such points has nothing friendly about it—but we do talk of states as unanimous, when they are of one mind about their interests, and adopt the same line of policy and follow out a common course of action. So that it is on matters of practice that men are unanimous, on practical matters that is to say of importance, and such as concern both parties or all alike. States for instance are unanimous when all the citizens agree that offices should be elective or to make an alliance with the Lacedemonians, or to put Pittacus in power so long as he also wished it himself; but when each one of the citizens wishes to rule in his own person, as is represented in 'the Phanissæ,' then they fall out. For unanimity does not consist in each wishing for a particular thing for himself, but in all wishing to see it in the same hands. For instance, the people and the upper classes are unanimous when they both wish the best men to be in office, as in that case all alike may get what they desire.

Unanimity differs from mere coincidence of opinion,

being coincidence of opinion on *practical* matters, and points of common interest,

Unanimity also has itself a friendly character and generally accompanies friendship. Unanimity consists not in holding the same views or in mere coincidence of opinion. Such coincidence of opinion might be found among those who are absolute strangers to one another, as there is nothing to prevent their holding the same views on the same subjects and having the same knowledge of the same points, even though they know nothing of one another. But unanimity exists only between those who are associated together and are on a footing of friendship. We speak for instance of states as unanimous, when they are of one mind about their interests and agree upon and carry out the same line of policy.

Unanimity is, then, a coincidence of view in friends, a coincidence of view not on theoretical but on practical matters, and on practical matters of consideration and importance. For in respect of trifles neither states, nor friends, are spoken of as unanimous. For instance we do not talk about men being unanimous about staying at home or going to the market, or doing or saying anything from which no great benefit or harm is likely to result. On all these and such like points no one would say they were unanimous.

But we do use the term where the matters, are important and to the interest of both the friends, or of the state at large: for instance when the whole state is agreed that its magistrates should not be returned to office by lot, or succeed in rotation but should be regularly elected, or when it is agreed to conclude an

alliance with the Lacedemonians, or to do anything else which is important and which makes a difference to the state at large. In the same way we speak of friends as unanimous when they adopt the same course of life and are agreed as to their highest interests and shun and pursue alike whatever tends to the hurt and to the advantage of both of them. For those who are to be unanimous must not only seek the same objects, but also seek them in the same way in all their bearings. For instance if both of two friends are agreed that one or other of them should be the guide of the other's life, but they should not agree as to which of the two, but each should wish to take the office on himself, then they would not be unanimous; for in that case, though they have the same object in view, they yet do not wish it to be realised in the same way. And in states also all the citizens will be unanimous in their choice of magistrates, when either all choose the same individual, or all choose the best men, and not each one himself, as Euripides represents them as doing in the Phanissæ. In this latter case a result is not arrived at which pleases all, and consequently there is not unanimity. But when all do get what they desire, then they are unanimous.

(*b*) FORMAL DEFINITION OF UNANIMITY.

and so may be defined as a kind of 'political friendship.'

It appears thus that unanimity is 'political friendship,' and this is the acceptation of the term in ordinary language. It has reference to our interests and all that concerns the general tenor of our lives.

Thus, then, unanimity is a kind of political friendship, and this is the ordinary acceptation of the term. Its province is practical matters and what concerns our interests and the general tenor of our lives, all which fall under the sphere of 'social science.'

(*c*) DEPENDENCE OF UNANIMITY ON VIRTUE.

'Tis the good alone that are unanimous,

Now unanimity of this kind is to be found among the good. They being, if one may use the expression, 'given up to' the same objects, are of one mind with themselves, and with one another. Their wishes are fixed and constant, and do not ebb and flow like the Euripus; and their wishes point to what is at once just and expedient, and their desires are shared in by all of them alike.

the evil are suspected and suspicious of one another.

But the wicked cannot be unanimous, except to a very limited extent, any more than they can be friends; for they have their heart set upon covetousness where their interests are concerned, while, where toil and voluntary services are in question, they lag behind. When each wishes for advantages for himself, he keeps his eye on his neighbour's doings and thwarts them; for if they don't watch one another, the common interest suffers. The result is that they are ever quarrelling, as they are exacting on one another but are not themselves willing to do their fair share.

Unanimity is to be found among the good, they are of one mind with themselves and with one another, being given up, if one may so say, to the same objects. The wishes of such are fixed and stable and do not ebb and flow and shift about like the Euripus, and they wish for what is at once just and expedient and all alike desire it.

But the evil cannot be unanimous—except to a very limited extent—any more than they can be steadfast friends, as they have their heart set upon covetousness and each seeks to get for himself a larger share of whatever is profitable, while in labours and in voluntary services undertaken in each other's behalf they are ever seeking to get out of them; and each holding it is his due to have little trouble but great advantage is for ever calling his neighbour to account, and exacting from him the full amount of voluntary service and hindering him from enjoying his advantages as much as he likes, considering them too great for him, while he gives him his full share of disagreeable tasks. The result is that having no eye to the public advantage, but each an eye to his own, they quickly fall out, for they snap what holds them together, and that is a sense of community of interest and unanimity. But when the tie that holds them together is snapped they can no longer be united. The result is that they quarrel, as they demand friendly offices from one another but are not themselves prepared to do what is just. So it comes about that among the bad there can be no unanimity, but only among the good.

iv.—The relation of Benefactor and Recipient.

(*a*) DIFFICULTY STATED.

Now benefactors seem to love those they have benefited more than the receivers of favours love those that have done them; and this fact as being something paradoxical is made a subject of speculation.

Why do benefactors love the recipients of their favours better than these recipients love them?

We must now proceed to investigate the following point—why it is that benefactors love the recipients of their favours more than they are themselves loved by them. The point attracts attention as being contrary to what we should naturally expect.

(*b*) POPULAR EXPLANATION OF THE DIFFICULTY.

The popular explanation is, that it is because the one are in the position of debtors the other of creditors; as, then, in the case of regular loans, debtors wish that those to whom they owe the debt should cease to be, while the creditors are ever anxious about the safety of their debtors, in the same way benefactors wish that the recipients of their kindness may continue to live, that thus they may get back favours from them, while these don't specially care to repay what they have received. Epicharmus would, perhaps, maintain that in saying this they are regarding human nature in a dark light; still it is human nature to act thus, for the majority *are* forgetful of kindnesses and more anxious to receive than to do good.

The popular explanation is that the two stand to one another in the relation of creditor and debtor.

The majority say that the reason why benefactors feel the greater affection is the same as that which makes creditors also love those to whom they have lent, even though they are not loved by their debtors. They who have made a loan wish the safety of their debtors and promote it in every way in order that they may get their money back again, but the debtors have no such feeling with respect to their creditors. These would be willing that their creditors should cease to exist, considering that they will be better off by being thus relieved of their debt. The same is the case, they maintain, with these. Benefactors, they say, wish that the recipients of their kindness should live and be kept safe, supposing that they will thus get a requital of their favours, whereas the parties benefited do not greatly desire the safety of their benefactors. For men do not so much care to repay kindnesses as to get them repaid. This is what appears to the majority the cause from looking at ungrateful and evil men and, as Epicharmus says, from viewing human nature on the dark side. Yet such is human nature. The majority are ungrateful, and more anxious to receive kindnesses than to do them.

(*c*) A DEEPER EXPLANATION OFFERED.

Yet the cause would seem to lie deeper in nature, and not really to be explained by the case of those who have made a loan. In their case there is no question of affection but a simple wish for the preservation of their debtors in order to get back their money; on the other hand those who have done a service do feel friendly to and love those who have been benefited by them, though they are of no advantage to them and never may be so. The same phenomenon is to be observed in artists; every one of them loves his handiwork more than he would be loved by it, were it endowed with life. Perhaps this is most conspicuously the case with poets. They love to distraction their own poems, doting on them like children. Very like this is it with benefactors. The person benefited is their handiwork, consequently they love him more than the handiwork loves its producers. Now the reason of this is that existence is desirable to and valued by all. We exist in being active, that is, in living and doing. So that the creator of a work finds in a way his existence actualised in the work he has made. Therefore he loves his work because he loves existence. And this is only natural. For what before is only potential, this the work stamps as actual.

Yet deeper reasons are to be found, for—
1. The benefactor loves the recipient of his favours like any artist loves his handiwork,

the artist finding in his work his own personality actualised and intensified.

At the same time to the benefactor the doing of his act is honourable, and so he takes pleasure in that in which this finds its sphere, but to the recipient no sense of honour accrues from the transaction, but at most profit. This latter is less pleasant, less desirable. Moreover while of the present it is the actual

2. The benefactor enjoys the sense and the memory of honour won.

existence that is pleasant, of the future the hope, of the past the memory, the actual is at once the most pleasant and the most intensely loved. Therefore for the doer of the benefit his work abides, for the sense of honour is lasting, but for the recipient the profitableness soon passes away. The memory too of noble deeds is pleasant, but of advantages gained not pleasant at all or less so, whereas with expectation the reverse seems to hold good.

Moreover loving is like the doing of something, being loved like the suffering of something. Love and friendly feelings are consequently the natural possession of those who are conscious of superiority in their activity.

3. The doer of a kindness has a sense of superiority and that kindles affection.

Once more all feel more natural affection for what is attended with trouble in the getting of it. For instance those who have made their money value it more than those who have inherited it. Now to receive favours is attended with no trouble, to do them is laborious. It is this same reason that makes mothers more devoted to their offspring, because the bearing of them is laborious and they are more fully assured that they are their own. This would seem to be just the position of benefactors as well.

4. The effort involved sweetens the result obtained.

Yet the real cause would seem to lie further back in nature, and not to be explained by the analogy of debtor and creditor. Between benefactors and the recipients of their kindnesses there grows up a real affection, but between creditor and debtor there is none. The creditor does not *love* the debtor but *merely* wishes for his safety, and that simply on the ground that he may recover his debt and get back his money. But those who have conferred benefits love and have a regard for the recipients of them, even though they are not serviceable to them and may never become so. This is also the case with artists. Every one of them loves his handiwork more than he would be loved by that work were it to be endowed with life. Above all others is this so with poets. They love their own poems to distraction, doting on them as if they were their children. Something in this same way is it with benefactors also. They who have been benefited by them are to that extent their work and, therefore, they love them more than their work does them. The reason of this is that existence is desirable to and loved by all. Now we exist most perfectly when we are active; and we exist in an active way by living and doing. So he who works is in a way made actual in his work. Architecture, for instance, which is the science of building, is actualised in a house. And the house itself, so far forth as it is a house, is the workman made actual, so far forth as he is a workman. In the same way every one who works is identified with his work in its actuality. If then it is natural to desire existence, and existence consists in acting and the work is the agent himself in his actuality, it is clear that in so far as everyone seeks for existence for himself, so far he seeks also the existence of his work; but it is natural for every man to love himself and to wish for his own existence; it is natural, therefore, for every man to love his work. But since a man loves himself best and since each loves *his own* work best, he will also love best the object of his kindness, in so far as he is his own work. For this reason, he will love him more

than this latter loves his benefactor. For the greatest affection one can feel is that which one feels for oneself. A further reason is that the benefactor improves himself by doing the kindness, and it is *a good* to him to do the kindness, consequently he takes pleasure in the object of it, because in him he sees his own good. But the recipient is not improved by receiving the kindness, nor does he find any good in the benefactor—for it is by what he does himself that a man is made better—since the good of man consists in active employment, as we explained in an earlier Book. Thus if the recipient finds any good in his benefactor it is not in the shape of good to himself but of advantage; and advantage is not so pleasant or so estimable as goodness. Goodness is what advantage has for its 'end,' and it is on account of goodness that advantage is pleasant or estimable at all. The result is, the benefactor loves the recipient of his favours more than he is loved by him. Again both the actual presence, the hope, and the memory of the good are pleasant, the actuality of its presence and occurrence, the hope of it in the future, the memory of it in the past. Yet good, when present, is more pleasant than when still future or when past, and the object of his kindness is a present good to the benefactor, for goodness abides and is enduring, and this is what the benefactor contemplates in the recipient; but the goodness of the recipient is not enduring: it consisted, as we saw, in advantage and so passed away with the advantage; nor is it properly speaking goodness at all: and consequently even if both were present, the good of the benefactor would be the more pleasant, or if both were past, the recollections of the benefactor would be more pleasant than those of the person benefited, inasmuch as the memory of goodness is pleasant in the highest degree, but the recollection of advantage not pleasant at all or far less so. With the expectation of advantage the opposite is the case: it is more pleasant than the recollection of good things which have passed away. It would seem, then, that on this ground too the benefactor would love the recipient of his favours more than he would be loved by him.

Once more, loving is like the doing something, being loved like a passive state. To those, then, who actively *do* deeds of friendship (that is clearly to the benefactors,) loving comes more naturally than to the recipients.

Once more, we dote upon and love more what has come by toil than what has been got less easily. This is why those who have made their money love it more than those who have inherited it. Now to receive favours involves no effort, it is a work of difficulty to do them. To receive favours is the part played by the person benefited, to do them by the benefactor. On this ground also the person benefited is more loved than his benefactor.

For this same reason mothers are more devoted to their children, because they have had labour in bearing them, than children are to their mothers—for their part has been only to be born; and mothers know better that the children are their offspring, than the children know that their mothers ushered them into life. All this seems to suit also the case of benefactors. For not only do they undertake what is laborious on behalf of their clients, but they also know better that it is they who do the service, than the recipients know that the service is done by them. For it is quite possible that the benefactor confers the favour not on his own responsibility but as the agent for another, and consequently is not himself the real author of the favours at all; or it may be, that, though he confers the favour at his own prompting, still he does not do it for the sake of the person benefited but for his own sake and with a view to profit. This too makes the recipient not feel absolutely sure of his benefactor. On the other hand nothing prevents the benefactor knowing perfectly the object of his favours, since he is absolutely sure of himself that he is a true and real benefactor. So on this ground in addition to the others the benefactor loves the recipient of his favours more than he is loved by him.

v.—The relation of self-love to love of friends.

(*a*) CONFLICTING VIEWS AS TO THE CHARACTER OF SELF-LOVE.

A question is raised moreover whether one ought to love one's self or one's neighbour best. On the one hand men blame those who love themselves best and call them 'lovers of self' as a term of reproach, and the *bad* man is thought to do everything with a view to himself, and the worse he is to do this the more completely. So men blame him because he does nothing without reference to himself. But the good man is held to act from a sense of nobility, and the better he is the more does he act from that motive and for the sake of his friend, and the more ready is he to neglect his own interests.

Self-love is both blamed and praised. On the one hand it is pointed out that it is the bad, who have an eye to their own interests.

Yet with such statements as these facts are at variance, and that not without good reason. For men say that we ought to love best him who is our best friend; and he is the best friend who wishes good to him to whom he wishes it absolutely for his own sake, even though no one shall ever know of it. But these conditions are best fulfilled in a man's own relations to himself, while we have here as well all those other characteristics by which a friend is defined. We have already pointed out how all our friendly relations to other men start from our own friendly relations to ourselves. Also all proverbial expressions fall in with this, such as that of friends 'having one soul,' 'having all things in common,' 'friendship's equality,' 'the knee is more than the covering of it.' All these expressions would be found most completely realised as between a man and himself. A man *is* his own best friend, and so must love himself best.

On the other that the love a man bears to himself is the type and origin of all other friendship.

Thus a doubt is raised which view we ought to adopt, since both have so much to say for themselves.

Both views have much to say for themselves.

We should, perhaps, then, distinguish the different senses in which these and similar expressions are used, and thus determine to what extent and in what particulars they are severally true.

So much on this head. But there is another point to be considered—whether one should love oneself or one's neighbour best. On the one hand to love oneself best is thought not to be proper to good men, and for this reason those who love themselves best are blamed and are called 'lovers of self' as a term of reproach. Also the bad man is held to do everything from selfish motives, and so

much the more the worse he is. And he is reproached for this very reason that he seeks nothing more than his own interests but has himself in view in everything that he does. The good man on the contrary does everything from a sense of nobility, the more completely so the better and the more excellent he is. And for the sake of his friend, and in order that he may give to others the means of getting what they want, he is ready to sacrifice his own property. On these grounds it is held that one ought not to love oneself best of all.

Yet with this view the facts of life are at variance, and that not without good reason. Men say that it is proper to love best one's best friend, and he is the best friend who observes all the obligations of friendship to him whom he loves. And the obligations of friendship are to wish one's friend good for his own sake, though no one shall ever know it, and to seek to live with him in preference to all others and to share his sorrows and his joys. Now all these are obligations which a man fulfils to himself; and from a man's bearing to himself his duties to his neighbour have been derived, as was explained in the 4th chapter. And all proverbial expressions testify to this same truth. When men wish to say that men are very great friends, they talk of them as of 'one soul;' and also the saying 'the goods of friends are common' has the same bearing; and 'friendship means equality' and 'the knee is nearer to us than the covering of it.' For if community and equality and nearness constitute friendship, what can be closer to each than a man's self? Consequently a man is his own best friend. But if one ought to love best one's best friend, then one ought to love oneself best.

Since, then, both these statements seem to be true, it is naturally asked which of them we should adopt. We shall find, by distinguishing their different senses and defining them, to what extent and in what sense each of them is true.

(*b*) THE DIFFERENT SENSES OF 'SELF-LOVE' DETERMINED.

Now if we discover in what sense the speakers severally employ the term 'self-regarding,' the difficulty will be, perhaps, cleared up.

The apparent contradiction is explained by considering the different senses of 'self-love' and 'self-regarding.'

Those, then, who use the word as a term of reproach apply the name 'self-regarding' to those who give themselves more than their fair share of money, honours or bodily pleasures. It is on such things as these that the majority set their hearts and spend themselves for them as the best of all things; this makes them also to be the special objects of contention. They, then, who are covetous in such matters gratify their lusts and generally their passions and the irrational principle in their souls. This is the character of the majority. And so the appellation has come to be applied in a bad sense, reflecting the badness of the majority. It is with justice, then, that those who are 'self-regarding' in this sense are reproached.

1. By 'self-regarding,' as ordinarily understood, is meant one who gratifies his own desires at the expense of others.

That it is those who assign to themselves such things as these that the world is wont to call 'self-regarding' is plain enough. For if a man were to be for ever anxious, beyond everything else, to do what is just or what is temperate or whatever

other conduct is dictated by any of the other virtues, and should be for ever seeking to gain true nobility for himself, such an one no one will call self-regarding nor find fault with him.

Yet such an one would seem to be more really 'self-regarding' than the other. At any rate he takes for his own share what is noblest and most excellent, and gratifies the highest part in him and obeys it in all things. And just as in a state or in any other 'system' it is the ruling element in it that most properly constitutes that state or that system, so is it too with man. And he accordingly is most truly self-regarding who loves this part and gratifies this part. Moreover a man is called master of himself or wanting in self-mastery according as his reason has sway in him or not, implying that it is reason which is a man's self. Also they are held to have acted of themselves and voluntarily who have acted most in conscious accordance with the dictates of their reason. That reason, then, constitutes a man's self or constitutes it more than anything else does, is plain; it is plain too that the good man loves this more than anything besides. Consequently he will have a claim to be considered most truly 'self-regarding,' only 'self-regarding' in a different sense from that which is matter of reproach—in a sense as far removed from that other as living by the dictates of reason is removed from living by the dictates of passion, and as desiring true nobleness is removed from the desire of apparent interest.

but (2) in its higher and better sense it is used of one who gratifies his true self, that is his reason and his nobler instincts.

If we consider the meaning of the term 'self-regarding' and the sense it is used in in the two different statements, we shall reach the solution we are in search of. The first statement means by 'self-regarding,' not those who simply love themselves, but, those who seek to get for themselves the larger share, and that, not in goodness or virtue, but in money, honours and bodily pleasures. For it is on these that the majority set their heart, and spend pains upon them as being the best things of all; and this fact makes them also the common objects of contention. Those, then, who are grasping in such matters, gratify their desires and their passions generally and the irrational element in their soul. This is the character of the majority, and for this reason the appellation has been given to such. For names are given in accordance with what *generally* occurs; whereas things of rare occurrence are not unfrequently not named at all, since some of them are not even known. Now the bad and those who assign to themselves things that seem good are many, while the good are few and far between. For this reason the many also, who are bad, get the name of self-regarding, and those who are self-regarding in this sense are with justice reproached. But that the majority do call those who are evilly disposed in the matter of their desires self-regarding is clear enough. For if a man were to be for ever anxious beyond all else to do what is just, or to do what is temperate or to follow out any of the other dictates of virtue, and were for ever seeking to win true nobility for himself, no one will call such a character self-regarding nor will find fault with him. The first statement then means by 'self-regarding' a man who loves himself amiss, and is so far true that one ought not to love oneself in this fashion. But the second state-

ment applies the name to the good man, who is ever seeking to win virtue and goodness for himself, and says that it is he who loves himself best.

Now such an one would seem to be in the more proper sense 'self-regarding.' He does gratify himself, as he gives to the most distinctive element in himself —his rational nature—what is noblest and best. He who gratifies the most distinctive element in himself, that man in the truest sense gratifies *himself*. For just as the highest element in a state is most properly the state, and it is the best of the citizens that most properly constitute it, in the same way the most distinctive of the elements in man is most properly man. And so he too is most truly a lover of himself who most loves this and tries to gratify this. Besides, a man is called master of himself or wanting in self-mastery not simply by mastering or being mastered, but according as the reason rules the passions, or is ruled by them. So that, when reason masters, the man himself is said to be master, but when the passions are masters, he is not said himself to have the mastery, but rather to be mastered. From this it is plain that a man's rational principle is in a special sense a man's self. And he who loves his own rational nature and in every way tries to gratify it will be properly called self-regarding in one sense of the term, but in a different sense from that when it is used as a term of reproach, —a sense as far removed from it as living by the law of reason is removed from living by the dictates of passion, and the desire of good is removed from evil lust.

(*c*) THE EXCELLENCE OF TRUE 'SELF-LOVE.'

Thus 'self-love' should be encouraged in the good, discouraged in the bad,

All are ready to welcome and praise those who are pre-eminently zealous in doing noble deeds. And if all were emulous to win true nobility and were earnest in doing what was noblest and best, all public duties would be at once fulfilled, and each individually would reap the greatest of all possible goods, since this is the result of virtue. And so a good man *ought* to be self-regarding, for he will at once reap advantage to himself by doing what is noble and will benefit all besides. On the other hand the bad man ought not to be so. By being so, he will hurt himself and his neighbours—by following, that is, his evil passions.

since in the one duty and interest coincide, in the other they conflict.

In the evil man then what he ought to do and what he does are at variance with one another, while the good man actually does what he ought to do. For reason ever chooses what is best for itself, and the good man hearkens to the dictates of his reason.

Seeing, then, that all praise and applaud those who are good and excellent, and that all ought to be good (for if all were emulous of true nobility and were zealous to do what is best, every good would be reaped both by the community at large and by every several member of it), it is plain that the good man ought to be self regarding. He will both benefit himself by doing what is noble and will spur others on to do the like. But the bad man has no right to be so. By loving and gratifying himself, that is by following his evil passions, he will do hurt both to himself and his neighbours. In the case of the good, what they actually do coincides with what they ought to do. For a good man identifies himself with his own reason, and reason chooses what is best for itself, and the good obey

and follow reason. But in the case of the bad, their duty and what they actually do conflict. Hence such have no right to be self-regarding, but the others should love themselves as much as they can.

(*d*) COINCIDENCE OF THE LOVE OF OUR NEIGHBOUR WITH TRUE SELF-LOVE.

It is quite true of the good man that he does many things for the sake of his friends and his country, to the extent, if need be, of even dying for them; he is ready to give up for their sake money and honours and all the most coveted goods, thereby reaping for himself a true nobility; for he would choose rather to feel an intense enjoyment for a little while than a poor enjoyment for a long time, and to live with honour for a single year, than to live for many years in an ordinary way, and to do one great and noble act rather than many small deeds. This is, perhaps, what actually happens in case of those who die for others. They choose, in doing so, a great honour for themselves. A good man will be ready too to sacrifice his own wealth, if his friends will get more thereby. For while his friend gets wealth, he gets honour, and so still reserves for himself the greater good. The same is the case with respect to honours and offices; all these he will give up to his friends, as this is honourable for him and praiseworthy. It is thus with good reason that he is pronounced good, as he chooses honour before all else. It may be that he will even surrender the chance of doing noble deeds in his friend's favour, and thus reap the greater honour of being the occasion of his friend doing them, an honour greater even than that of doing them himself.

Thus, while the good man benefits his friends and his country,

he yet wins thereby a more noble reward for himself in the shape of honour and the gratified sense of duty,

It thus appears that in all praiseworthy deeds the good man assigns the lion's share of *honour* to himself.

In this sense one may be 'self-regarding,' as has been already said, but in the popular sense, one should not.

and in this way a man may be rightly 'self-regarding.'

Thus then the true definition of self-love has been determined. And we must now explain the first statement, by which it appeared that the good man is not self-regarding in that he neglects his own interests and seeks those of his friends and his country, in behalf of which he is prepared to die, if need be. That such is the character of the good man is perfectly true. Yet we may not for all this say that he is not in the highest sense self-regarding—nay rather, he is shown by these very things to be self-regarding. He gives up trifling matters to get great advantages, and by throwing away goods of little value he earns for himself the greatest rewards. To his friends and to his country he surrenders wealth, honours and such like things, but for himself he earns a character of honour and goodness, honesty, and patriotism and so on, goods with which those others cannot compare. Yet, even

when he dies for his friends and his country and gives up his own life for them, he still gains more than he gives up. He chooses to feel intensely for a short time a good and praiseworthy pleasure rather than a slight pleasure for a long time. He thinks that it is better for him that his life should be short and filled with great achievements, than that he should live long and not earn such praise —and to do *one* great and noble act than many little ones. This is the more noble course than the other.

Noble deeds too, sometimes, he resigns in favour of his friend, and when he might do them himself, yields to him the distinction of doing them. In this case also he reaps for himself the greater good, since it is more glorious to be the cause of one's friend doing noble deeds even than to do them oneself.

Consequently he is with justice considered to be good, since he chooses true nobility in preference to all besides, and seeks the lion's share for himself only in what is good and excellent.

Thus, then, the good man is shown to love himself best, and on every occasion to get for himself the lion's share of true nobility.

In this way, then, one ought to be 'self-regarding,' as has been already observed, but in the way the majority are so, one ought not. As to the sense in which, then, one ought to love oneself best let thus much be said.

XII.—RELATION OF FRIENDSHIP TO HAPPINESS.

i.—General question proposed and discussed.

There is a question moreover raised, whether the happy man stands in need of friends or no.

Does the happy man need, or not need, friends?

1. Negative argument. If he is happy, he must have *all* good, be self-sufficing, and not require them.

On the one hand it is maintained that those who are perfectly blessed and self-sufficing have no need of friends, for they possess already every blessing. If, then, they are self-sufficing, they can need nothing more, while a friend in the capacity of a kind of second self furnishes what one cannot get for oneself. Hence the line of the poet—

"When heaven showers blessings, what need have we of friends?"

2. Counter-arguments. (i.) He who is to have all good must have friends, the greatest of external goods.

1. And yet it would seem to be strange, when we are granting the happy man all good things, not to grant him friends, a gift which is thought to be the greatest of all 'external' goods.

2. If it is more characteristic of a friend to confer favours than to receive them, and if it is the part of a good man and of virtue to be doing good acts—if, moreover, it is more honourable to do good to one's friend than to strangers, then the good man will require objects for his benevolence. And this is the reason why a further question is raised whether friends are more indispensable in prosperity or in adversity, since in adversity a man requires them to confer

(ii.) He requires them as objects for his benevolence.

favours on him, in prosperity as objects on whom to confer his favours.

3. Perhaps it would be also strange to make the happy man a solitary being, since no one would choose to have all blessings entirely alone by himself. Man is *naturally* social, framed by nature to live in company. Such accordingly must be the condition of the happy man, since he has (*ex hypothesi*) all the goods that nature designs him to have. It is plain also that it is more agreeable to spend one's time in the company of good men and friends than of ordinary men and strangers. The happy man, then, does need friends.

(iii.) It is not *natural* for man to be solitary, and the happy man has all the goods that nature designs him to have.

A question is raised with respect to the happy, whether they have need of friends or no. Men maintain that the blessed who are self-sufficient can have no need of them, for being self-sufficing and so having everything that is good, how can they want anything besides? Friends want friends, to get by their help what they cannot get for themselves, the friend being a second self. But since the happy are sufficient for themselves they have no further need for friends, whence the saying:

"When heaven grants us good, what need we friends?"

On these grounds then it is thought that the happy stand in no need of friends.

But from another point of view it seems strange that, when we are granting the happy man all blessings, we should not furnish him with friends, which are thought to be the greatest of all external goods.

All the more is this the case because the doing of good offices is indispensable to happiness, and the form of it which is at once the noblest and the most extolled is that which is exercised towards friends. So the happy need friends, since they need to exercise the noblest form of benevolence. A friend's most proper province is to do benefits and to receive them, and it is more honourable to do good to friends than to aliens or strangers, who have no connexion with us either on the score of character or citizenship. On these grounds then the happy man does appear to require friends, and this causes the question to be asked whether friends are more needful in prosperity or in adversity. For the unfortunate too needs friends to help and to mend his fortunes, the prosperous man needs them as objects for his benevolence.

It would be strange furthermore to regard a happy man as a solitary being who lives a life apart by himself; happiness is indeed desirable, but no one would choose to be solitary. No one wishes to have all goods to himself, for man is social, and naturally desires to live in company. These characteristics the happy man too possesses, and he wishes to live in company. All the goods which nature designs for man he too possesses. But if the happy man must live in company, it is plain he must live in the company of the most excellent and the most kindred spirits. Such are friends and the excellent; and to live with them is better and is pleasanter than to live with strangers and ordinary men. So the good man does need friends.

ii.—Why the happy are thought not to need friends.

What then is the meaning of the propounders of the first argument, and how far are they right? Is not their contention based on the fact that the majority regard those who are serviceable

to us alone as friends. Now of such the happy man will indeed have no need, because he has all goods secured to him. Nor does he need either friends for pleasure's sake, except to a very limited extent, for his life being pleasant in itself has no need of imported pleasure. And not needing friends of this description he is thought not to need friends at all.

The mistake of imagining that the happy need no friends arises from an unworthy view of friendship.

But we must explain the original arguments, by which it was contended that the blessed have no need of friends. We must point out what they mean and how far they are right. We maintain then that the majority count as friends only those who are useful to them, and consider that friends are loved not for their goodness but for their serviceableness, while sometimes they reckon in those who are loved for the pleasure they give. Such the happy man does not require: not the serviceable, for he has already all that heart can desire; not the pleasant, for his life is pleasant in itself, and he requires no pleasure from the outside.

But not needing such friends as these, he is thought not to need friends who are really friends, who are loved for their virtue's sake and for their goodness.

iii.—That the happy do need true friends.

(*a*) MORAL ARGUMENTS.

Yet this is, perhaps, not true; we stated at the beginning of our Treatise that happiness is a form of activity, and an activity is clearly for ever coming into being, and does not permanently reside with us, as a possession does. But, if being happy consists in living and exerting ourselves, and the active presence of the good is excellent and pleasant in itself, as we explained at starting, and if what is nearly related to us is pleasant; if, once more, we can watch our neighbours better than ourselves, their acts better than our own, the conclusion of all this is that the acts of good men, if friends, are pleasant to the good—they contain both the elements which make them naturally pleasant. We conclude, then, that the happy man will require such friends, since he cannot but choose to contemplate excellent actions which he can claim for his own. Such are the acts of a good man if he be his friend.

1. Happiness, being an activity, is called out by the contemplation of the good acts of our friends.

Moreover, men consider that a man to be happy should live pleasantly, but to a solitary man life is laborious. It is not easy to be active for long, when by one's self; it is far easier when with others and with them to look to. Under these latter circumstances the activity will be more continuous for being in itself pleasant (and this it should be in the case of the happy man), for the good man, in virtue of being

2. The performance of good acts is rendered easier, more pleasant, more constant by the company of the good.

a good man, must take pleasure in acts that embody virtue, while at acts that proceed from vice he feels disgust, in the same way as a musical man takes pleasure in fair sounds, but is pained by discords.

And there will result also a certain practice of virtue from living with the good, as Theognis also says.

3. Good friends encourage one another in the *practice* of virtue.

Yet this is not true, as is plain from the following considerations. Happiness, as we said at the beginning of this Treatise, is an activity, and an activity is constantly in course of being realised and has its essence in 'becoming,' and has not already come into being nor exists permanently, like a possession: nay, rather, happiness consists in living and acting. To be happy is to be living in the practice of virtue and to be doing good acts. But, since such activity is pleasant to the good man, both because it is good and pleasant in itself, as we stated at starting, and also because it suits his character, therefore the contemplation of such activity is most pleasant to the happy man: and we can better contemplate the conduct of our neighbour than our own, and his acts than our own acts: consequently the happy man will best contemplate the actions of his friend, and, if they be good, will be most pleased by them. But if the happy man must experience good pleasure, it is plain the happy man will need friends in this capacity, since he wishes to contemplate good acts which touch him nearly, and this is the character of the acts of a good man, if he be his friend.

Furthermore, all regard the life of the happy man as most pleasant. But the life of the happy man consists in employing his faculties in obedience to the law of virtue. It is easier to employ oneself actively when in company with others, more difficult when by oneself: for this reason a life of solitude is difficult; besides, what is easier is pleasanter than what is difficult, and what is pleasanter is more proper to the happy man. At the same time their activity will be more continuous for being pleasant. And this is appropriate to the happy man to be continuously exercised in virtue. And this in its turn will make his pleasure the greater—as the good man, in virtue of being a good man, finds pleasure in acts embodying virtue, while acts which proceed from vice he loathes; in the same way a musical man finds pleasure in fair strains, but is pained by discords.

But not only will a happy man by living with the good exercise more continuously a disposition which is already his, he will also acquire one he has not yet got, and will enhance the value of that he already has. There will come an increase of virtue from living with the good, as Theognis also says: therefore the happy man *has* need of friends.

(*b*) METAPHYSICAL ARGUMENTS.

And if we look at the matter from a point of view going deeper into nature, the good friend seems *naturally* desirable to the good man.

Looking at the question from a metaphysical point of view, we observe:

Whatever is *naturally* good, we have already said, is in itself good and pleasant to the good man.

1. Whatever is naturally good and pleasant is so to the good man.

Life is defined in animals as a *power* of sensation, in man as a *power* of sensation or of thought; power is relative to the exercise of it, and the distinctive feature resides in such active exercise; so that life in its most distinctive form seems to be identical with sensation or thought.

Now life is one of those things which are essentially good and pleasant (it is definite and distinct, and the definite is of the nature of the good), and whatever is *naturally* good is so to the good man; and for this reason all hold it to be pleasant. (Yet one ought not to take as an instance of life an evil and corrupt life nor one passed in pain —such a life is indeterminate like its attributes are—in the next Book we will clear up further the nature of pain.)

Life, by which we mean a power of sensation and thought, is *naturally* good and pleasant; it is, therefore, good and pleasant to a good man.

But if life in itself is good and pleasant (and it seems to be so from the fact that all desire it, and most of all the good and blessed, since to them life is most desirable and their life the most blessed), and if, further, he who sees perceives that he does see; he who hears, that he does hear; he who walks, that he does walk; and in the case of all other forms of activity, in the same way, there is a something that perceives we are active, so that we perceive that we do perceive and think that we do think; and if, once more, to perceive that we do perceive and to think that we do think is to perceive that we exist —for existence consists, as we say, in perception or in thought;— if again the perception that one is alive is in itself pleasant (for life is naturally a good, and to perceive that one has a good belonging to oneself is in itself pleasant), and if life is desirable, and most of all so to the good, since existence is good to them and pleasant as well (for they take a pleasure in sharing the consciousness of what is absolutely a good); and if, to crown all, a good man feels to his friend exactly as he does to himself, as a friend is to him a second self;—we conclude from all this that exactly as existence for oneself is desirable to each individual, so is one's friend's existence desirable, or very nearly as much so.

But the consciousness which ever accompanies life must be naturally good and pleasant also.

This consciousness must, therefore, be good and pleasant to the good man.

But existence is, as we shewed, desirable because of our consciousness of it as being a good, and such a consciousness is pleasant in itself.

To be happy we should, therefore, share in the consciousness of our friend's existence, and this will be secured by our living with him and sharing with him words and thoughts. For this would seem to be the meaning of 'living together' when spoken of men, and not the mere feeding together, which is all it means when applied to the brutes.

But this consciousness we enjoy in the presence of our friends.

Now if for the happy man existence is in itself desirable, being

as it is, *naturally* good and pleasant, and the existence of a friend counts nearly for the same as one's own existence—supposing, that is, a friend to be a desirable possession: and if that which is in itself desirable *ought* to belong to him, or he will so far fall short of perfect happiness—he who is to be perfectly happy will on this showing require good friends.

This presence, then, must be good and pleasant to the good man,

and so he will require friends in order that he may enjoy it.

Once more this will be seen to be the case if we look at the matter from a more metaphysical point of view. Let us regard it in the light of facts which are not peculiar to the happy man, but extend to all equally. Life is by nature pleasant to all living things; but life may be defined in irrational animals as a power of sensation, in men as a power of perception or of thought. But power is relative to the exercise of it, and the distinctive feature resides in that exercise. If, then, life consists in the *power* of perceiving or thinking, much more does it consist in actually perceiving, actually thinking. Actual perceiving, then, or actual thinking, constitutes life, and life is pleasant in itself and good, most of all because life is a something determinate. But the determinate enters into the nature of the good, as the Pythagoreans also thought; they classed the determinate in the rank, or file, of goods. In the next place it is proved by the consideration that all things desire life, and what all desire is good in itself and pleasant; but when I talk of life, I mean not a bad life or one full of ten thousand misfortunes. Such lives are indeterminate, like the accidents that occur in them. But we will discuss these points when we come to speak about pleasure. Since, then, life is in itself good and pleasant, and each feels delight and pleasure in witnessing in himself anything good and pleasant, therefore we are delighted and pleased by perceiving that we are alive. For we do perceive that we are alive, just as, when we see, we perceive that we see; when we hear, we perceive that we hear; when we walk, that we walk; and when we think or perceive, we know that we think or perceive. But to perceive, or to think, itself constitutes the existence of beings which perceive or think. We perceive, therefore, that we exist, and we have in us a power by which we know that we are active and that we are alive. But if life is a good, and to be conscious of a good in oneself is in itself pleasant, to know that we are alive is pleasant. Seeing, then, that what is naturally good and pleasant is good and pleasant to the good man, the good man will take pleasure in being alive, and even more so than other men, inasmuch as his life is more desirable, more pleasant, more blessed than theirs. He will, therefore, also take pleasure in knowing that he is alive, and, as life consists in thinking, in knowing that he is thinking. Moreover the good man feels to his friend as he does towards himself, for the friend is a kind of second self; it is, therefore, plain that as it is pleasant to him to live himself, to be and to be alive, in the same way he seeks for the existence of his friend—that is, that his friend should think. For existence and life are identical with thought. And as he takes delight in knowing that he thinks, so it is pleasant and agreeable to him to know that his friend thinks. But the knowledge that one's friend is thinking is made actual knowledge, when one knows what he is thinking about, not merely that his mind is active. This will be attained by living with one another, sharing in each other's reasonings and thoughts. This is the sense in which we talk of men 'living together.' To be in one and the same place is not to 'live together,' as we talk of beasts living together when they feed in the same pasture. To be in the company of friends, then, is desirable for the good man, and pleasant. But that which is desirable for him, this he ought to possess. If not he will so far be deficient, and this is opposed to the idea of happiness. The man, therefore, who is to be happy will require good friends.

iv.—The number of Friends desirable. Their number must necessarily be limited.

(*a*) GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SUBJECT.

Must we, then, make as many friends as possible; or, as it would seem to have been well said in respect of hereditary connexions,

It is not possible to have more than a limited number

> "Neither a man of many guest-friends nor yet wholly without them."

so too in the case of friendship will it befit us to be neither without friends, nor to be given to many friends over much? Now as far as friends for advantage are concerned, the saying would seem to be thoroughly applicable. To return the services of many is a matter of difficulty, and life itself is not long enough to effect this. So that more than are required to meet the needs of our own proper life are superfluous and a hindrance in the way of living nobly. There is, therefore, no need of them. And of friends for pleasure few suffice, like a little flavouring in food. But in case of the good, should we make friends with the greatest possible number, or is there a limit to the number of friends, as there is a limit to the size of a state? A state cannot be made out of ten men; when extended to ten thousand men it ceases to be a state any longer. The exact number which constitute a state is not, perhaps, any single quantity, but anything that comes between certain assignable limits. So too of possible friends there is a certain permissible number, the superior limit being, perhaps, represented by the number with which it is possible to live as a permanence; for this is, as we saw, the most essential thing in friendship.

of friends for profit's sake,

nor of friends for pleasure's sake, no, nor of friends on grounds of virtue.

But since the happy man does need friends, we must inquire whether he should make friends with as many as he possibly can, or whether—as in the case of hereditary connexions, it has been said well and justly that a man should neither be without guest-friends nor yet guest-friend with all the world—so in the case of regular friendship too it is reasonable that he should neither be without friends nor yet friends with the whole world.

We may begin by observing, that since friendship is divided into three kinds—one having profit for its object, a second pleasure, a third goodness and virtue—of friends for pleasure or for profit's sake our needs are limited, most of all of friends for profit, because a man can help only a few in what they want, and to do services to many is laborious, particularly if they happen to be superfluous, and should expect to be treated with undue attention.

Of friends for pleasure's sake a limited number suffice, because only a little pleasure and relaxation is necessary in life, just like a little flavouring in cooking.

But of good friends, who love us on grounds of virtue and goodness, the

happy man will require more. Yet there will be a limit even to them. For just as there is a limit to a state, and a state can neither be made out of ten men, nor out of ten thousand, for such an aggregation of population would cease to be a state any more, so our friends too must be restricted, and a certain limit must be set to them. And just as in the case of a state the exact amount of its citizens cannot be determined, and you cannot state the precise number which a state may properly have, but only fix a number which it is not to exceed and a number which it is not to fall short of, and take all that lies between these limits as the number the state *may* possess—in the same way in the case of friends it is not possible to name a precise number, but they may be as many as a man can comfortably live with. To live with one's friends is, as we saw, the most essential condition for friendship.

(*b*) PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS WHICH LIMIT THE NUMBER OF OUR FRIENDS.

The reasons why it is not possible to live in company of many, and to divide oneself among them, are obvious enough. It is further needful that they should also be friends with one another, if they are to pass their days in one another's society. This is a condition which it is difficult to have fulfilled, where many are concerned. It is difficult moreover to feel real sympathy with the sorrows and the joys of many at once, as it is very likely to happen that, at one and the same time, one would have to be feeling joy with one, and sorrow with another. Perhaps, then, it is as well not to seek to be as widely friends as possible, but to limit one's friendship to the numbers one can comfortably live with. It would seem not even to be *possible* to be *very* close friends with many, any more than it would be possible to be in love with many. Friendship has a tendency to run into intensity, and this intense friendship can be felt for but one at a time, and close friendship with but few.

(1) Only a limited number can keep friends with one another,

(2) our powers of sympathy are limited,

(3) friendship tends to grow into an intense feeling like love, and so its range is limited.

That it is not possible to live with a large number and to divide oneself among them is clear enough. We ought besides to pass our days in the company of our friends. If they are very many, this becomes irksome in the extreme. Further, we ought to feel close sympathy with their sorrows and their joys, and this again becomes difficult if one has many friends. For when they are many, some of them will be experiencing joy, others sorrow at one and the same time, and a friend should be portioning himself out to both of them, and this is matter of difficulty. Perhaps, then, it is as well not to seek to be very extended in one's friendships, but to admit only so many to our friendship as we can live with and pass our days with and share in their sorrows and their joys. But to treat many in this way is not possible, any more than it is possible to be on a footing of loving friendship with many. The position of lovers is friendship pushed to an extreme, and consequently can be experienced only towards one at a time. In the same way, in the case of friendship that rests on virtue, it is not possible to love many dearly, and to observe all the obligations of friendship in respect of them, but it is possible to treat a few in this way.

(*c*) VERIFICATION OF THE POSITION FROM FACTS AND EXPERIENCE.

And this seems to be the case in the facts of actual life. Large numbers do not bind themselves in the ties of comradeship, and the friendships of renown, of which poets sing, have been between two only. Those who have a wide circle of friends, and strike up an intimacy with any one, are thought to be true friends with no one, to be at most on terms of 'civility.' Such are called complaisant.

1. The relation of comradeship embraces only a few.
2. The most renowned friendships have been restricted to two.

Nay, on these terms of 'civility' you *may* be friends with many, and that without being complaisant, but from real goodness of heart. But on grounds of virtue and for their own sakes you cannot be friends with many. You must be thankful if you can find a few such friends.

3. While you can be 'civil' to a large number, you must be content to find few true friends.

These considerations are confirmed by the facts of experience. Large numbers do not enter into the ties of comradeship, and the most celebrated friendships of this character are said to have been formed between only two.

Those who are friends with the whole world and strike up a friendship with all they come across, and in words and deeds seem to give each one of the citizens his precise due, have a proper and true friendship with no one, but may be called friends in respect of what is called 'civil' friendship. Of these some are complaisant, seeking to gratify all they are thrown with. About them we have spoken in a former book. Others are good, and have regard to truth and virtue in their conversation. They are called friends from the likeness of their behaviour to friendship, and they are praiseworthy—they come intermediate between the complaisant and the disagreeable, both of whom are blamed, as was shewn in the eighth chapter of the 4th Book. Any one may find many of such friends as these, but of real friends we should be grateful if we find even a few.

v.—The Uses and the Treatment of Friends.

(*a*) THE ADVANTAGES OF FRIENDS IN PROSPERITY AND IN ADVERSITY COMPARED.

Are friends more needful in prosperity or in adversity? We require them under both circumstances. Those who are in misfortune require assistance, while the prosperous need friends to live with and as objects for their kindness, since they have a wish to be doing good. In misfortune they are more indispensable, and therefore under these circumstances we require serviceable friends. In prosperity it is more honourable to possess them, and so in that case we seek out the good. The good are the more desirable objects for our benevolence, the more desirable company to live with.

Friends are more necessary in misfortune, more honourable in prosperity.

But since the prosperous and the unfortunate have alike need of friends, we must inquire under which circumstances friends are more needful. The unfortunate require the assistance which is to be got from friends, and the prosperous require companions to live with, and objects for their benevolence. They are anxious to be doing good, and it is necessary to their happiness.

In a certain way the unfortunate has more need of friends than the good man, in another way the prosperous has the greater need. The one on account of their indispensableness, the other on account of their honourableness. You must understand that friends are more indispensable to the unfortunate than to the prosperous.

(*b*) THE USE OF FRIENDS IN ADVERSITY.

The presence of friends is by itself pleasant even in misfortunes; those who grieve have their griefs lightened by friends sharing in their sorrows. And so it might be asked whether they do not bear, if one may so say, an actual part of the burden, or whether it be that their presence being pleasant and the sense of their sympathy with our grief make the grief less. The question, however, whether it be for this reason or for some other that a man's load is lightened by the presence of friends may be dismissed; in any case the fact is as we have stated it.

The sympathy of friends is a comfort in misfortune; it lightens the load of grief.

Still their presence seems to give rise to mixed feelings. On the one hand the sight of friends is pleasant, most of all when one is in misfortune, and is an assistance against giving way to grief. A friend is comforting both by look and by word, if he be a man of tact, as he knows our disposition and what gives us pleasure or pain. On the other hand, to see our friend grieved at our misfortunes is painful, for every one hates being an occasion of grief to a friend. For this reason manly characters are careful how they summon their friends to share their griefs, and unless they be superior to their friends in the power of withstanding grief, do not suffer the pain of the sight of their misfortunes to be given to their friends; and as a rule he does not call in others to make lamentation with him, because he is not inclined to make lamentations himself. On the other hand weak women and men who are like them delight in having others to groan with them and love them as sympathising friends. Yet we need scarcely remark, 'tis the better man's example we should follow in all things.

Still a brave man cannot but regard their presence with mixed feelings.

He will give them no unnecessary pain,

nor does he encourage them to make lamentations.

The very presence of friends is pleasant, even in misfortunes. Those who grieve have their grief lightened by their friends sharing their sorrows. For this reason a question may be raised, why it is that the sight of our friends grieving

with us is an alleviation of our griefs. Grief is thought to be a kind of burden which is lightened by being shared with one's friends. Yet this is not really the case. The fact is that the presence of friends and the sight of their sympathy with our grief being pleasant, make the grief less, for pleasure drives out pain. However, whether it be for this or for any other reason that our griefs are assuaged, we may forbear to ask for the present. In any case, that those who grieve are comforted by the presence of friends is obvious.

Yet it would seem that the good cannot take unmixed delight in their friends grieving with them, and that this pleasure is not without alloy—rather they grieve over it in part. In itself the sight of friends is pleasant, most of all to the unfortunate, and we find in them assistance against yielding to grief. A friend is comforting—the very sight of him and his words, if he be a man of tact. He knows his friend's character, what he is pained at, what he is pleased with, and so can easily comfort him.

In this respect, then, the presence of friends is pleasant. On the other hand the seeing one's friend pained at our misfortunes makes his presence to that extent painful. For every one finds it painful to be the cause of pain to one's friends. Consequently manly characters are very careful how they invite their friends to share in their griefs, and unless the consolation gained be great and for the greatest misfortunes, and the pain caused to them, if they do share their griefs, small, they cannot bring themselves to make their friends partakers of their own troubles, and in any case they do not desire those who will make lamentation with them, because they are not themselves given to wailing, but bear up bravely against their ills. But weak women and womanly men take absolute pleasure in having people to groan along with them and love them as truly sympathetic friends. Still we should imitate not these but the manly, for in all things we should follow the better example. In this way then friends are a help to the unfortunate.

(*c*) THEIR USE IN PROSPERITY.

In prosperity the presence of friends enables us to pass our time more pleasantly, and gives us the sense of their being pleased at the blessings we enjoy.

In prosperity we value them on two grounds—as companions to spend time with, and as partners in our joy.

In prosperity the presence of friends is pleasant in two ways: first because it is most pleasant to pass our time with our friends just because they are our friends; secondly because we see them rejoicing at the blessings we enjoy, and this is the highest proof of goodwill.

(*d*) GENERAL DIRECTIONS FOR OUR CONDUCT TO OUR FRIENDS.

Accordingly it would seem that we ought to be forward to call in our friends to share our good fortune (for it is honourable to be forward to do kindnesses,) but to hesitate before summoning them to share our misfortunes—for we should impart our troubles to others as little as may be—and hence the saying of the poet,

(1) Be eager to invite your friends to share your good fortune,

(2) be slow to invite them to share your misfortunes,

"I am enough to be unfortunate."

Most readily may a man summon them, when at the cost of slight grief to themselves they may do him great service.

Contrariwise, one ought to go to one's friends in adversity unsummoned and of one's own accord. It is a friend's business to do kindnesses—most of all to those in need, who have not requested our services. It is more pleasant and more honourable for both. Further, one should be ever ready to join in promoting a friend's prosperity—as it is for this that friends are needful, but one should be loath to put oneself under obligations to one's friend, as it is not honourable to be eager to be helped. Still one should, perhaps, be on one's guard against the appearance of discourtesy in repelling such offers: for this sometimes happens.

(3) be ready to visit your friends in adversity, be slow to visit them in prosperity,

(4) be ready to help your friend, be slow to receive favours from him, yet not to the extent of discourtesy.

We have thus shown that the presence of friends is desirable under all circumstances.

Summary.

Seeing, then, that we grieve when we make our friends partners in our misfortunes, rejoice when we share with them our prosperity, it would seem that we ought eagerly to invite them to be spectators of our good fortune, but to be slow to do this in our adversities. To do good offices is honourable, but we should make others as little as possible partakers of our woes. Accordingly also the tragedian says, 'I am enough to be unfortunate.' One ought not to fill one's friend with one's own private woes. Then, most of all may we summon our friends to share our griefs when they can greatly relieve our distress at slight pain to themselves.

Contrariwise, however, friends ought to volunteer good offices to their friends when in misfortune, if free from misfortune themselves. One ought to seek out the unfortunate unasked and of one's own free will. It is a friend's part to do good offices, most of all to those in need who make no request. This is more pleasant and more honourable for both parties—for those who give and for those who receive. When affairs are prospering with them we should go to our friends, and should be ready to help and abet them in securing their prosperity. We should have more scruple in accepting favours at their hands. It is not honourable to show eagerness to be assisted. But if we show zeal and energy in assisting our friends, we should perhaps not reject or thrust aside their offers of services, lest we should seem to be discourteous to our friends. For this is sometimes the case.

vi.—Of the society of Friends.

Is it not the case, then, that just as lovers take special delight in the *sight* of the objects of their affection, and take more delight in the perceptions of this sense than in any of the others—love having its being and originating cause in sight more than in any of the other senses—in the same way fellowship is more delightful to friends than anything besides? Friendship means a community of interests, and one should feel towards one's friend as one does towards oneself. But in one's own case the consciousness that one exists is desirable, so too therefore is the consciousness that one's friend exists. But this consciousness

Constant intercourse is essential to friendship.

only becomes actual by their living together, so it is with good reason they desire this. Moreover, in whatever the existence of each is most truly centred and with a view to whatever in particular they severally desire to live, in this above all they seek for their friends' society. Hence it is that some drink together, others play dice together, others join together in the sports of the gymnasium, or hunt together, or philosophise together, each passing their time together in those particular occupations which they love best of all those that fill up their life. Wishing to live a common life with their friends, they do those things together and share those occupations in which they consider that that common life is realised the most.

Above all, intercourse in those pursuits to which their life is devoted.

As a consequence of this, the friendship of bad men turns out evil in its results. They participate in what is evil, and are unstable in their foundations. And they are made evil also by growing like one another. But the company of good men is good, strengthening with their growing intercourse. They seem further to improve by calling out one another's activities and by correcting one another's defects. They take their stamp from one another, each feeling delight in the other. And so the saying of the poet—

Such intercourse among the evil leads, it is true, to evil,

but among the good it enhances and promotes virtue and excellence.

"From good, good things proceed."

Thus much on the subject of friendship.

It follows, then, from what has been said, that to live with one another is most desirable in the eyes of friends. And as lovers delight in the sight of one another's countenances, and they prefer to hold intercourse by this rather than by any other of the senses, implying thereby that through this sense love is both born in the first instance and is brought to maturity, so too among friends a common life is more desirable than any of the other means of promoting friendship.

To live together is a form of communion and the most perfect form of communion, and friendship has its essence in communion, for friendship is communion. There are other grounds for this, but the chief one is that to be conscious of oneself is most desirable, as we have shown above: but our feelings to our friend are the same as our feelings to ourselves: consequently to be conscious of one's friend's existence will be desirable beyond everything else. And one becomes actually conscious of one's friend's existence by being with him, by living with him, and by passing one's time with him. So friends have good reason for desiring to live with one another.

Consequently whatever view each takes of the proper object of man's activity, and on whatever grounds he chooses life and whatever he regards as the proper career for man, in this he wishes to live and to spend his time along with his friends. Some think that they ought to carouse with their friends, others that they should play dice with them, others wish to hunt or practise at the gymnasium with them, because these are the objects that are valuable in their eyes, and

it is in such that they consider they ought to have the companionship of their friends, others again claim their companionship in philosophising; and some make their friends participate in one kind of activity and life, others in other kinds, and in short each wish to pass their days with their friends in that particular pursuit they love the best of all the varied objects of their life. Wishing to *live* with their friends, they do those things and get them to partake in those things which are pleasant to both of them. On these terms it is possible to live together.

Hence the friendship of the bad turns out evil, and they participate with one another in evil, and their friendship is not steadfast; they are inconstant, and they degenerate by growing like one another and by encouraging one another in evil courses. But the friendship of the good is good and steadfast, ever growing with the growth of their intimacy; and they seem to improve by their efforts towards good, correcting one another's faults. They receive from one another the stamp of each other's good qualities, for the sake of which they love one another. Hence a certain poet says,

"From good, good things proceed."

From good we reap good results; from evil, evil results.

On Friendship let this suffice. The subject next in order for us to discuss will be Pleasure.

BOOK X.

I.—CONCERNING PLEASURE.

II.—CONCERNING HAPPINESS.

III.—CONCERNING THE BORDER-LAND BETWEEN ETHICS AND POLITICS.

INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS.

I.—Concerning Pleasure.

THERE are several grounds upon which we are bound to proceed to the consideration of Pleasure. It is an essential element of human life: it is an indispensable instrument of education: its proper direction and control are of the greatest importance in relation to a virtuous and happy life. In addition to its proper claims to consideration, it has the further claim of having been the object of much controversy. Opinions about it have varied widely: on the one hand Eudoxus has maintained it to be the Chief Good: on the other hand the Platonists have maintained it to be an unmixed evil. [This latter view has probably been maintained to some extent on educational grounds: whatever be the real nature of pleasure, they may have thought, men are naturally so prone to it that the true policy of a moralist is to draw them away from it by representing it as an evil. This is, however, a mistaken policy: men will not be deluded by false pictures: they test theories by experience and observation: and a demonstrably false theory which is put forward, with however excellent an intention, not only fails of its purpose but brings the truth itself into discredit.]

We shall begin, according to our custom, by examining these two theories of the nature of pleasure.

I. Eudoxus used four arguments to prove his thesis: and it may be added that the excellence of his personal character gave his arguments a force which was not inherent in them, by making it clear that they were not a mere cloak for voluptuousness.

(1.) 'Since every object of desire is a good, the supreme object of desire will be the Chief Good. But pleasure is the supreme object of

desire. It is consequently the Chief Good.' As far as the major premiss goes, this argument is sound. The appeal to universal experience is valid and proper.

(2.) 'The same line of argument may be used in reference to pain: it is the object of universal avoidance as being an evil: the inference may be drawn that its opposite, pleasure, is a good.' This opposition between pain and pleasure has been denied: but upon insufficient grounds. If, as is sometimes alleged, they were both evils, then both would be avoided: but, as a fact, one of them is avoided, the other is not: consequently the opposition between them is real.

(3.) 'Pleasure is desired not as a means to something else, but in and for itself.' This must be admitted of certain forms of pleasure.

(4.) 'Whatever makes every other good more desirable must be the Chief Good: pleasure does so, and is therefore the Chief Good.' But it may be urged in reply that, assuming the minor premiss to be true, it only proves pleasure to be *a* good: every good is more desirable when joined to another good. At the same time Plato's use of the argument to prove that pleasure is *not* the Chief Good cannot be admitted, because it proceeds upon a conception of the Chief Good which is transcendental and impossible to be realized in human life: whereas the Chief Good of which we are in search is essentially human.

II. The theory of the Platonists is supported by several arguments which we will examine in turn.

(1.) 'Pleasure is not a quality, and is therefore not a good, since all goods are qualities.' This argument proves too much: for it would exclude justice or happiness itself from the list of goods. [In other words, justice or any other virtue is only a good so far as a man consciously exercises it: that conscious exercise is not a quality but an activity: the fact, therefore, that pleasure is not a quality but an activity does not prove it to be not a good.]

(2.) 'Pleasure is indeterminate: it admits of degrees of intensity: but every good is determinate: therefore pleasure is not a good.' This argument also proves too much: for it is applicable to virtues as well as to pleasures: and, moreover, it makes no distinction between pure pleasures which do not admit of greater or less perfection, and pleasures which are alloyed with pain, which are realized, as health is, in varying degrees in different individuals.

(3.) 'Pleasure is a movement and process of becoming: as such it is necessarily incomplete, and is consequently not a good.' The assumption is not true: pleasure is neither a movement nor a process of becoming: some pleasures may be so, at least in a metaphorical sense, but other pleasures are not so: consequently the definition cannot be true of pleasure in itself.

(4.) 'If pleasure were a good, no pleasures would be bad: but some pleasures are bad.' In the first place the minor premiss is not true: what are called bad pleasures are pleasures only to morbid minds. In the second place a distinction must be drawn between pleasures themselves and the means by which they are procured.

There are other arguments which are adduced to prove the same thesis, and which may be criticised in a similar way. The general

result of the examination of current opinions on the subject seems to be that

(1.) Pleasure is not the Chief Good:

(2.) Pleasures differ in kind: some being choiceworthy for their own sake: some not being proper objects of choice at all.

But let us proceed to examine in a more positive way—What is pleasure in itself?

In the first place it is, like sight, complete at each moment of its exercise: consequently it is not a movement or 'process of becoming,' for movement is at each moment incomplete. In the second place it is the result of a perfect and healthy consciousness, acting in the presence of the highest object which can come within its range: it supervenes upon such a consciousness, and marks the perfection of its activity.

Consequently, this perfect state of any form of consciousness being, as our nature is constituted, transient and not permanent, pleasure is transient also. It follows the weakening and the waning of the consciousness upon which it supervenes. On the other hand the desire for pleasure is as universal and as constant as the desire for the full activity of consciousness, which is, in other words, the desire for life. The two desires are inextricably intertwined: which of them is prior or superior, is difficult to determine.

It follows from this account of the nature of pleasure that pleasures not only vary in intensity, but also differ in kind. There are different forms of consciousness, and different kinds of feeling that supervene upon and mark the perfection of those different forms. That they are different in kind as well as in degree is proved not only by the difference in their antecedents but by the difference in their effects: some pleasures are antagonistic to other pleasures, and that which under other circumstances might be a pleasure is, when it is alien to an existing pleasure, of the nature of a pain. Again, the moral qualities of pleasures vary as the moral qualities of states of consciousness vary: some are desirable, others blameworthy, others indifferent. They vary also as types of character vary: for each species of animals, whose nature is simple and who are ruled by instinct, there may be one kind of pleasure: but for man, with his complex nature and his free power of choice, pleasures are as various in kind as are the forms of his activity. The highest kind of pleasure is that of the highest type of character—the character of the virtuous man: all other kinds of pleasure are secondary and subordinate, and must be referred to that highest kind as a standard.

II.—Concerning Happiness.

It remains for us to consider briefly the nature of happiness.

It has been shown in preceding Books that happiness must be not a passive state of mind, but an activity, and not only an activity, but an activity which is desirable for its own sake. This view of the nature of happiness is so universally held as to have led many persons to confound happiness with pleasure: for pleasure also is an activity, though at the

pleasure does not satisfy the other
desirable for its own sake, nor is
ter parts of our nature, or such
who is the true standard, would

piness is the activity of a perfectly
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philosophic meditation, will con-
ness. There are many corrobora-
is not only the highest form of
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will be independent of all external
s own sake: it is free from care.
éclat and seem to fill a more im-
portant [illegible] it they all have drawbacks from
which the life of [illegible]ion is free, and which make it impossible that they should be the perfect and final aim of man. Indeed, the life of which we are speaking vindicates for itself the position which we have claimed for it by almost rising out of the sphere of humanity and approaching what is divine: the fact that it does so is an additional obligation to pursue it, by proving it to be the highest life which is possible to us, and that which is most distinctively our own.

There are, no doubt, other forms of happiness. For man is a social being, and there are virtues which rise out of his relations to society, and the life which consists in the exercise of those virtues must be, as far as it goes, a happy life. But such happiness, however real, is secondary and subordinate to the happiness which we have been describing: the former is relative to human life, the latter is absolute: the former is more or less the creature of circumstances, the latter is independent of them. Moreover the life of philosophic meditation is the life of the Gods, who should be our pattern and to whose level we should aspire: we shall be blessed in proportion as we approach them, and we shall approach them in proportion as we share their 'Beatific Vision.'

The external conditions of this life must be such as to give it play. A philosopher will not want wealth, but he must have a sound body, and sufficient means to satisfy the wants of that body without exertion or care. Excess of wealth or power is not necessary even for the development of *moral* virtue: much less for philosophical meditation. But requiring as he does only moderate means, a philosopher need not be anxious about them: let him have faith in the providence of the Gods, who will not desert one who is striving to be like them.

III.—Concerning the Border-land between Ethics and Politics.

If our Treatise ended here, its purpose would seem to be not practical but speculative. But since the reverse is the case, we must go on to consider how the ideal which we have sketched of virtue and happiness is to be actually realized in human life. Neither theory nor argument

will bring about such a realization, for the mass of men are dead to moral appeals and cannot be reformed by logic.

The link between theory and practice is law: for the instrument of law is fear: and fear alone is the ultimate deterrent from vice. But law may be made to act in forming habits: and the formation of habits is in fact education. The province of law is thus identical with the province of education. Other means of making men good are sometimes discussed: some persons think that goodness is a gift of nature: some, again, think that it is a product of teaching: but it will be found that habituation, and especially early habituation, is the only real power. This process of forming moral habits by the agency of law, acting through rewards and punishments, should begin when persons are young; but it does not cease when they become older: in fact it goes on all through life. The chief difference in its operation is that the particular rewards and punishments vary with various classes of persons and with various periods of life. The function of the State will be to provide and to apply such rewards and punishments; it must cover the whole of a man's life, ordering it from first to last by the rule of reason, and by the force of physical coercion.

No other authority but that of the State is competent for the task: the authority of a father or the will of an individual is deficient in power of coercion: and indeed we tend to rebel against any constraint except that which the State puts upon us. But the majority of States fail of their duty: they all have laws, but those laws do not sufficiently cover the ground of moral education. The defect has to be supplied by private education, and, where the State fails, it is not only the function but the duty of the private citizen to do his best for the moral education of both his children and his friends.

Such private education, as we have seen, is deficient in coercive power; but it is analogous to, and follows the same principle as, education by the State. Both the one and the other are based on law; and consequently, any one who takes part in private education must cultivate the spirit of the legislator. He must acquaint himself with general principles, and with the application of such principles to particular cases.

From whom is he to learn such principles? Should we not say, *primâ facie*, from those who profess and apply them, *i.e.* from practical statesmen?

But there is this difficulty, that hitherto statesmen have known such principles only empirically. Beyond question experience is the basis upon which the principles of legislation must be based; but on the other hand it is insufficient for the student without a knowledge of causes. The materials lie ready to hand, but the science is not yet built. The sophists indeed have professed to teach the subject; but their theories are useless because they have ignored experience, and disregarded the conditions of the problem.

We have therefore ourselves, for the first time, to construct from the materials which experience has furnished a Science of Statesmanship, and to find out by the help of that science what is the ideal state of society, and by what laws that ideal state will fashion the lives of its citizens to the standard of perfect virtue.

We proceed at once, therefore, from Ethics to Politics.

TRANSLATION.

I.—CONCERNING PLEASURE.

i.—Connection of Pleasure with the theory of Morals.

1. The subject which follows next in order for us to discuss is perhaps Pleasure. It is thought that Pleasure is bound up in closest union with the nature of man. Hence, in educating the young, we use pleasure and pain as the rudders to guide their lives (through the storms of passion).

1. Pleasure is an essential element of human life; hence its importance in education and in the formation of habits.

2. Furthermore, as a help to the formation of personal character, it is thought to be of the highest moment that men should have the feelings of joy or of aversion in reference to the proper objects. These feelings in fact spread over the whole course of life, and have a powerful influence and tendency to make a life virtuous and happy. The objects which men set before themselves as the objects of their choice are things pleasurable: the objects they seek to avoid are things painful.

2. The pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are the strongest and most permanent motives to action.

3. But since pleasures and pains involve such issues, it would seem not to be right on any account to omit their consideration, more particularly as the subject is one that opens up much discussion.

(1.) Some philosophers declare Pleasure to be the 'absolute good.'

(2.) Others on the contrary declare it to be an unqualified evil.

3. The ethical value of pleasure is strongly controverted:
(1.) Some maintain pleasure to be the summum bonum.
(2.) Others view it as an unmixed evil.

Of these rival theorists, those who uphold pleasure do so, perhaps, with a genuine conviction that it *is* the source of all good.

Their opponents are influenced by the opinion that it is better, in view of practical life, to exhibit pleasure among things that are evil, even though in fact it be not, and by observing that the

mass of men are naturally predisposed to yield to pleasure and b become slaves of their appetites. They argue, in consequence, that it is right to draw them to a contrary direction, in the hope that they may, through these counteracting influences, attain to a proper moderation.

Those who decry pleasure do so often from prudential considerations, and in order to counteract the undue pursuit of it.

I doubt whether such a theory is prudent or politic. Theories that bear on human emotions and practical conduct are less credited than observed facts. When therefore, theories are at variance with the facts that come under personal observation they are derided and bring the truth itself into an equal discredit. For example, if the philosopher who censures pleasure is himself observed at any time to be eager for some pleasure of his own, he is thought to have such a leaning for it, as though it were altogether and entirely a thing to covet. In such cases it is not characteristic of the world generally to make fine distinctions.

But such a policy defeats its own ends.

In practical matters men always bring theories to the test of their own experience and the observations of life. A theory which manifestly contradicts experience (however pious the intention) brings discredit on the author.

Theories, however, that are true and can be verified, are of extreme utility, not merely with a view to knowing our duty, but also in their bearing on practical life. Being consistent with the facts of experience they are accredited, and consequently stimulate those who understand their importance, to live in accordance with their standard.

Theories, however, that are based on *fact*, are accepted by the reason and made a rule of life.

But enough of general remarks. Let us proceed to the discussion of the theories that have been maintained on this subject of pleasure.

In what follows, we must, according to the scheme of our argument, discuss more fully the nature of Pleasure: for Pleasure is in a sense congenital, and an essential element in our nature. This is the reason why, as teachers of the young, we guide them by Pleasure and Pain; leading them, by infliction of the latter, away from what is base, and by means of the former inciting them to what is noble. Which process clearly proves that by nature we shrink from pain and pursue after pleasure. Therefore, since our Treatise concerns the emotions of mankind and their actions as well, it is but reasonable and consistent with our scheme, that we should accurately discriminate in the matter of Pleasure, affecting as it does both emotions and actions. Further, it appears to contribute in no small degree to the acquisition of Moral Virtue, that we should feel delight and dislike just when such feelings are appropriate. For these feelings are co-extensive with human life; joy and sorrow, in their respective objects, are always with us: and, if felt duly and fittingly, both in kind and amount, and consistently with Right Reason, they contribute largely to the formation of the virtuous character, and to the life of true happiness.

Nor would it be at all reasonable to omit such a subject as Pleasure: for, in its consideration, there is nothing so simple or obvious as not to require copious

and weighty discussion. On the contrary, so great, somehow, is the divergence of opinion about Pleasure, that some affirm it to be the very Chief Good, while others affirm that it is not a 'good' at all, but exactly the opposite—an intrinsically base thing.

Of those who maintain the latter view, some do actually themselves believe it, having been convinced that pleasure is a base thing; while others, believing, themselves, that this or that pleasure may be good, yet wish to persuade their neighbours that all pleasure is bad, thinking that this is a safer canon for the conduct of life, and that men in general would be advantaged by a conviction that Pleasure is a base thing. This they support by pleading the natural propensity of all men to pleasure, and consequently, how essential it is to give them a strong wrench in the opposite direction, by drawing them, once for all, by all available means, away from pleasures, and enabling them thereby to reach the condition which we called 'the mean state,' and so to adopt eventually the right attitude towards Pleasure in the abstract. This plea is fallacious. Such a process will never wean the majority of mankind from base pleasures. Human emotions and actions carry more conviction to those who behold them, than do arguments about them. Whenever therefore such teachers are found to condemn Pleasure by their words, but to approve it by their practice and by their feelings towards it, they contradict themselves, and become a laughing-stock to those who hear their words, and see their conduct; and such teachers progress not one step towards aiding mankind, for all their words, the insincerity of which is proved by their actions. He who condemns Pleasure, if at any time he is detected in its pursuit, is concluded to have deserted to its side, and to be approving it as a good: nay, more, he causes those, who observe his defection, to imagine, not merely that some pleasure may be a good, but that all Pleasure may be approved as such. For distinction and discrimination—as, that one class of pleasure may be good, while another pleasure may possibly be base—are too subtle for the multitude: which no sooner sees a man of mind delighting in some pleasure, than it leaps to the conclusion that all pleasure is a thing good in itself and choice-worthy. Whereby such teachers as we have described not only fail to establish their own views, but bring the truth to naught, into the bargain. Thus it is clear that true moral theories, and such only, can have real usefulness to the mind, in purging it of all error, and can also have a profitable influence on the conduct of life. Such theories win acceptance by being seen to coincide with the best actions of those who hold them.

Enough however about erroneous views: let us return to the discussion of Pleasure itself; and, first, we will set forth the opinions of the ancients about it.

ii.—Examination of the theory of Eudoxus that Pleasure is the Summum Bonum.

(*a*) STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENTS OF EUDOXUS.

Now Eudoxus regarded pleasure as the summum bonum, and used the following arguments:

1. He saw all creatures, as well rational as irrational, eagerly striving to attain it. 'In all cases that which is desired is a thing good and right, and that which is desired in the highest degree is by the same reasoning the highest good. Consequently, the fact that all creatures alike are impelled to the pursuit of pleasure, proves that for all alike

1. 'That which is desired is a good. That which is desired in the highest degree is the summum bonum. But pleasure is desired in the

highest degree and by all. Therefore pleasure is the Summum Bonum.'

pleasure is the greatest good. Everything, he argued, finds out what is good for its own self, just as it finds out its proper food; hence a thing which is good for all beings, a thing for which they all strive, that is the chiefest good.

[These arguments of Eudoxus gained credit on account of the excellence of his personal character, rather than through their own cogency. He was known to be a pre-eminently temperate man; consequently he was thought to hold these opinions not as the votary of pleasure, but from real conviction of their truth.]

(His arguments had great weight from the pure and temperate character he bore.)

2. He maintained, too, that the correctness of his view was equally plain from a consideration of pain, which is the opposite of pleasure. Pain, he said, was a thing shunned by all creatures as an evil in itself; and by parity of reasoning its opposite, pleasure, was a good to be coveted.

2. The same truth is seen conversely. 'Pain is shunned as universally as pleasure is coveted.'

3. Now an object is, in the highest degree, an object of choice when we desire it not on account of something else nor with any ulterior aim; and, confessedly, pleasure is an object of this kind: if a man feels pleasure, no one asks him further what his motive is for having that feeling, pleasure being a feeling desirable in its own right.

3. Pleasure is a good in its own right and satisfies *per se*. Therefore it is the summum bonum.

4. Added to any other good, he argued, pleasure makes that good more desirable still; *e.g.*, added to the performance of justice or the practice of self-restraint, pleasure makes such acts more desirable: and that which increases good must, he thought, itself be good.

4. Whatever makes other good more desirable is the summum bonum: pleasure does so: therefore pleasure is the summum bonum.

Eudoxus, for his part, held that Pleasure was the absolute ultimate good; and he held so because he saw all things, rational and irrational, eager in its pursuit; and that which all things specially pursue, must be—he thought—the crowning good, and superior to all others. For his definition of the good was 'to each man, that, at which he specially aims.'

Just as, in the case of food, each animal seeks after that which is good and serviceable *to itself*, while that food, if such there be, which all alike desire and would procure for themselves, is 'good' in the universal sense—so, (he held) that which all things alike deem absolutely good, and desire accordingly, must be the ultimate good.

Such were the declarations of Eudoxus about Pleasure; and his arguments obtained credence rather through the moral excellence of their author than by their own merit. For he was the most temperate of men, and seemed therefore

to argue thus, not as a partisan of pleasure, but as an ardent votary of truth. Further, he thought that his theory was clearly proved by the opposition between Pleasure and Pain: inasmuch as all things avoided Pain, they must '*pari passu*' pursue Pleasure: and what all things pursue, must be the good.

And, again, he tried to fortify his view by this argument. Of all things choiceworthy, that is most so which is choiceworthy for its own sake, and is not selected on any other account nor with a view to any further result. And such a good—he argued—Pleasure undoubtedly is. No one, indeed, asks why we wish for Pleasure, as might be asked about other objects—such as, for example, money or honour, with what aim we desire them. Pleasure admits no such queries: no one can allege any ulterior result of pleasure which prompts him to its acquisition; but everyone chooses it for its own nature, as its own standard, measure, and perfection. And since that which is absolutely and in itself choiceworthy is thereby the end, and ultimate object, and the actual good, therefore (he inferred) Pleasure is the ultimate good.

Furthermore, he thought another reason proved his view on the subject. Pleasure, superadded to any good, makes it more choiceworthy and desirable: *e.g.* Temperance, or Justice, certainly become sweeter and more choiceworthy when combined with Pleasure. But that which has power to make any good better, when added to it, *that*, he held, must be the ultimate good.

(*b*) CRITICISM UPON THE PREVIOUS ARGUMENTS.

Surely such an argument would seem to prove at most that pleasure is *among* things that are good, though not more so than any other good, every good being more desirable when joined to another good, than when isolated.

(1) The *fourth* argument of Eudoxus is not conclusive:

(*a*) Assuming it to be true, the inference is that pleasure is A good, not *the* good.

(*b*) Plato, in fact, used this identical argument to prove that pleasure is *not* the summum bonum.

In fact it was by a precisely similar argument that Plato positively *dis*proves the theory that pleasure is the summum bonum. He showed that a life of pleasure is even more desirable when combined with wisdom, than when it is *per se* and apart from wisdom; and he drew the conclusion that, if the combination be better, then pleasure is not *per se* the summum bonum. The absolute summum bonum cannot be made more desirable whatever may be added to it. But [Plato proves too much:] it is evident that according to this argument neither pleasure nor anything else can be the summum bonum: for there is nothing in the world that does not become more desirable by association with some absolute other thing good in itself. What, then, is there that satisfies Plato's requirements, and is yet *a good in which we mortals have a share?* [None]: and yet this is a necessary attribute of the good which is the object of our search.

[The summum bonum of Plato, however, was something transcendental, and his argument has no real validity. The good of which we are talking is of course τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν.]

Those, again, who take exception to the theory that 'an object

at which all things aim is a good,' and maintain the contrary, are surely mistaken in their view. When an opinion is held by all men, I maintain that it is true. The theorist who destroys this universal ground of confidence will have no greater assurance of certainty for what he may himself adduce. If it were only irrational beings who yearned for pleasures, there would have been some reason in the objection, but since even rational creatures have the same impulses, on what grounds can their objection possibly rest? It is probable that even in depraved natures there is an instinctive good, higher than the level of themselves, which aims at an 'end' congenial to itself.

(2) The *first* argument of Eudoxus is confirmed — so far as his *premisses* go.

The appeal to universal experience is a valid and proper one.

The pursuit of pleasure by all living things proves it to be A *good* (though not the summum bonum).

2. Nor, again, do the criticisms of the opponents of Eudoxus on his argument from pain as the contrary of pleasure seem to be soundly based. They deny that it follows that if pain is an evil, pleasure is therefore a good. They maintain that evil may be opposed to evil, and both extremes to a state of indifference or impassivity; and so far their reasoning is not amiss, though they are not right in their inferences in regard to the question now before us. If pleasure and pain were both evils, then both of them ought to have been equally avoided; if neither were evils, then neither ought to have been avoided, or both alike in exact proportion. But, as a matter of fact, men are seen to shun pain as an evil and to desire pleasure as a good. Consequently pleasure and pain *are*, in reality, opposed the one to the other.

(3) The second argument of Eudoxus is challenged by Speusippus, but upon insufficient grounds. Eudoxus was right in assuming an opposition between pleasure and pain, as one is φευκτόν and the other is not.

But this is not the case. That which, added to a good, makes it better, must itself be *a* good: but it need not be the ultimate Good, nor indeed better than any other good. Every 'good' added to another of course enhances it *quâ* 'good;' the whole must invariably be greater than the part.

Such, at any rate, were the views of Eudoxus about Pleasure. Plato, on the other hand, used to maintain that Pleasure could not be the ultimate Good: for which position he employed the very arguments by which Eudoxus attempted to prove that it was. For since—he says—that 'good,' a greater good than which can be found, cannot be the ultimate Good—(for the ultimate Good must be the greatest of all)—it follows that any good which, by the addition of another, becomes greater and more choiceworthy, cannot itself be the ultimate Good; for it is not the greatest good, but admits of a superior.

Such a 'good,' Pleasure is: the life of pleasure becomes more pleasurable and choiceworthy by the addition of Wisdom, or of Temperance: which proves that there is something better than Pleasure. Pleasure, therefore, according to Plato, is not the ultimate Good; it is a good, but in the same sense as are the virtues, the sciences, and the other endowments of our nature. Now this is the very

doctrine we are anxious in the present case to prove—that pleasure is a good of this class; thereby avoiding the error of those who, pleading against Eudoxus' theories, affirmed it to be not a 'good' at all, though all things aim at it. Their position is absurd, for that which all men unanimously think true is what we call the truth. There is no other canon of truth; and any one who annuls this doctrine of common consent, and endeavours to shake the faith based upon it, will be ill able to substitute a better. And all men of common sense agree that a thing at which all things aim must be a good. They clearly hold it to be a good, for they pursue it through every means that conduces to it. The case would be different if only irrational beings aimed at it: for then we might think it was only a good *to them*; and their suffrage might be inadequate to prove that it was truly a good. But we find, by the means they take to obtain it, that things irrational and rational alike consider it to be a good; and why then should it not be an absolute good? For indeed, even irrational beings have in them a certain natural affinity to the Good, which supersedes, as it were, their inferiority, and qualifies them to aim at the good, by an inner attraction to it.

Such is the objection brought against the first part of Eudoxus' theory. As against the second, which is based upon the law of opposition, they deny that it follows that pleasure is a good, because pain is an evil. If a thing be an evil, its opposite need not be a good; an evil may be the opposite of an evil, as, apathy for instance, of intemperance, both being evils; and both are opposites to temperance.

So far they are right—but they are in error about pleasure. For if pleasure and pain were both evils, both would be worthy of avoidance, just as, if both were goods, both would be choiceworthy, or, if both were neither good nor bad, neither would be really choiceworthy. But, as it is, we avoid pain as an evil, and choose pleasure as a good; and so, plainly, pain is opposed to pleasure as an evil to a good.

iii.—Examination of the theory of the Platonists that Pleasure is not a good.

1. Nor assuredly does it follow that, because pleasure does not come under the class of qualities, therefore neither does it come under the class of things that are good. Neither happiness nor the various modes in which virtue is displayed are qualities, yet they are certainly goods.

1. 'Pleasure is not a quality: Every good is a quality: ∴ Pleasure is not a good.' [Aristotle denies the minor.]

2. The Platonists urge, further, that, whereas 'the good' is a thing defined and determinate, pleasure is a thing undefined and indeterminate, because it admits of degrees of greater or less intensity.

There are two senses in which this objection may be taken:—

(1.) If they draw their inference from the sensations of pleasure which men feel, their criticism will apply equally to Justice and the virtues generally, in respect of which they distinctly say that men are found with corresponding dispositions to a greater or less degree. Some men are just and some are brave to a greater

2. 'Pleasure is not defined: Every good is defined: ∴ Pleasure is not a good.' [Whatever admits of degrees is not defined: Pleasure admits of degrees: ∴ Pleasure is not defined.] But the minor is equivocal, both
(a) proving too much—every feeling being relative.

degree than others; and acts of justice and self-restraint may be more complete in some cases than in others.

(2.) But if they rest their criticism on the pleasures themselves, they are surely mistaken in the true reason (of their apparent indeterminateness), seeing that some pleasures are pure and others are alloyed with pain. What is there to prevent pleasures from being realized in varying degrees in precisely the same way that health, though it be a thing defined and determinate, admits of a greater or less perfection? The same completeness of development is not found in all men alike, nor is it uniformly maintained in the same individual. Yet even when the health is lowered, it continues within certain limits, and differs only in alternations of more or less completeness. It is of course conceivable that the case of pleasure should be precisely similar.

And (β) ignoring the differences between 'pure' and 'alloyed' pleasures.

3. Assuming 'the good' to be a thing absolute and complete, while processes of 'movement' or of 'becoming' are transitional and incomplete, they endeavour to show that pleasure is a process of 'movement' and of 'becoming' (and therefore not 'the good').

'Pleasure is movement and becoming, Movement and becoming are imperfect: ∴ Pleasure is imperfect.'

i. But, in the first place, our critics seem to be wrong in their view that pleasure *is* a process of movement or change.

But (i.) Pleasure is *not* a movement.

A characteristic of all change seems to be swiftness or slowness of motion, if not absolutely, as in the motions of the Cosmos, yet taken in comparison with something else. But neither swiftness nor slowness are proper attributes of pleasure. It is possible indeed *to come into* a state of pleasure quickly, just as it is to get into a state of rage quickly; yet quickness or slowness are impossible attributes of the feelings themselves.

α. Movement implies swiftness or slowness, either absolute or relative.

Nor yet, again, can we predicate such attributes of one man's pleasure as compared with that of another in the way in which we can of such changes as 'walking' or 'growing,' and similar processes where comparisons of degree are natural and correct.

While, therefore, the transition to a state of pleasure may be a slow or a rapid one; on the other hand, the enjoyment of a consciousness in conformity therewith (I refer to the actual sensation of pleasure) cannot be either slow or rapid.

β. Swiftness or slowness can only be accidental conco-

ii. In the next place, how can pleasure possibly be 'a process of becoming'? Such a theory can be disproved by a number of arguments:—

mitants, not essential to the idea.

(ii.) Pleasure is *not* a 'becoming:'

(1.) It is evident that every effect is formed out of definite causes, and may be resolved again into the elements out of which it was produced. [Accordingly, if pleasure were 'a becoming,' its elements would also be pleasurable. But, as a matter of fact,] it is not pleasure but *pain* that results from the breaking up of pleasure. [Therefore pleasure cannot be 'a becoming.']

α. If it *were*, the result would be like the cause; but in fact it is distinct.

(2.) In opposition also to the theory which they use, that 'pain is the want of attaining to a natural condition, and pleasure the satisfying of that need,' there are two answers: (α) These emotions, upon which this theory relies, are simply bodily and physical emotions. (β) If pleasure be the recovery of a natural condition, the part in which the restoration takes place, will be the part that will feel the pleasure; *i.e.*, it will be the body. But, as a matter of fact, the seat of pleasure is evidently not the body, but the mind. Consequently pleasure is not the restoration to a bodily state, though whilst such a restoration is going on, a man will be conscious of pleasure, just as, when undergoing a medical operation, he will be conscious of pain.

β. Pleasure is a 'restoration' only metaphorically.

[This last opinion, that pleasure is a process of recovery, seems to have originated from the feelings incidental to hunger and thirst: when men experience want and endure the pangs of hunger, they are conscious of pleasure at the satisfying of their wants.

[The explanation of pleasure as 'a restoration' is at best only applicable to bodily pleasures, and is a metaphor derived from associations of hunger and thirst.]

But such conditions are not found in regard to *all* pleasures. Some pleasures have no background of pain; for example, the pleasures of learning, and, among such as follow the gratification of the senses, pleasures that come through fragrant odours, or pleasant sounds and sights and recollections and hopes. What is there of 'becoming' which such pleasures could be 'processes?' No need has been experienced from satisfying which the pleasure could arise.]

4. In reply to those who adduce the fact that certain pleasures are disgraceful (in order to prove that pleasure cannot be 'the good') (1) one may deny the *fact* that such gratifications are really pleasurable.

4. 'If pleasure were bonum, no pleasure would be

bad. But many pleasures *are* disgraceful .·. Pleasure is not bonum.'

But

(α) Bad pleasures are not really pleasures.

Even though they be gratifying to men whose moral state is corrupt, one must not imagine that they are gratifying to any one else. In precisely the same way things are not really wholesome or sweet or bitter because they appear to be so to people in bad health, any more than things are white that appear so to patients suffering from ophthalmia.

(2) Or may not the true statement of the case be that pleasures are desirable *per se*, yet not assuredly from unlawful means—precisely as wealth is *per se* desirable, yet not for one who has turned traitor to get it; or as health is desirable, yet not to the man who has had to eat unnatural food.

(β) Pleasure is only desirable when the means thereof are lawful.

(3) Or may it not be that pleasures differ in kind? Pleasures derived from noble acts are surely different from those that come from disgraceful acts. Every pleasure implies a corresponding character in the man who feels it. For example, unless a man himself be just, he cannot feel the pleasure that the just man feels; nor can he feel the pleasure of the musician unless he have musical tastes of his own; and so on through the whole list of pleasures.

(γ) Pleasures differ in kind: it does not follow because *some* pleasures are bad that therefore *all* pleasures are bad.

5. Again, it is urged that the case of the friend as being different from the flatterer seems to show that pleasure is not identical with 'the good,' or that pleasures differ in kind. The true friend is thought to shape his intercourse with a view to moral well-being, whereas the flatterer has no other aim than pleasure. Hence the flatterer is censured, whereas men praise a true friend, knowing that his intercourse points to higher objects.

5. 'If *all* pleasure were good, the flatterer would not be blamed. But the flatterer *is* blamed. .·. Pleasure is not a good.' [But confessedly pleasures *differ in kind*.]

6. Again, no one, they say, would care to live all his days with the 'intellect only of a child;' with the very keenest delight, but only with the pleasures of a young child.

6. 'If all pleasure were good, the life of a child might be a desirable life. But no one would have such a life. .·. Pleasure is not a good.' [But pleasures differ in kind.]

7. Nor would a man care to have enjoyment at the price of doing most disgraceful acts, though he were never likely to meet with pain for doing so.

7. [For similar reasons no one would have pleasure or avoid pain if the price were disgraceful.]

8. Lastly, to show that pleasure is not identical with the good, they remind us that there are many things about which we should be enthusiastic, even though they entailed no sense of pleasure; *e.g.*, sight, memory, knowledge, and the possession of moral excellences. It makes no difference to the argument that, as a matter of fact, pleasures *do* attend the possession of these things: we should choose them though no pleasure resulted therefrom.

8. Just as we do not grasp pleasure by any and every means, so there are many objects which we covet irrespectively of any pleasure they may bring. Therefore pleasure is not Summum Bonum.

The conclusions then that seem to be evident from the above discussion are:—

(1.) Pleasure is not the Chief Good.

(2.) It is not every pleasure that is choiceworthy.

(3.) Certain pleasures are choiceworthy for their own sake, but they either differ in kind from others or in the circumstances out of which they arise.

This examination must suffice for the theories that are current in regard to pleasure and pain.

Others again say that pleasure is not a good, because it is not a quality. This argument has no real cogency; for it would equally prove that the activities of the different virtues, and happiness itself, not being qualities, were not goods: but there is clearly nothing that can really disprove their being goods.

Again, they pleaded that Pleasure could not be a good because it is indeterminate, while the good must be determinate. And they called Pleasure indeterminate because it fluctuates, and admits of more and less. This would be cogent and true if the more and less were discernible in Pleasure itself: but in fact the sharpening and slackening in the sense of pleasure takes place in the subjects of it, and is relative to their capacity for it; as is the case also with the virtues. These may be just, or manly, and act justly, or live temperately, all in a greater or less degree; but that does not make these virtues in themselves indeterminate. Precisely in the same way Pleasure is not in itself indeterminate, but allows its *sense* to sharpen or slacken in those who feel it, because it is not in all alike, nor in an equal degree pure and unalloyed with pain. Such is the case with Health; it is determinate, yet in its subjects it is made intense or relaxed as the case may be; for all men have not the same balance of the vital power, nor has any one man the same balance always; but the power fluctuates, now to more, now to less; and at one time the body is purely healthy, and at another it contains a germ of disease. Precisely analogous to this may be the case of Pleasure. Again, it was argued that Pleasure could not be a good, from the following considerations. Pleasure is a process of motion and development; and motion and development are, ipso facto, imperfect, and what is imperfect cannot be a good; for what is good has perfection: therefore, Pleasure cannot be a good,

Here the minor premiss is false: pleasure is not a process of motion, nor of development, as we will proceed to show.

In all motion, there would seem to be a natural quality of swiftness or slowness: and if any motion appear to have no such quality in itself and absolutely, (that is, to have no increase or decrease of speed in its material subjects, such as there is in things which move irregularly), still, those material subjects, if compared not with themselves but with some other things, are seen and said to

have swiftness or slowness. The revolution of the heavens, for instance, is in itself equable and unchangeable: but considered relatively to the motion of the stars it may be called swift. So it is that every motion has its special quality of speed or slowness, whereas Pleasure has no such quality, therefore Pleasure is not a process of motion. And that Pleasure has no such quality is plain from the following considerations. A man is said to 'be pleased' *quickly*, just as he may 'be angered' quickly. That is, he may change quickly from the condition of not being pleased to that of being so: but he cannot be said to feel Pleasure itself quickly or slowly; neither relatively to himself, (as the things which move irregularly were said to have speed or slowness relatively to themselves) nor in comparison with anything else (as the things, whose motion was equable, were said to have). Progression, growth, change, and all modes of motion are contemplated in connection with swiftness or slowness; and so may the lapse, or sudden shifting, into the condition of pleasure. But there is no swiftness or slowness in the activity of Pleasure itself. Pleasure is a sort of goal or term of motion; it is a sort of rest, and therefore cannot itself be motion of any kind: and this, as we consider, we have proved. Nor, as we have said, is it a process of development; for, if it were, its opposite, Pain, would be a process of dissolution; and of that, of which Pleasure was the development, Pain would be the dissolution: for neither development nor dissolution is casual, nor are they casually connected; but from whatsoever anything is developed, into that, and nothing else, does it naturally dissolve.

Again, if it be true, as is said, that Pain is a depletion of the natural condition, it will follow that Pleasure is a renovation thereof; and this depletion and renovation are clearly bodily processes. And so, if Pleasure is a renovation of some natural condition, that which has the renovation—to wit, the body—will feel, and be the subject of, the pleasure: and pleasure will be corporeal purely. But this is not the fact; all agree that the sense of pleasure appertains to the soul.

Therefore Pleasure, we conclude, is not a process of development and renovation; but it is consequent on a renovation, just as Pain is on a depletion, of the natural state: we certainly feel pleasure while a renovation is taking place, and pain, *e.g.*, when amputation is being performed.

The view we have been criticising seems to have been derived from a consideration of bodily pleasures and pains, and, especially those of eating and drinking: wherein it is certainly true that we first feel and are pained by depletion, and then pleased by renovation. But this does not hold with all pleasures: *e.g.*, with those of mathematical science, and those of mental perception. Certainly the pleasures of hearing, smelling, seeing, take place with no antecedent pain, nor are they in any sense a renovation following on depletion.

Hope, again, and remembrance of things good, are among the most pleasurable things: but can these pleasures be called a development? and if so, of what? There was in their subjects no previous depletion of which they could be the renovation. All which proves Pleasure not to be a development.

Others again aver that pleasure is not a good, and plead the instances of pleasures which are disreputable. So when we reply that things are not pleasurable because base men think them so; the true canon of pleasure is not 'that which pleases the ill-disposed.' Such pleasures are relative to such men, not real—just as, to sick appetites, things appear wholesome, or sweet, or bitter, which are not such in fact, but only relatively to the vitiated taste: or as, to diseased eyes, things appear white which are not actually white. So it is evident, in spite of these theories, that the claim of pleasure to be a good is not disproved. For we allege specially

(i.) That the pleasures of the dissolute are not really pleasures.

(ii.) If we grant they are pleasures, still it does not follow that Pleasure in itself is base: for pleasure is not homogeneous, but manifold; that is, some kinds may be base while others are good, and those derived from honourable and laudable objects are of one quality, and those derived from base objects, of another: in short, some pleasures are good, and some detestable, in themselves. Take as an analogy the case of wealth or health. There is an honourable wealth,

which a man obtains without wronging any one, and a dishonourable wealth, obtained by treachery to one's country, or by selling children or relations into slavery. There is, again, a proper health, obtained by a natural and human mode of life; and an improper health, obtained by unnatural and discreditable means; and so on, in other matters. Precisely the same is the case of pleasures. They are absolutely distinct in kind; *e.g.*, the musician's pleasure cannot be shared by the unmusical, nor that of the just man by any one who is not just; clearly therefore the musician's pleasure is 'sui generis,' and the just man's also, and so on. Therefore,—even if we grant that the pleasure of base men is a base thing,—it does not follow that Pleasure, in itself, is worthy of avoidance.

Others again have argued that Pleasure could not be a good, from consideration of the difference between a flatterer and a friend. The flatterer is censured, because in his intercourse he has only the design of pleasing; while the friend is praised because he aims, not at giving pleasure, but at telling truth, and doing good to his friend. Hence it seems to have been inferred that Pleasure was censurable. But the inference is not good; it would be sounder to conclude that the pleasures differ in kind, and that one is censurable and the other laudable. Everybody knows that a friend is agreeable, and gives pleasure to the object of his attachment; whence it is clear that *all* intercourse between man and man has a mutual pleasure; but, because friendship is exalted in motive, its pleasure is praised; whereas flattery being unworthy in motive, its pleasure is censured.

Others again have argued that pleasure is censurable, because no man of sound mind would choose to live a life of mere childish pleasures, with the ideas and delights of children, nor make any other mean choice merely for pleasure's sake.

But this no way proves Pleasure to be a base thing. A man of sound mind does not avoid the life of mere childishness and petty actions *because it is pleasurable*, but because, for a man, it is intrinsically base.

Many things, again, which conduce to Pleasure we aim at, not for the pleasure, but for their own desirability. For example, if there were no pleasure in sight, memory, knowledge, virtue, we should still choose them. It makes no difference in principle, even if we admit that each of these has a pleasure inseparable from it: we should desire them for ourselves, even if that were not so.

It is therefore clear,—

(i.) That *all* pleasure is not choiceworthy nor good.

(ii.) That there are certain pleasures meritorious in themselves and distinct from the base pleasures, both in kind and in origin.

iv.—The true nature of Pleasure explained.

But it will become more evident what the true nature of pleasure is and what are its characteristics, if we take up the subject again from the beginning.

(*a*) COMPARISON BETWEEN PLEASURE AND SIGHT.

Now the sense of sight is thought to be perfect at any moment of its exercise: it needs nothing to happen at a future time in order that its nature may be perfected. This is the kind of phænomenon with which pleasure must be compared: pleasure is a thing complete in itself—at no instant could one find a pleasure whose nature would be more fully consummated if its sensation were protracted for a longer time.

Pleasure is of a nature simple, uncompounded, unique, complete, and perfect in an instant.

We have thus recounted the current sayings about Pleasure and Pain. Now we are concerned to investigate about the former, what it intrinsically or generically is; and this would be most clearly shown by a resumption of an earlier part of the argument, in which we affirmed Pleasure to be perfect in itself—just as, *e.g.*, at any moment of its exercise sight is perfect; and it is impossible to discriminate any part of the time occupied in seeing, during which sight is developed: it is complete during the whole time.

(*b*) PLEASURE IMPLIES NEITHER CHANGE NOR BECOMING.

Wherefore pleasure is not a process of change or of movement. Every movement takes place in a certain time and has reference to a certain end; *e.g.* the process of housebuilding is not complete until it has accomplished the design which it had in view. When I say 'in a certain time' I mean either 'within a certain period' or 'at a particular moment.'

Pleasure being complete in an indivisible particle of time cannot be 'a process of movement.'

(*c*) CHARACTERISTICS OF TEMPORAL MOVEMENT.

But in relation to particular sections of time all movements are incomplete. Every point of the movement is distinct in kind from the process as a whole, and every point from every other. The laying of the bricks is distinct from the fluting of the columns, and these again from the structure of the whole temple. The structure of the temple is complete and perfect: it lacks nothing in view of the purpose for which it was conceived; whereas the structure of the base and the sculpture of the beams are incomplete, each being the structure only of a part.

Temporal movement, in contrast to pleasure, implies (1) division into parts; (2) a distinct 'end.'

Such processes, therefore, all differ in kind, and it is impossible to find at any exact instant a process of movement that is complete in its idea and aim, or, if conceivably at all, within some period regarded as a whole.

All the parts or different elements of movement are distinct from one another and from the whole.

Herein, we may observe, sight differs from motion, which is imperfect, so to speak, in each part, and heterogeneous; the parts differ from the whole motion and from one another: just as do the parts in the process of house-building. Take, for instance, the entire construction of a temple,—the process of combining the stone-work is one thing, and that of moulding the pillars another; and they differ both as compared to one another and to the complete result, which—as being fully worked out in all essential parts—may be called perfect; but the work of the basement and of the triglyph is in itself imperfect, because each is only the construction of a part.

Therefore the parts of motion differ generically; and in no sub-division of time —I mean of course the time occupied in the motion—can you make any subdivision of the motion perfect according to the standard of the completed motion —which is consummated in the full period only.

(*d*) CHARACTERISTICS OF 'LOCAL' MOVEMENT.

The case applies similarly to walking and to all local movements. If it be the fact that locomotion is a movement from one place to another, here too there will be differences corresponding to the different kinds of locomotion, such as flying, walking, leaping and so on. Nor is it only so; but there are distinctions to be made in actual walking. 'Movement from one place to another' is not the same thing in the stadium as a whole as in particular sections of it, nor are all the sections equal nor is it the same thing to pass this line and that. A man does not merely pass over a line, but that line exists in a particular place, and one line differs from another in position.

Similarly in local motion not only are the various kinds distinct, but those kinds are further subdivided into other varieties equally distinct.

[I have argued the question of locomotion in another Treatise with scientific precision. The conclusion seems to be that motion is not a thing complete at any and every moment, but the majority of motions are incomplete, as standing in the relation of co-ordinate species to a common genus, assuming, that is, that the 'whence' and the 'whither' constitute different species of motion.]

Such also is the case in walking and all other modes of motion. Progression comprises divers kinds of motions, such as leaping, flying, walking; all of which are modes of progression, but specifically distinct from each other. Nay, more, in each of these motions there are specifically distinct kinds of progression. The terms, for instance, the 'whence' and the 'whither,' are different. And as the terms differ, the modes of motion specifically differ, as in the race-course any part of the race differs, in point of terms, from the race regarded as a whole; and not only that, but from all the other parts of the race. Suppose the whole race to be from the point A to the point E,—



the portion of the race between A and B is different in terms from the whole race, and from the other portions, viz., B to C, C to D, and D to E. And as the terms differ, so are the portions specifically distinct. If each motion traversed one and the same line, it would be otherwise; but, as each line lies in its own place, and the places differ, the motions that traverse each line also differ.

We have elsewhere written our scientific account of motion; here we need only affirm that motion as such is only complete in its whole period, not at any and every point of the time it occupies; the portional motions which, combined, make the whole motion, are in themselves incomplete and diverse from each other, if, as is clear, the terms of motion, the 'whence' and 'whither,' constitute specific differences.

(*e*) ABSOLUTE COMPLETENESS AND INDEPENDENCE OF PLEASURE.

In regard to pleasure on the other hand, its nature or logical conception is realized at any given moment whatever. It is clear

therefore that various pleasures will be distinct from one another, and that the sensation of pleasure itself will be one of those things that are 'wholes' (or 'unities') and complete in themselves.

Pleasure on the contrary is a thing absolutely unique in each instant.

This view will be also evident from the fact that it is impossible for motion to take place except within a certain time, whereas pleasure can be instantaneous; what is instantaneous, being a 'whole' or 'unity' in itself.

From these considerations it is clear that writers are in error who describe pleasure as a process of transition or of becoming. 'Change' or 'becoming' are terms not predicable of all facts, but only of those facts that may be analysed into parts and that are not 'units' in themselves. There is no 'process of becoming' in the case of sight nor of a point nor of a monad: in not one of these cases is either 'movement' or 'becoming' possible, nor assuredly in the case of pleasure either, pleasure being an ultimate fact, 'a unity' or 'whole' in itself.

Pleasure, therefore, is an indivisible 'whole,' whereas change implies parts.

But with Pleasure the case is different; at any point of time it is specifically complete—therein differing from motion; the former being something whole and complete in itself, the latter incomplete in itself and needing a certain duration of time for completion. Complete motion, *e.g.* is impossible in the momentary, present, and indivisible point of time, while complete and entire pleasure is possible therein.

All which proves that Pleasure is neither a process of motion, nor of development. Development is not of all things, but of parts rather than of wholes; *e.g.* we do not talk of the development of sight, or of a point, or of the unit. Each of these is a whole and indivisible, and does not develop and come to completion by lapse of time, but is, at any moment, whole and complete in itself. The unit, for instance, and the Point are not perfect in one part and imperfect in another, nor are they brought to development by lapse of time; and Sight is, at each moment of the time we are exercising the faculty, complete in itself; as indeed the activity of every sense, working on its appropriate subject, is perfect at every moment of its exercise.

(*f*) PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF PLEASURE.

If, then, every sense comes into operation when in presence of an object of sense; and if the operation is perfect when the sense itself is in a normal state and is in the presence of the highest object that can come within its range (the perfect operation being thought to be pre-eminently of this description, and the difference being immaterial whether we say that the sense itself operates or the subject in which the sense resides) .... in every case, I say, the highest activity is that of a man

Pleasure is the result of
(α) a sense healthily constituted;
(β) an object coming within the sphere of that sense and adapted to it.
The highest pleasure will be that where these two

who is most perfectly constituted, and is in presence of the highest object that can fall within his senses. Such an activity will be most perfect and most pleasurable.

factors are the purest and best that can blend together.

In fact pleasure follows in the wake of every sensation, and in like manner also of every process of reasoning or play of thought, and the most pleasurable activity is that which is most perfect, and the most perfect activity is that of the man who is in a normal state when it is brought to bear upon the noblest object that can come before it.

This law applies also to the intellectual *δυνάμεις*.

It is indeed the pleasure resulting from it that makes the activity perfect. Yet pleasure does not perfect the activity in the same way that the sensation and its object do, when they are normal and right. Pleasure is not essentially, but only accidentally, the result of the activity. Just in the same way healthfulness is the cause of a man's being hale and well, in a different sense than that in which the physician is the cause. But it is clear that pleasure ensues as a consequence of each state of sensation: we say that sights and sounds are pleasant, and evidently the pleasure will be greatest when the sensation is most excellent and the object in presence of which it operates is of a corresponding excellence. So often as the object felt and the person who is conscious of the sensation are mutually excellent, then invariably pleasure will arise—so often, that is, as the object that is to produce the sensation and the person who is to experience it are both present and are brought into contact.

Pleasure is not the 'efficient cause' of the activity, but only 'forma quædam accidentalis.'

Pleasure, then, makes the activity perfect—not as a permanent state inherent in the patient, but as a kind of perfection supervening, like the bloom of health on the cheeks of youth.

So long, therefore, as the object of our intellectual or sensuous consciousness be of a right and normal character, and the faculty of discriminating or of contemplating be likewise in a normal condition, then there will be pleasure in the activity that ensues from the contact. So long, that is, as the two forces of the mind, the active and the passive, mutually correspond, the attitude of each being analogous to that of the other, this same result must from the nature of things always supervene.

Pleasure is like a healthy bloom, supervening whenever our *ἐνέργειαι* are sound and good.

Pleasure follows on the activities of Sense and of Intellect; especially when Sense and Intellect are both in the condition of soundness, and so put forth their

most complete activity, and that in the best direction—Sense to the fairest goal among things sensible, and Intellect to that among things intellectual; for it is with that object in view that activity, or the active habit (the name is indifferent) most specially and adequately operates. Such activity (*e.g.* of sight) is perfect when we behold, healthfully and adequately, some one of the noblest objects of vision; and so with the Intellect and all the other senses; and that which is most perfect is, *ipso facto*, the sweetest also. That there is a pleasure of the Intellect, and of each of our senses, is clear; we speak of matters intellectual as pleasing us, and we enjoy the objects of our contemplation, and are delighted with sights and sounds; and this, especially, as we have said, when our activities are complete; and we see best, and contemplate best, and have all our senses most at command. For as long as Sense and Intellect, with their respective objects, are what they are, there must be pleasure in their exercise; so long, that is, as Intellect and Sense are affected by the presence of their objects.

Therefore Pleasure follows on each activity, and forms its consummation: only not in the same sense as habituation has been shown to develop its subject from the state of potential capacity to that of actual exercise. Architecture, *e.g.* develops the man who has a capacity for it, and makes him an actual architect: but it is in another sense that we speak of Pleasure as working completion. Health is the cause, in one sense, of a man being sound; in another sense, the physician is; the former superinduces the activity of healthfulness, though it is not identical with it; the latter guards and protects it, and labours for its permanence. Nor again does Pleasure work completion of the activity of its subjects in the same sense as the object of Intellect may be said to perfect Intellect, or the object of Sense to perfect sense. Habit and the object lead the active faculty on from the potential state to that of actual exercise; while Pleasure, which is contemporaneous with this exercise, guards and protects the active faculty, and urges it on to exercise, being a sort of second completion of the activity, as beauty is of youths in their prime; and it is inseparable from it so long as Sense and Intellect subsist in activity with regard to their proper objects; and especially when they are in their best and soundest state, and their activity is most fittingly directed.

(*g*) REPLY TO VARIOUS DIFFICULTIES UPON THE SUBJECT.

1. 'How is it, then, that no one retains an uninterrupted consciousness of pleasure?' Is not the answer this—that a man wearies of his sensations. None of the faculties of man are capable of being exercised without cessation; so neither does pleasure last for ever, being, as it is, only a concomitant upon the exercise of our faculties.

1. If a man could work incessantly, he would feel incessant pleasure.

2. For the same reason also, there are things which please while their novelty lasts, yet by and by lose their early charm. At first the mind is excited and concentrates itself with sustained attention upon the matter before it. It is precisely so with sight. At first men look steadily upon an object; but the mental strain is not maintained, but is by and by relaxed and weakened, and the pleasure consequently becomes less vivid.

2. As the activity is weakened the pleasure is weakened also to a corresponding degree.

3. One may suppose that all men strive after pleasure, since all are eager likewise to live. Life is, in a sense, a development of the faculties; and the objects upon which and for the sake of which every man spends his energies, are the objects he most truly loves. For example, the musician cultivates the sense of hearing, to catch the modulations of sound, and the student cultivates the understanding, to catch the thoughts that underlie the music; and so on in the various other pursuits.

3. The universal desire of pleasure is the result of the universal desire of life (life being activity, and pleasure its concomitant).

But it is pleasure that in every case makes the exercise of the faculties perfect, and therein also life itself for which men yearn. Hence it is natural that men should strive after pleasure, perfecting as it does for each man his life, and life being confessedly an object of desire.

4. The question may be dismissed for the present, whether we desire life for the sake of pleasure, or pleasure for the sake of life. The two conditions are evidently intertwined one with the other and do not admit of separation: pleasure is not felt without the exercise of the faculties, and every exercise of the faculties is crowned by its attendant pleasure.

4. Pleasure is a *sign* of the satisfaction of desire, and desire is coextensive with activity.

Here a difficulty might be raised—why, if this be so, does no one feel continuous pleasure in the exercise of such activities? The answer is:—All things human are prone to wear out and are incapable of continuous activity. Pleasure, therefore, as the concomitant of activity, cannot be continuous either. Certain things, when newly presented to the senses or mind, give pleasure; but after a while, they become customary, and seem no longer as pleasant as before; and the cause is what I have described.

First of all the Intellect is strongly swayed to them, and develops a vigorous activity in regard to them, just as those who gaze fixedly on something develop an activity of sight. Subsequently the activity loses its quality and becomes indifferent, and therewith of course the pleasure also fades and becomes less intense. Since, therefore, Pleasure crowns and completes every activity, and life itself is an activity, all things that love life aim at pleasure as its perfection; and as all things love life, we may sum up that all things aim at pleasure, as making the activity of life, and indeed every activity, more desirable. Every man is most active for and in those objects which bring him most pleasure; the musician in the training of his ear for musical sounds; the student of philosophy in speculation; and so on.

As therefore Pleasure enhances and makes more choiceworthy each activity, all things that aim at the activity naturally aim also at its concomitant pleasure: those therefore that love life, naturally love its concomitant pleasure, as perfecting that, at which they aim as choiceworthy—viz. Life. (We dismiss for the present the question whether we aim at Life for the sake of Pleasure, or Pleasure for the sake of Life: for the two are practically inseparable, and nobody can reach pleasure without activity nor activity without pleasure; for pleasure is the completion of activity, and therefore inseparable from it).

v.—Varieties and differences of Pleasure.

(*a*) ARGUMENTS FROM THE DIFFERENCE OF OPERATIONS.

1. For these reasons, pleasures seem to differ also in *kind*, or specific character. Their causes or conditions vary, and we believe that things distinct in kind can only be perfected by things similarly distinct. Evidently this is the case with the creations of nature no less than the products of art—with animals and trees as with paintings and statues, houses and furniture. In a similar manner the various functions of the mind that are distinct in kind require corresponding conditions to make them perfect. For example, the activities of the intellect differ from the activities that accompany our sensations, and our sensations again differ from one another according to their kinds. As a consequence, so also do their concomitant and perfecting pleasures.

1. Perfections of things differing in kind are different: Pleasures are perfections of things differing in kind: ∴ Pleasures are themselves different in kind.

2. This truth may be further shown from the fact that every pleasure is intimately bound up with the activity which it perfects. In fact our faculties are invigorated by the pleasure which is natural to their exercise. When we take pleasure in the exercise of our powers we discriminate objects more clearly and give a more exact finish to our work. Those who take pleasure in working at geometry become more easily geometricians and gain a clearer insight into mathematical problems. So also students of literature or of architecture make far greater advance and progress in their several professions when they take an interest in their work.

2. What are natural to things different in kind are themselves different: Pleasures are natural to things differing in kind: ∴ Pleasures are themselves different.

The pleasures, then, that are felt strengthen the faculties in their exercise, and that which strengthens anything is congenial and proper to it. But when things differ in kind, the attributes that are proper to them differ in kind also.

3. Yet more evident still will this truth appear from the consideration that pleasures arising from things alien to them are hindrances to our immediate activities; for instance, lovers of flute music are unable to attend to a lecture, if they hear a man playing a flute, since they feel greater gratification at the flute playing than in the business immediately

3. Things which produce contrary effects are different in kind: Pleasures (from different activities) produce contrary effects:

before them. In such cases, then, the pleasure that attends flute-playing destroys the interest that should be taken in speculation.

∴ Pleasures are different in kind.

[The minor is proved by examples.]

This result is found in a similar degree in all cases where a man is busying himself about two things at once. The more agreeable occupation drives away the other, the more completely so if it be much superior in point of pleasure, so that in the end the man ceases entirely to bring his mind to bear upon the other.

The inference is, that when we take a keen pleasure in anything, we absolutely do nothing else, and that when we are but slightly pleased with one thing, we take up another. An example of this tendency may be seen in the theatres, where those who eat sweetmeats do so particularly when the acting or the actors are indifferent.

4. Since, then, the pleasure proper to each activity renders that activity more keen and each exercise thereof more sustained and better, whereas alien pleasures destroy those activities, it is clear that pleasures are widely different from one another.

4. Alien pleasures have the same effect as natural pains.

In fact alien pleasures have pretty nearly the same effect as kindred pains. The effect of kindred pains is to destroy the exercise of our faculties. For example, if the act of writing or of calculating be distasteful to a man, he discontinues it: in the one case he ceases to write, in the other case he ceases to calculate, such occupations being painful to him.

Consequently, in the exercise of our faculties the result that ensues from their proper pleasures is the exact opposite of what ensues from their proper pains (natural or 'proper' pleasures being those which ensue by a natural law upon the exercise of the faculties). As has been explained, alien pleasures have a result pretty nearly identical with pain:—they destroy the activity of the mind, though not after the same fashion.

Thus it is manifest that pleasures differ specifically from each other; for, where activities differ specifically, their perfections, *i.e.* pleasures, must do so also: it cannot be otherwise with the perfections of different activities than with the activities themselves. *E.g.*, the activities of Intellect differ specifically from those of sense, and from each other; therefore their concomitant pleasures also differ; an obvious result of the special concomitance of a pleasure with each activity. Clearly it is a *special* concomitance, because the activity is enhanced by its special pleasure. All knowledge, all close inquiry, in short all mental activity, is at its best when accompanied by pleasure. Those who take delight in geometry become the best geometricians; and in each branch of knowledge, those who love the study pursue it to the best effect, under the stimulus to progress which pleasure gives them.

If therefore pleasures enhance activities, and if that which enhances anything

must be in some sort akin to it, and if the things which are akin to things specifically distinct must be themselves specifically distinct—it clearly follows that pleasures are specifically distinct. Which is further proved by the fact that, just as activities are enhanced by their special pleasures, they are impeded by alien pleasures: *e.g.* the pleasure of flute-music would easily disturb the pleasure of acquiring knowledge, in any student not habituated to learning; he would find more delight in hearing the flute than in his speculation, and consequently, the pleasure taken in flute-music would annul the activity of reasoning. So in other cases, when a man exercises two activities at a time, the pleasanter of the two ejects the other, and the more, in proportion to its superior pleasantness. If the pleasure of the one activity much exceeds that of the other, it actually cancels that other, and annuls its exercise: and hence it is that when we vehemently delight in doing some particular thing, we have no inclination at all for doing anything else; whereas if we have no particular pleasure in the matter in hand, we do something else at the same time, like people at the theatre who eat sweetmeats: they do it particularly when the actors are bad and the spectacle indifferent to them.

Since therefore the special pleasure of each activity emphasizes, prolongs, and improves it, while an alien pleasure mars it, it is plain that the pleasures differ widely from each other: indeed the activities seem to find alien pleasures almost as great an obstacle to their proper exercise and development as are their own special pains (*i.e.* the opposites to their special pleasures). Their special pains annul the activities—*e.g.* If writing is a pain to a man, he will not write; if reasoning be unpleasant to a man, he will not philosophize. And exactly the same result will be brought about by an alien pleasure. If, therefore, the alien pleasure acts just like the special pain, and the special pain be the opposite to the special pleasure, it follows that the alien is opposite to the special pleasure; and, if opposite, they cannot be homogeneous. Pleasure, therefore, is not homogeneous.

(*b*) ARGUMENTS FROM THE GOODNESS AND BADNESS OF PLEASURES.

1. Pleasures admit of the same qualities as our activities do. But activities differ in goodness and badness. Consequently pleasures also differ in goodness and badness.

1. Now as the various modes of human activity differ in goodness and badness, some of them being desirable, others blameworthy, and others indifferent, pleasures also exhibit corresponding characteristics; every exercise of our powers being attended by a pleasure natural to it. Consequently the pleasure that is natural to a right activity will itself also be right, whereas a pleasure involved in a bad activity will itself also be an evil one.

2. But desires differ equally in goodness and badness. Pleasures being more intimately united with activities than are the desires, must have the same characteristics.

2. Furthermore, desires for what is honourable are praiseworthy, whereas desires for what is base are blameable. But the pleasures involved in our activities are more 'natural' and more akin to those activities than are the desires for those activities. The desires are separate and distinct, both in point of time and in their own nature, whereas pleasures are very closely akin to the activities from which they arise, and are in fact so little distinguishable from them as to make it an open question whether the activity is not the same thing as the pleasure. [Yet,

most assuredly, pleasure does not appear to be merely a movement of the mind, nor, again, a sensation, or one of the senses: such a view is paradoxical. Still, from the fact that pleasure is inseparable from thought and feeling, some think that it is identical therewith.]

Just, then, as our modes of activity are distinct, so also are the pleasures resulting therefrom.

3. Again, the sense of sight differs from the sense of touch in respect of pureness, and similarly hearing and smelling differ from taste. In a corresponding manner pleasures differ also; and among pleasures those that attend the exercise of the mind differ from those that attend the play of the senses, and each of the two forms of mental activity differs from the other.

3. Some activities are less material and more spiritual than others. Pleasures will follow the same analogy.

Now since each pleasure is specially akin to the activity from which it takes its rise, and activities differ from each other in goodness and badness—some being desirable, some detestable, and some neutral—it is plain that the same holds good of pleasures—some must be good, some bad, and some neutral; and the pleasure which is akin to the honourable, good, and worthy activity, shares those qualities; while that which is akin to the baser activity shares that quality (for of course desires for the honourable are praiseworthy, and desires for the base, blameworthy), and lastly, the pleasure which is akin to the neutral activity is itself neutral. And since in the activity there is what may be called an inner craving, by which we are impelled to exercise the activity, we must inquire whether pleasure be more akin to the activity or the inner impulse. Apparently it is more closely akin to the activity; for it is not cotemporary with the inner impulse, either in origin or in duration, but distinct from it in both. The inner impulse precedes both the activity and its concomitant pleasure; which are themselves so closely cotemporary as to raise a doubt if they be not identical. It would seem then that the pleasure is nearer akin to the activity than to the inner impulse; yet they are not identical; pleasure is under no circumstances identical with Intellect, nor with any Sense; the very idea is absurd; but, as being inseparable, an activity and its pleasure sometimes *seem* to be one.

Again, pleasures differ from one another, as activities do: Sight, *e.g.* from Touch, in *purity*—in so far as the former takes cognizance of *form* only, while the latter brings us more into communication with *matter*. So again Hearing differs from Smell and Taste, as being less concerned with matter than they are. Correspondingly different are the concomitant pleasures of these different activities. Nay, even the pleasures of Intellect cannot but be different from each other, because there are diverse activities of the Intellect.

(*c*) ARGUMENTS FROM VARIETIES OF CHARACTER IN SUBJECTS CAPABLE OF FEELING PLEASURE.

It is thought that there is a pleasure proper and natural to every organized being, just as there is also a proper function; and this natural pleasure is that which attends the exercise of its functions.

Activities differ in different animals: Pleasures are like

the activities, and consequently differ in kind.

In every single creature this truth will be evident if we examine the matter carefully. The pleasure of a horse is distinct from that of a dog or from that of a man. As Heraclitus says, an ass would choose a bundle of fodder rather than gold, fodder being more agreeable to asses than gold.

The pleasures of animals who are ruled by instinct fall under general groups.

As, therefore, the pleasures special to subjects differing in kind, are themselves different in kind; so on the other hand it is reasonable to conclude that pleasures special to the same class of subjects are indistinguishable.

But *man*, having a free will, varies his activities; and the variation of his activities is followed by a corresponding difference in his pleasures.

But in the case of *men* at any rate the objects that cause pleasure differ in no slight degree. Things which delight some men are painful to others: things distressing and hateful to some men are pleasant and welcome to others. This difference is found to exist even in matters of taste: the same things do not appear sweet to a man who has a fever as to one who has sound health, nor does the same thing appear hot to an invalid as to one who is hale and strong. In a similar manner this observation applies to things that are distinct *per se*.

Amid these varieties the standard of the virtuous man is the true and only standard.

In all such cases where pleasure and pain are concerned, it is the impression made on the good man that appears to be the true one. But if this principle can be safely laid down (as it probably may)—if, that is, the criterion of every pleasure is virtue and the virtuous man in the degree of his virtue, then what appear pleasures to *him* will be pleasures indeed, and things in which he takes delight will be delightful indeed.

No argument can therefore be drawn from disgraceful pleasures.

But it is no marvel if what is distasteful to the good man should appear pleasant to others. There are many corrupt and debased forms of human nature; and it is only to such and such like that the things which a good man abhors appear pleasant: they are not really so.

Pleasures however that are confessedly disgraceful cannot, it is clear, be rightly called pleasures, except to the vicious and abandoned.

The virtuous man being the standard of right, the ac-

But among pleasures that appear honest and true, of what nature can we say is the distinctive pleasure of *man?* Is it not, evidently, the pleasure that flows from the conscious exercise and develop-

ment of his faculties, every form of such development being attended by a pleasure of its own?

tivities of such an one will give the highest pleasure.

Whether therefore there be one activity or many forms of activity that are proper to the perfect and happy man, the pleasures which consummate those activities may be emphatically called the proper pleasures of man. Other pleasures are so in a secondary sense, through many gradations and ranges, just as are the activities from which they arise.

The pleasures of intellect, therefore (whether speculative or practical), will be the highest pleasures; and all others can only take rank by relation to this standard.

Further, it appears that each living thing, having its own function, has therewith its own pleasure. Because, if each activity has its concomitant pleasure, and if each living thing has its special natural activity, each must have its special pleasure; as individual instances demonstrate. There is one pleasure of a horse, another of a dog, another of a man; Heraclitus notes this point, when he says 'the ass prefers his wisp of hay to gold; fodder is sweeter than gold—to asses.' So, at any rate, pleasures akin to different activities are themselves different: while, as is natural, those akin to the same activities are akin to one another—in kind, that is; for in quantity they may differ. Everybody knows that an activity gives very varying amounts of pleasure to different men; so much so indeed that one and the same activity is the delight of one man and the detestation of another.

Thus, for instance, men do not all think the same things sweet; the fever-patient and the healthy man differ widely on this point, and so do the weakly and the strong, about heat—and so in other cases. Still, just as in those cases we can learn to discriminate the truly sweet from the seemingly sweet by a reference to the taste of sound and healthy men—so can we discriminate the moral pleasures from others by a reference to men of a sound moral condition—good men, in short. And if this be an accurate saying, that 'virtue is the measure of each thing, and each man is good in right of such virtue as he possesses'—then the true definition of pleasures will be 'such things as the good man considers pleasures,' and of things agreeable, 'those in which the good man feels delight:' while things for which he has a distaste, can in no true sense be called agreeable, nor pleasures. And if corrupted men think such things agreeable, it is not matter for wonder; for there are many polluted and debased instincts, which are agreeable to corrupted men, but not in a true sense agreeable. Plainly then we must not say that confessedly base pleasures are pleasures, unless with the saving clause 'to corrupted men.'

But of the honourable pleasures, which shall we name the expressly human pleasure?

This too is clear from the preceding discussion. Since each pleasure is akin to the activity it accompanies, let us find the *human* activity—that of man quâ man—(whether it be one or more activities): then, the pleasures which perfect that activity, or those activities, as found in the perfect and happy man, are the pre-eminently human pleasures; the others may be called human, like their activities, in a secondary sense and in a more multifarious classification.

II.—CONCERNING HAPPINESS.

i.—General conception of Happiness.

The examination of the Virtues and of Friendship and of Pleasure being now concluded, it remains for us to describe in outline the nature of Happiness—regarding happiness, as we do, as the consummation of human interests.

From (the efficient cause) virtues, friendship, and pleasure, we now pass to (the final cause) happiness.

The discussion will certainly be expedited if we recapitulate the arguments already advanced upon the subject.

We have thus discussed the Virtues, and Friendship, and Pleasure: it remains to deal in outline with Happiness, because it is, by common consent, the end and aim of all human action. We shall give the clearest and readiest account of it by recalling our previous statements on the subject.

(*a*) HAPPINESS IS NOT A PASSIVE CONDITION.

We have already shown that happiness is not a merely passive condition of mind. If it were so, it might be possessed by a man who slumbered all his life through, having an existence like that of plants, or by a man who was suffering from the direst misfortunes.

If happiness were a ἕξις, (1) it might belong to a man in sleep: or (2) in great affliction.

We stated in the thirteenth chapter of the first Book that Happiness is not a mere condition of mind: for, if it were, a man who lay asleep all his life, or lived the merely vegetative life, and even the man of many and great woes, might have to be called happy: for such lives may befal a man who yet has the habit of virtue.

(*b*) HAPPINESS AN ACTIVITY DESIRABLE *PER SE*.

If, however, such a view would not satisfy our idea of happiness, and we must rather rank it as a conscious, *active* play of the faculties (as has been explained in the preceding Books), and all such modes of human activity are either (1) unavoidable and only desirable as means to ends, or (2) desirable for their own sake, it is evident that we must regard happiness as one of those states that are desirable for their own sake, and not as one of those that are desirable relatively to something else. Happiness lacks nothing for its completeness, but is perfect in and by itself.

Happiness being an activity (and the modes of activity being (1) subordinate, or (2) absolute), will be a mode of activity absolutely choiceworthy *per se*.

Now those mental activities are absolutely choiceworthy from which nothing is expected beyond their own free exercise; and

acts that are regulated by a moral law seem to be of this character, since the performance of good and noble acts comes under the category of things desirable for their own sake.

Definition of absolute activities.

If, then, it seems absurd to call such a man happy, it remains to us to conclude that Happiness is an activity: so we must certainly inquire which of the human activities it is. For some activities are perfunctory, and tend to aims other than themselves, and are sought, consequently, as means, not as ends; while others are in themselves desirable. Hence it is apparent that Happiness is to be reckoned in the latter class, as being adequate in itself and in no way imperfect; while whatever is chosen as means to an object, clearly needs the addition of that object, to be in itself desirable and good.

But activities according to the virtues (which are sought not as means but as ends), are adequate in themselves; to do things honourably and well is among the things choiceworthy *per se*.

(*c*) HENCE MANY THINK THAT HAPPINESS IS IDENTICAL WITH AMUSEMENT WHICH IS ALSO DESIRED *PER SE*.

Amusements, again, that are pleasurable, seem to be of this character: men desire them, irrespective of consequences. Indeed the tendency of amusements is that men are injured rather than benefited thereby, disregarding, as they do, health and fortune in the pursuit.

But 'amusement' comes within this definition of perfect activities: will amusement then be happiness?

But the majority of those whom the world accounts happy, have recourse to amusements of this kind, because at the courts of Princes men skilled in such like pastimes are in high favour, as making themselves agreeable in entertainments for which Princes crave: indeed such courtiers are necessary for them. Still, though such things are popularly thought essential to happiness because men in high office divert themselves therein, yet men of this type are surely no real criterion of what happiness is. In the mere exercise of power there is implied neither moral worth nor intellectual perception, whence alone right dispositions and a good life have their rise.

The mass of men think so, and those who have greatest power are those who are keenest for amusement.

Yet neither 'the many' nor 'the powerful' are true judges upon such a subject.

Pleasant amusements are no doubt in this same category: that is, they are chosen for their own sakes, and when chosen bring no ulterior advantage, but rather loss; for they lead to neglect of health, and of such possessions as tend to health. Thus it happens that many of the fortunate, whose life's course runs smoothly, betake themselves eagerly to the life of amusement, and highly esteem men of ready and amusing disposition; and, at the courts of tyrants, skilled jesters gain much popularity, by pleasantly providing their masters with the amusement which they desire, and think necessary for their so-called Happiness. Well, such amusements are thought to constitute happiness, because men

in high power spend so much time in them; but they do not really constitute it, and the suffrage of such men is quite inadequate as a proof. Power is no guarantee of virtue nor of healthiness of mind, and it is these which produce sound activities.

(*d*) BUT NONE BUT THE PERFECT MAN IS COMPETENT TO PRONOUNCE UPON MORAL QUESTIONS.

Worthlessness of an appeal to popular passions.

The mere fact that men who have never had a taste of genuine and noble pleasures, hurry away to bodily enjoyments, must not lead us to infer that a life of self-indulgence is therefore more desirable than a life of virtue:—that would be to argue like children, who fancy that things prized among themselves are things most excellent. It is very natural therefore that there should be a wide difference between the feelings of the good and the bad, precisely as there is between the impressions of children and of men.

The judgment of all men is coloured by their character. Only the virtuous man therefore can determine questions of virtue.

We come back therefore to the view which has been often explained in this Treatise, that things are only pleasurable in reality when they appear so to the mind of the good man: whilst to each individual the activity is most desirable which is in accordance with his own peculiar state; so, too, the activity most desirable in the eyes of the good man is one that is regulated by the standard of virtue.

The fact that men, being wholly and lastingly devoid of taste for noble and genuine pleasure, betake themselves to mere carnal delights, does not lead us to conclude that such delights are in any sense preferable to genuine pleasures. Children think their own pet toys the finest of all things, but such childish things are valueless to men; and, correspondingly, honest men will not admire what base men think admirable; for the former are attracted by the reality, the latter by the semblance, of pleasure.

Therefore, as we began by saying, the true definition of things honourable and noble is 'those which the righteous man thinks such.' And since each man aims at and prefers such activities as correspond to the inner habits of his soul, and the righteous man lives according to the habit of virtue, it is plain that *his* pleasure will be in activities according to virtue, and that these, and these alone, will seem to him either honourable or pleasant; while mere amusements, as being alien to his soul's habit, will seem contemptible. Such a man's decision will be sound and correct.

(*e*) FURTHER ARGUMENTS THAT PLEASURE IS NOT SUMMUM BONUM.

1. Amusement is not an end perfect in itself.

Happiness, then, does not consist of Amusement. It would surely be absurd that the Chief End of man should be amusement, and that men should spend their energies and endure hardship all life

long for the sake of subsequently diverting themselves. There is nothing but what has an end beyond itself, *except happiness;* to speak generally, everything else that we desire has regard to something beyond. But happiness is an end complete and absolute in itself.

Again, to devote ourselves to a life of labour and of privation, with only amusement for a motive, is evidently the sheerest folly and childishness. On the contrary, the right course seems to be, as Anacharsis says, to take amusement only to qualify us for the strain of serious work. Amusement has, in fact, a resemblance to relaxation, and all men require relaxation, being unable to labour without intermission. Consequently 'relaxation' is not itself a 'final end,' being taken only with a view to subsequent activity.

2. The raison d'être of amusement is subsequent activity.

Furthermore, it is thought that the happy life is one in conformity with virtue; but virtue involves a spirit of earnestness, and does not consist in amusement.

3. Amusement is inconsistent with the very idea of the happy life.

We say too that things earnest are better than things frivolous or things that bring amusement, and that the activity of Reason as the highest faculty and of man as the noblest creature, is more earnest and more important than any other; and the activity of that which is highest is at once better and fraught with greater happiness.

4. From the economy of our nature, the activity of the higher powers is happier than that of the lower.

As for bodily or sensuous pleasures, that is a happiness which any one might enjoy—the slave no less than the best of men. But no one allows a slave any claim to real happiness, any more than to real *life*. True happiness is not possible in such pursuits as those of a slave, nor in fact under any other circumstances than the free development of a life in harmony with virtue, as has been already explained.

5. Amusement involves dissipation and may be enjoyed by a slave; but the slave's life is inconsistent with happiness.

We may, therefore, conclude that mere amusement is not a thing to be held in honour, and that true Happiness is not to be found in it. Indeed it is absurd to conceive of amusement as being the 'end' of human life, and to devote oneself utterly to labour and trouble all one's life, to secure amusement: yet this must be allowed to be necessary, if one suppose amusement to be happiness. For whatever else we seek, we seek as a means to happiness; and it is the extreme of folly, and childishness itself, to sweat and struggle through life to obtain amusement! But to choose amusement on the principle of Anacharsis—that we may do serious work the better for it—is the true and proper course. For amusement is a kind of respite to those who live a life of effort, inasmuch as they cannot keep up a continuous strain; it revives their power and restores them to their task refreshed and invigorated; so that the respite is not an 'end' in itself, but

the activity is the 'end' of the respite. Besides, everybody allows that the truly happy life must be in accordance with virtue; it must therefore be an earnest life; and the earnest man is such in virtue of his serious hours, not of those of amusement. Further, we say that things serious are in themselves of higher type than matters jocose and comic; and that the activity of the better part of the soul is of a higher type than that of the worse part; and that which is itself better and has a better origin is more akin to true happiness.

Further, indulgence in carnal pleasures is common to all—to ordinary men, to base men, to slaves—and to the most villainous as much as to the best; but happiness is said to appertain to the good and to them only; for no one could ascribe it to the base as well, any more than he could say that the base and the best lived an identical life: because Happiness is not incident to a low standard of living, but resides, as we have already said, in activities which are in accordance with virtue.

ii.—Happiness under its ideal aspects.

(*a*) HAPPINESS, BEING THE ACTIVITY OF THE HIGHEST PART OF OUR NATURE, IS PHILOSOPHIC MEDITATION.

Happiness, is an 'activity according to virtue' and *perfect* virtue is the virtue of the highest part—*i.e.* νοῦς. *Perfect* happiness will, therefore, be intellectual activity.

If, then, happiness be the unfolding of a life in harmony with virtue, its standard must naturally be the highest virtue—*i.e.* the virtue of that which is highest. Consequently whatever this be, whether Intellect or some other faculty which by nature's right seems to rule and to take pre-eminence and to have an instinctive perception concerning objects noble and divine (whether it be itself divine, or whether of all attributes within us it be most divine)—the activity of this faculty, in accordance with its own proper excellence and realizing its own standard, will be perfect, absolute happiness; and, as has been explained, such an activity will be meditative or philosophic.

It being proved, then, that Happiness resides in activities according to virtue; if there be among such activities any pre-eminent one, that will be the special abode of Happines. For Happiness is pre-eminent and the crown of all things; and our crowning activity is that of the best among our powers—(that power, I mean, which by nature rules and guides us towards truth and the good; whether we call it Spirit or by some other name, matters not; it is that part in us which comprehends things honourable and divine, and is itself divine, or, at any rate, the most divine of our powers). The activity of this power, well and fitly developed and in accordance with its special virtue, must be Perfect Happiness.

(*b*) CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LIFE OF MEDITATION.

Intellectual activity satisfies fully all the requisite conditions of happiness.

This view of happiness will be seen (from the accompanying description) to harmonize with our previous statements and with the truth.

1. The activity of Reason is *the highest* form of

activity, since Reason is the highest faculty within us, and the subjects which come within the cognizance of Reason are the highest within the range of thought.

1. It is the *highest* conceivable.

2. Moreover this activity is the *most abiding:* we are better able to meditate continuously than to do, continuously, aught else whatever.

2. It is the *most permanent.*

3. This activity inspired by Philosophy is confessedly more than all other activities that are conformable to virtue, most *pleasurable;* and we all think it essential that pleasure should be intermingled with happiness. It is believed at any rate that Philosophy entails pleasures that are marvellous both in purity and permanence; and it is but natural that the pursuits of those who have attained to knowledge should be more delectable than the pursuits of others who are searching for it.

3. It is *most pleasurable.*

4. Further, the '*self-sufficiency*' of which I have spoken, will be most surely found in the practice of meditation. Of course the mere necessaries of life are required as much by the philosopher as by the man of honour and all others. But, assuming men to be amply provided with necessaries, the upright man has still further need of society of his fellow-citizens, towards whom and in reciprocity with whom he may display his integrity. Similarly in the case of the temperate and brave man—social surroundings are essential. The philosopher, on the contrary, is able to meditate even in isolation, and the more profound a philosopher he is, the better able is he so to meditate. It were, perhaps, preferable that he should have fellow-workers; still he is in himself perfectly independent and sufficient for the development of his own life.

4. It is perfectly self-sufficing.

5. Again, the activity of reason, even when quite alone, would seem to be cherished *for its own sake.* Nothing accrues from this activity beyond the simple play of thought; whereas from external activity we compass some result, greater or less, beyond the mere action itself.

5. It is independent.

6. Lastly, the activity of reason seems to imply the possession of *leisure.* To gain such leisure is the very aim of all our business, just as the purpose of carrying on war is to secure peace.

6. It is free from care.

[All other forms of life involve labour and anxiety.]

Now the exercise of the practical virtues takes place either in public life or in the career of the soldier; but the actions incidental to politics or to war seem to involve anxiety and labour—those of war absolutely so. The statesman never resolves on war for the simple purpose of fighting, nor does he make warlike preparations without an ulterior aim: he would be regarded as a perfect savage if he treated his friends as enemies simply that battles and slaughters might be brought about.

The activity of the statesman also is laborious and anxious, even beyond the mere exercise of political functions, aiming, as it does, at compassing ascendancy and honour, or at any rate happiness for himself and his fellow citizens (happiness in this sense being distinct from national or public happiness, which in fact we seek as personal and private and distinct from the happiness of the community as such).

This Happiness is *contemplative*; for both our previous account of human activities, and the facts as they stand, are witnesses that perfect happiness lies in the activity of contemplation. For indeed (as we said in our treatise on Friendship) Intellect is our essential being, and consequently the activity of Intellect is our highest activity, and its discoveries are the highest of all the discoveries of our senses: and therefore, if Happiness is the highest of all things, its province must certainly be that of Intellect, as the highest of our powers.

Furthermore, we must ascribe continuance to Happiness. Perfect happiness is only possible to a man on condition of no sudden break occurring in it; and this condition is most possible to Contemplation, which admits of continuance more than anything else that we do.

Further, we conceive that an admixture of Pleasure is necessary to Happiness; and, of all activities in accordance with virtue, that of the philosophic mind is confessedly most pleasurable. Philosophy indeed appears to confer marvellous pleasures, because of its purity and entire abstraction from matter, and its constant unchanging activity about subjects immutable and eternal. Herein it differs from practical activity, which needs matter to work on, and concerns things merely contingent, (*i.e.*, the details of practice), and therefore presenting no scope for perfect Happiness.

Further, the truly happy man must be adequate to himself—a quality conferred more by contemplative than by practical activity. The contemplative and the practical man alike require the necessaries of life; in addition to which the practical man needs other things to develope his activity in accordance with virtue; the just man, *e.g.*, requires other men as objects and aids of his just dealing, and so does the temperate man, and the brave man, and so on. But the Philosopher, even when alone, can philosophize, needing no other presence, and the greater philosopher he is, the less are his extraneous needs: and even if he does require companionship as an aid to better contemplation, still he is, most of all men, adequate to himself in practising perfectly his special activity.

Again, Happiness must be choiceworthy in itself and desirable; and the contemplative life answers to this requirement, being loved for itself. We seek no further end by its means, nor is there any collateral result of Contemplation, besides itself; whereas by all the practical virtues, there is some such object, greater or less, to be gained; by courage, victory; by temperance, serenity of soul; by prudence, discovery of means to the supreme End; by all alike, public prosperity. But Contemplation has no further result, with a view to which it

seems desirable, but is loved for its own sake. Therefore it appears to constitute human happiness.

Again, Happiness must subsist in a certain serenity and leisure for contemplation. For leisure, not work, is the true end; we work hard, in order to win leisure, just as we fight in order to win peace. But the activities of the practical virtues are exercised in public affairs and in war, which, of all actions, seem furthest removed from serenity and leisure. This is especially true of war; for, in that, serenity is impossible: (if it were otherwise, war would be sought for its own sake, which of course never happens; no one wishes to cause a war as *per se* desirable; it would be the act of a miscreant to make friends into enemies for the sake of war and carnage). Public affairs, too, are clearly contrary to leisure; the public man, besides managing the affairs of the state, has to obtain power and honours for himself, and happiness too, only not merely for himself but for the people as well; and this is distinctly a double work; as is proved by his own attitude towards it; he is not satisfied with his own happiness, but seeks that of the people, thereby showing that they are distinct.

(*c*) RÉSUMÉ: THE CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF THE PERFECT LIFE.

Exhaustive description of the philosophic life and its pre-eminence over the life of action.

If, therefore, among actions conformable to virtue, the career of the statesman or of the soldier, though pre-eminent in *éclat* and importance, is anxious and subordinate to ulterior purposes and is not choiceworthy for its own sake, whereas on the other hand, the activity of the intellect seems pre-eminent in moral worth (as being contemplative and philosophic), and aims at no end beyond itself, and involves a pleasure all its own and a pleasure which strengthens the power of meditation; and if, further, the characteristics of 'self-sufficiency' and 'freedom from care' and 'unwearyingness' (relatively to man), together with all other attributes that are commonly assigned to the happy man, are seen to follow in the wake of this intellectual activity—this, assuredly, will be the perfect happiness of man, if taken to comprise within it a full term of life, nothing incomplete being compatible with the conditions of happiness.

And since, of all actions according to virtue, those of public affairs and war are most considerable in honour and importance, and at the same time are most contrary to leisure, and specially directed to some end, not being in themselves desirable; while the activity of the intellect is of higher type, (as being the activity of the soul's noblest part,) and is sought for no object besides itself, nor itself aims at any other object, but possesses its special pleasure, and that a greater pleasure than attaches to the practical activities—which pleasure enhances the activity: since, also, the activity of Intellect is at once most adequate to itself and most serene (as far at least as such states are possible to man), and shares, in a word, all the qualities specially ascribed to the happy man: since, I say, all this is so, it is plain that Contemplation, which is the activity of the intellect in accordance with virtue, prolonged through a complete life (for neither duration, nor any particular of happiness, should be imperfect) forms the perfect happiness of man.

(*d*) THIS IS NOT AN UNATTAINABLE NOR TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAL

A life that fulfils these conditions will be higher than the common range of man. No one can live a life like this so far as he is merely man, but in so far as there is a divine element inherent in his nature. In the proportion in which this divine element is superior to the complex organism of man, in that degree also his intellectual or spiritual activities will be superior to those which are inspired by ordinary virtue.

Such a life is ideal; yet it is attainable in virtue of the divinity of his nature.

If, therefore, intellect is divine relatively to man, then the life which is conformable to intellect will be divine relatively to the life of man. But, for all that, we ought not to follow the advice of those who bid us think only of human interest as proper to our human life, and of that mortality which all men share. Rather ought we, so far as may be conceivable and possible, enter upon immortality, and to shape our every thought with the aim of living by the standard of the highest principle within us. Little though it be in bulk, intellect far surpasses all other powers in dignity and capacity: it would seem, in fact, to be each man's own 'self'—if, that is, a man's 'self' is the sovereign principle, and that which is highest within him. It would, therefore, be a monstrous thing if a man were to prefer not the life which is peculiarly his own, but a life that belongs to something else.

Moral obligation to follow the life of reason as the only true and proper life of man (reason being the truest 'self.')

The view maintained (in the last Book) will harmonize with the present: that 'which is peculiarly its *own*, is naturally the best and most agreeable to every creature.' So, too, if intellect be pre-eminently distinctive of man, the life regulated by intellect will be the life most pleasurable to man, and consequently also the life most truly blessed.

The life of reason, being suited to the highest nature of man, will give him truest pleasure and happiness.

Such life, however, is superhuman: a man who lives it, lives it, not *quâ* man, but in so far as he has an element of divineness in his nature. So then, by as much as the divine element excels the human admixture, by so much do its activities excel the other human activities– and its virtue, the rest of moral virtue. For if man is godlike *quâ* Intellect, the life of Intellect is godlike as compared with all other human life.

Let us not, however, follow the principle inculcated by some, 'Let man think man's thoughts, and mortal man heed the things of the mortal state.' Rather, let each man, as far as lieth in him, grasp at immortality and do all that he can to live in accordance with the highest element within him. And this element in us is Intellect. Granted, that in size and bulk it is inferior to all others, because it is above and apart from matter—it is yet the greatest of all in power and worth. It would be utterly absurd if a man were to choose for himself, not his own life

but that of some one else; yet, in simple fact, a man's true self is that in him which is most eminent and best; and he does not live for his true self, nor his own proper and real life, unless he lives in accordance with this best element. Indeed, what we said before will exactly apply here: what is proper and special to each man's nature is best and pleasantest to him; and the thing most proper and special to man is activity according to Intellect (if, as appears to be true, a man's Intellect is his real self) and, of each thing that has any activity, the special function is to develope that activity. Whence we conclude that the life according to Intellect is the highest and pleasantest life for man, and makes him most truly happy, and is, consequently, Human Happiness, in a primary sense and degree.

iii.—Happiness under its social aspects compared with the ideal happiness of Reason.

(*a*) CONTEMPLATION IS DIVINE: ACTION IS HUMAN.

The life inspired by other virtues is but second in the scale of happiness. Activities conformable to a law other than that of Reason are proper to man only in his social character. It is only by intercourse one with another, in commerce, in the various kinds of business, and in the control of our feelings, that we can display justice and courage and perform acts corresponding to the virtues, so as to maintain what is becoming in every relation and circumstance. But these actions and qualities are distinctive of our *human* rather than of our spiritual nature.

Happiness for man as a *social* being is derived from the moral virtues.

Some of these qualities seem in fact to result from our physical organization, and in many ways the excellence of our moral nature seems to be inseparably associated with the feelings.

Some moral virtues are dependent upon the bodily constitution of man.

Further, the moral sense is closely dependent upon the excellence of the moral nature, and this again reacts upon the moral sense, since of course, the principles of the moral sense are such as to correspond with the moral virtues, and the standard of the moral virtues is one that is regulated by the moral sense.

The moral sense depends upon the moral virtues,

These moral excellences, moreover, bound up as they are with the emotions, will be displayed in man in so far as he is a compound of soul and body, and the excellences of man as a complex organism are those which are proper to his distinctively *human* nature.

and the moral virtues are bound up with the affections.

Consequently both the life that is regulated by the virtues and the happiness which is their product will be characteristically *human*, and adapted to the frame of man.

Hence the moral life (and social happiness) is *human* rather than ascetic or spiritual.

Whereas the spiritual life (and contemplative happiness) is divine.

The happiness produced by philosophy, on the other hand, will be independent and apart from human interests and human needs. [So much only need be said about it: to examine the conception more particularly would be beyond the scope of our present purpose.]

The second place is held by that happiness which attends the exercise of the other virtues. Their activities are purely human, and subsist in the mutual relations of mankind. For instance, we exhibit towards each other acts of justice, of courage, and of the other virtues, in mutual affairs, dealings, and compacts, and we tutor our own feelings by preserving a seemly regard for our neighbour: and all these things, combined, are the preservation of this life of ours, in so far as its mortal admixture is concerned; they are, in fact, distinctively human.

Again, the moral virtues are at times much influenced by corporeal conditions many, *e.g.*, have naturally and constitutionally a tendency to temperance, or to bravery, or to magnanimity; and, in a general way, Moral Virtue and Insight are closely connected with the feelings. (I couple together Moral Virtue and Insight for reasons previously stated, *i.e.* because Insight has its first principles in the moral virtues, which supply to it the power of rightly conceiving the End; while Insight confers on Moral Virtue the knowledge of Means to the End, as we have explained in the thirteenth chapter of the Sixth Book.) Since, then, Moral Virtue concerns, and is closely connected with, human feelings, and Insight has been proved to be inseparable from Moral Virtue, it clearly follows that every virtue that is exhibited in action is closely connected with the feelings; that is, it concerns the admixture of the human element in us, and the life centred in that element, the virtues of which are the distinctively human virtues. (Indeed, the definition of man is borrowed from the terms expressing the human admixture of his nature.)

Consequently, the life and the happiness that are in accordance with these activities, are the distinctively human life and happiness: while only that life and happiness that are in accordance with Intellect are divine, being sundered from things purely human. To explain exactly how they are sundered, and what their essential character is, would be beyond the scope of this Treatise, and more suited to Theology, to declare. Let it suffice at present to affirm that they are superhuman.

(*b*) CONTEMPLATION IS FAR LESS DEPENDENT UPON OUTWARD CIRCUMSTANCES THAN ACTION IS.

The Spiritual life is far less the creation of circumstances than is the moral or social life, which presupposes a suitable field for its activity.

Intellectual happiness would seem also to require external help only to a trifling extent, or at any rate far less than does the happiness of the moral nature. Granted that the need of the bare necessaries of life is felt in both cases to an equal extent, though the citizen of the world be more solicitous about the body and material things:—the relative difference in either case will be but slight. In regard, however, to the exercise of their powers and faculties, the contrast between their external needs will be considerable. The liberal man will need resources to carry out his liberal purposes.

The just man will need money to requite his obligations. [Mere 'good intentions' are uncertain and precarious: even the unjust pretend that their desire is to act justly.] The brave man, again, will require opportunities if he is to achieve any exploit worthy of his courage; and the temperate man will need moral freedom. How, otherwise, could he, or any other character, be made manifest?

Upon this point a controversy has been raised—whether the most distinctive part of virtue be the intention of the agent or the performance of the act, virtue being implied under either aspect. Clearly the absolute or perfect form of virtue does not reside in either intention or act singly, but in the union of both.

'Is the morality of the *agent*, therefore, dependent upon the performance of *acts*, and so, absolutely intertwined with external conditions?'

However, for the performance of virtuous actions a man requires many favourable conditions; and the greater and more noble those actions are, the more numerous must the conditions be. On the other hand, for the philosopher in his meditations there is no need of any external circumstances cooperating, so far at least as concerns the simple play of thought: nay, external circumstances, to speak generally, are positively hindrances, at any rate to the practice of meditation.

Freedom and independence of the spiritual or contemplative life.

Still, so far as he is *man*, and lives in the society of his fellows, the philosopher consents to perform acts that accord with moral virtue; and consequently he will require such external resources as I have described, in order to play his part as a *man*.

The requirements of the philosopher are the barest minimum.

Our view is confirmed by the following considerations. Such a life and such happiness require no externals nor any provision from without, to support their activity. The life of Contemplation requires, of course, the necessaries of existence, inasmuch as its subject is a man; but, for its own activity, it needs nothing; while the life of practical action needs bodily provision as much as that of Contemplation does, (or rather more, because practical activities make a greater claim on the physical powers) and, beyond and besides that, needs an external equipment, *e.g.* the liberal man needs money wherewith to exercise his liberality; the just man needs it, to make repayments; and, without such external equipment, neither the one nor the other, nor any one possessing a virtue parallel to these, can do anything in accordance with his special virtue. The courageous man needs a certain coincidence, of opportunity and of physical strength, to be able to exhibit his courage and endurance: the temperate man needs a certain capacity and power of plunging, if he choose, into Pleasure; and so on, with the possessors of each practical virtue—all need certain coincidences and opportunities to exercise their virtue.

For, without action in accordance with the habit of a virtue, the desire and habit of that virtue remain utterly doubtful. Some men, *e.g.*, without being just, claim to feel the desire of dealing justly; others, without being liberal, claim to feel the desire of acting liberally.

Further, to have chosen a virtue deliberately is not, by itself, enough to pr duce a perfect example of it; it is also necessary to act up to it, for its perfe state needs both deliberate choice *and* action; both are so requisite that it h been questioned whether the choice or the action be the more essential eleme in virtue. For its perfection, plainly, is in their combination.

We have shown, then, that practical virtue needs for its perfection a certa external equipment; and the greater and fairer the virtue is, the more it nee this equipment—because its actions, if great and notable, need more extern opportunities to develope their exercise. But the man of contemplative virt needs no such aids and opportunities for the activity of his virtue; nay, suc aids stand in the way, so to speak, of Contemplation. Still, though as philosoph he will not need them, he nevertheless provides himself, as a man among me with the necessaries of practical virtue, in order to play the part of humanit properly with his fellow-men.

(*c*) THE LIFE OF THE GODS SHOULD BE OUR EXAMPLE, AND THEIR LIFE IS ONE OF CONTEMPLATION.

A further proof that perfect happiness is 'intellectual activity or a free exercise of thought, may be seen fro the following considerations. The conceptio which we have formed of the Gods is that the are in the highest sense blessed and happy.

What is best, is divine; but the diyine life is not one of action but of contemplation.

But, as for moral actions, what kind, pra could we attribute to *Gods?* Suppose the practice of justice:— surely they would appear ridiculous exchangin among one another, restoring deposits and such like things? or, can we suppose them to pe form deeds of courage, bearing up under ci cumstances of fear, and incurring danger because that we noble? Or suppose them to perform acts of generosity:—y to whom will they make presents? It were monstrous tha there should be currency or anything of that kind among *God* Or suppose the practice of self-restraint:—what would that mea of *Gods?* Would it not be a vulgar and equivocal complimen to say of them that they had no bad passions? Indeed, if w go through the whole catalogue of moral relations, we shal find that they are all trifling and too inadequate for the life o Gods.

Inconsistency of assuming action or moral virtue to the Gods.

Yet, notwithstanding, we have all this belief of the Gods tha they *live*, and hence that their existence is conscious and active existence:—we cannot o course imagine that they sleep their life lik an Endymion. But in the case of one wh *lives*, if action, and, still more, production, b taken out of his range, what is there left excep meditation?

What then is the life of the Gods if we exclude action and production? Contemplation or thought.

So, then, the activity of the Gods, though excelling our own in blessedness, will be the practice of meditation; and, among all the forms of activity that are possible for man, that will be most blessed that is nearest akin to the life of the Gods.

The life of the Gods should be our pattern.

There is a new proof of this view in the fact that the animal world generally have no share of happiness, deprived as they are of the faculty of meditation in the true sense of the term.

The same truth is shown us by contrast of the animal kingdom.

On the part of the Gods, then, their whole life is blessed; but on the part of men, their life is only blessed so far as there is abiding in us some faint resemblance to that heavenly contemplation. But of all living creatures not one, save man, is happy, as having in no sense any part in the 'Vision Divine.'

Our true happiness, therefore, will be in exact ratio of our power of contemplation.

The conclusion, therefore, is this: wide as is the range of intellectual activity, so wide is the range of happiness: those to whose lot it falls to have a more uninterrupted vista of truth, realize to an equal extent what it is to be happy—not uncertainly and as matter of chance, but in right of their powers of meditation, the vision of truth being precious and glorious in itself.

So long as the power of contemplation lasts, so long does the consciousness of happiness continue.

In a word, then, happiness is a species of ecstasy, or meditation upon things divine.

In fact, contemplation and happiness are identical.

The following consideration also proves that perfect happiness subsists in the contemplative life. Contemplation is the sole function of God, who is purely blessed and happy. For what other occupation can we possibly ascribe to Him? Can we say He deals justly, for instance? Nay, it is clearly absurd to conceive of Him as concluding bargains, restoring pledges, and so forth. Can we say He acts with courage? Nay, in what sense can He have to face things terrible or risk his life for honour? The very expression is preposterous. Can He show liberality? Nay, to whom can He show it, and by gift of what? It is absurd to conceive of Him as having money which He needs for his own support, but gives to others for generous motives. And how can He be temperate, having no bad appetites to curb? All such practical qualities are petty and unworthy to be ascribed to God.

But if, as all men conceive, He has life, He must have an activity—we cannot think that He lies torpid and inactive, like Endymion!

So, since He has an activity, but not, as we have shown, that of moral action, still less that of production, (for it is not reasonable to think of Him as continuously labouring, as handicraftsmen do, to produce material results,) what is left for us to ascribe to Him but Contemplation?

The activity, therefore, of God, being preeminent in blessedness, must be that of Contemplation; and perfect Happiness must certainly subsist in the contemplative life, because there it will be most closely linked to the activity of God. A further proof is, that no irrational beings have any share in true happiness, being wholly devoid of the activity of Contemplation. The whole life of

God is purely blessed: the life of man is blessed just so far as it bears the likeness and stamp of the divine activity; the life of animals is not purely blessed at all, inasmuch as they have no share in the contemplative faculty. All things therefore that have any share in Contemplation, have Happiness, and the larger share of Contemplation, the more Happiness. In short, Happiness and Contemplation are co-extensive, and that not incidentally but in virtue of Contemplation being verily and indeed Happiness, and in itself honourable and precious.

The conclusion is: 'Happiness, in its highest and most complete sense, is a sort of Contemplation.'

(*d*) THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHER ARE SLIGHT, AND ARE SURE TO BE PROVIDED BY THE GODS, WHO APPROVE HIS PURSUITS.

But on account of his human nature, the philosopher will require the circumstances around him to be sunny and bright. The nature of man is not sufficient, in its isolation, for the development of the spiritual life. His body must be sound and healthy: food and the conveniences of life must be provided for him. Yet surely we must not suppose that, if a man is to be happy, he will require a *multitude* of favourable conditions, though it be not competent for any one to be happy without *certain* external advantages. The true sufficiency of the philosopher does not depend upon superfluity; nor does our estimate of a man's character depend upon the abundance of his riches; nor does the morality of the act depend upon the wealth of the agent. It is competent for a man to perform noble deeds, though he be not 'lord of earth and sea:' even with moderate resources a man may act worthy of his virtue.

Still the happiness of Contemplation is not absolute and perfect unless certain conditions are assumed; *e.g.* health and the necessaries of life.

One may see unmistakable illustrations of this truth, since private individuals are thought to perform honourable acts no less than potentates; nay, even more so. It is sufficient for the practice of virtue that a man have a bare competency. However poor his worldly station, a man's life will be a happy life when he devotes his faculties to the practice of the virtues.

Even *moral* virtue can exist without great wealth or power, though certain conditions must be assumed.

Solon was probably correct in the portrait he drew of the happy when he described them as being (1) moderately provided with external goods, (2) as having performed most noble deeds (as he reckoned them), and (3) as having lived a temperate and sober life. Though possessed of only moderate means, a man may still perform his duty in all its relations.

That moderate means are sufficient for the attainment of happiness, supported by the authority of (1) Solon,

Anaxagoras, again, seems to have understood by the happy man

not the rich and powerful, since he said that he should not be surprised if the happy man were thought by the multitude a mere unfortunate. The mass of men form their estimate by outward circumstances, of which alone have they any perception. (2) Anaxagoras.

The opinions, therefore, of our sages seem to harmonise with my own definitions. This agreement at any rate affords some presumption in their favour; still, in matters of conduct, strict truth can only be ascertained by observation of results and of actual life. The important element in the question depends upon particular circumstances. Consequently we must bring the opinions and theories I have mentioned to the test of experience and of real life; and if our theories harmonize with facts we may accept them, whereas if they are at variance with facts we must regard them as 'idle words.'

The appeal to authority must be borne out by experience and fact.

But when a man developes a life in harmony with Reason and cherishes Reason above all things, he seems to be most perfectly constituted and most beloved of Heaven. Surely if any watchfulness is shown by Gods for the interests of men (as men hold), it is but natural that they should take pleasure in that element of our nature which is highest and most akin to themselves, viz. Reason, and that they should requite with their blessing those who love and honour Reason most truly when they see them having reverence for what is pleasing to Heaven, and living just and noble lives.

Fresh argument: the wants of those who cherish things divine are sure to be provided by the blessing of the Gods, who care for those who love what they love.

That all these qualities are found in the philosopher is no doubtful truth. The philosopher, therefore, is most beloved of the Gods; and it is but natural that he should also and by the same right be most happy. Here then is a new proof by which philosophy and happiness are shown to be identical.

The philosopher approaches nearest to the ideal of the Gods and is most beloved by them.

Still, for the work of Contemplation, it is necessary to keep the body sound and healthy by external aids: for it is irrational to expect any man, as such, not to require these aids: human nature is not, in such points, self-supporting.

But, of these things, the man of Contemplation will need less than the man of action. Absolutely, indeed, his requirements will not be many or great; they will consist merely of the necessaries of life, and of those to a moderate amount. For it is not the abundance of wealth and other externals that makes the happy man adequate to himself, or that persuades him to judge rightly in practical matters, or to do his duty therein. A man may act nobly, without possessing power by land and sea; he may, from moderate resources, effect such things as would well beseem men invested with dominions far and wide. We see this

clearly every day, when we find private men keeping the path of Honour and fair dealing, as well as, if not better than, men high in place and power.

Such moderate external provision, then, is sufficient for the truly happy man: it will enable him to practise his virtue, and to live the life of Happiness, without let or hindrance.

Solon confirms this view, by defining Happiness, not as *consisting* in external goods, but as being the lot of those who have a competency of external goods, who have done deeds of fame, and have lived a temperate life: for, be it well noted, men of limited possessions may equally walk in the path of duty.

Anaxagoras, also, it would appear, held that the happy man need not be rich or powerful: nay (he says) the many would think him an absurd personage; and no wonder, for the many have no eye for anything but externals and appearances, and are quite capable of thinking the really good and happy man a poor sorry creature.

Thus the opinions of these philosophers agree with our theories as here set forth—a fact which adds a certain confirmation to what we have said: though of course the main confirmation of moral theories is the agreement of the facts of life with them, just as their main refutation is a discrepancy of those facts. Practical facts are the standing test of theory: let us therefore consider the foregoing treatise and apply it to human actions and life, and, where it harmonizes, let us accept it as true; where it is at variance, let us presume it to be words and wind.

Lastly, the following argument evinces the superior happiness of the man whose activity is of the Intellect. He is the most beloved of God—which, in itself, is the summit of Happiness.

For if (as is held by all men, and, surely, with truth) God has any regard for things human and any care for their condition, in what, of all the possessions of man, should He more fittingly delight than in the noblest element of Humanity, which is most akin to Himself, namely in Intellect?

And if this be His principal delight, He will repay with all favour those who love, honour, and exercise Intellect, as being guardians of that which He most loves and to which He is most akin, and as acting in other respects well and nobly.

Such is the character of the true philosopher, whose activity is that of the Intellect; and he, consequently, is most loved of God, and is, naturally, the happiest of men withal.

The conclusion, therefore, is that the philosopher is the truly happy man, and that Happiness subsists in the life of Contemplation.

III.—THE BORDER-LAND BETWEEN ETHICS AND POLITICS.

(*a*) THE THEORY OF MORALS SUBORDINATE TO PRACTICAL STATESMANSHIP.

The aim of Ethics is not merely the anatomy of social duties but the realization of virtue in practical life.

Now that a sufficient description has been given to explain in general outline my theory of life and virtue, of friendship and of pleasure, are we to suppose that the purpose of this Treatise is complete? Is it not rather the truth that, as the saying is, in questions concerning conduct, the end is not to speculate nor to comprehend the bearing of every duty, but rather to carry them into effect? Neither assuredly, in

the case of virtue, is it enough to understand its meaning, we must endeavour to possess it for ourselves and to put it to practical use, or to adopt any other means there be by which we may ourselves become virtuous.

Had theories of virtue been sufficient to make men virtuous, most deservedly, as Theognis says, would they have carried off many and great rewards, and it would have been our duty to have equipped ourselves with them. In fact, however, theories are only found to have influence enough to urge forward, and encourage to virtue, such of the young as are noble-minded, and even to keep obedient to virtue characters high-tempered and truly enamoured of virtue, amid the assaults of evil; but on the other hand they are powerless to incite the masses to the practice of virtue and the sentiment of honour.

Moral speculations are *per se* profitless, except as an encouragement to the noble few.

Such in fact is the tendency of the masses, that they are controlled by fear rather than by self-respect, and they refrain from what is base through apprehension of punishment rather than from a sense of shame. Living by the rule of their passions, they follow after such pleasures as are congenial to them, and compass opportunities by which such pleasures may be gained; so, too, they try to avoid the pains that conflict with their pleasures, and they have not so much as a notion of what is noble and inherently pleasurable, never having tasted its sweetness.

The mass of men require penal sanctions rather than moral appeals to maintain their allegiance to duty.

When men have a character such as this, what argument can possibly bring them to order? It is an impossible task, or at least it is no easy one, to reform by means of argument impressions that have for a long time been stamped upon the character. It is surely a result to be satisfied with, if, when all conditions are provided through which we are thought likely to become good, we may even so gain some share of virtue.

Hopelessness of attaining a social reformation by means of argument.

We have, in what we have said, given a suitable and sufficient sketch of the Virtues and of Friendship, and of Pleasure, and of Happiness: and our Treatise needs no further account of them.

Is then our whole design accomplished, and has our task reached the proper conclusion?

Not so, for our Philosophy has Action in view, and must be summed up and completed in conformity with that design—while to know what Virtue is, or what Friendship, and so on, is theory only.

Therefore, even as the man who is aiming at virtue must not close his effort

when he has learnt what he should do and from what he should abstain, and what Virtue is, and what Vice, and what the supreme end and object of Humanity —but must apply himself to Action, and do the right and avoid the wrong and strain every nerve to reach true Happiness—even so, I say, he whom we may call the athlete of Virtue must not be satisfied with what we have hitherto said (which only shows him what each of these things—Virtue, Friendship, Pleasure, Happiness—is in itself); he must go further and learn, as it were, to bring them into being aright, and having learnt, must teach the same, feeling that thus only can he be an actual Teacher of Virtue. For the Teacher must so shape his teaching as to perfect his pupil; and perfection, for the athlete of virtue, lies in becoming truly virtuous and a willing doer of all that is honourable.

Clearly therefore we must add, to what we have said about the virtues, directions for practice—what actions a man must do and what disposition he must develop to make himself really akin to Virtue and the Good, and really inclined to hear expositions of Virtue, and capable of living according to her laws. For thus our treatise on Virtue would be adequate to its own aim, by preserving throughout the result it develops—viz., the virtuous character.

Therefore we must try to exhibit the method of teaching that leads to action; for if a mere treatise on Virtue could induce men to be virtuous, I should indeed, in the words of Theognis,

'Win me a manifold wage, ample and merited meed,'

and my Treatise would be of high value and much to be sought after. As it is, such words seem able to stimulate and exhort to virtue and its practice and habit, all the better and more liberal, noble, and aspiring dispositions among our youth; but not yet able to do the same by the many: of whom no one can be led to choose honour and eschew baseness, merely by means of words and persuasion. For they are not led by a fine sense of shame to abhor the very idea of appearing base—but, if at all, by fear of consequences: and they do not abstain from mean actions because they are mean and because to do them is base, but because of the penalties.

And the cause of this is, that such men do not live by Reason, the parent of Honour—but in obedience to their instincts, and consequently in pursuit of the pleasures which follow those instincts, and in avoidance of the pains which thwart them. And avoidance of pains is Fear; and when men are in this state, and, never having tasted of things truly honourable and right are unable even to conceive of them, what mere Treatise can set them in a better way? It is impossible, or next to it, for mere argument to remove qualities engrained and confirmed by lapse of time. Other means are required; and, even with them, we must be well satisfied if one or two, out of the many, turn to Virtue and good principles.

It being allowed, then, that words are not adequate to secure the object in view, we must inquire what that is which is needed as a substratum, to enable argument to persuade men to the Good.

(*b*) THE PROVINCE OF EDUCATION IDENTICAL WITH THAT OF LAW.

The means whereby men are made good, are variously explained. Some philosophers think that goodness is a gift of nature: others that it is a formation of habit: others again, that it is the product of instruction or philosophy.

The instruments which are used in the attainment of virtue are (1) Nature, (2) Training, (3) Philosophy.

Now, evidently, a gift of nature does not depend upon our own control: it results from 'chance divine,' and falls only to the lot of those who are truly 'favourites of fortune.'

(1) Nature is the instrument of *Providence.*

Reason and instruction certainly are not equally effectual in all cases, but (to secure their influence) the soul of the student must be previously moulded by the formation of habits, with the aim that the pleasures or aversions it feels may be true and right —the soul being like the ground that is to nourish the good seed. If a man live by the law of his passions he will not hear the voice of reason dissuading him from his evil ways, nor yet again will he understand; and when a man is in such a frame of mind, how is it possible to convince him of his folly? In a word, passion seems to yield not to Reason but to force.

(3) Philosophy is powerless without (2) previous Training or Discipline.

Hence it is essential that the character or temper of a boy should be previously shaped in some way or other so as to be naturally receptive of virtue, loving what is noble and scorning what is base. But it is difficult for a boy to secure a right education unless he be reared from early youth under the discipline of laws framed for moral ends. To live a life of temperance and of endurance is not agreeable to men in general, least of all to the young. Their diet and pursuits ought, therefore, to be controlled by legal sanctions: such a discipline will not be painful if it be made habitual.

Essential importance of *early* habituation to the practice of virtue.

The causes of Virtue in man are, it is allowed, three—Nature, Instruction, Habit.

Of these, Nature is plainly not under our own control. To have a natural disposition to Virtue comes to the truly fortunate by some divine agency. Instruction, and mere argument about virtues, cannot, in every case, persuade or convince, as we have already shown.

Habit is necessary, before argument. That is, the soul of him who listens to the argument needs a previous equipment of good habits, whereby he feels delight in, and dislike for, the proper objects.

This is the right preparation for Instruction—the soil, as it were, best fitted for the seed: and without such preparation, how can one yield to any argument that dissuades from Pleasure? nay, how can he, who lives according to his instincts alone, even comprehend such argument? and if he cannot comprehend it, how can it convince him of error?

To make instincts yield to Reason plainly requires something more than argument—a certain *force*. The words of Reason, then, being incapable by themselves of making men good, Habit must form the soil for Instruction to sow; that is, Habit must aid Instruction to qualify the learner for closer kinship with Virtue, more love of the noble, more hatred of the base.

Thus we have shown that Habit, and a certain preparation of soul, must precede Virtue.

How is good Habit, and sound guidance and direction towards Virtue, to be secured without rules of conduct, themselves right and just and conducive to Virtue?

Such rules are necessary for our education, from childhood itself. For temperate and hardy life is not pleasant to average men, especially in youth; and consequently their practice, nurture, and life in general, must be placed under rules; a process which only habituation can make otherwise than painful to us.

(*c*) THE REIGN OF LAW MUST, THEREFORE, EXTEND TO THE WHOLE OF LIFE.

Education begun in childhood must be continued by the State through the whole of life.

Yet it is not sufficient, surely, that we should enjoy a proper course of diet, and supervision only as boys: even when grown to man's estate, we must practise the traditions of our boyhood and live by habit; in the regulation of our habits, therefore, and generally in the whole conduct of life, we shall need the control and guidance of the laws. Compulsion rather than reason is the motive to which the masses yield obedience: pains and penalties are more efficacious with them than the sense of right.

The State must adopt a system of rewards and punishments as motives to influence different classes of citizens.

Looking to the different motives which influence men, some philosophers think that our legislators in framing laws ought to encourage and stimulate men to the practice of virtue for the sake of what is noble and right, with the conviction that those who have been rightly brought up by a course of habits will hearken to such an appeal; on the other hand, if men will not heed the call of duty, but are of too ignoble a nature, then ought our legislators to inflict punishments and penalties upon them, and absolutely to banish from the State such as are incurable. The man who is upright and guides his life by the law of honour will, they rightly think, be obedient to the voice of reason; whereas the bad man while striving after pleasure is controlled, like a refractory steed, by the infliction of pain. For the same reason they also maintain that the pains inflicted by the laws ought to be of a character the exact reverse of the pleasures which the delinquents have unduly loved.

The State must be the guardian of the *whole* life of its citizens, directing everything to a noble and virtuous end.

If it be the fact, then, that, as has been explained, a man must be morally and nobly trained and moulded to particular habits if he is to be a good man, and then, after his character has been thus formed, pass his life in pursuits or occupations that are honourable and right, and under no circumstances, voluntarily or involuntarily, commit disgraceful deeds;—these conditions, I say, can only be secured when men's lives are ordered and their conduct constrained by some form of Reason and by a moral discipline carrying with it a power of coercion.

It is not in youth only that rules are necessary, but in manhood also: for proper nurture in youth will not suffice to make men good; they must, when

grown-up, practise honourable deeds and accustom themselves to Virtue. So that, at that stage also, and indeed all through life, rules will be required. For most men obey compulsion better than Reason, and penalties better than the call of Honour.

This has induced some men to think that law-givers should begin by urging people to Virtue and the Good, by words and exhortations, in the name of Honour; for that the good would become better by being thus habituated to the idea of excellence—and then the law-givers should proceed to lay penalties and inflict chastisements on the recalcitrant and less noble natures; and, finally, should banish the incurably vicious from the society of those who are, or may become, sound men. The natural discipline is that the righteous man, who lives for Honour, should yield loyal obedience to Reason; and that the base man, who is always craving for pleasure and obeying his animal instincts, should be chastened, like a beast of burden, into obedience and improvement. Thus, we are told, irrational men must be chastised by infliction of those pains which are directly opposed to the pleasures they love: *e.g.*, the covetous man should be despoiled of what he has; the hectoring braggart should be treated with contumely; the debauched man should be whipped, and so on.

Now if all this preliminary discipline be hard and unlovely, and if, for all that, it is essential for every man to be honest and good—the process of proper nurture and education must begin early. We cannot be too soon taught the habit of honour, and to learn and cleave to the good practice thereof, so as to do no meanness, either without or with intention.

This result can be reached by living a life in obedience to a certain discipline and to fixed rules that have both authority and efficacy.

(*d*) DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE LEGISLATION OF THE FAMILY AND OF THE STATE.

Now the government of a father has no stability nor any binding, compulsory force. Nor, again, has the ordinance of any single individual a constraining power, unless he be a king or a person of similar authority. On the contrary, Law involves a power of obligation, since its decision is one that issues from a kind of Moral Insight and Abstract Reason. Again we hate those who on their own responsibility oppose our inclinations, even though they are right in doing so. On the other hand Law is not offensive to us, since it ordains only what is abstract right.

No authority, save that of the State, is sufficiently powerful to undertake the education of the citizens.

It is only, however, in the city of the Lacedæmonians with a few others that the legislator seems to have made provision for regulating the diet and pursuits of the citizens. In the majority of States a complete disregard for such matters prevails, and every citizen lives the life he chooses, after the fashion of the Cyclops 'legislating for his children and his wife.'

And even the States (excepting that of Sparta) are indifferent to their higher responsibilities.

The best course, however, is that there should be a system of

moral education common to all the citizens, and that the legislature should have authority to make it compulsory. But where National Education is neglected by the State, it would seem to be the duty of each individual to do what in him lies for his children and friends to promote morality among them, or at any rate to have the desire and intention of doing so. It would seem from what has been said, that a man would have the best chance of carrying out his purpose by cultivating the spirit of the legislator. For it is evident that the administration of the State is carried out by means of laws, and when the laws are good the administration will be good also.

Though the State is the proper guardian of education, in default of action by the State private and individual action is necessary.

The commands of parents, however, to their children, are not, as a rule, efficacious in compelling: nor, indeed, have those of any individual (unless he be a despotic ruler or a king) force to drive average men against their will into the path of Honour.

But what the commands of men cannot enforce, the Law can, because it is believed to have been instituted by some superior mind and judgment. So it is that the multitude detests those who oppose, however rightly, its impulses; but no one bears any grudge against the Law, and its directions to do the good and renounce the bad. For, while human teachers of virtue can be suspected of inflicting pain for malicious or jealous reasons, the Law, being impersonal, cannot so be suspected. Laws, therefore, of direction and control, operating in favour of virtue, are necessary to us from childhood.

Among communities, however, only that of the Lacedæmonians, with, perhaps, a very few others, has such laws. Most countries have disregarded the necessity of them—and, in such countries, each man orders his life and household as he will, with a sway as absolute as that of the Cyclops—

'O'er wife and children.'

The true course is, to have proper public ordinances, so that all may be able to follow, and live according to, rule and Right Reason. Where this is not so, and where, consequently, the public interest is neglected, it seems to be the duty of each man to help his children and friends onward on Virtue's path—or, at any rate, to be ready and anxious so to help them when opportunity offers; and a careful study of the requisite laws will enable every one so to help his neighbours. Now Laws are the essence of careful improvement; and public improvement results from public laws, and all honest and seemly improvements and instructions from corresponding—*i.e.*, honest and seemly—laws.

(*e*) NECESSITY OF A STATESMAN-LIKE SPIRIT, EVEN FOR PRIVATE LEGISLATION.

It would seem to be immaterial whether the laws are written or unwritten, or, again, whether they are such that one person or many will be trained by them; their precepts, *i.e.*, are of universal application, like those of Music or Gymnastic or similar professions.

But private education must be based upon *law* as much as State education.

In fact the counsels of a father and the traditions he sets have precisely the same influence in private families as institutions and customs have in States; nay, even more so, through the tie of blood and the benefits received. In families the members start with a store of affection, and are obedient from an instinct of nature.

In private education the father occupies the position of the State.

There are, moreover, positive differences in the training suited to private life and in that adapted to the community. There is an exact analogy in the case of medicine. As a matter of general theory, repose and low diet are best for a man who is in a fever, but in a particular instance possibly the reverse may be the best. Again, the professor of boxing does not lay down the same method of defence for all his pupils. It would seem, therefore, that special peculiarities are best and most exactly provided for when the treatment bestowed is personal; the individual being in that case most likely to meet with what is suitable to his own condition.

Private education is indeed more individual and empiric.

But, notwithstanding, a man will deal most successfully with individual cases, whether as physician, or as trainer, or as a professor generally, if he knows the general principle that '. . . . such and such is good for *all*, or for particular classes or subjects.' The sciences are said to be, and truly *are*, concerned with *general* truths. [Still for all that, though a man be a mere empiric, there is nothing to prevent his providing rightly for some particular case, if he has accurately observed from his own experience the special symptoms attending that particular case. Just in the same way some men seem to be their own best physicians, though unable to render relief to any one else.]

Still even private education should be based upon comprehensive principles.

None the less on that account would it seem that if a man wishes to become a true artist and to have a knowledge of the principles of things, he ought surely to go forward to the Universal and ascertain under what conditions it may be realised, since the Universal, as has been explained, constitutes the subject-matter of the Sciences.

A knowledge of general truths is essential to success in treating individual cases.

For the same reasons, I venture to think that the man who wishes by his personal guidance to make his fellows better, whether on a larger or smaller scale, must endeavour to gain

the mind of a statesman, since it is only by laws that we ar made good. It is not within the power of a ordinary person to frame a law at will, nor t determine the character of a law already made if practical statesmanship is possible at all, it i possible only for the scientific student, just a in the case of medicine and other subjects whic involve a kind of personal supervision and practical judgment, o 'insight.'

Therefore the private educator should cultivate the faculty of framing laws of universal application.

It makes no difference whether these laws be written or unwritten, n whether our concern be to teach many or to regulate the conduct of one— indeed is also the case with Music, Gymnastics, and the other accomplishment That which will develop one athlete, will develop any number; and what will ma one man a musician, will '*ceteris paribus*' make any number of men musicians and, *vice versâ*, what will make many men musicians, will make an individual musician. Correspondingly, a man who has only a single family to direct a regulate, or only one man to teach, may be a legislator, in practice and theory, much as the man who governs a whole city or nation. Just as a city feels t authority of its manners and customs, a single family feels the authority of t father's commands: and his approval, in the matter of conduct, has a great infl ence, on the children and the rest of the household, in favour of that conduct and the greater influence, because of his relationship and their obligations to hi which form a much closer bond between children and their father than any whi subsists between citizens and their law-giver.

Therefore it is that children, though in other matters obstinate, are pretty easi led by their father, and obey the laws laid down by him better, because of a natu and original affection for him.

Besides, private laws are more exact in detail than public laws, and therefo more effective. An analogy to this may be found in Medicine—in which ind vidual prescriptions, adapted to the constitution of a single person, are mo effective than universal precepts. Universal precepts affirm, *e.g.*, that a spa diet and rest are good for fever: but an individual case of fever may be bett treated in the reverse way. Thus he who prescribes for one patient will be mo exactly right than he who merely issues an universal order. And a boxer—if l make his game by careful observation of successive opponents and by a judicio varying of his defence according to circumstances, will be a better boxer. I short, everything will be more advantageously treated if it gets special individu attention; for so its true requirements are more likely to be discovered.

It is plain then that he who knows the universal rule—be it in Medicin Gymnastic, or Legislation—will be a better manager of an individual case, or c a small number of cases, in proportion as he can modify his scientific univers by application of it to the particular case. He knows already what is good fc all men in this or that condition—(for Sciences are said to be, and are, of th Universal,) but the application is also necessary. Indeed, a man, ignorant of th Universal, but a careful observer of special symptoms, may very likely succeed i an individual case. Some men, *e.g.* with no knowledge how to heal others, a yet good physicians of their own bodies. So it is also with the other professions yet, however experience may suffice, in each profession, to deal with individu cases, he who wishes to become really skilled in an art, or truly capable of cor templation, must diligently press on to Science, and to the Universal with whic Science is concerned.

This Universal, in the sciences of Medicine, Legislation, or the like, is not to b looked upon as immovable and unchangeable, but as decidedly contingent: fo such sciences are themselves of things contingent, not of things immovable.

Therefore, as we must in each case aim at the Science, the man who wishes t

improve other men, whether many or few, must study the Science of Legislation: for it is by means of the Law that we progress towards the Good and towards Virtue. As things are, it is not in the power of any casual man to direct aright either many or even one of his neighbours, nor to teach them a proper relation to Virtue. This is only possible, if at all, to him among men who knows how to estimate existing laws and to lay down others that are required.

(*f*) FROM WHOM MAY THE PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATION BE LEARNT?

Shall we, therefore, go on to consider from what sources and how a man may acquire the faculty of making laws? Is it here, as in analogous cases, from those whose profession it is, *i.e.* from statesmen? For legislation seemed to us, and is commonly classed as, a branch of statesmanship. Or is there obviously no correspondence between the case of Statesmanship and that of the sciences and professions generally? For in the various arts the artists lay down rules for their art and work out those rules in their own practice, examples being painters and physicians.

Politics have not hitherto been treated as a separate Study, nor are its general principles ascertained.

In regard to statesmanship, on the other hand, though the Sophists undertake to teach the subject, there is not one of them that puts his theories into practice. Practical statesmanship is left to the politicians, who would seem to be guided by a kind of native talent and experience rather than by reasoned conviction. Statesmen are not found to write nor to speak upon the method of politics, though perhaps that were a nobler occupation than elaborating speeches for the law-courts and for the forum; nor yet again do they appear to have made statesmen of their own sons nor any others of their friends: yet that were a natural thing for them to have assayed, if they had had the power; nor could they have bequeathed any nobler heritage to their several states, nor could they have preferred any higher faculty to be reserved for themselves and those dearest to them.

The Sophists have framed theories, but their theories have not been based upon experience. Politicians, on the other hand, who have experience, have left us no general theories.

Yet, assuredly, experience seems to contribute in no slight degree to statesmanship: otherwise men would not have become, as they do, better statesmen through political associations and intercourse. Hence those who desire to understand the science of statesmanship seem further to have need of experience.

But experience is found to make politicians better.

As for the Sophists, those who promise highly are found to be

far from teaching the science of Politics: in fact, they do n
much as know what the distinctive nature o
Science is nor what is its subject-matter: o
wise they would not have ranked it on the
level as Rhetoric or even inferior to it;
would they have supposed that it is easy to l
late by collecting together the most appr
among existing laws. 'It is an easy ma
they say, 'to make a selection of the best la
—as though the very selection were not a matter of moral ins
and as though a wise discrimination were not a matter of gr
difficulty, as it is in what relates to musical composition.

The Sophists have shown an utter disregard for the conditions of their problem,

and have formed confused and unworthy notions of the subject.

Now it is only men of experience who judge of facts correct
all their bearings and who understand the pr
means and the proper manner for bringing a
each result, and what kinds of phenomena
monize together. On the other hand, men wit
experience may be well content if they are
deceived in their estimate whether a partic
piece of workmanship has been constructed well or ill, as
might judge of the case of a painting.

The Science of Politics must be based upon a thorough examination of social facts and phenomena.

But 'laws' correspond to the results of statesmanship, a
products. How then could a man become fi
legislate or how could he decide what laws
best from a merely empirical observation?
viously it is as impossible as for men to bec
physicians by the mere study of prescriptions.

'Laws' must be viewed [in connection with the facts they are framed to meet.

Yet, notwithstanding, men endeavour at any rate to tell us
only different methods of treatment, but also
individuals may be cured and how we ought
treat each case, merely classifying the vari
bodily conditions. Such an enumeration of p
ticular instances seems to be useful enough to experienced ph
cians, but profitless to such as are unscientific.

Our empirical politicians view political 'effects' apart from their causes.

Assuredly, therefore, collections of Codes and of constituti
are most useful to those who are able to und
stand the theory of them, and to judge aright w
enactments are just or the contrary, and w
social conditions best harmonize together.
the faculty of judging aright cannot reside
those who merely enumerate such particulars without an indep
dent power of their own (unless such a judgment could be sp

Political constitutions are only useful to those who understand political phenomena.

taneous and innate), though they may perhaps become more expert upon such subjects.

Thus we have proved that he whom we have called 'the athlete of Virtue' must study legislation; we must now inquire how that study is to be pursued.

As one learns to be a scholar, or a musician, from one who is already such, so it is evident, one must learn to be a legislator from one who understands legislation—that is, from a statesman; for Legislation is a branch of Statecraft.

Statecraft appears to differ, in some points, from other faculties and sciences, in which the same men teach the methods and practise the activities of their profession. A physician, and a painter, each practises his own art and teaches it as well. But with Statecraft the case is different. The Sophists announce themselves as teaching the art of politics, though they never practise it: statesmen practise it, but never teach it; nor indeed could they do so, for they employ no method or science in their practice of politics, but proceed by a sort of natural aptitude, and rather by experience than by pure intelligence. The ability to teach they clearly have not; they never do teach, nor tell others by speech or writing, anything about their business—though, if they could, they surely would speak of it. It would surely contribute more to satisfy their ambition, if they could compose works on politics, than all their forensic or popular speeches. Certainly also, if they knew how to communicate the art of politics, they would make statesmen of their sons, or of some of their friends: for, if they had the power, they would naturally have the will, thus to benefit their friends or nearest relations. Indeed the greatest and most useful gift they could bequeath to their country would be written exposition and instruction in the art of Politics; nor could they desire for themselves, their sons, or their friends, anything better than the ability to communicate that art.

Plainly, then, if they could teach Politics, they would wish to do so, and would do so. As they obviously do not do so, it is plain that they cannot: it is plain that they have not themselves acquired it by any rational or scientific method, but by experience only. And experience, no doubt, does contribute a good deal to enable one to deal with practical politics. Men really do become statesmen, or something like it, by practical familiarity with affairs of state: which therefore ought to be acquired, as well as scientific knowledge of statecraft, by those ambitious to become statesmen.

The Sophists, indeed, announce themselves as teachers of Legislation; but they do not teach it, for all their professions. Nay, so devoid are they of power to speak of it aright, that they do not even understand its essence nor its nature. They regard it as merely identical with or inferior to the Art of Rhetoric, and consider it so easy as to be in the scope of every man. To collect the most approved codes, and to select out of them the best laws, is their idea of Legislation; and such estimation and selection they consider easy. But—in the first place—it is not easy, nor possible to every man who happens to wish it, to acquire the faculty of rightly judging each part of a code: it requires remarkable shrewdness and intelligence to do so. Only those experienced in the details of the whole subject can judge rightly of them: just as it needs a skilled musician to estimate a musical performance, and a scholar to decide literary questions, and so on. Such persons know how each of these performances are produced; what combinations are suitable; what each detail implies: while the inexperienced, knowing none of these things, will be unable to select, from the whole, the fairer and most excellent parts. We may well be satisfied if they reach the simple knowledge that the whole result is good, or that it is bad. Exactly thus it is with painting. One need not be a painter, to know of a first-rate picture that it is well painted. To know that it is really first-rate, and wherein its superiority lies, one needs to comprehend the art, or, at any rate, to have had some experience in it.

Therefore, neither the painter's work, nor the musician's, nor the scholar's, can be rightly estimated without some study of their respective sciences: and corres-